Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[Uaarkson]

Waiting for the markets to close? Lol

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 19 September 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 19 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Urgent discussion on September 19 among Russia’s proxies of the need for Russia to immediately annex Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (much of the latter of which is not under Russian control) suggests that Ukraine’s ongoing northern counter-offensive is pan

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Urgent discussion on September 19 among Russia’s proxies of the need for Russia to immediately annex Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (much of the latter of which is not under Russian control) suggests that Ukraine’s ongoing northern counter-offensive is panicking proxy forces and some Kremlin decision-makers. The legislatures of Russia’s proxies in occupied Ukraine, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), each called on their leadership to “immediately” hold a referendum on recognizing the DNR and LNR as Russian subjects.[1] Russian propagandist and RT Editor-in-Chief Margarita Simonyan spoke glowingly of the call, referring to it as the “Crimean scenario.” She wrote that by recognizing occupied Ukrainian land as Russian territory, Russia could more easily threaten NATO with retaliatory strikes for Ukrainian counterattacks, “untying Russia’s hands in all respects.”[2]

 

This approach is incoherent. Russian forces do not control all of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Annexing the claimed territories of the DNR and LNR would, therefore, have Russia annex oblasts that would be by Kremlin definition partially ”occupied” by legitimate Ukrainian authorities and advancing Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian strikes into Russian-annexed Crimea clearly demonstrate that Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s illegally annexed territory do not automatically trigger Russian retaliation against NATO, as Simonyan would have her readers believe. Partial annexation at this stage would also place the Kremlin in the strange position of demanding that Ukrainian forces unoccupy “Russian” territory, and the humiliating position of being unable to enforce that demand. It remains very unclear that Russian President Vladimir Putin would be willing to place himself in such a bind for the dubious benefit of making it easier to threaten NATO or Ukraine with escalation he remains highly unlikely to conduct at this stage.

 

Russian leadership may be running out of ways to try to stop Ukrainian forces as they advance across the Oskil River and closer to Luhansk Oblast. The Kremlin may believe that partial annexation could drive recruitment of additional forces, both from within Russia and from within newly annexed Ukrainian territory. Russian forces are desperately attempting to mobilize additional forces from all potential sources to backfill their heavily degraded and demoralized units but have proven unable to generate significant combat power, as ISW has repeatedly written.[3]

 

This latest annexation discussion also omits other parts of Russian-occupied southern Ukraine in which the Kremlin was previously planning sham annexation referenda. A willingness to abandon the promise to bring all the occupied areas into Russia at the same time would be a significant retreat for Putin to make in the eyes of the hardline pro-war groups he appears to be courting. It remains to be seen if he is willing to compromise himself internally in such a fashion. The Kremlin’s proxies in Donbas regularly outpace Kremlin messaging, on the other hand, and may have done so again as they scramble to retain their occupied territory in the face of Ukraine’s successful and ongoing counter-offensive.

 

Recent Ukrainian counter-offensive successes are further reducing the already poor morale among Russian units that had been considered elite before February 24. Independent Belarusian media outlet Vot Tak posted images of intercepted documents left behind by Russian soldiers of Unit 31135 of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division as they fled Izyum en masse.[4] The signed documents (dated to August 30, prior to Ukraine’s counter-offensive in Kharkiv on September 7) include written pleas to commanders of Unit 31135 to dismiss the letters’ authors due to persistent “physical and moral fatigue.”[5] Ukrainian intelligence claimed that 90% of the personnel of the 1st Motorized Rifle Regiment wrote damning reports on the state of morale as early as May 23, 2022.[6] The 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division is one of three divisions of the 1st Guards Tank Army, which, prior to the current war in Ukraine, was considered Russia’s premier mechanized force and was to be Russia’s key force in a large-scale conventional war with NATO.[7] The intercepted letters indicate pervasive morale issues among Russia’s most elite units and the degradation of Russia’s conventional capabilities against NATO.

