Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[Uaarkson]

2 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

A Russian Su-27 downed an American Reaper drone over the Black Sea today:

 

 

And no accident:

 

 

Not some small civilian drone that's easy to miss:

 

I’ve seen these in person, they’re larger than most small passenger aircraft and definitely way bigger than the average fighter.

[CitizenVectron]

Full statement of US European command:

 

[Jwheel86]

Drone size:

[mclumber1]

7 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

A Russian Su-27 downed an American Reaper drone over the Black Sea today:

 

 

And no accident:

 

 

Not some small civilian drone that's easy to miss:

 

 

Yeah the Reaper is as large as a WWII fighter plane:

[CayceG]

I desperately want video of this encounter. 

[Jwheel86]

Did the Russian jet crash too? 

[CayceG]

30 minutes ago, Jwheel86 said:

Did the Russian jet crash too? 

 

It doesn't sound like it. 

[CitizenVectron]

15 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

It doesn't sound like it. 

 

Even if the Su-27 is only minorly damaged and needs to be taken out of service for a few weeks/months for repairs, that's probably a good trade in the US' eyes, considering the cost difference, and especially the difference in difficulty to replace for both countries. Not that the US wants Reapers being downed by a major power.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 14 March 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Prominent Russian milbloggers are reamplifying a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to weaponize religion to discredit Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture issued a decision on March 9 stipulating that the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Prominent Russian milbloggers are reamplifying a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to weaponize religion to discredit Ukraine. The Ukrainian Ministry of Culture issued a decision on March 9 stipulating that the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra Reserve will terminate its lease agreement with the Kremlin-affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP), meaning that the UOC MP will need to vacate the premises of the lower Lavra by March 29.[1] The Ukrainian government did not renew the UOC MP’s expired lease on the upper Lavra and allowed the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) to hold Christmas services at the Lavra on January 7, as ISW previously reported.[2] Two prominent milbloggers responded on March 14 to the latest decision requiring the UOC MP to vacate the lower Lavra by March 29 and exploited the story to accuse Kyiv of repressing freedom of religion within Ukraine.[3] Former Russian officer and convicted war criminal Igor Girkin claimed with no evidence that Kyiv will likely stage a military takeover of the Lavra because Ukrainian authorities are bent on “bloodily pitting the Russians on both sides of an artificial border” against one another.[4] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commander and former DNR Security Minister Alexander Khodakovsky accused Ukraine of causing a “church frenzy” to divide the UOC MP and OCU dioceses and encouraged Ukrainian authorities to see past Ukrainian and Russian distinctions and exercise “restraint and Christian patience.”[5] Khodakovsky’s comment is remarkable because it is Russia’s rejection of the validity of seeing any distinctions between Russians and Ukrainians that was one of the justifications for the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine in the first place.

 

Both Girkin’s and Khodakovsky’s renewed exploitations of the Lavra issue are based on a misrepresentation of events and disingenuously seek to portray Kyiv as attacking religious liberty in Ukraine. The UOC MP is the Kremlin-controlled Russian Orthodox Church’s subordinate element in Ukraine and provided material support for Russia’s illegal invasion of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014.[6] The UOC MP is not an independent religious organization but rather an extension of the Russian state and an instrument of Russian hybrid warfare.[7] By misrepresenting the Ukrainian government’s decision to reduce the Kremlin-controlled UOC MP’s influence in Ukraine, Russian milbloggers are amplifying a known information operation attempting to delegitimize the Ukrainian state and turn international public opinion against Ukraine.

 

Russian authorities continue measures to mobilize the struggling Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war effort, including measures that will force the Kremlin to choose between having skilled workers in the DIB and skilled military personnel fighting in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed during a March 14 visit to an aviation production plant in Ulan-Ude, Buryatia, that the DIB suffers from a lack of adequately trained personnel and announced a series of reforms to attract more specialists to work at military production plants, including the reallocation of federal assets to housing and increasing pay.[8] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Tactical Missile Corporation in Moscow Oblast and called on the plant to double production even after announcing that the plant had met the requirements of the state defense order.[9] Putin also announced that the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade has prepared a list of unspecified specialties to defer from military service, which may suggest that the Kremlin is prioritizing using skilled workers in the production of Russian weapons over having skilled soldiers fight in Russia’s military.[10] Russian news outlets Interfax and RBK, the latter citing a Russian federal official, reported that the Russian Ministry of Finance is also considering issuing war bonds.[11] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) assessed that Putin’s March 3 presidential decree on government oversight of the DIB sets conditions for the Russian Ministry of Trade and Industry to bypass DIB managers at enterprises that fail to meet Russia’s production standards.[12] The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service reported that Russian defense enterprises significantly decreased their hiring standards and now accept workers without experience and with histories of drug use, criminal records, and bankruptcy.[13] ISW has previously reported on Russia’s struggle to rejuvenate its DIB amid labor shortages and Western sanctions and its ensuing lack of success in this endeavor.[14]

 

Two Russian Su-27 aircraft forced down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Black Sea in international airspace. US General James B. Hecker stated that two Russian aircraft hit the drone nearly causing both aircraft to crash and resulting in the loss of the drone.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that the drone crashed due to “sharp maneuvering.”[16] The incident will not cause an escalation to direct conflict between Russia and the US. Russian forces have used coercive signaling against US and allied flights and naval vessels for decades in multiple theaters without triggering conflict.[17] The US and Russian presidents retain full freedom to choose how to respond to such incidents, and there is nothing automatic about escalation in such situations. Given President Joe Biden’s repeated commitments to avoid committing US forces to direct conflict with Russia and the Kremlin’s clear and repeatedly demonstrated reluctance to get into a war with NATO, there is no reason for incidents such as these to cause dangerous escalations.

