Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[CitizenVectron]

Sounds like South Korea is gifting 500,000 artillery shells to the US to help rebuild American stocks. Korean law forbids donating the shells to nations at war...but obviously this is a roundabout donation to Ukraine.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 11 April 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 11, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Kremlin passed legislation to use tools of digital authoritarianism to digitize and improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and crack down on Russian draft dodgers. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its third reading on April 11 to

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

The Kremlin passed legislation to use tools of digital authoritarianism to digitize and improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and crack down on Russian draft dodgers. The Russian State Duma adopted a bill in its third reading on April 11 to create a digital unified register of Russian citizens eligible for military service.[1] Russian military recruitment offices will use the digital register to issue summonses to military service. The unified register harvests Russian citizens’ personal identification information—including medical, educational, and residence history, foreign citizenship status, and insurance and tax data—from multiple Russian legal entities, including Russia’s Federal Tax Service, investigative bodies, courts, medical institutions, the Russian Pension and Social Insurance Fund, the Central Election Commission, and federal and local authorities.[2]  Summoned individuals may not leave Russia and must appear at a military recruitment office within 20 days of being summoned. The law bans summoned individuals who are 20 days delinquent for reporting from driving vehicles, buying or selling real estate, and taking out loans. A senior Russian legislator stated that the law will correct some of the bureaucratic shortcomings that appeared during Russia’s partial mobilization in September 2022.[3] Some Russian milbloggers who have long agitated for more aggressive force generation policies praised the law and stated that it exemplifies healthy interactions between Russian civil society and government.[4] ISW previously forecasted that the Kremlin would marry Soviet-style societal control measures with big data and 21st-century information technology to intensify control over the Russian population after Russia used facial recognition, QR codes, and mobile device geo-tracking technology to enforce a draconian COVID-19 quarantine in 2020.[5]

 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin acknowledged each other's roles in the Bakhmut effort on April 11. The Russian MoD and Prigozhin claimed that Wagner fighters comprise the main effort to take territory and push Ukrainian forces in central Bakhmut, whereas unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements comprise the supporting effort on Wagner’s flanks north and south of Bakhmut, including near Zalizhnyanske, Sakko i Vantsetti, and Mykolaivka.[6] The Russian VDV forces on the flanks likely aim only to hold the flanks rather than make any significant advances. This array of forces suggests that the Russian MoD intends to use the Wagner Group to capture Bakhmut while minimizing casualties among conventional Russian forces—supporting ISW’s prior assessments that the MoD seeks to use Wagner forces to capture Bakhmut then supplant them and take credit for the victory.[7] Prigozhin reiterated that Wagner forces are making gains within Bakhmut, however, claiming that Russian forces control 80 percent of Bakhmut due to Wagner advances.[8] Russian forces occupy at least 30.68 square kilometers (about the size of the Chicago O’Hare airport) or 76.5 percent of Bakhmut based on ISW's control of terrain assessment.  However, this area increases to 34.5 square kilometers or 86.1 percent of Bakhmut when factoring in all Russian-claimed territory in Bakhmut, including contradictory claims.

 

A small, fringe group of pro-war Russian milbloggers called for the Russian government to repeal the censorship laws against discrediting the Russian military. A group of at least 20 Russian milbloggers amplified a blanket statement expressing solidarity with "angry patriots” and others enraged at and weary of the poor application of the Russian censorship laws.[9] These milbloggers, many of whom have limited social media followings, represent a small fraction of the Russian information space and their statement does not indicate broader anger over the mere existence of these laws.  However, this faction of milbloggers is the most likely to face prosecution under these laws because they lack Kremlin affiliation, are among the most critical of the Russian war effort, and would likely be among the first targets of an expanded application of the law. The pro-war information space has expressed continued outrage over Russian authorities prosecuting a Russian medic under these censorship laws, which ISW has assessed will likely be a growing source of discontent in the pro-war information space.[10]

 

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin passed legislation to use tools of digital authoritarianism to digitize and improve the effectiveness of issuing summonses and to crack down on Russian draft dodgers.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin acknowledged each other's roles in the Bakhmut effort.
• A small, fringe group of pro-war Russian milbloggers called for the Russian government to repeal the censorship laws against discrediting the Russian military.
• Russian forces appear to hold positions northeast of Kupyansk and have made gains in the forest area south of Kreminna.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces conducted defensive operations in southern Ukraine.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu visited defense industrial enterprises in Tula Oblast as part of the ongoing effort to portray the resilience of Russia's defense industrial base (DIB).
• Russian Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova continues to confirm that Russian authorities are taking a number of actions vis-a-vis Ukrainian children in an attempt to exculpate herself from the International Criminal Court's (ICC) warrant for her arrest.

 

[Spork3245]

So… Serbia is supplying Ukraine with arms?

Exclusive: Leaked U.S. intel document claims Serbia agreed to arm Ukraine

WWW.REUTERS.COM

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Serbia has agreed to supply arms to Kyiv or has sent them already, according to a classified Pentagon document, despite the country's professed neutrality in the Ukraine war and refusal to sanction...

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

6 hours ago, Spork3245 said:

So… Serbia is supplying Ukraine with arms?

Exclusive: Leaked U.S. intel document claims Serbia agreed to arm Ukraine

WWW.REUTERS.COM

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Serbia has agreed to supply arms to Kyiv or has sent them already, according to a classified Pentagon document, despite the country's professed neutrality in the Ukraine...

