Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (03 May 2024) - Drones now kill more soldiers than artillery or bullets

[CitizenVectron]

12 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

 

 

Ukrainian forces definitely haven't reached the city proper (at best they are near the outskirts/surrounding villages), so I wonder what is going on. Possibly partisans or special forces (or partisans equipped by special forces).

[CayceG]

Here is an amazing thread analyzing the Kharkiv operation and why Russia's defense failed. It's a very long thread.

I'm going to pull a few specific tweets to talk about some things too. 

 

 

 

 

Some notable observations:

 

 

 

 

 

 

This is wild to me and I understand now why there are so many tales of Ukrainians hearing from POWs that their "orders have to come from Moscow." 

Between Wagner, OMON, Rosgvardia, and the Army itself, there are separate fiefdoms all fighting under Putin--and with different motivations. 

 

When Russia collapses the different sectarian forces vying for power will be terrifying. 

 

 

 

Once again, poor equipment readiness combined with bad assumptions about what the Ukrainians might do doomed a Russian operation (just like at the outset of the war). 

[PaladinSolo]

I feel like once Russia failed to win this war in a couple days, it should have been obvious to everyone something was very wrong within Russia's forces.  Like any tanks and vehicles we have in Europe could be given to Ukraine and theres really nothing to worry about.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 17 September 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 17 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces continue to conduct meaningless offensive operations around Donetsk City and Bakhmut instead of focusing on defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives that continue to advance. Russian troops continue to attack Bakhmut and various

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian forces continue to conduct meaningless offensive operations around Donetsk City and Bakhmut instead of focusing on defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives that continue to advance. Russian troops continue to attack Bakhmut and various villages near Donetsk City of emotional significance to pro-war residents of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) but little other importance. The Russians are apparently directing some of the very limited reserves available in Ukraine to these efforts rather than to the vulnerable Russian defensive lines hastily thrown up along the Oskil River in eastern Kharkiv Oblast. The Russians cannot hope to make gains around Bakhmut or Donetsk City on a large enough scale to derail Ukrainian counteroffensives and appear to be continuing an almost robotic effort to gain ground in Donetsk Oblast that seems increasingly divorced from the overall realities of the theater. 

 

Russian failures to rush large-scale reinforcements to eastern Kharkiv and to Luhansk Oblasts leave most of Russian-occupied northeastern Ukraine highly vulnerable to continuing Ukrainian counter-offensives. The Russians may have decided not to defend this area, despite Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated declarations that the purpose of the “special military operation” is to “liberate” Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Prioritizing the defense of Russian gains in southern Ukraine over holding northeastern Ukraine makes strategic sense since Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts are critical terrain for both Russia and Ukraine whereas the sparsely-populated agricultural areas in the northeast are much less so. But the continued Russian offensive operations around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, which are using some of Russia’s very limited effective combat power at the expense of defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives, might indicate that Russian theater decision-making remains questionable.

 

Ukrainian forces appear to be expanding positions east of the Oskil River and north of the Siverskyi Donets River that could allow them to envelop Russian troops holding around Lyman. Further Ukrainian advances east along the north bank of the Siverskyi Donets River could make Russian positions around Lyman untenable and open the approaches to Lysychansk and ultimately Severodonetsk. The Russian defenders in Lyman still appear to consist in large part of BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) reservists and the remnants of units badly damaged in the Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive, and the Russians do not appear to be directing reinforcements from elsewhere in the theater to these areas.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continue to prioritize strategically meaningless offensive operations around Donetsk City and Bakhmut over defending against continued Ukrainian counter-offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces liberated a settlement southwest of Lyman and are likely continuing to expand their positions in the area.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct an interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to conduct unsuccessful assaults around Bakhmut and Avdiivka.
• Ukrainian sources reported extensive partisan attacks on Russian military assets and logistics in southern Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian officials continued to undertake crypto-mobilization measures to generate forces for war Russian war efforts.
• Russian authorities are working to place 125 “orphan” Ukrainian children from occupied Donetsk Oblast with Russian families.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russia's new combat force they've been hyping up was sent in a rush to defend against the Kharkiv offense...and lasted only a few days.

 

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

5 hours ago, CayceG said:

Here is an amazing thread analyzing the Kharkiv operation and why Russia's defense failed. It's a very long thread.