 

Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated on March 14 that Poland could supply MiG-29 multirole fighters to Ukraine within four-to-six weeks. Morawiecki stated that Poland is ready to give Ukraine an unspecified proportion of its total fleet of 28 MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine as part of an international coalition. Slovak Defense Minister Jaroslav Nad previously signaled Slovakia’s support for providing Ukraine MiG-29 aircraft on March 9.[18] The Ukrainian Air Force operates MiG-29s and would be able to use them in counteroffensive operations if Ukraine receives them with enough time in advance of its next counteroffensive.

 

Key Takeaways

• Prominent Russian milbloggers are reamplifying a longstanding Russian information operation that seeks to weaponize religion to discredit Ukraine.
• Russian authorities continue measures to mobilize the struggling Russian defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war effort.
• Russian Su-27 jets forced down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Black Sea in international airspace.
• Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated on March 14 that Poland could supply MiG-29 multirole fighters to Ukraine within four-to-six weeks.
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces continue building defenses along Russia’s border with Ukraine in order to pin Ukrainian troops to northern border areas.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces advanced within Bakhmut and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City frontline and in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces continue fortifying rear areas in Russian occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.
• United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak announced on March 14 that the Russian State Duma will consider a law simplifying the legal recognition of missing Russian soldiers as dead.
• Ukrainian partisans injured the Deputy Head of the Nova Kakhovka Occupation Military Administration in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

I have no freakin' idea what Kyiv is thinking if this is truly representative of the situation around Bakhmut.  

 

The risk of the encirclement of the UAF is completely self-evident.

 

 

[mclumber1]

1 hour ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

I have no freakin' idea what Kyiv is thinking if this is truly representative of the situation around Bakhmut.  

 

The risk of the encirclement of the UAF is completely self-evident.

 

Could it be part of a larger strategy to concentrate Russian forces in that area so UAF can launch a wider and more effective counteroffensive in other parts of the war zone?  

[CitizenVectron]

8 minutes ago, mclumber1 said:

 

Could it be part of a larger strategy to concentrate Russian forces in that area so UAF can launch a wider and more effective counteroffensive in other parts of the war zone?  

 

It could, in theory. It was the same strategy they used with their Kherson/Kharkiv offensives; they publicly made a big deal about forces organizing for a Kherson push, and Russian reinforced with better troops. Then, Ukraine pushed in an area they knew was weaker (Kharkiv). So it works, and Russia is dumb, but at the same time Russia now has a much "better" defense, in that they've just piled infantry everywhere on the line, in depth. That's not to say that Ukraine can't break through, or that Russian troops (especially conscripts) won't break fairly easily under a combined arms push, but it's much harder than in the Kharkiv example. 

 

But yes, I think basically that Ukraine is continuing to hold Bakhmut for the primary reason of pinning down Russia's better troops, and to bleed those better troops. Ukraine is likely reserving their own better troops and equipment for pushes elsewhere.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

13 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

But yes, I think basically that Ukraine is continuing to hold Bakhmut for the primary reason of pinning down Russia's better troops, and to bleed those better troops. Ukraine is likely reserving their own better troops and equipment for pushes elsewhere.

 

The recent maps indicate that the Russians finally "got smart" and figured out that they could simply go around Bakhmut, leaving it an isolated pocket that would be nothing more than a mere annoyance.

 

The UAF's "pinning" strategy may have had some genuine merit for the last few months, but the situation has changed to the point where that no longer seems applicable nor shrewd. 

[CitizenVectron]

2 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

The recent maps indicate that the Russians finally "got smart" and figured out that they could simply go around Bakhmut, leaving it an isolated pocket that would be nothing more than a mere annoyance.

 

The UAF's "pinning" strategy may have had some genuine merit for the last few months, but the situation has changed to the point where that no longer seems applicable nor shrewd. 

 

I agree, it's had diminishing returns to the point where it's now likely no longer worth it.

[CayceG]

This is video of a pass from a Flanker on an MQ-9. It's unclear whether it was yesterday's intercept. 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Israel for 1st time since war began OKs export licenses for anti-drone systems for Ukraine

WWW.AXIOS.COM

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Israel has been careful not to give military assistance to Ukraine, fearing such a move could create tension with Russia.

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

Rare Israeli W 

[CitizenVectron]

The US has released onboard video of the collission:

 

 

 

It confirms the US' version of events, which is that the Russian pilot made dangerously close passes to dump jet fuel on the drone, and in the second pass was incompetent and struck the drone (while pouring jet fuel!!!). Incredibly dumb, and the pilot is lucky to be alive.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 15 March 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 15, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The overall pace of Russian operations in Ukraine appears to have decreased compared to previous weeks. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces, Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, stated on March 15 that Russian

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

The overall pace of Russian operations in Ukraine appears to have decreased compared to previous weeks. A spokesperson for the Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces, Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, stated on March 15 that Russian offensive actions have decreased significantly over the last week and noted that daily Russian ground attacks have decreased from 90 to 100 attacks per day to 20 to 29 per day.[1] Dmytrashkivskyi reported that Russian forces have somewhat lost offensive potential due to significant manpower and equipment losses.[2] Dmytrashkivskyi’s statements are consistent with ISW’s general observation regarding the pace of Russian operations along the entire frontline in Ukraine. The Russian offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast is likely nearing culmination, if it has not already culminated, although Russia has committed most elements of at least three divisions to the Svatove-Kreminna line.[3] Russian forces have made only minimal tactical gains along the entire Luhansk Oblast frontline over the last week, and Ukrainian forces have likely recently managed to conduct counterattacks and regain territory in Luhansk Oblast.[4] ISW has been unable to confirm the commitment of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division (1st Guards Tank Army, Western Military District) to the offensive in Luhansk Oblast since certain unspecified elements reportedly deployed to Luhansk Oblast in January--the only large formation assessed to be operational but not yet engaged.[5] It is unclear if the 2nd Motor Rifle Division has already deployed and has not been observed or if it is waiting to deploy to either Luhansk Oblast or other areas of the front. The commitment of two or three of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division’s constituent regiments, however, is unlikely to significantly delay or reverse the culmination of the Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast, especially considering that at least five Russian regiments have definitely been fully committed in this area, likely along with several others, but Russian forces have still been unable to make substantial gains.[6]