 

Now that is gonna piss off Moscow something fierce!

[SuperSpreader]

Leaker of U.S. secret documents worked on military base, friend says - The Washington Post

WWW.WASHINGTONPOST.COM

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In interviews with a member of the Discord group where intelligence documents were shared, The Washington Post learned details of the alleged leaker, “OG.”

 

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 12 April 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 12, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Kremlin’s campaign of “Russification” in Ukraine is burning back into Russia itself as it continues to empower and amplify overtly nationalist voices and ideologies. Russia is engaged in a campaign of deliberate “Russification” within Ukraine aimed at

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

The Kremlin’s campaign of “Russification” in Ukraine is burning back into Russia itself as it continues to empower and amplify overtly nationalist voices and ideologies. Russia is engaged in a campaign of deliberate “Russification” within Ukraine aimed at the destruction of Ukrainian identity through a multitude of military, social, economic, legal, bureaucratic, and administrative lines of effort.[1] The ideologies that underpin the basis of this “Russification” also form the rhetorical backbone of the pro-war information space, which frequently mirrors its militarism with staunch Russian nationalism and intense xenophobia that is directed both at Ukraine and Ukrainian identity as well as at domestic minorities within Russia itself.

 

The domestic ramifications of the acceptance of the ideology of “Russification” are manifested in the responses by Russian authorities and prominent Russian milbloggers to ethnic minorities in Russia. Several Russian milbloggers and commentators published their reactions to a recent news story about the murder of a 17-year-old Russian student by a group of Tajik migrants in Chelyabinsk and used the story to criticize Central Asian migrants and ethnic minority communities for failing to integrate into Russian society.[2] Head of the Russian Investigative Committee Alexander Bastrykin accused migrants of destabilizing Russia by importing terrorism and extremist ideologies and emphasized the role of migration policy in ensuring public order.[3] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin amplified a criticism that authorities of the Tuvan Republic are returning the indigenous Tuvan names to 104 administrative-territorial units, which one milblogger decried as “pushing boundaries” unnecessarily during wartime.[4] Social media footage circulated on April 12 shows a group of Russian men reportedly giving the Nazi salute and walking past administrative buildings in Ufa, Bashkortostan while shouting “Russia is for Russians.”[5] These instances of xenophobia and racism exemplify the crux of domestic “Russification.” The war in Ukraine has empowered the most virulent voices in the information space to consolidate their ideology and project it both towards the Ukrainian people and towards non-Slavic minorities in Russia itself. This dynamic will likely escalate as the war continues and will outlive Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, pervading the Russian domestic space for years to come.

 

These domestic-facing ramifications of “Russification” ironically continue to place the onus of the war effort on the communities that it marginalizes. Bastrykin has previously called for military authorities to specifically recruit migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus who received Russian citizenship because these migrants have a “constitutional obligation to protect the country that received them.”[6] Russian officials at the Sakharovo migrant center in Moscow are reportedly requiring the center’s employees to offer migrants contracts for military service, as ISW previously reported.[7] Russian officials have continuously targeted migrant and ethnic minority communities in ongoing force generation efforts, which largely places the military burden of the “Russification” project in Ukraine on communities and individuals that are its targets domestically.[8]

 

Russian milbloggers offered a muted response to a Kaluga Oblast court’s refusal to hear a case against Russian military doctor and “Union of Donbas Volunteers” member Yuri Yevich for “discrediting the Russian armed forces.” The Kozelsky District Court in Kaluga Oblast issued on April 12 a decision on the “return of the protocol” of Yevich’s administrative offense and other materials of the case to Russian law enforcement agencies, which permits those agencies to resolve any issues associated with the case materials.[9] Russian authorities may still decide to pursue legal prosecution against Yevich for the charge of “discrediting Russian armed forces” after reviewing and formalizing those case materials. Russian milbloggers had previously widely decried the charging of Yevich and voiced concerns that Russian authorities could use the law as carte blanche to suppress any Russian soldier, volunteer, or “patriot.”[10] A very limited number of Russian milbloggers amplified the court’s decision without additional commentary on April 12, however.[11] The court’s refusal to hear the case partially met Russian milbloggers’ previous demands, and the milbloggers’ failure to recognize this fact reflects the fact that this community focuses on promoting salient controversies to criticize Russian officials and institutions. Russian milbloggers’ responses to the court's refusal to hear the case may also be muted because they are worried that the charges against Yevich represent a trial run for using the law against the “discreditation” of the Russian Armed Forces to suppress segments of the ultranationalist pro-war community. Russian milbloggers may view the court’s refusal to hear the case as a pause in a possible Kremlin plan to begin censoring some segments of the Russian pro-war information space that have been highly critical of the Kremlin, and milbloggers will be unlikely to admit any satisfaction about this controversy until the case against Yevich is completely dropped.  

 

The Russian nationalist community continues to glorify atrocities and advocate for the expansion of brutality. Russian milbloggers responded to widely circulated footage of a Russian soldier beheading a Ukrainian prisoner of war. A Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel attempted to excuse the beheading by claiming that both sides engage in brutal acts and asserted that this beheading would not be the last violent execution during the war.[12] The channel claimed that being accused of brutality during war is like getting fined for speeding during a car race—a claim it used when discussing two previous Wagner executions videos.[13] Russian forces’ continued use of such violent tactics and its support in the Russian information space undermines professionalism and discipline in the Russian military.