I'm going to pull a few specific tweets to talk about some things too. 

 

 

 

 

Some notable observations:

 

 

 

 

 

 

This is wild to me and I understand now why there are so many tales of Ukrainians hearing from POWs that their "orders have to come from Moscow." 

Between Wagner, OMON, Rosgvardia, and the Army itself, there are separate fiefdoms all fighting under Putin--and with different motivations. 

 

When Russia collapses the different sectarian forces vying for power will be terrifying. 

 

 

 

Once again, poor equipment readiness combined with bad assumptions about what the Ukrainians might do doomed a Russian operation (just like at the outset of the war). 

A marketplace of ideas, but for your own military forces

[silentbob]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 18 September 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 18 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly relying on irregular volunteer and proxy forces rather than conventional units and formations of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. ISW has previously reported that Putin has been bypassing the Russian

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin is increasingly relying on irregular volunteer and proxy forces rather than conventional units and formations of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. ISW has previously reported that Putin has been bypassing the Russian higher military command and Ministry of Defense leadership throughout the summer and especially following the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast.[1] Putin’s souring relationship with the military command and the Russian (MoD) may explain in part the Kremlin’s increasing focus on recruiting ill-prepared volunteers into ad-hoc irregular units rather than attempting to draw them into reserve or replacement pools for regular Russian combat units.

 

A prominent Russian milblogger reported that Russian forces have “already began the process of forming and staffing the 4th Army Corps, at least on a documentation level.”[2] The report may be true given the recent Russia-wide push for the formation of more regional volunteer units among the Kremlin representatives following the Russian defeat around Kharkiv Oblast.[3] Russian federal subjects had previously begun advertising for contract service in volunteer units around the time of the formation of the 3rd Army Corps.[4] Russian forces are also increasingly recruiting prisoners, involving Cossack units, deploying elements of Russian security services such as the Russian Federal Security Service and Rosgvardia, and covertly mobilizing men from occupied Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. The continued focus on the formation of irregular units is receiving some criticism from retired Russian officers who are calling for proper conventional divisions rather than volunteer battalions.[5]

 

The formation of such ad-hoc units will lead to further tensions, inequality, and an overall lack of cohesiveness between forces. Ukrainian and Russian sources have reported instances of Russian Armed Forces refusing to pay veteran benefits, one-time enlistment bonuses, or provide medical treatment to BARS (Russian Combat Army Reserve) servicemen.[6] Some military formations offer financial incentives for every kilometer that the serviceman’s unit advances, an incentive that few soldiers will likely benefit from considering that Russian forces are on the defensive almost everywhere apart from the areas around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, where gains have been slow and very limited.[7] Russian opposition publication Insider reported instances of ethnic discrimination within Chechen units, noting that the Chechen leadership deploys non-Chechens to the frontlines before committing Chechens to the battle.[8] Professional military staff are likely to confront behavioral issues among recruited prisoners, especially considering the likely prevalence of prisoners convicted of violent crimes, narcotics, and rape. The Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (LNR and DNR) have both previously refused to fight for each other’s territory.[9] All these groups have different levels of military training, decentralized command structures, and different perceptions of the war and motivations to fight, which makes conflict and poor unit coordination more probable. The one thing they have in common is wholly inadequate training and preparation for combat.

 

The formation of irregular, hastily-trained units adds little effective combat power to Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. Forbes noted that the 3rd Army Corps rushed in to defend Russian positions around Kharkiv Oblast during the counteroffensive but failed to make any difference and “melted away.”[10] The reported arrival of increasing numbers of irregular Russian forces on the battlefield has had little to no impact on Russian operations.

 

Russian forces are likely attempting to conduct a more deliberate and controlled withdrawal in western Kherson Oblast to avoid the chaotic flight that characterized the collapse of Russian defensive positions in Kharkiv Oblast earlier this month. The Russians have heavily reinforced western Kherson Oblast over the past several months including with airborne units and at least some elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army.[11] These ostensibly more professional and well-trained and equipped units are concentrated in a small area in Kherson Oblast and were prepared for the expected counteroffensive. They appear to be performing significantly better than Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast. The Ukrainians destroyed a number of units of the 1st Guards Tank Army in Kharkiv Oblast, putting them to flight and capturing large amounts of high-quality equipment. The worse performance of professional Russian soldiers in Kharkiv Oblast compared with those in Kherson Oblast may be due to the thinner concentration of Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast as well as the fact that the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast appeared to surprise the Russian defenders.