 

The overall Wagner Group offensive on Bakhmut additionally appears to be nearing culmination. Ukrainian military sources have noted a markedly decreased number of attacks in and around Bakhmut, particularly over the last few days.[7] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has recently emphasized the toll that a reported lack of ammunition is having on Wagner’s ability to pursue offensives on Bakhmut and stated on March 15 that due to ammunition shortages and heavy fighting, Wagner has had to expand its encirclement of Bakhmut.[8] Prigozhin notably claimed that Wagner captured Zalizianske, a tiny rural settlement 9km northwest of Bakhmut on the east side of the E40 Bakhmut-Slovyansk highway, which indicates that Wagner forces are likely conducting opportunistic localized attacks on settlements further north of Bakhmut that are small and relatively easier to seize.[9] Recent Wagner gains north of Bakhmut suggest that manpower, artillery, and equipment losses in fights for Bakhmut will likely constrain Wagner’s ability to complete a close encirclement of Bakhmut or gain substantial territory in battles for urban areas. The capture of Zalizianske and other similarly small towns north of Bakhmut and east of the E40 highway is extremely unlikely to enhance Wagner’s ability to capture Bakhmut itself or make other operationally significant gains. It therefore is likely that Wagner’s offensive on Bakhmut is increasingly nearing culmination. Russian forces would likely have to commit significant reserves to prevent this culmination. They may be able to do so, as ISW has observed elements of Russian airborne regiments in and around Bakhmut that do not seem to be heavily committed to the fighting at the moment. The Russians might also commit elements of other conventional units, including possibly the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division, or units drawn from elsewhere in the theater. But it seems that the Wagner offensive itself will not be sufficient to seize Bakhmut. Russian forces are not pursuing active or successful offensive operations elsewhere in theater, and as the pace of operations slows along critical sectors of the front, Ukrainian forces likely have an increased opportunity to regain the initiative.

 

International journalists reportedly obtained the Kremlin’s long-term strategy document for destabilizing Moldova and reintegrating it back into the Russian sphere of influence by 2030.[10] The Kyiv Independent, Yahoo News, and several other international news partners released details of the Moldova report, reportedly originating from the same document as the leaked Belarus annexation strategy document.[11] Moldovan Prime Minister Dorin Recean reportedly saw the document and stated that it is consistent with Moldova’s assessments of Russia’s ongoing campaign to undermine Moldovan sovereignty.[12] ISW is unable to confirm the existence or authenticity of this document, but the document’s political lines of effort are consistent with recent Russian efforts to destabilize Moldova.[13]

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin commented on the reports about the dismissal of the Russian Commander of the Airborne (VDV) Forces Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky (first reported on January 20) - likely revealing Teplinsky’s affiliation with Wagner. Prigozhin stated on March 15 that Teplinsky is an honest and competent commander whom he had met before the war in passing and during “tragic” operations near Berestove, Donetsk Oblast.[14] Prigozhin stated that one of the possible reasons behind Teplinsky’s dismissal was his refusal to lie about the situation on the frontlines. Prigozhin also claimed that Teplinsky expressed his ”honest opinion,” which had saved many paratroopers. Prigozhin stated that he hopes that commanders like Teplinsky and former theater commander in Ukraine, Army General Sergey Surovikin, would take senior positions in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Ukrainian intelligence previously linked Surovikin to Wagner, and Prigozhin’s praise for Teplinsky is similar to the praise he offered Surovikin in October 2022.[15] ISW previously observed Wagner-affiliated milblogger claims about Teplinsky’s dismissal on January 20 attributed to a reported disagreement with the Russian General Staff.[16] These claims emerged only nine days after Surovikin’s dismissal from the position of theater commander and his new subordination under Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on January 11.[17] Gerasimov may have removed Teplinsky as a result of his affiliation with Wagner, if the reports about his dismissal are true.

 

The Russian State Duma adopted the law on punishment for “discreditation” of all participants of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on March 14 to foster self-censorship within Russian society. Individuals found guilty of discrediting participants in combat operations will receive a fine of up to five million rubles ($65,530), up to five years of correctional or forced labor, or up to seven years in prison.[18] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin responded to a journalist’s question about the law on March 15 stating that while he initiated and supported this law, he expected that it would not protect Wagner commanders and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) from criticism.[19] Prigozhin noted that he is not worried about being accused of discrediting the Russian MoD because he ”only speaks the truth” and has lawyers review all of his ”carefully worded” social media posts. Prigozhin also implied that Russia cannot physically arrest 146 million Russians, further indicating that this law aims to encourage self-censorship among Russians and hinting that many Russians share his views critical of the MoD.

 

Continued Russian efforts to portray the war in Ukraine as existential to Russian domestic security by establishing additional air defense installations in areas that will never see hostilities is reportedly sparking internal backlash. Russian independent opposition outlet The Insider reported on March 14 that Russian forces are establishing additional S-400 air defense systems in residential areas and protected nature zones in Moscow, generating backlash for potentially endangering civilians and cutting down heavily forested areas for the installations.[20] The Insider reported that Kremlin-affiliated Telegram channels denied reports of the additional air defense installations.[21] The Bryansk Oblast Duma reported on March 9 that Russian State Duma Defense Committee Head Andrey Kartapolov proposed using public utilities payments to fund the installation of air defense systems to defend against ”terrorist attacks.”[22] The Bryansk Oblast Duma later removed this initiative from its website after the initiative garnered public attention on March 15 and blamed its publication on unspecified hackers.[23]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin used his March 15 meeting with the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to continue to bolster his reputation as an involved and effective wartime leader.[24] Putin identified several lines of the war effort for the Prosecutor General’s Office to regulate and improve upon, including timely payment and social support to Russian military personnel and their families, timely payment for defense industrial base (DIB) workers, proper usage of the DIB’s allocated funds, law enforcement efforts in occupied Ukraine, and measures to support and protect orphaned children. Putin praised the Prosecutor General’s Office for its ongoing efforts but emphasized throughout his speech that Russia needs more weapons and protection against external threats. Putin has attempted to reinvigorate his image as a wartime leader since late 2022 by framing himself as mobilizing the Russian DIB to a robust wartime footing.[25]  He is also working to mobilize the DIB, but publicized meetings of this type are more likely staged for imagistic purposes than effective.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Syrian President Bashar Assad in Moscow, Russia on March 15. NOTE: A version of this text will also appear in The Critical Threat Project’s (CTP) March 15 Iran Update.