 

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin’s campaign of “Russification” in Ukraine is burning back into Russia itself as it continues to empower and amplify overtly nationalist voices and ideologies.
• The domestic ramifications of the acceptance of the ideology of “Russification” are manifested in the responses by Russian authorities and prominent Russian milbloggers to ethnic minorities in Russia.
• These domestic-facing ramifications of “Russification” ironically continue to place the onus of the war effort on the exact communities that it marginalizes.
• Russian milbloggers offered a muted response to a Kaluga Oblast court’s refusal to hear a case against Russian military doctor and “Union of Donbas Volunteers” member Yuri Yevich for “discrediting the Russian armed forces.”
• The Russian nationalist community continues to glorify atrocities and advocate for the expansion of brutality.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk line.
• Russian forces continue to construct defenses in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast and Crimea.
• Russian officials continue to advance a law aimed at improving the effectiveness of issuing summonses and cracking down on Russian draft dodgers.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center released a report detailing the extent of illegal deportations of Ukrainian children from Donbas to the Russian Federation.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Thread from Ukrainian reserve officer about Russia's "echeloned defense system" in the south, the presumed primary axis for the expected Ukrainian counter-offensive.

 

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Given the ongoing discussions regarding the Ukrainian counter-offensive, it's crucial to understand russia's echeloned defense system along the frontline, particularly in the south. These defense lines are composed of multiple obstacles that Ukrainian forces will face

 

 

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To help paint a clearer picture, we'll be using satellite imagery from Feb 2023 to analyze a section of the enemy's fortifications located south of Vasylivka, Zaporizhia oblast. Although some changes have occurred since then, the general idea of the defenses remains the same

 

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One key feature of russia's defense lines are famous dragon's teeth, pyramidal anti-tank obstacles that can effectively impede or slow down mechanized or motorized units during an attack. These obstacles can be particularly effective in combination with other defense measures

 

 

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It is common for the areas immediately preceding and following dragon's teeth to be heavily mined, and this specific section of the defense line is no exception.

 

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The subsequent defensive line, positioned approximately 300-500 meters away from the dragon's teeth, is composed of conventional trenches, dugouts, and vehicle revetments, providing protective cover for armored vehicles positioned in "hull down" mode.

 

 

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It is common to utilize tree lines as camouflage for ammunition, observation posts, or anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) teams. It is possible that we may observe the presence of older anti-tank weapons such as the MT-12 "Rapira" in that area.

 

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About 500 meters further, another line of defense begins which includes anti-tank ditch. This excavated ditch is designed to prevent the advance of attacking vehicles by forcing them to fall into the ditch, thus becoming immobilized.

 

 

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Although overcoming these obstacles is certainly feasible and well within Ukraine's capabilities, it is important to acknowledge that the fortified defenses are substantial and have the potential to significantly impede maneuverable attacking forces.

 

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If we view these defense lines on the imagery as a single echelon, it's important to note that russia has multiple echelons in some areas, with as many as three in certain directions, each separated by dozens of kilometers.

 

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Air power can neutralize these defenses, but limited availability of modern jets in sufficient numbers makes it challenging. 

 

A successful breach of such defenses could serve as a valuable case study for researchers and historians, showcasing effective military art.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

The NYT has identified the leaker of the "Minecraft Discord Server Files" as a 21 year-old member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, specifically its intelligence wing:

 

Leaked Documents Live Updates: Leader of Online Group Where Secrets Appeared Is Air National Guardsman - The New York Times

WWW.NYTIMES.COM

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Federal investigators are searching for the person who shared classified documents that revealed government secrets about the Ukraine war.

 

[mclumber1]

3 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

The NYT has identified the leaker of the "Minecraft Discord Server Files" as a 21 year-old member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, specifically its intelligence wing:

 

Leaked Documents Live Updates: Leader of Online Group Where Secrets Appeared Is Air National Guardsman - The New York Times

WWW.NYTIMES.COM

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Federal investigators are searching for the person who shared classified documents that revealed government secrets about the Ukraine war.

 

 

This is all a psyop by the Pentagon.  The leak.  The investigation.  The culprit they fingered.  PSYOP!

 

[CitizenVectron]

1 hour ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

The NYT has identified the leaker of the "Minecraft Discord Server Files" as a 21 year-old member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, specifically its intelligence wing:

 

Leaked Documents Live Updates: Leader of Online Group Where Secrets Appeared Is Air National Guardsman - The New York Times

WWW.NYTIMES.COM

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Federal investigators are searching for the person who shared classified documents that revealed government secrets about the Ukraine war.

 

 

Turns out he's a gun nut, hardcore Christian, and anti-Semite...not surprising that he has some kind of Russian sympathies/anti-Ukrainian viewpoint.

[CayceG]

Time to purge him from the services!

[Chris-]

Is he the leaker or just the leader of the Discord group?

[CayceG]

3 minutes ago, Chris- said:

Is he the leaker or just the leader of the Discord group?

 

Both.

[CayceG]

His home has been surrounded by SWAT.

[mclumber1]

1 hour ago, CayceG said:

Time to purge him from the services!

 

This boy is Leavenworth bound!

[Air_Delivery]

2 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Turns out he's a gun nut, hardcore Christian, and anti-Semite...not surprising that he has some kind of Russian sympathies/anti-Ukrainian viewpoint.

From that article it just sounded like he was trying to impress his online friends.

[CitizenVectron]

4 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said:

From that article it just sounded like he was trying to impress his online friends.