 

Key Takeaways

• Urgent discussion on September 19 among Russia’s proxies of the need for Russia to immediately annex Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts (much of the latter of which are not under Russian control) suggests that Ukraine’s ongoing northern counter-offensive is panicking proxy forces and some Kremlin decision-makers.
• Ukrainian counter-offensive successes are degrading morale among Russian units that were regarded as elite prior to the invasion of Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces are likely continuing limited and localized offensive operations across the Oskil River and along the Lyman-Yampil-Bilohorivka line.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks south of Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces are continuing to strike Russian military, transportation, and logistics assets in Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 19: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and in northern Kherson Oblast near Olhine.
• The size of volunteer units Russia can generate is likely decreasing.

 

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

6-7 minute headway is slow. Because of the war. 

[CitizenVectron]

lmao

 

 

[Ricofoley]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 20 September 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 20 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian-appointed occupation officials in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts announced on September 20 that they will hold a “referendum” on acceding to Russia, with a vote taking place from September 23-27. The Kremlin will use the fal

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian-appointed occupation officials in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts announced on September 20 that they will hold a “referendum” on acceding to Russia, with a vote taking place from September 23-27.[1] The Kremlin will use the falsified results of these sham referenda to illegally annex all Russian-occupied parts of Ukraine and is likely to declare unoccupied parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts to be part of Russia as well.

 

The Kremlin’s annexation plans are primarily targeting a domestic audience; Putin likely hopes to improve Russian force generation capabilities by calling on the Russian people to volunteer for a war to “defend” newly claimed Russian territory. Putin and his advisors have apparently realized that current Russian forces are insufficient to conquer Ukraine and that efforts to build large forces quickly through voluntary mobilization are culminating short of the Russian military’s force requirements. Putin is therefore likely setting legal and informational conditions to improve Russian force generation without resorting to expanded conscription by changing the balance of carrots and sticks the Kremlin has been using to spur voluntary recruitment.

 

Putin may believe that he can appeal to Russian ethnonationalism and the defense of purportedly “Russian peoples” and claimed Russian land to generate additional volunteer forces. He may seek to rely on enhanced rhetoric in part because the Kremlin cannot afford the service incentives, like bonuses and employment benefits, that it has already promised Russian recruits.[2] But Putin is also adding new and harsher punishments in an effort to contain the risk of the collapse of Russian military units fighting in Ukraine and draft-dodging within Russia.  The Kremlin rushed the passage of a new law through the State Duma on September 20, circumventing normal parliamentary procedures.[3] This law codifies dramatically increased penalties for desertion, refusing conscription orders, and insubordination. It also criminalizes voluntary surrender and makes surrender a crime punishable by ten years in prison. The law notably does not order full-scale mobilization or broader conscription or make any preparations for such activities.

 

ISW has observed no evidence that the Kremlin is imminently intending to change its conscription practices. The Kremlin’s new law is about strengthening the Kremlin’s coercive volunteerism, or what Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called “self-mobilization.”[4]

 

The Kremlin is taking steps to directly increase force generation through continued voluntary self-mobilization and an expansion of its legal authority to deploy Russian conscripts already with the force to fight in Ukraine.