 

Russian news outlet RIA Novosti claimed that Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov said that topics for discussion included Syria-Russian relations, Syrian post-war reconstruction, and Syrian-Turkish relations.[26] According to the Kremlin readout of the meeting, Assad thanked Putin for the Russian military’s ”decisive contribution” in Syria.[27] Putin likely used the meeting to foster relationships with international partner states such as Syria and maintain Russia’s stake in Levantine affairs. Assad regime officials used the meeting to discuss issues surrounding the attempted and struggling Ankara-Damascus rapprochement with their Russian counterparts. State-affiliated Syrian media refuted recent Turkish claims that ministerial-level Iran-Syria-Russia-Turkey quadrilateral rapprochement talks would occur in Moscow on March 15 and 16, as CTP previously reported.[28] The Assad regime’s decision to discuss rapprochement issues with Russian officials after refusing to participate in the quadrilateral meetings may be part of a negotiating strategy intended to strengthen the Syrian position with intentional ambiguity.  

 

Key Takeaways

• The overall pace of Russian operations in Ukraine appears to have decreased compared to previous weeks.
• The overall Wagner Group offensive on Bakhmut appears to be nearing culmination.
• International journalists reportedly obtained the Kremlin’s long-term strategy document for destabilizing and reintegrating Moldova back into the Russian sphere of influence by 2030.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin commented on the reports about the dismissal of the Russian Commander of the Airborne Forces Mikhail Teplinsky - likely revealing Teplinsky’s affiliation with Wagner.
• The Russian State Duma adopted the law on punishment for “discreditation” of all participants of the “special military operation” in Ukraine on March 14 to foster self-censorship in Russian society.
• Continued Russian efforts to portray the war in Ukraine as existential to Russian domestic security by establishing additional air defense installations in areas that will never see hostilities is reportedly sparking internal backlash.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin used his March 15 meeting with the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office to continue to bolster his reputation as an involved and effective wartime leader.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Moscow, Russia on March 15.
• Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks northwest of Svatove and conducted limited ground attacks on the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued advancing in and around Bakhmut and conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to conduct offensive actions across the Kakhovka Reservoir in Kherson Oblast.
• The Kremlin reportedly tasked the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to recruit 400,000 contract servicemen starting on April 1.
• Ukrainian partisans killed a Russian collaborator in an IED attack in Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Per ISW:
 

Quote

The overall Wagner Group offensive on Bakhmut additionally appears to be nearing culmination. Ukrainian military sources have noted a markedly decreased number of attacks in and around Bakhmut, particularly over the last few days.

 

GOLLY GEE!

I WONDER WHY THAT COULD POSSIBLY BE?!?!?

 

[mclumber1]

Poland is starting to transfer MiG fighters to Ukraine: 

Poland plans to grant Ukraine's request for fighter jets | AP News

APNEWS.COM

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WARSAW, Poland (AP) — Poland’s president said Thursday that his country plans to give Ukraine around a dozen MiG-29 fighter jets, which would make it the first NATO member to fulfill the Ukrainian government's increasingly urgent requests for warplanes.

 

[Derek]

Steven Seagal declares himself ‘one million per cent’ Russian

WWW.INDEPENDENT.CO.UK

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‘Over half of the people in America actually love Russia,’ actor claimed

 

[Anathema-]

joke's on him you can only be a thousand percent anything

[elbobo]

16 minutes ago, Anathema- said:

joke's on him you can only be a thousand percent anything

 

have you seen how fat he is now?

[Anathema-]

2 minutes ago, elbobo said:

 

have you seen how fat he is now?

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 16 March 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 16, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) appears to be trying to penetrate the Russian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) in a way that is reminiscent of the KGB’s involvement with the Soviet military establishment. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian C

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

The Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) appears to be trying to penetrate the Russian Defense Industrial Base (DIB) in a way that is reminiscent of the KGB’s involvement with the Soviet military establishment. Spokesperson for the Ukrainian Center for the Research of Trophy and Prospective Weapons and Military Equipment of the Ukrainian General Staff Andrii Rudyk remarked on March 16 that Ukrainian experts have found FSB markings on many Russian weapons components that Ukrainian forces have destroyed or captured on the battlefield.[1] Rudyk noted that these markings appear not only on equipment such as T-90M tanks, but also on weapons’ microcircuits, and suggested that this means that the FSB conducted an equipment inspection of such weapons and components.[2] Rudyk concluded that this means that the FSB does not trust Russian military leadership and is conducting inspections of Russian equipment accordingly.[3] FSB markings on Russian equipment and weapons components, if confirmed, would have broader implications for the relationship between the FSB, the Russian DIB, and the broader Russian military apparatus. Either FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov has instructed the FSB to conduct these investigations at the direction of Russian President Vladimir Putin, or Bortnikov has issued this directive independent of Putin. In either case the FSB appears to be directly inserting itself into the inner workings of the Russian DIB, likely penetrating equipment acquisition and inspection processes. The KGB (the FSB’s predecessor) notably penetrated the Red Army and Soviet defense industry in a similar fashion.