 

The Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast is nevertheless making progress, and Russian forces appear to be attempting to slow it and fall back to more defensible positions rather than stop it cold or reverse it. Continuous Ukrainian attacks on Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the Dnipro River to western Kherson Oblast appear to be having increasing effects on Russian supplies on the right bank—recent reports indicate shortages of food and water in Russian-occupied Kherson City and at least a temporary slackening of Russian artillery fire. Poor-quality proxy units have collapsed in some sectors of the Russian front lines, moreover, allowing Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian forces remain likely to regain much if not all of western Kherson Oblast in the coming weeks if they continue to interdict Russian GLOCs and press their advance. Ukrainian gains may continue to be slow if the Russian troops can retain their coherence but could also accelerate significantly if Russian forces begin to break.

 

A prominent Russian milblogger also claimed that the Russian command issued a “no retreat” order last week for all units serving in Donbas, requiring that Russian forces operating on the axis hold their positions regardless of the unfolding situation in front of them.[12]  This order would be noteworthy in two ways if the report is accurate. First, Donetsk Oblast is the only area in Ukraine in which Russian forces are still attempting offensive operations. There have been sporadic reports of limited Ukrainian counterattacks, but no evidence that Ukraine is preparing a large-scale counteroffensive operation in this area.[13] The order suggests that the Russian military may fear a Ukrainian counteroffensive into the teeth of their last offensive efforts, however. Second, it shows deep mistrust of the combat capabilities of the units receiving the order in contrast with the apparently higher confidence Russian commanders have in the units in western Kherson Oblast, where sensible efforts to conduct a controlled withdrawal appear to prevail. 

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to be increasingly relying on irregular, poorly trained ad-hoc volunteer and proxy units rather than attempting to rebuild damaged or destroyed conventional Russian ground forces units.
• Ukrainian forces continue to consolidate positions on the east bank of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast despite Russian efforts to contain them.
• Russian forces in western Kherson Oblast may be attempting to fall back to more defensible positions in a controlled withdrawal to avoid the chaotic retreat that characterized the collapse of Russian defenses in Kharkiv earlier in September.
• Russian forces suffered devastating losses of manpower and equipment in their fight for eastern Ukraine and especially during the Ukrainian Kharkiv counter-offensive. Multiple Russian armored and mechanized units have likely been effectively destroyed according to assessments released on September 18.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine appears to be making decent progress in Kherson. Nothing like the northeast, but every day they are taking  multiple villages, pushing the Russians back.

[PaladinSolo]

Imagine barely holding back Ukraine's counter offensive then striking out at NATO directly, it'd take like an hour for the US to wipe out any form of Russian AA in Ukraine and literally just airstrike hell for Russian forces.

[silentbob]

If they strike Poland, I think all gloves are off. I could see world leaders conferencing and initiating a strike to eliminate Russia. I would love to just see a direct precision strike on Putin himself. Russia is gonna Russia, and just lie about everything. I wonder if they just have a bunch of Sideshow Bob like nuclear bombs to make threats with. 

[Spork3245]

30 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

Imagine barely holding back Ukraine's counter offensive then striking out at NATO directly, it'd take like an hour for the US to wipe out any form of Russian AA in Ukraine and literally just airstrike hell for Russian forces.

 

Is it bad that I laughed super hard at this?

[Uaarkson]

1 hour ago, PaladinSolo said:

Imagine barely holding back Ukraine's counter offensive then striking out at NATO directly, it'd take like an hour for the US to wipe out any form of Russian AA in Ukraine and literally just airstrike hell for Russian forces.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Anathema-]

what the fuck a tank can't go on the table

[Littleronin]

10 minutes ago, Anathema- said:

what the fuck a tank can't go on the table

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

Just now, Littleronin said:

[CayceG]

If Ukraine can maintain the PzH 2000 howitzers and M109 howitzers they've been given, they can handle export model Abrams.