• Putin’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory will broaden the domestic legal definition of “Russian” territory under Russian law, enabling the Russian military to legally and openly deploy conscripts already in the Russian military to fight in eastern and southern Ukraine. Russian leadership has already deployed undertrained conscripts to Ukraine in direct violation of Russian law and faced domestic backlash.[5] Russia’s semi-annual conscription cycle usually generates around 130,000 conscripts twice per year.[6] The next cycle runs from October 1 to December 31. Russian law generally requires that conscripts receive at least four months of training prior to deployment overseas, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly denied that conscripts will be deployed to Ukraine.[7] Annexation could provide him a legal loophole allowing for the overt deployment of conscripts to fight.
• Russian-appointed occupation officials in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts announced the formation of “volunteer” units to fight with the Russian military against Ukraine.[8] Russian forces will likely coerce or physically force at least some Ukrainian men in occupied areas to fight in these units, as they have done in the territories of the Russian proxy Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR).
• The Russian State Duma separately passed new incentives for foreign nationals to fight in Russia’s military to obtain Russian citizenship and will likely increase overseas recruitment accordingly.[9] That new law, which deputies also rushed through normal procedures on September 20, allows foreign nationals to gain Russian citizenship by signing a contract and serving in the Russian military for one year. Russian law previously required three years of service to apply for citizenship.
• Putin’s appeals to nationalism may generate small increases in volunteer recruitment from within Russia and parts of occupied Donetsk and Luhansk. However, forces generated from such volunteers, if they manifest, will be small and poorly trained. Most eager and able-bodied Russian men and Ukrainian collaborators have likely already volunteered in one of the earlier recruitment phases.
• Local Russian administrators will continue to attempt to form volunteer units, with decreasing effect, as ISW has previously reported and mapped.[10]
• Russian forces and the Wagner Private Military Company are also directly recruiting from Russian prisons, as ISW has previously reported.[11] These troops will be undisciplined and unlikely to meaningfully increase Russian combat power.

 

Putin likely hopes that increasing self-mobilization, and cracking down on unwilling Russian forces, will enable him to take the rest of Donetsk and defend Russian-occupied parts of Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts. He is mistaken. Putin has neither the time nor the resources needed to generate effective combat power. But Putin will likely wait to see if these efforts are successful before either escalating further or blaming his loss on a scapegoat. His most likely scapegoat is Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Russian Ministry of Defense.  Reports that Shoigu would accompany Putin while Putin gave a speech announced and then postponed on September 20 suggest that Putin intended to make Shoigu the face of the current effort.[12]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely also intends to deter Ukraine’s ongoing counteroffensives by annexing occupied Ukrainian territory and framing Ukrainian attempts to liberate occupied territory as attacks on Russia. Russian officials and propagandists such as Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev issued vague warnings on September 20 that “the infringement of Russian territory is a crime; committing this crime permits using all means of self-defense.”[13] Russian officials are demonstrably panicked over Ukrainian advances, as ISW assessed on September 19.[14] The Kremlin likely intends these vague warnings to exacerbate Ukrainian and global fears of nuclear escalation. However, Putin has already declined to enforce any territory-specific redlines in response to Ukrainian attacks on Russian-annexed Crimea, occupied territory he has controlled for eight years and declares to be Russian.

 

Ukrainian and Western leaders responded to reports of the impending referenda with renewed declarations of commitment to restoring Ukrainian sovereignty over occupied Ukrainian territory.  Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba stated on September 20 that “sham ‘referendums’ will not change anything ... Ukraine has every right to liberate its territories and will keep liberating them whatever Russia has to say.”[15] NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said on September 20 that “[sham referendums] will only further worsen the situation, and therefore we need to provide more support to Ukraine.”[16] US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said on September 20 that the United States “will never recognize this territory as anything other than a part of Ukraine” and will continue to provide “historic support” to Ukraine.[17] German Chancellor Olaf Scholz emphasized on September 19 that “Ukraine has every right to defend the sovereignty and integrity of its own territory and its own democracy.”[18] French President Emmanuel Macron called the sham referenda a “parody” and a “provocation.”

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian-appointed occupation officials in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia oblasts announced on September 20 that they will hold a “referendum” on acceding to Russia, with a vote taking place from September 23-27.
• The Kremlin’s annexation plans are primarily targeting a domestic audience; Putin likely intends to improve Russian force generation capabilities by calling on the Russian people to volunteer for a war ostensibly to defend newly-claimed Russian territory.
• Ukrainian forces continued disrupting ongoing Russian efforts to reestablish ground lines of communications (GLOCs) across the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces are likely targeting Ukrainian hydrotechnical infrastructure in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts to threaten Ukrainian positions along the Siverskyi Donets River.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on September 20.
• Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks west of Hulyaipole on September 20 and continued routine artillery strikes throughout Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces continue to degrade their force generation capabilities by cannibalizing training elements to fight in combat formations in Ukraine.