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he received a press question exposing a plot spearheaded by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to undermine and “neutralize” the Wagner Group. Prigozhin’s press service published a claimed request for comment on March 16 from Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta asking if Prigozhin was aware of alleged discussions between Putin and Patrushev regarding the future of the Wagner Group.[4] The press comment claims that information on these discussions has recently circulated on Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels and alleges that Patrushev suggested to Putin that there will be “nothing left” of Wagner in “one and a half to two months.”[5] The post goes on to claim that Patrushev suggested that upon Wagner’s destruction in Ukraine, Prigozhin will try to “unite the former and remaining active Wagner fighters under a far-fetched pretext,” arm them, and "send them to the territory of Russia in order to seize power in the regions bordering Ukraine with a possible advance inland.”[6] The post concludes that Patrushev has already ordered observation and control over the movement of former Wagner fighters and that Putin reportedly agreed with this step and thanked Patrushev for his efforts to “neutralize Wagner in general and Yevgeny Prigozhin in particular.”[7] Prigozhin posted an audio clip in response to the claimed press comment saying that he had not heard about these supposed negotiations or observed speculation on Telegram channels, remarking that Russian special services should work to neutralize threats to Russia regardless of where they come from.[8]

 

ISW has not observed any information to suggest that these discussions have happened, nor has ISW captured any speculation in the Russian information space about them. Nezivisimaya Gazeta has not published the press comment on its own site, and no record of the comment is visible anywhere other than in references to the post by Prigozhin’s press service. The lack of external confirmation on this subject suggests that Prigozhin has fabricated the alleged plot to further several information operations on behalf of Wagner and his own reputation. First, this exchange clearly identifies Patrushev and possibly the Russian Security Council as enemies of the Wagner Group. Prigozhin appears to be setting careful information conditions to blame Patrushev for Wagner’s failures and potential crackdowns against the group, as well as introducing an invented scenario wherein Wagner poses a direct threat to Russia domestically. This effort appears to be the next evolution of Prigozhin’s campaign against the Russian military establishment, and Patrushev could become Prigozhin’s next target after his concerted informational campaigns against the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff.[9]

 

Western news agencies confirmed on March 16 that Chinese companies have sold rifles, drone parts, and equipment that could be used for military purposes to unidentified Russian entities. Politico cited data provided by customs data aggregator ImportGenius showing that Chinese companies sent equipment including 1,000 assault rifles, 12 shipments of drone parts, and over 12 tons of body armor to unspecified Russian actors between June and December 2022.[10] CNN also reported on March 16 that Ukrainian forces shot down a retrofitted, weaponized commercial Mugin-5 drone produced by a Chinese commercial manufacturer.[11] These sales appear small in scale, concern largely commercial equipment, and — in all but one confirmed case — do not include companies with ties to the Chinese government, according to Politico.[12]

 

Such Chinese shipments are significant, however, because they could alleviate strain on the overextended Russian defense industrial base (DIB) and circumvent Western attempts to limit Russian access to microchips. ISW has not observed routine Russian small arms shortages, and Russia’s DIB appears capable of producing sufficient quantities of assault rifles. The import of domestically available equipment from China likely enables the Russian DIB to transfer resources — most critically the limited number of skilled Russian defense plant workers — from the production of such goods to the production of military equipment for which Russia has a dire need.[13] Meanwhile, the sale of even commercial drone parts to Russian entities could provide Russia’s DIB with access to valuable microchips vital to the production of sophisticated equipment, which Western sanctions have worked to prevent.[14]

 

Syrian President Bashar Assad used a staged interview with Russian outlet RIA Novosti to amplify notable Russian information operations. Assad told RIA on March 16 that Russian military bases in Syria should receive the “most advanced weapons” to effectively deter threats in response to a question about the deployment of hypersonic missiles.[15] This comment is explicitly in support of the deployment of Russian hypersonic weapons, likely of the Kinzhal variety, to Syria, which is part of a longstanding Russian information operation to strengthen Assad and increase pressure against Turkey as Ankara considers ratification of Finland and Sweden’s accession into NATO. [16] Assad also notably recognized the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine as a part of Russia.[17]

 

Polish President Andrzej Duda stated on March 16 that Poland will give Ukraine four MiG-29 fighter jets. Polish news outlet Wydarzenia reported that Duda said that Poland will deliver the MiG-29s in the coming four to six weeks.[18] Polish news outlet Rzeczpospolita reported that Duda announced that Poland is servicing an unspecified number of additional MiG-29s for delivery to Ukraine.[19] The Ukrainian Air Force operates MiG-29s and would be able to use them in counteroffensive operations if Ukraine receives them with enough time in advance of its next counteroffensive.

 

Russia’s redeployment of elements of its “peacekeeping force” from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine is eroding Russia’s influence with Armenia. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan accused Azerbaijan of preparing to conduct a new large-scale attack and genocide against ethnic Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh at an unspecified future time on March 16.[20] Pashinyan stated that Armenia should appeal to the United Nations Security Council if the Russian Federation is unable to uphold the November 9, 2020, Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire that Moscow helped broker with Azerbaijan.[21] Pashinyan previously accused Russia’s “peacekeeping force” in Nagorno-Karabakh of “not fulfilling its obligation” under this ceasefire in December 2022 after Russian forces failed to secure passage on the only road through the Lachin Corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.[22] Russia’s “peacekeeping force” in Nagorno-Karabakh is very likely understrength. The Russian military redeployed elements of the 15th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade — Russia's only dedicated peacekeeping brigade — from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine in March 2022.[23] Ukraine’s General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces severely degraded the 15th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, killing about 800 and wounding about 400 soldiers of the brigade’s 1,800 soldiers that deployed to Ukraine as of June 2022.[24] Russia will likely lose military influence in other post-Soviet states since Moscow has redeployed elements of permanently stationed Russian forces from Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan, occupied Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Tajikistan to fight in Ukraine.[25]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to reassure the Russian public that the war in Ukraine will not have significant long-term economic consequences, likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to prepare Russians for a protracted war. Putin delivered a speech at the Congress of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs in Moscow on March 16 in which he claimed that the Russian economy has steadily grown in the past eight months following a roughly five percent contraction over the first months of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.[26] Putin attempted to portray Russia as not being isolated from the international economy by claiming that Russian trade with fast-growing markets has increased at double-digit rates.[27] Putin claimed that the domestic Russian economy will experience sustainable long-term growth and forecasted that Russian industries will significantly grow as they fill niches previously held by Western firms that have left the country and stopped doing business with Russia.[28] Putin suggested that the entire Russian economy will expand in a manner similar to the Russian agricultural sector’s growth following 2014 Western sanctions regimes associated with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea.[29] Putin claimed that Russia’s supposed economic resilience has disproven Western analysts who predicted empty store shelves and massive shortages of goods in Russia because of Western sanctions.[30]