[PaladinSolo]

Russia just filming the use of incendiary weapons on a village.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russia is amending their penal code and adding entries related to wartime, mobilization, etc. Markets in Russia aren't taking it well.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[TUFKAK]

More dead Ivan’s is a good thing. Send em up Vlad.

[Spork3245]

 

"What war? There's no war. You want war? I go to war on your mother's vagina" -Putin, probably.

[CitizenVectron]

Sounds like they will announce "referendums" for the following Ukrainian oblasts to join Russia:

• Luhansk
• Donetsk
• Zaporizhzhia
• Kherson

The theory is that once they are incorporated in Russia proper, any Ukrainian attack is then an invasion of Russia, and so justifies the full declaration of war and mobilization of the population (including conscription, etc). It also justifies the deployment of conscripts to those regions. Currently, Russian law forbids conscripts being sent to war. But they can be sent to bases on Russian soil...

 

It's also important to note that Russia does not control 100% of any of these oblasts. They did briefly hold Luhansk, but Ukraine has since taken back some land.

[Jason]

5 hours ago, PaladinSolo said:

Russia just filming the use of incendiary weapons on a village.

 

 

 

white phospohrous munitions apparently

[PaladinSolo]

3 minutes ago, Jason said:

 

white phospohrous munitions apparently

More likely its thermite, WP went out of style decades ago.

[mclumber1]

17 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

Sounds like they will announce "referendums" for the following Ukrainian oblasts to join Russia:

• Luhansk
• Donetsk
• Zaporizhzhia
• Kherson

The theory is that once they are incorporated in Russia proper, any Ukrainian attack is then an invasion of Russia, and so justifies the full declaration of war and mobilization of the population (including conscription, etc). It also justifies the deployment of conscripts to those regions. Currently, Russian law forbids conscripts being sent to war. But they can be sent to bases on Russian soil...

 

It's also important to note that Russia does not control 100% of any of these oblasts. They did briefly hold Luhansk, but Ukraine has since taken back some land.

 

Yeah it's pretty transparent what Russia is trying to do here.  

[Jason]

26 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

More likely its thermite, WP went out of style decades ago.

 

Yeah because WP is like one step down from a war crime, which we all know Russia cares about very much.

[CitizenVectron]

46 minutes ago, mclumber1 said:

 

Yeah it's pretty transparent what Russia is trying to do here.  

 

My question is: what does Putin expect to achieve with war mobilization? Okay, so you draft 400,000 new men (and the most competent will avoid the draft, as their system uses names and addresses from many years ago). Now what? You've lost most of your specialists, you have no reserve system, you can't afford six months to train them all, and you lack any gear newer than from 1980 to equip them with. And when they get to the front and face combat, many will refuse to fight.

[CitizenVectron]

Lukashenko has announced that Ukraine plans to invade Belarus and convert it to a NATO nation. Therefore, Belarus must prepare for war.

[Jason]

18 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

My question is: what does Putin expect to achieve with war mobilization? Okay, so you draft 400,000 new men (and the most competent will avoid the draft, as their system uses names and addresses from many years ago). Now what? You've lost most of your specialists, you have no reserve system, you can't afford six months to train them all, and you lack any gear newer than from 1980 to equip them with. And when they get to the front and face combat, many will refuse to fight.

 

Seems like Vlad hasn't been thinking rationally about any of this since about a week into the invasion. 

[silentbob]

27 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

My question is: what does Putin expect to achieve with war mobilization? Okay, so you draft 400,000 new men (and the most competent will avoid the draft, as their system uses names and addresses from many years ago). Now what? You've lost most of your specialists, you have no reserve system, you can't afford six months to train them all, and you lack any gear newer than from 1980 to equip them with. And when they get to the front and face combat, many will refuse to fight.

 

He’s gone full Zapp Branningan 

 

 

[Greatoneshere]

1 hour ago, CitizenVectron said:

Lukashenko has announced that Ukraine plans to invade Belarus and convert it to a NATO nation. Therefore, Belarus must prepare for war.

 

Was waiting for Lukashenko to weigh in. He's big brained, as usual.

[CitizenVectron]

Putin was supposed to announce mobilization an hour ago. Then it was delayed. Now it's been removed from schedules.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Sounds like maybe tomorrow.