 

 

[Air_Delivery]

I don't see how moblization moves the needle. Maybe in a couple of years when they can ramp up production enough to offset their losses but even then they are going to have trouble gettting parts with the sanctions in place. Sending more poorly trained unwilling men over there isn't gonna solve anything. 

IMO this is just more meat to be thrown in to the meat grinder. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

2 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said:

I don't see how moblization moves the needle. Maybe in a couple of years when they can ramp up production enough to offset their losses but even then they are going to have trouble gettting parts with the sanctions in place. Sending more poorly trained unwilling men over there isn't gonna solve anything. 

IMO this is just more meat to be thrown in to the meat grinder. 

 

Beyond "mobilization", I have little doubt that the "nuclear stick" will be brandished in an attempt to intimidate Ukraine and its allies that an attack into the newly-integrated regions of "Novorossiya" will be viewed as an attack on the Rodina itself.  Or at the very least,  outright state that NATO infrastructure that facilitates the transfer of materiel to Ukraine that eventually is used in Novorossiya will be considered legitimate targets.

[Air_Delivery]

18 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

Beyond "mobilization", I have little doubt that the "nuclear stick" will be brandished in an attempt to intimidate Ukraine and its allies that an attack into the newly-integrated regions of "Novorossiya" will be viewed as an attack on the Rodina itself.  Or at the very least,  outright state that NATO infrastructure that facilitates the transfer of materiel to Ukraine that eventually is used in Novorossiya will be considered legitimate targets.

They have threatened the nuclear option throughout the war so that isn't really anything new. Ukraine has already hit Crimea and Belgorod multiple times with no nuclear response. I'd imagine they would use chemical weapons before actually going nuclear because once you go there, there is no coming back. It risks NATO becoming directly involved because using nuclear weapons can't be normalized. China, Pakestan, North Korea have to be shown the consequences of going there.

And they aren't attacking NATO cause thats just suicide and they know it. 

 

[Air_Delivery]

 

[Jason]

 

[Air_Delivery]

2 hours ago, Jason said:

 

[TUFKAK]

4 hours ago, Jason said:

 

More Ivan’s gonna see the Rockets Red Glare.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Greatoneshere]

59 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

A major part of the CSTO has clearly spoken.

[Spork3245]

1 hour ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

This seems like a really big deal.

[Jason]

1 hour ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

13 minutes ago, Spork3245 said:

 

This seems like a really big deal.

 

Kazakhstan also appears to be doing military "drills" near the Russian border (i.e. is making it clear they don't want Russian military inside the country).

[69los]

Putin ally dies after falling down stairs on day of Russia mobilization

WWW.NEWSWEEK.COM

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Scientist Anatoly Gerashchenko is the latest Russian public figure who has died in mysterious circumstances since February.

 

 

[5timechamp]

… so many people falling down stairs. Putin cant have too many thembrians left in his inner circle. At what point is he done, the propaganda machine may work on commons but some of the upper parts of his circle must see the real picture and think its not worth the hassle

[CitizenVectron]

Russia moving T-62s into Ukraine:

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Jwheel86]

 

 

 

[5timechamp]

Somebody needs to have the ending of A Bugs Life playing on a loop in Russia

[PaladinSolo]

Seems like they should definitely give all of these people guns!

[SuperSpreader]

1 hour ago, PaladinSolo said:

Seems like they should definitely give all of these people guns!

I like it 

[CitizenVectron]

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 21 September 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 21 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of “partial mobilization” on September 21 reflected many problems Russia faces in its faltering invasion of Ukraine that Moscow is unlikely to be able to resolve in the coming months. Putin’s order to mobili

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of “partial mobilization” on September 21 reflected many problems Russia faces in its faltering invasion of Ukraine that Moscow is unlikely to be able to resolve in the coming months.[1] Putin’s order to mobilize part of Russia’s “trained” reserve, that is, individuals who have completed their mandatory conscript service, will not generate significant usable Russian combat power for months. It may suffice to sustain the current levels of Russian military manpower in 2023 by offsetting Russian casualties, although even that is not yet clear. It will occur in deliberate phases, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in an interview on September 21, likely precluding any sudden influx of Russian forces that could dramatically shift the tide of the war.[2] Russia’s partial mobilization will thus not deprive Ukraine of the opportunity to liberate more of its occupied territory into and through the winter.

 

Putin and Shoigu emphatically said that only reservists who have completed their initial military service will be mobilized, making clear that Russia will not be expanding conscription. Shoigu also declared that students will not be affected and told them to go about their studies without concern.[3]  These comments were clearly intended to allay fears among the Russian population that “partial mobilization” was code for general conscription.

 

It is not clear how much of the Russian reserve has already been deployed to fight in Ukraine. Western intelligence officials reportedly said in November 2021 that Russia had called up “tens of thousands of reservists” as part of its pre-war mobilization.[4] Ukrainian military officials reported in June 2022 that Russian forces had committed 80,000 members of the mobilized reserve to fight in Ukraine.[5] The Russian military likely called up the most combat-ready reserves in that pre-war mobilization effort, which suggests that the current partial mobilization will begin by drawing on less combat-ready personnel from the outset.

 

Russian reserves are poorly trained to begin with and receive no refresher training once their conscription period is completed. Russian mandatory military service is only one year, which gives conscripts little time to learn how to be soldiers, to begin with. The absence of refresher training after that initial period accelerates the degradation of learned soldier skills over time. Shoigu referred to the intent of calling up reservists with “combat experience,” but very few Russian reservists other than those now serving in Ukraine have any combat experience.[6]

 

Reports conflict regarding how much training reservists called up in the partial mobilization will receive.  Shoigu described a deliberate training process that would familiarize or re-familiarize mobilized reservists with crew, team, detachment, and then platoon-level operations before deploying them to fight. That process should take weeks, if not months, to bring reservists from civilian life to war readiness. Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security head Viktor Bondarev reportedly said that mobilized reservists would train for over a month before being deployed.[7] A military commissariat in Kursk Oblast, on the other hand, reportedly announced that reservists under 30 would deploy immediately with no additional training.[8]

 

Putin emphatically did not say that the Russian nuclear umbrella would cover annexed areas of Ukraine nor did he tie mobilization to the annexation. He addressed partial mobilization, annexation referenda in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, and the possibility of nuclear war in his speech—but as separate topics rather than a coherent whole. The fact that he mentioned all three topics in a single speech was clearly meant to suggest a linkage, but he went out of his way to avoid making any such linkage explicit.

 

Putin framed his comments about the possibility of Russian nuclear weapons use in the context of supposed Western threats to use nuclear weapons against Russia. He claimed that Western officials were talking about “the possibility and permissibility of using weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons—against Russia.” He continued, “I wish to remind those who allow themselves such statements about Russia that our country also has various means of attack...”  His comment on this topic concludes by noting that Russia would use all means at its disposal in response to a threat to “the territorial integrity of our country, for the defense of Russia and our people.” That comment could be interpreted as applying in advance to the soon-to-be annexed areas of occupied Ukraine, but its placement in the speech and context do not by any means make such an interpretation obvious. Nor is Putin’s language in making this comment different from formal Kremlin policy or from previous statements by Russian officials. Putin’s speech should not be read as an explicit threat that Russia would use nuclear weapons against Ukraine if Ukraine continues counter-offensives against occupied territories after annexation.

 

Putin did not connect annexation with the partial mobilization either, defending the need for partial mobilization by referring to the length of the lines along which Russian forces are now fighting and Western assistance to Ukraine. He noted that the front lines now stretch for more than a thousand kilometers to explain why more Russian forces are needed. He and Shoigu also heavily emphasized the false narrative that Russia is fighting not Ukraine but NATO and the West. This narrative is not new. It is not even markedly different from the initial false justifications Putin offered before ordering the invasion in February.[9] The formal Kremlin position has long been that NATO was pushing Ukraine to war with Russia, that NATO was preparing to give Ukraine nuclear weapons, and that NATO forces were taking up or preparing to take up positions in Ukraine. Putin’s and Shoigu’s repetitions of that line do not reflect an escalation in their rhetoric.

 

Russia’s partial mobilization will not transform the war this year and may or may not have a significant impact on Russia’s ability to continue operations at their current level next year.  Ukraine and the West should neither dismiss it nor exaggerate it. 

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announced “partial mobilization” will not materially affect the course of the war in the coming months.
• Putin did not explicitly threaten to use nuclear weapons if Ukraine continues counter-offensive operations to liberate occupied areas after Russian annexation.
• Ukrainian forces likely continued offensive operations around Lyman.
• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes north and east of Kherson City as part of an operational-level interdiction campaign against Russian logistics, military, and transportation assets in Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 21: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border around Vysokopillya.
• Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing crypto-mobilization efforts regardless of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declaration of partial mobilization.
• Russian-appointed occupation administrators are likely increasing law enforcement and filtration measures in occupied areas of Ukraine in preparation for Russia’s sham annexation referenda.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

So by all accounts this is a full mobilization of the country. In his speech, Putin said that they would only be conscripting 300,000 men, and only from the ranks of military retirees and reserves. In reality, the order he signed has no limit, and police in many regions are now simply rounding up all men 18+ that they can find, including from classrooms, their homes, etc. Estimates put the actual conscription at 1,000,000, primarily from the ethnic regions already heavily depleted of young men.

 

In the short term this will have almost no effect on the war, even if, as reported, many of these men will effectively be shipped to the front lines with almost no training. In the mid-term, it likely won't have much of an effect, either, as there is a lack of equipment and specialized training required to make much of a difference. In the long-term, it could affect the war as you aren't stopping a million men with a few hundred artillery pieces and tanks, even if all those men have are WWII-era rifles and helmets. 

 

The greatest threat to Russia's effectiveness with this mobilization is time and morale. If they can somehow get a million men into Ukraine with weapons, then yes, Russia can throw 50% of their lives away to take more of the country simply because Ukraine will lack the shells necessarily to stop a horde. But in reality, a million men aren't going to march forward if they are under constant attack and death. Even currently, many Russian "professional" units are refusing to do much on the front lines. When you throw in majority-level conscript units (and people who don't want to fight in the first place), you aren't going to have great combat effectiveness.

 

So, Russia can still "win" this war (take most of the east and south) if they are willing to throw away a few hundred thousand more lives and those men are willing to go along with it. But it won't be this winter, and it might not be before next winter. How long will the Russian military (and society) accept that level of loss? On top of this, Russia likely doesn't even have the necessary Soviet artillery stocks to continue at the current level of combat for more than this winter, especially if the frontlines freeze until spring 2023, and during that time Ukraine continues to launch constant HIMARS strikes, etc.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

While the mobilization is being seen at above-weight levels in the central and eastern regions of Russia, the "European" western regions are still being impacted:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

Always hard to tell what China really thinks about a situation. However, I'm sure they are perfectly fine with their "ally" Russia burning through its money, resources, and friendships so that they can exploit it more cheaply in the future. At the same time, they also likely know that this war is only strengthening the bonds of the west (which doesn't help China), so they probably want it over and settled, even if that means Russia takes the L.

[Air_Delivery]

28 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

Always hard to tell what China really thinks about a situation. However, I'm sure they are perfectly fine with their "ally" Russia burning through its money, resources, and friendships so that they can exploit it more cheaply in the future. At the same time, they also likely know that this war is only strengthening the bonds of the west (which doesn't help China), so they probably want it over and settled, even if that means Russia takes the L.

China likes stablity and they don't like how this is drawing attention to Taiwan. Sure they are happy to take advantage of the situation but overall I think they just want things to return to normal.