 

Putin’s portrayal of a healthy and resilient Russian economy is at odds with Russia’s issues with sanctions-related supply chain bottlenecks, the Russian defense industrial base’s (DIB) struggle to meet the Russian military's needs in Ukraine, and the Kremlin’s substantial projected budget deficit problems.[31] Putin likely sought to reassure the Russian public as the Kremlin increasingly signals to Russians that the Kremlin intends to fight a protracted war in Ukraine and implicitly consign the Russian economy to an indefinite period of stringent Western sanctions.[32] The Kremlin also likely sought to reassure the Russian public that war-related production will not detrimentally impact the rest of the Russian economy as Russian officials continue efforts to gradually mobilize more of Russia’s DIB.[33] The Kremlin will likely struggle to not contradict its different informational lines of effort as it attempts to reassure the Russian public about the Russian economy, set informational conditions for a protracted war, and mobilize a wider portion of Russia’s DIB.

 

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Federal State Security Service (FSB) appears to be trying to penetrate the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) in a way that is reminiscent of the KGB’s involvement with the Soviet military and industrial base.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he received a press question exposing a plot spearheaded by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev to undermine and “neutralize” the Wagner Group.
• Western news agencies confirmed that Chinese companies have sold military and dual-use equipment to unidentified Russian entities. These sales appear small in scale but could alleviate strain on Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) and circumvent Western attempts to limit Russian access to microchips.
• Syrian President Bashar Assad used a staged interview with Russian outlet RIA Novosti to amplify notable Russian information operations.
• Polish President Andrzej Duda stated that Poland will give Ukraine four MiG-29 fighter jets.
• Russian’s decision to redeploy elements of its “peacekeeping force” from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine is eroding Russia’s influence with Armenia.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to reassure the Russian public that the war in Ukraine will not have significant long term economic consequences, likely as part of the Kremlin’s effort to prepare Russians for a protracted war.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued advancing in and around Bakhmut and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line and in Western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces increased their naval presence in the Black Sea.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russia-Ukraine war live: Slovakia approves sending Mig-29 planes to Ukraine; Russia rewards pilots over Black Sea drone collision | Ukraine | The Guardian

WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM

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Fleet retired recently and most not operational, reports say; defence minister gives state awards to pilots in US intercept

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

The ICC has issued an (highly symbolic) arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova (the Russian official responsible for the scheme to forcibly deport thousands of Ukrainian children to Russia.

 

International Criminal Court issues arrest warrant for Putin over alleged Ukraine war crimes

WWW.NBCNEWS.COM

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The court said Friday that the Russian leader is allegedly responsible for the “war crime” of unlawful deportation of children. The Kremlin has previously denied the accusation.

 

Quote

 

The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant Friday for Russian President Vladimir Putin, accusing him of being responsible for war crimes committed in Ukraine.

 

Putin is allegedly responsible for the “war crime” of unlawful deportation of children and the unlawful transfer of children from Ukraine to Russia, the court — which is based in The Hague, Netherlands — said in a news release.

 

“There are reasonable grounds to believe that Putin bears individual criminal responsibility for the aforementioned crimes,” the court said its pre-trial judges had assessed.

 

It added that he had allegedly failed to “exercise control properly over civilian and military subordinates who committed the acts, or allowed for their commission, and who were under his effective authority and control.”

 

Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova, Putin's presidential commissioner for children's rights, is also alleged to have committed similar crimes, the ICC said.

 

 

[Greatoneshere]

To Putin, this is the equivalent of winning the Nobel Peace Prize. Frame it on the shelf-type stuff.

[GeneticBlueprint]

Is he ever going to leave Russia again? Was he going to?

[CitizenVectron]

A Leopard tank was spotted in my city today, being transported, and it caused me to look up tank stats for western Canada. I stumbled across something I wasn't aware of, which is the Suffield Tank Training area, located in Alberta.

 

British Army Training Unit Suffield - Wikipedia

EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG

 

Basically, Canada has set aside an area 19% the size of Northern Ireland for tank maneuvering (~2,500 square km). It's primarily used by Canada and the UK for field exercises on a large scale, specifically to simulate the European steppe, but Germany also used to utilize it and another similar area. 

 

 

Never even knew this place existed, or that apparently every year the UK and Canada shuffle in/out hundreds of tanks for large exercises. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 17 March 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 17, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a state visit to Russia from March 20 to 22 likely to discuss sanctions evasion schemes and Chinese interest in mediating a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine.

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a state visit to Russia from March 20 to 22 likely to discuss sanctions evasion schemes and Chinese interest in mediating a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin stated that Putin and Xi plan to sign unspecified bilateral documents and discuss topical issues in Russia’s and China’s comprehensive partnership.[1] Chinese companies have reportedly sold rifles, drone parts, and equipment to Russian entities that could be used for military purposes, and Western intelligence agencies have stated that Chinese leadership is considering the provision of lethal equipment to Russia.[2] Xi likely plans to discuss sanctions evasion schemes with Putin and Russian officials to support the sale and provision of Chinese equipment to Russia. ISW previously assessed that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Xi signed a package of 16 agreements on March 1 that may facilitate Russian sanctions evasion by channeling Chinese products through Belarus.[3] Xi also likely aims to promote Chinese efforts aiming to position China as an impartial third-party mediator for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. China released a broad 12-point peace plan for the war in Ukraine on February 24, although it remains unclear what more definitive Chinese proposals for a negotiated settlement to the war would encompass. Xi may seek to parlay his success in mediating the restoration of diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia into a larger effort to mediate in this war.