 

Discord member details how documents leaked from closed chat group - The Washington Post

WWW.WASHINGTONPOST.COM

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In interviews with a member of the Discord group where intelligence documents were shared, The Washington Post learned details of the alleged leaker, “OG.”

 

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United by their mutual love of guns, military gear and God, the group of roughly two dozen — mostly men and boys — formed an invitation-only clubhouse in 2020

 

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In a video seen by The Post, the man who the member said is OG stands at a shooting range, wearing safety glasses and ear coverings and holding a large rifle. He yells a series of racial and antisemitic slurs into the camera, then fires several rounds at a target.

 

[Uaarkson]

And nothing of value was lost 

[Massdriver]

He is a leaker, but is he the original source of the leaks and the only leaker?

[Air_Delivery]

It is crazy to me that some 21 year old national guardsman has access to such top secret documents.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

The guy who leaked Ukraine War plans on Discord got busted because of his Steam profile | PC Gamer

WWW.PCGAMER.COM

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Jack Teixeira, a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, was arrested by the FBI today.

 

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According to Bellingcat researcher Aric Toler, one of the first to report on the leak last week, Teixeira's Steam account included "lots of Arma 3, Zomboid, PUGB, CS, HOI4, [and] Garry's Mod.

 

[TUFKAK]

9 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

The NYT has identified the leaker of the "Minecraft Discord Server Files" as a 21 year-old member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, specifically its intelligence wing:

 

Leaked Documents Live Updates: Leader of Online Group Where Secrets Appeared Is Air National Guardsman - The New York Times

WWW.NYTIMES.COM

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Federal investigators are searching for the person who shared classified documents that revealed government secrets about the Ukraine war.

 

Enjoy your 25 year marine corps boot camp experience you pos. 

[Nokra]

6 hours ago, Air_Delivery said:

It is crazy to me that some 21 year old national guardsman has acccess to such top secret documents.

Yeah this is the strangest part to me. Did he perform any additional (criminal?) actions to attain these documents, or was it part of his normal job?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 13 April 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 13, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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A senior Ukrainian official warned that Russia can reconstitute itself as a serious threat to Ukraine in the long run despite facing severe force generation problems at this time. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

A senior Ukrainian official warned that Russia can reconstitute itself as a serious threat to Ukraine in the long run despite facing severe force generation problems at this time. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov stated on April 13 that Russian crypto-mobilization efforts are stagnating due to Russians’ growing awareness that causality rates for Russian soldiers in Ukraine are high. Hromov stated that Volgograd and Saratov oblasts have only met seven percent (134 of the 7,800 recruits) and 14 percent (270 of the 7,600 recruits) of their regional recruitment quotas for the first quarter of 2023 respectively.[1] Hromov also stated that Moscow is creating “alternative” private military companies (PMCs) to fill these gaps, but that these PMCs will not be as powerful as the Wagner Group in the near future, partially supporting previous ISW forecasts.[2] Hromov noted that Ukraine and its allies must not underestimate Russian force generation capabilities in the long run for a protracted war of attrition. ISW has previously warned that the US and NATO should not underestimate Russian capabilities in the long run, as Russia can regenerate by leveraging its population and defense industrial base (DIB) to threaten Ukraine and NATO if Russian President Vladimir Putin decides to fundamentally change Russia’s strategic resource allocation over the long run.[3] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced plans on January 17 to form 12 new maneuver divisions over the course of several years, for example.[4]

 

The Kremlin has not yet undertaken the necessary reorganization of its war effort to effectively leverage economies of scale to support large-scale Russian force generation, however. Current Russian half-measures and decentralized recruitment efforts to regenerate forces such as crypto-mobilization, leaning on Russia’s regions to generate volunteers, relying on new small PMCs, and pressuring various Russian state-owned enterprises to sponsor and pay for recruitment campaigns seek to shift the resource burden to generate forces among different siloviki and elements of the Russian state.[5] The Kremlin is reportedly billing the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom for its volunteer recruitment efforts in occupied Donetsk Oblast, offering volunteers 400,000 rubles (approximately $4,900) salary per month.[6] A Russian State Duma official proposed the institution of a new 2–3% “military tax” on Russian citizens’ income — a provision that would allow Putin to reduce the burden on existing federal funds but would likely anger more Russians.[7] These various Russian groups’ resources are finite. The Kremlin’s currently unsustainable effort to commandeer them will exhaust itself without fundamental resource generation and resource allocation reform. These current efforts will generate some additional combat power in the short term, to be sure, but will do so with diminishing marginal returns at increasing cost. The Russian state’s current model of resource allocations and economies of scale do not synergize disjointed efforts to tap discrete resource pools. The Kremlin’s decision to continue relying on financially incentivizing voluntary recruits with both one-time payments and accrued lifetime benefits will create large long-term structural costs and will not be sustainable indefinitely.[8]

 

Ukrainian assessments confirm ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russia cannot conduct multiple offensive operations simultaneously at this time. Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Ukrainian General Staff Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov stated on April 13 that Russian forces deployed unspecified Russian forces from the Avdiivka area of operations to reinforce offensive operations around Bakhmut and that Russia has lost about 4,000 Wagner and conventional personnel in Bakhmut since around March 30.[9] Hromov’s statement supports ISW’s longstanding assessment that the Russian military — in its current form — is unable to conduct large-scale, simultaneous offensive campaigns on multiple axes.[10]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly personally approved the arrest of Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich. Bloomberg reported on April 12 that Putin personally approved the arrest of Gershkovich on espionage charges before the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested Gershkovich in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast on March 30 for collecting information constituting a state secret about the activities of a Russian military-industrial complex enterprise.[11] Putin’s reported personal involvement in the arrest suggests that the arrest was likely a retaliatory response to the US arrest of Russian national Sergey Cherkasov on March 24 on charges of acting as agent of a foreign power.[12] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied that Putin ordered Gershkovich’s arrest and stated that Russian special services independently decided to arrest Gershkovich.[13] ISW has previously reported that the FSB has made other recent arrests in connection with information about defense enterprises in Sverdlovsk Oblast, and ISW assesses that the Kremlin may use the pretext of threats to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) to justify crackdowns and further conceal the activities of Russian defense industrial enterprises.[14] Putin’s reported personal involvement in the first arrest of a US journalist since the Cold War may indicate that the Kremlin viewed the arrest as a calculated escalation that it will attempt to use as leverage for extracting concessions from the United States.

 

The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed to have identified the individuals allegedly responsible for assassinating milblogger Maxim Fomin (known under the alias Vladlen Tatarsky) on April 13.[15] The FSB claimed that alleged Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) agents Darya Trepova and Yuriy Denisov worked with Russian Anti-Corruption Foundation associates Leonid Volkov and Ivan Zhadanov — both located abroad — to track Fomin for months and eventually assassinate him.[16] The FSB stated that it added Denisov to the international wanted list after he fled Russia.[17] Anti-Corruption Foundation Director Ivan Zhandov claimed on April 13 that the FSB released this version of events to justify extending Anti-Corruption Foundation founder and Russian opposition politician Alexei Navalny’s prison sentence.[18]

 

Key Takeaways

• A senior Ukrainian official warned that Russia can reconstitute itself as a serious threat to Ukraine in the long run despite facing severe force generation problems at this time.
• The Kremlin has not yet undertaken the necessary reorganization of its war effort to effectively leverage economies of scale to support large Russian force generation.
• Ukrainian assessments confirm ISW’s longstanding assessment that Russia cannot conduct multiple offensive operations simultaneously at this time.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly personally approved the arrest of Wall Street Journal correspondent Evan Gershkovich.
• The Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) on April 13 identified the individuals allegedly responsible for assassinating milblogger Maxim Fomin (alias Vladlen Tatarsky).
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued to make gains in Bakhmut, and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continue to reinforce and strengthen their positions in southern Ukraine in preparation for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and his supporters continue to feud with St. Petersburg authorities and advertising companies allegedly obstructing Wagner Group recruitment efforts.
• Wagner Group are reportedly training Ukrainian children to use weapons as part of the Russian Young Army Cadets National Movement (Yunarmiya) in occupied Ukraine.

 

[Jwheel86]

11 hours ago, Nokra said:

Yeah this is the strangest part to me. Did he perform any additional (criminal?) actions to attain these documents, or was it part of his normal job?

 

He was basically a junior IT guy inside a SCIF.

[Jwheel86]

@CayceG new purchase? 

 

Russian T-90 Tank From Ukraine Mysteriously Appears At U.S. Truck Stop

WWW.THEDRIVE.COM

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The tank was apparently captured by Ukraine last fall, but it is unclear how or why it ended up in Louisiana.

 

[CayceG]

Look, our potholes are still really bad...

[skillzdadirecta]

17 hours ago, Nokra said:

Yeah this is the strangest part to me. Did he perform any additional (criminal?) actions to attain these documents, or was it part of his normal job?

He was doing transcriptions.  Also as I said in the other thread, apparently he's a racist anti-semite which prompted Congresswoman Racist Anti Semite to defend him

 

Marjorie Taylor Greene defends alleged Pentagon leaker Jack Teixeira

WWW.INDEPENDENT.CO.UK

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Jack Teixeira arrested by FBI at his home in Massachusetts amid leak probe

 

She tweeted:

 

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“Jake Teixeira is white, male, christian, and antiwar. That makes him an enemy to the Biden regime. And he told the truth about troops being on the ground in Ukraine and a lot more,” she tweeted.

“Ask yourself who is the real enemy? A young low level national guardsmen? Or the administration that is waging war in Ukraine, a non-NATO nation, against nuclear Russia without war powers?”

 

This woman is on the HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITEE 

[CitizenVectron]

Yeah he's going to become a political prisoner in the eyes of the American right within the next week for sure.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 14 April 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 14, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray Russia as an equal defense partner with China ahead of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s visit to Moscow from April 16 to 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 14 that Russian Defense

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray Russia as an equal defense partner with China ahead of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s visit to Moscow from April 16 to 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 14 that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu will meet with Li to discuss bilateral defense cooperation as well as issues of regional and global security.[1] Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Qin Gang stated on April 14 that China will not sell weapons to Russia and will regulate the export of items to Russia that have dual civilian and military uses.[2] Qin‘s comments represent a continuation of China’s efforts to rhetorically downplay its support for Russia and demonstrate that there are limits to the ”no limits” partnership that Russia and China declared before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[3] ISW assessed that Putin was unable to secure the no-limits bilateral partnership with China that he likely hoped for when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Moscow from March 20 to 22.[4]

 

The Kremlin is likely hoping to make itself more attractive to China by launching Russian Pacific Fleet exercises to project Russia’s naval power in the Pacific. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on April 14 that the Russian military raised the Pacific Fleet of the Eastern Military District (EMD) to the highest level of combat readiness for combat readiness checks.[5] Russian Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, also stated that elements of the Pacific Fleet will conduct combat exercises.[6] The Russian Pacific Fleet’s combat readiness checks are likely meant to signal to China that Russia supports Chinese security objectives in the Pacific and that Russia remains an equal military partner that can operate as a Pacific power despite the degradation of Russian military power in Ukraine.

 

The Kremlin also likely intends to use the Pacific Fleet’s combat readiness checks to attempt to deter further Japanese support for Ukraine ahead of the G7 meeting from May 19 to 21. Shoigu stated on April 14 that Russian forces declared that combat readiness checks are intended to work out methods to prevent enemy forces from deploying in the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk and to repel a landing on the southern Kuril and Sakhalin islands, both signals to Japan (which claims part of the archipelago that the Soviet Union seized at the end of World War II).[7] Russia‘s Eastern Military District (EMD) recently deployed a battery of Bastion coastal defense missile systems to Paramushir Island in the northern portion of the Russian-occupied Japanese Kuril Islands, which ISW assessed was likely a warning to Japan about further supporting Ukraine.[8]  Russia likely intends to use military posturing in the north Pacific to raise fears about military escalation with Japan in an increased effort to prevent Japan from further supporting Ukraine when it hosts the G7 meeting in Hiroshima. Russia has employed similar information operations and demonstrative actions against the West aimed at preventing further Western security assistance to Ukraine by stoking concerns about escalation, although these efforts have never presaged any real escalation.[9]

 

The Russian military is in no position to threaten Japan at this time. ISW previously reported that elements of the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades of the Pacific Fleet suffered heavy losses near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast in early 2023 and in late 2022, with the 155th being reconstituted as many as eight times in the past year.[10] The Pacific Fleet likely lacks the available combat power in the Pacific region to posture in a way that would be truly threatening to Japan or suitable for Russia power projection attempts that would be able to convince China that it is an equal military power.

 

It is noteworthy that Prigozhin – one of most extreme thought leaders among Russia’s pro-war faction – considers that Russia can incur a defeat in Ukraine and that such a defeat in the short run would actually benefit Russia.

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is setting information conditions to exploit a Russian military failure if the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive is successful. Prigozhin published an essay on April 14 in which he argues that Ukraine’s coming counteroffensive is more likely to succeed than fail.[11] Prigozhin warned that a selfish Russian “deep state” (which he defines as “a community of near-state elites that operate independently of the political leadership of the state and have close ties and their own agenda”) is currently in crisis due to the Russian military’s failures to secure a victory quickly.[12] Prigozhin accused members of this deep state embedded in the Russian bureaucracy of deliberately sabotaging Russian success in the war because they seek to resume their privileged lives of comfort.[13] Prigozhin stated that these Russian deep state "internal enemies” will push the Kremlin to “make serious concessions” tantamount to “betraying Russian interests,” including even possibly returning occupied Ukrainian territory to Ukraine over the course of a few years.[14]

 

Prigozhin explicitly rejected the notion of any negotiations to end the war and urged Russians to continue fighting, even if it results in Russia’s temporary defeat. Prigozhin stated that Russia must ignore the Russian deep state’s temptations to cut Russian losses and settle.[15] Prigozhin stated the Russian military cannot stop fighting now despite current Russian territorial gains because the Ukrainian state has transformed, and unoccupied Ukraine is now politically opposed the Kremlin. Prigozhin stated that Russia must continue to fight relentlessly in Ukraine regardless of how adverse conditions become. He stated that any scenario in which Russia faces defeat will result in a groundswell of “radical national feelings” in Russia that will serve as the catalyst for a reinvigorated Russian patriotism and enable the Russian nation to undergo the baptism by fire necessary to emerge victorious and defeat Ukraine.[16] Prigozhin’s essay is thematically and logistical consistent with his previous stated effort to transform Wagner Group into a hardline ideological elite parallel military organization to advance Russian interests.[17]

 

The Russian nationalist discourse about the acceptability of Russia suffering defeat in Ukraine deviates from some Western assertions of the need to preserve Russia from humiliation and allow Russia to “save face.” Prigozhin’s argument that the Kremlin must resist the temptation to settle and instead remain committed to winning in Ukraine is not compatible with the idea that the Kremlin must be given a way to save face lest it conduct a massive, possibly nuclear, escalation.[18] It is noteworthy that Prigozhin – one of most extreme thought leaders among Russia’s pro-war faction – considers that Russia can incur a defeat in Ukraine and that such a defeat in the short run would actually benefit Russia.  Prigozhin’s comments, together with those of other radical pro-war voices, highlight the priority that the pro-war community places on galvanizing Russian society and energizing it for a long fight against the West.  That agenda is not advanced by courting thermonuclear destruction.

 

Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin denied speculations that he is facing charges in St. Petersburg for the discreditation of the Russian Armed Forces – a denial that likely further indicates his protection by unknown siloviki patrons. A Russian news aggregator claimed on April 14 that a Novosibirsk resident asked the St. Petersburg Investigative Committee to investigate Girkin’s social media content for discreditation of Russian forces – a crime punishable by a fine of up to five million rubles ($65,530), up to five years of correctional or forced labor, or up to seven years in prison.[19] Girkin denied receiving a criminal charge notice, claiming that he will not alter his behavior and is not intimidated by authorities.[20] Girkin denied receiving any charges from the Russian Ministry of Interior (MVD) and hypothesized that the MVD could ”theoretically” investigate him for discreditation.[21] Girkin added that if someone has the ”political will” then he could be framed for humanitarian aid fraud. Girkin noted that everyone will soon find out if the  “authorities are ready to stop [him].”[22] Girkin’s response is consistent with his ruthless criticisms of the Kremlin and may indicate that he likely continues to benefit from some protection from within the Russian force structures – the siloviki. Girkin has every reason to believe that he would be convicted without such protection, as his vitriolic assaults on the Russian military’s performance in Ukraine almost self-evidently violate the discreditation law.

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be attempting to apply pressure on Girkin’s patronage networks by responding to accusations against Girkin. Prigozhin stated that Girkin would not be recruited into Wagner as Wagner is no longer recruiting prisoners – likely implying that Girkin would remain in prison for his behavior.[23] While it is unclear if Prigozhin or Wagner-affiliated figures are involved in sparking an investigation against Girkin, it is notable that the complaint was filed in St. Petersburg - a city where Prigozhin has connections and a city where Prigozhin is attempting to push his political aspirations.[24] Girkin is reportedly based out of Moscow, which makes the St. Petersburg venue of the complaint more unusual.[25] Prigozhin and Girkin have a history of personal attacks and feuds, and Prigozhin may want to expose or strain Girkin’s patronage networks, which are allowing him to be unscathed despite ongoing censorship measures in Russia. ISW also previously assessed that Prigozhin and Girkin are likely competing for influence and patronage within the pro-war faction, and a public investigation into Girkin might burden Girkin’s patrons as they attempt to deflect or quash these accusations.[26]

 

Russian elite forces are diluting their combat effectiveness with poorly trained mobilized personnel and volunteers due to high causalities sustained in Ukraine. The Washington Post reported that leaked classified US intelligence documents revealed that Russia’s 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose (SPETSNAZ) Brigade (Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff) and two other unspecified SPETSNAZ brigades suffered an estimated 90-95% attrition rate in Ukraine.[27] The Washington Post also reported that the 346th SPETSNAZ Brigade lost almost its entire complement, with only 125 servicemen remaining active out of 900 initially deployed.[28] These high casualty rates suggest that Russia’s most elite forces - Airborne and SPETSNAZ forces - are likely no longer elite. Russian forces have recently deployed elements of airborne brigades and SPETSNAZ formations to frontline areas in Ukraine that operate as volunteer battalions or that are almost entirely comprised of mobilized personnel.[29] It is highly unlikely that mobilized personnel or volunteers received training on how to conduct aerial landing operations and special forces operations, which would suggest that these Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) and SPETSNAZ elements do not differ markedly from other combat ineffective Russian formations staffed by mobilized personnel or volunteers.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely host his annual June press conference in early June 2023.   Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced on April 14 that the Kremlin expects to hold the “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,” a live forum at which Putin addresses questions from the Russian public, on an unspecified date likely in June 2023.[30] Putin cancelled his “Direct Line” in 2022 due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as in 2020 due to COVID-19.[31] Putin notably cancelled his annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly in December 2022 and regurgitated boilerplate rhetoric at his annual New Year’s speech, indicating that Putin was uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space amidst criticism of the Russian military’s performance in the war.[32] This year’s event will likely be highly filtered to support Putin’s current rhetorical lines and avoid exposing any challenges to the Kremlin or to Russia’s conduct of the war in Ukraine.

 

The Russian State Duma is intensifying its efforts to censor Russian cultural figures who fled Russia and criticize the war, likely aimed at encouraging domestic self-censorship. Russian State Duma Vice Speaker Pyotr Tolstoy announced on April 14 that the State Duma has created a working group to find a “fair solution” to prevent these cultural figures as well as designated foreign agents from receiving income from creative endeavors in Russia.[33] Tolstoy claimed that some deputies are making “radical proposals...because it’s not worth making money in a country that you hate.” Prior Duma proposals included withholding state funding, royalty payments, advertising revenue and copyrights, and confiscating the property of Russians who fled.[34] State Duma Vice Speaker Irina Yarovaya chairs the committee, and other members include Tolstoy and the chairs of the State Duma committees for Security and Anti-Corruption, State Building and Legislation, Information Policy, Information Technology and Communications, and Culture.[35] Measures that punish Russians abroad or foreign agents for criticizing the war in Ukraine also demonstrate to domestic audiences the range of punishments they may also suffer for airing their own criticisms.

 

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin is likely attempting to portray Russia as an equal defense partner with China ahead of Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu’s visit to Moscow from April 16 to 18.
• The Kremlin is likely hoping to make itself more attractive to China by launching Russian Pacific Fleet exercises to project Russia’s naval power in the Pacific.
• The Kremlin also likely intends to use the Pacific Fleet’s combat readiness checks to attempt to deter further Japanese support for Ukraine ahead of the G7 meeting from May 19 to 21.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is setting information conditions to exploit a Russian military failure if the planned Ukrainian counteroffensive is successful.
• Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin denied speculations that he is facing charges in St. Petersburg for the discreditation of the Russian Armed Forces – a denial that likely further indicates his protection by unknown siloviki patrons.
• Russian elite forces are diluting their combat effectiveness with poorly trained mobilized personnel and volunteers due to high causalities sustained in Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely host his annual June press conference in early June 2023.
• The Russian State Duma is intensifying its efforts to censor of Russian cultural figures who fled Russia and criticize the war, likely aimed at encouraging domestic self-censorship.
• Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Kreminna area as Ukrainian forces targeted rear areas in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to advance in Bakhmut and conduct ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian forces continue to endanger the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amidst continued Russian efforts to establish control over the ZNPP.
• The Kremlin reportedly continues to use private military companies (PMCs) and nationalist networks to support its force generation campaigns.
• Russian security personnel continue to arrest Ukrainian citizens under allegations that they associate with claimed illegal formations.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Ukraine’s Allies Fear War Breakthrough May Not Come Before Next Year (Bloomberg)

 

Quote

 

Some of Ukraine’s European allies are increasingly skeptical its military will be able to make a decisive breakthrough this year because Russia’s defenses have had time to dig in ahead of the looming offensive. 

 

The mood among Western officials marks a sharp departure from late last year, when Kyiv surprised its allies - as well as Russia - with a pair of successful counteroffensives that recaptured large swathes of occupied land. 

 

That fueled hopes its forces might be able to make further breakthroughs this year that would tip the momentum of the war in Ukraine’s favor. Now, Kyiv’s allies are reining in their expectations and contemplating the need for intense fighting well into 2024, according to European officials involved in efforts to support Ukraine’s military. 

 

 

Quote

 

US officials were offering their own downbeat assessment of the outlook six to eight weeks ago, according to a trove of classified documents whose exposure in a leak has stirred anger in Kyiv. The concerns expressed then remain entrenched among some Ukrainian allies, despite the arrival of billions of dollars in NATO ammunition and weaponry since. 

 

While a Ukrainian drive toward the city of Melitopol in the south, aimed at splitting Russian forces is widely expected, some European officials are now skeptical that can be achieved this year.

 

Instead, a more realistic target is now seen as a 30 km (20 mile) or so advance that would put Ukraine’s most capable artillery within range of Russian supply lines and create conditions for a deeper push in 2024, one of the officials said. Allies need to work now to enhance their production capacity and the support that will be needed to sustain those efforts, the official added.

 

Even a less ambitious push would likely cost thousands of lives and large quantities of ammunition and equipment because of Russia’s layered defenses of minefields, ditches and concrete anti-tank pyramids that have been built over the winter. 

 

 

Quote

 

With the war now thought likely to grind on into next year, allies are developing new supply plans. A second major offensive would require further large-scale deliveries of Western financing, weapons and ammunition. There will be the risk that this runs into political opposition in capitals as well as capacity constraints.

 

“Neither army is what it was,” said Dara Massicot, a specialist on the Russian military at the Rand Corporation, a US think tank. She predicted a war of attrition at high cost to both sides.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Current situation around Bakhmut according to War Mapper:

 

Quote

Russian forces have continued their advances west of the city centre and have crossed the rail line into western Bakhmut.

 

 

 

[Greatoneshere]

I would love for someone to explain to me how pro-Russian sentiments have become so popular amongst the right? I know it's about a Christian kingdom, they love "strong men" like Putin, they love fascism and dictatorships and complete control, etc. But didn't 60 years of the Cold War program right wingers to hate Russia? It's right wingers in the '80's who loved movies like Red Dawn and shit. It's like they've done a complete 180 degree heel turn despite the fact that America has almost universally always been anti-Russia (until Trump) but now it's like totally cool to be pro-Russia like MTG, Trump, etc.

 

It's like the right wing being against vaccinations now even though we haul babies and toddles to the pediatrician for regular vaccination shots all the time now for decades. It's strange to see such a turn when the opposite was true for decades.

[CayceG]

2 minutes ago, Greatoneshere said:

I would love for someone to explain to me how pro-Russian sentiments have become so popular amongst the right? I know it's about a Christian kingdom, they love "strong men" like Putin, they love fascism and dictatorships and complete control, etc. But didn't 60 years of the Cold War program right wingers to hate Russia? It's right wingers in the '80's who loved movies like Red Dawn and shit. It's like they've done a complete 180 degree heel turn despite the fact that America has almost universally always been anti-Russia (until Trump) but now it's like totally cool to be pro-Russia like MTG, Trump, etc.

 

It's like the right wing being against vaccinations now even though we haul babies and toddles to the pediatrician for regular vaccination shots all the time now for decades. It's strange to see such a turn when the opposite was true for decades.

 

Because Democrats Bad. 

 

Whatever Democrats are for, I will be against because that's what Republicans do. 

Anti-Communism has transitioned its boogeyman from Russia to China because China appears more threatening and because Trump made nice (or tried to) with Putin. 

 

I hate to simplify it this much, but it almost appears as if this is truly what is at the heart of this turn:

Owning the libs is the base mode of operation for the Republican hardliners. 

[Greatoneshere]

4 minutes ago, CayceG said:

Because Democrats Bad. 

 

Whatever Democrats are for, I will be against because that's what Republicans do. Anti-Communism has transitioned its boogeyman from Russia to China because China appears more threatening and because Trump made nice (or tried to) with Putin. 

 

I hate to simplify it this much, but it almost appears as if this is truly what is at the heart of this turn: owning the libs is the base mode of operation for the Republican hardliners. 

 

Man, if it's partly as simple as that and they've truly forgotten there are real reasons to at least distrust Russia and 60+ years are no longer sticking to the right wing because owning the libs is truly the most important thing, then that's that I suppose, there's no way to change them at this point then is there?