 

Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed that Belarusian industry is supplying Russia with electronic components, potentially supporting previous ISW assessments that Belarus may assist Russia in evading Western sanctions. Lukashenko stated on March 17 that Belarus and Russia signed an agreement on establishing a joint Belarusian-Russian center for the development and production of photomasks (an intermediate good used in the production of integrated circuits), that the two states have developed a list of critically important electronic components, and that Belarusian industry has already begun shipping unspecified microelectronics to Russian enterprises.[4] ISW previously assessed that Belarus might facilitate sanction evasion for Russia and that China might clandestinely transfer goods and/or equipment to Russia via Belarus.[5] The US State Department sanctioned several additional Belarusian defense entities and tightened existing export controls to Belarus as of February 24, 2023, but these sanctions may not be comprehensive enough to prevent Belarus from sending Russia electronic components used in weapon systems and other dual use technologies.[6] Lukashenko made this announcement at the Belarusian Planar Joint Stock Company technological enterprise, which the US does not appear to have sanctioned.[7]

 

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s rhetoric about Belgrade’s refusal to sanction Russia is softening. Vucic refused to promise that Serbia will not sanction Russia, acknowledged that Belgrade’s decision not to join European sanctions against Russia has brought Serbia “tough [economic] circumstances,” and stated that he will evaluate "when we are in a deadlock and when our policy has to change” on March 17.[8] Serbian Economy Minister Rade Basta called on the Serbian government to impose sanctions on Russia and stated that Serbia is paying a "high price" for not doing so on March 14.[9] Politico previously reported that Vucic is seemingly reconsidering Serbia’s close ties with Russia, spurred in part by ongoing Wagner Group recruitment and subversion efforts in Serbia and demonstrating the international economic and informational costs imposed on Putin by his invasion of Ukraine.[10]

 

The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova on March 17 for alleged war crimes involving the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.[11]

 

Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that it did not submit a press request to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin concerning a rumored plot by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev against him. Nezavismaya Gazeta suggested that someone responsible for fabricating the request is actively engaged in fomenting conflict between different siloviki structures, which may support ISW’s March 16 assessment that Prigozhin likely promoted the alleged plot to support informational campaigns against the Russian military establishment.[12] ISW initially assessed on March 16 that Prigozhin might have fabricated the alleged plot to support these informational campaigns, but ISW failed to observe that a Russian milblogger had posted rumors about the alleged plot on March 13.[13] Prigozhin’s press service was involved in a fabrication of some kind given the Nezavisimaya Gazeta denial, but Prigozhin does not appear to have fabricated the rumor itself. Prigozhin’s press service may have received a fabricated press request or may have fabricated the press request itself. Prigozhin chose to give prominence to the rumored plot whoever fabricated the press request. ISW continues to assess that Prigozhin promoted the rumored plot to identify Patrushev and the Russian Security Council as enemies of the Wagner Group, set conditions to blame Patrushev for Wagner’s failures in Ukraine, and support ongoing informational campaigns against the traditional Russian military establishment.[14]

 

Key Takeaways

• Chinese President Xi Jinping will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a state visit to Russia from March 20 to 22 likely to discuss sanctions evasion schemes and Chinese interest in mediating a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko confirmed that Belarusian industry is supplying Russia electronic components, potentially supporting previous ISW assessments that Belarus may assist Russia to evade Western sanctions.
• Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s rhetoric about Belgrade’s refusal to sanction Russia is softening.
• The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Commissioner on Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova on March 17 for alleged war crimes involving the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia.
• Russian outlet Nezavisimaya Gazeta reported that it did not submit a press request to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin concerning a rumored plot by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev against him.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks across the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian forces along the front line in southern Ukraine.
• The Kremlin continues to call up reservists throughout Russia.
• Russian authorities reportedly detained three Ukrainian partisans in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast

 

[SuperSpreader]

Live updates: Russia's war in Ukraine

WWW.CNN.COM

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Russian President Vladimir Putin has visited Russian-occupied Mariupol, in an apparently defiant move reported by the Kremlin just days after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant...

 

Putin was driving around Mariupol

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 18 March 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 18, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces targeted Ukraine with 16 Shahed-136 drones overnight on March 17-18. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces shot down 11 of the 16 drones and noted that it is difficult for Ukrainian mobile fire groups to

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Russian forces targeted Ukraine with 16 Shahed-136 drones overnight on March 17-18. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat stated that Ukrainian forces shot down 11 of the 16 drones and noted that it is difficult for Ukrainian mobile fire groups to shoot down drones at night due to the lack of visibility.[1] The drones targeted facilities in Kyiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Lviv oblasts, reportedly including a Ukrainian fuel warehouse in Novomoskovsk, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[2] Russian sources claimed that Russian drone strikes also targeted Kyiv Thermal Power Plant 5, which Russian forces reportedly targeted in a strike campaign on March 9.[3]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued his campaign against anti-war dissent and the misappropriation of military assets within Russia. Putin signed two bills into law on March 18 that significantly increase the fines and jail time for discrediting Russian forces in Ukraine and for selling Russian arms to foreign actors.[4] Russian sources reported that Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) personnel detained over 40 people in raids against two Moscow bars for suspicion of financing Ukrainian forces and made patrons participate in pro-war activities on March 17.[5] Russian sources have increasingly reported on FSB detaining Russian civilians under suspicion of financially assisting Ukrainian forces since February 28 after Putin instructed the FSB to intensify counterintelligence measures and crackdown against the spread of pro-Ukrainian ideology.[6] 

 

Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigohzin is likely attempting to set informational conditions to explain the Wagner Group’s culmination around Bakhmut. Prigozhin-affiliated outlet RIA FAN published an interview with Prigozhin on March 17 in which he asserted that Ukrainian forces are preparing to launch counteroffensives in five separate directions: into Belgorod Oblast, in the Kreminna area, in the Bakhmut area, towards Donetsk City, and in Zaporizhia Oblast.[7] Prigozhin stated that Ukrainian forces will launch these operations starting in mid-April and urged Russian forces to prepare for these counteroffensives by preserving ammunition and equipment.[8] Prigozhin likely depicted Ukrainian forces as having enough combat power to launch a massive theater-wide counteroffensive to justify the Wagner Group’s inability to complete an envelopment or encirclement of Bakhmut. Prigozhin stated that Ukrainian forces are preparing to counterattack Wagner’s flanks in the Bakhmut area and that Wagner fighters are preparing for these counterattacks.[9] ISW previously assessed that Wagner fighters are likely conducting opportunistic attacks on easier-to-seize settlements further north and northwest of Bakhmut as their ability to make tactical gains in Bakhmut itself diminishes, and Prigozhin likely seeks to frame these activities as securing flanks in preparation for Ukrainian counteroffensives.[10] A prominent Wagner-affiliated milblogger similarly argued that Wagner fighters are conducting offensive operations northwest of Bakhmut to spoil Ukrainian counterattacks and asserted that Wagner fighters are focused on advancing towards the Siverskyi Donets Canal west of Bakhmut to complete the envelopment of the city.[11] The milblogger likely tried to rationalize the Wagner Group’s failure to envelop Bakhmut by setting the necessary conditions for the envelopment further away and farther out of the Wagner Group’s current operational capabilities. Prigozhin also claimed that Ukrainian forces have at least 19,000 personnel deployed within Bakhmut, likely an attempt to justify Wagner’s lack of progress within the city.[12]

 

Prigozhin may be implying that the overall Russian offensive in Ukraine is nearing culmination by calling for Russian forces to preserve resources for Ukrainian counteroffensives. Prigozhin’s forecast about five separate Ukrainian counteroffensives is mirror-imaging—Russian forces have specialized in conducting multiple simultaneous advances along diverging axes that are not mutually supporting, which is one of the reasons for Russian failures in the war so far. Prigozhin may have forecasted a Ukrainian counteroffensive in five directions to amplify the relevance of his calls for Russian forces to preserve ammunition and equipment and out of concerns that widespread ammunition and equipment shortages are constraining the Wagner Group’s and the Russian military’s ability to maintain offensive operations in Ukraine. Prigozhin’s depiction of imminent Ukrainian counteroffensives also implies that he believes that Russian forces will lose the initiative to Ukraine soon and be forced onto the defensive rather than continuing stalled or unsuccessful offensives in the Kreminna, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, or Vuhledar areas.

 

Russian regional authorities may be severing their connections with Prigozhin. Prigozhin claimed that the Goryachiy Klyuch, Krasnodar Krai authorities reneged on a prior agreement to bury Wagner Group deceased mercenaries in the town.[13] Goryachiy Klyuch Head Sergey Belopolskyi claimed that locals do not think that the resort town Goryachiy Klyuch is an appropriate place to bury Wagner fighters.[14] Prigozhin also released a phone call in which a Goryachiy Klyuch official told a Wagner representative that Krasnodar Krai Governor Veniamin Kondratyev stripped him of authority to cooperate with Wagner.[15] Wagner servicemen also released a threatening video appeal to the local administration claiming that they will “personally solve the issue” with the administration if they do not respond to the appeals.[16] The Wagner Group has used training and burial grounds in Krasnodar Krai in the past, indicating that Prigozhin likely has extensive, long-term connections to regional authorities that may now be weakening.[17] Prigozhin previously fought with St. Petersburg officials over their refusal to bury deceased Wagner mercenaries in the same burial ground as conventional Russian soldiers, as ISW has previously reported.[18]

 

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated on March 18 that the Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist goals in Ukraine. Zakharova stated that Russia is ready to hear Western and Ukrainian proposals for the diplomatic settlement of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but noted that the West will need to remove all sanctions and lawsuits from Russia.[19] Zakharova continued to reject Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s conditions for peace talks by noting that the removal of Russian forces from occupied Ukrainian territories, reparation obligations, and attendance at international tribunals are “unrelated” to the establishment of peace in Ukraine. Zakharova instead claimed that peace in Ukraine depends on the West ceasing its weapon deliveries to Ukraine, the international recognition “of new territorial realities,” and the demilitarization and “denazification” of Ukraine. Zakharova's demands mirror Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maximalist objectives announced on February 24, 2022, and are a continuation of the Kremlin's ongoing information operation to prompt the West to offer preemptive concessions and coerce Ukraine into negotiations on conditions more favorable to Russia.[20]

 

BBC and Russian opposition news outlet Mediazona reported on March 17 that Russian forces (excluding Donetsk People’s Republic [DNR] and Luhansk People’s Republic [LNR] militiamen) have suffered a confirmed 17,375 deaths, a conservative estimate of 35,000 total deaths, and 157,000 casualties. BBC claimed that total pro-Russia forces’ casualties may exceed 211,500 people. BBC noted that 1,304 of the dead it has confirmed perished within the past two weeks, indicating that recent casualties are significantly higher than the 2022 average. The majority of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine reportedly come from outside of Russia’s major urban centers. Moscow—which comprises 9% of the entire Russian population—has suffered only 107 confirmed deaths while Krasnodar Krai has suffered 714, Sverdlovsk Oblast has suffered 664, and Buryatia has suffered 567.[21]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces targeted Ukraine with 16 Shahed-136 drones overnight on March 17-18.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued his crackdown against anti-war dissent and misappropriation of military assets within Russia.
• Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely attempting to set informational conditions for the Wagner Group’s culmination around Bakhmut.
• Russian regional authorities may be severing their connections with Prigozhin.
• Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova reiterated that the Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist goals in Ukraine.
• BBC and Russian opposition news outlet Mediazona estimated that Russian forces have suffered at least 35,000 total deaths and 157,000 total casualties.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and on the outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continue to erect defensive fortifications along ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in and near occupied Crimea.
• Conventional Russian authorities and the Wagner Group continue to invest significant resources in efforts to involve youth in the war effort and ready them mentally and physically for military service.
• Russian occupation authorities continue efforts russify Ukrainians in occupied territories.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New videos from Kings & Generals and Perun: