TUFKAK Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 1 hour ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said: Always treat these reports from the UAF with a healthy dose of rational skepticism. But I like dead Russians 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 8 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said: Always treat these reports from the UAF with a healthy dose of rational skepticism. I think their trends are accurate relative to themselves. In other words +1140 is the most ive ever seen and even if it isn't accurate its probably true that it is one of the highest casuality days for Russia. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
TUFKAK Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 9 hours ago, CitizenVectron said: You haven't even admitted using the r-word is wrong, so get bent. I spent way longer than I’d like to admit trying to figure out how R*ssian was offensive. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 9 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said: Always treat these reports from the UAF with a healthy dose of rational skepticism. How do they compare to the visually confirmed losses compiled by open-source intelligence data? I mean the equipment losses anyway, it's not like there's equally comprehensive data on killed and wounded soldiers. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 33 minutes ago, Demut said: How do they compare to the visually confirmed losses compiled by open-source intelligence data? I mean the equipment losses anyway, it's not like there's equally comprehensive data on killed and wounded soldiers. I really haven't performed a comparison between the OSINT reporting and the UAF reporting. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 ISW analysis for 11 February 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 11, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances of the Russian Armed Forces. Representative of the Ukrainian M Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances of the Russian Armed Forces. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR), Andriy Chernyak, stated that Russia does not have the resources necessary to launch a large-scale offensive operation on February 24 to coincide with the anniversary of Russia’s 2022 invasion.[1] Chernyak noted that Russians are preparing to intensify their attacks in eastern Ukraine in the next few weeks and are currently searching for weak spots in Ukrainian defenses. ISW has previously assessed that Russian forces have regained the initiative on the Svatove-Kreminna line but that the offensive has not yet reached its full tempo.[2] Ukrainian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson, Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, also noted that the Russian leadership had ordered the capture of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts’ administrative borders and said that the grinding Russian operations in Bakhmut are a “symbol” of Russia’s inability to conduct rapid and powerful offensive operations.”[3] Russian milbloggers continue to appear demoralized at the Kremlin’s prospects for executing a major offensive. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) commander Alexander Khodakovsky questioned why Russian forces are wasting their limited resources on small-scale grinding advances rather than accumulating combat force to launch larger-scale offensives.[4] Another milblogger amplified Khodakovsky’s concern, accusing Russian presidential administration officials of creating unattainable expectations for Russian offensives.[5] Russian forces’ reported culmination and tactical failures around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Russian forces are able to launch a decisive offensive operation. A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces failed to quickly advance in the first days of their offensive to capture Vuhledar and that Russian forces had lost the initiative by the end of January due to Ukrainian forces’ rapid transfer of reserves to the area.[6] The milblogger made his assessment that the Russian offensive to capture Vuhledar has likely culminated in response to viral footage showing Ukrainian forces destroying a disorderly column of Russian mechanized forces in the Vuhledar area.[7] Russian milbloggers seized on the footage to criticize the Russian military command for repeating the same failures that have plagued the Russian military throughout the war in Ukraine, with one prominent milblogger arguing that such incidents illustrate that the Russian army is unable to conduct an offensive along the entire Donetsk front.[8] The disparity between the limited but significant Russian advances in the Bakhmut area and the lack of meaningful advances elsewhere in Ukraine may support milblogger and Ukrainian observations that Russian forces are unable to secure rapid advances through traditional mechanized maneuver warfare. The Russian military command is deploying its most elite units to the Bakhmut area in smaller formations using urban infiltration tactics, according to the limited footage of Russian tactics in the area that ISW has observed.[9] These tactics seem to be resulting in significant tactical Russian advances in the Bakhmut area that could lead to operational gains if Ukrainian forces choose to withdraw from Bakhmut. Russian offensive operations elsewhere in Donetsk Oblast and along the Svatove-Kreminna line have resulted in marginal advances without operational significance thus far. ISW has observed limited footage of Russian tactics in areas separate from the Bakhmut effort that suggests that Russian forces are engaging in more traditional mechanized maneuver warfare tactics with regular, not elite, motorized rifle, naval infantry, and tank elements.[10] All the formations so far observed were rendered combat-ineffective in earlier phases of the war and have very likely been reconstituted with mobilized personnel. The Russian military appears to have been unable to prepare its mobilized personnel to conduct effective mechanized offensive operations in the short period of time since their call-ups, as ISW forecasted.[11] The lack of adequate vehicles, ammunition, and other materiel is likely contributing to the ineffectiveness of Russian mechanized maneuver tactics thus far. The Russian military is unlikely to be able to scale its approach from the Bakhmut area to the wider theater because the tactics it is using in Bakhmut are more suited to dense urban environments and because Russian forces lack the number of elite formations needed to conduct a larger offensive in eastern Ukraine in the same fashion. ISW‘s assessment regarding the prospects for future Russian mechanized offensive operations is offered with low confidence due to the limited available footage depicting Russian military tactics across the entire front line. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is trying to salvage his declining influence in Russia as the Kremlin continues to sideline him and his mercenaries. Prigozhin attempted to improve the declining reputation of his Wagner mercenaries in an interview with a prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger Semyon Pegov (known under the alias Wargonzo) on February 10. Prigozhin responded to a series of questions about Wagner controversies such as high casualties and ineffectiveness of recruited convicts, execution of deserters, treatment of recruited forces as cannon fodder, Prigozhin’s harsh criticism of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and his supposed political aspirations, and Wagner mercenaries bearing “symbols of the Third Reich” despite fighting to “denazify” Ukraine.[12] Prigozhin notably confirmed that Wagner has stopped recruitment in prisons because of the expiration of an agreement permitting such recruitment with an unspecified agency – likely the Russian MoD. Prigozhin falsely denied ever criticizing the Russian conventional military and inaccurately presented his critiques as similar to the commonly expressed frustrations among Russian milbloggers regarding poor communications between the Russian military command and Russian units, as well as professionalization efforts that have been widely criticized. Prigozhin also denied having political aspirations and attacked his long-standing enemy St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov. The Kremlin is continuing to dim Prigozhin’s star by depriving him of the right to recruit in prisons and by targeting his influence in the information space. In addition to the Wargonzo interview, a Wagner-affiliated milblogger obtained a document that outlines rules for covering the war in Ukraine with explicit requirements to refrain from mentioning Wagner and Prigozhin in the media.[13] The document also calls on media officials and milbloggers to refrain from praising Deputy Commander of the Russian Joint Grouping of Forces in Ukraine, Army General Sergei Surovikin, who is reportedly affiliated with Wagner.[14] The milblogger noted that he is not sure about the authenticity of the document, but the Russian MoD and the Kremlin had already been deliberately avoiding mentioning Wagner and Prigozhin as ISW has previously observed.[15] Prigozhin likely attempted to deflect attention from his controversies by undercutting the Kremlin’s unrealistic goals for the war in Ukraine. Prigozhin forecasted that it would take Russian forces up to two years to reach the Donetsk Oblast administrative borders and three years to advance to the Dnipro River from the east. Prigozhin added that Russian society would need to be drastically militarized for the Kremlin to reach the English Channel, likely either hyperbolizing Russia’s aims of destroying NATO or referring to the Cold War-era Soviet war plans aimed at conducting a rapid blitzkrieg to the Channel coast. Prigozhin likely sought to contribute to the current concern within the Russian information space about the Russian military command's ability to sustain a major offensive in Donetsk Oblast to reestablish his reputation relative to that of the Russian MoD. The Wargonzo interview itself was likely a Kremlin ambush of Prigozhin aimed at calling public attention to Wagner controversies. Prigozhin likely saw this interview as an opportunity to elevate his name but instead found himself on the defensive throughout. Prigozhin’s criticism of the Kremlin’s military campaign resembles the rhetorical approach of the former Russian militant Igor Girkin. Girkin had previously assisted the Kremlin by leading proxy armed formations in Crimea and Donbas in 2014 until the Kremlin deprived him of any influence following his surrender of Slovyansk in July 2014. Girkin became an embittered critic of the Kremlin and the Russian military command while seeking to rehabilitate his reputation in extremist Russian nationalist circles. Prigozhin’s uncharacteristically nihilistic forecast about Russian offensive prospects closely mirrors Girkin’s forecasts, and it is possible that Prigozhin is also turning into a bitter zealot who is losing his ability to leverage his parallel military to obtain political influence.[16] If the current Russian offensive stalls rapidly, on the other hand, the star of the conventional Russian military may once again wane, possibly re-opening a path for Prigozhin to regain significance and opportunities. Russian forces targeted southern Ukraine with air, missile, and aerial and maritime drone strikes overnight on February 10-11. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces intercepted 20 of 24 Russian UAVs and one Kh-101 missile overnight.[17] Russian forces chiefly targeted energy infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Dnipro, Kryryi Rih, and Khmelnytskyi cities.[18] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces used a naval drone to strike the Zatoka road and rail bridge in Odesa Oblast (28km south of Odesa City on the Black Sea coast), the first observed instance of Russian forces operating unmanned naval drones.[19] The footage suggests that the bridge may have sustained severe damage, but the true degree of damage is currently unknown. Russian forces also conducted airstrikes against Snake Island, and Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk suggested that Russian forces conducted these strikes to demonstrate that Russian forces have not forgotten about offensive actions in southern Ukraine.[20] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces currently lack the ability to threaten southern Ukraine with a full-scale offensive. The Ukrainian Operational Command South stated that Russian forces are trying to incite panic in the areas bordering Moldova.[21] Key Takeaways Ukrainian military officials and Russian pro-war nationalist voices are downplaying Russia’s ability to launch a sweeping large-scale offensive in Donetsk Oblast in the current circumstances of the Russian Armed Forces. Russian forces’ reported culmination and tactical failures around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast, have likely further weakened the Russian ultranationalist community’s belief that Russian forces are able to launch a decisive military effort. The disparity between the limited but significant Russian advances in the Bakhmut area and the lack of meaningful advances elsewhere in Ukraine may support milblogger and Ukrainian observations that Russian forces are unable to secure rapid advances through traditional mechanized maneuver warfare. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is trying to salvage his declining influence in Russia as the Kremlin continues to sideline him and his mercenaries. Russian forces targeted southern Ukraine with air, missile, and aerial and maritime drone strikes overnight on February 10-11. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove and Kreminna. Russian forces continue to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast. Russian occupation authorities are likely draining the Kakhovka Reservoir north of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin confirmed that the Wagner Group stopped recruiting inside Russian prisons due to the expiration of an agreement between the Wagner Group and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 New video from Perun: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 10 hours ago, Reputator said: Someone told me today was the biggest single day loss of life for Russia since the invasion began. No idea if that's true. 9 hours ago, TUFKAK said: But I like dead Russians 3 hours ago, Air_Delivery said: I think their trends are accurate relative to themselves. In other words +1140 is the most ive ever seen and even if it isn't accurate its probably true that it is one of the highest casuality days for Russia. 45 minutes ago, Demut said: How do they compare to the visually confirmed losses compiled by open-source intelligence data? I mean the equipment losses anyway, it's not like there's equally comprehensive data on killed and wounded soldiers. At the very least, the UK MoD has assessed the claims as "likely accurate": Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 I think your embed went wrong. 43 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said: I really haven't performed a comparison between the OSINT reporting and the UAF reporting. Okay, so you got me curious and I did. Using Oryx we get the following (left: UAF, right: Oryx): Tanks: 3267 / 1718 APV: 6474 / 3348(?) MRLS: 463 / 172 Aircraft: 295 / 71 Helicopters: 286 / 77 Lemme mention one issue right off the bat: I have no idea if both count losses the same way (is it the sum of destroyed, damaged, abandoned and captured in both cases or subsets of those?) and how they classify each piece of equipment. The UAF figures for example have just this one category called "APV" (Armored Personnel Vehicle, I'm guessing) whereas Oryx lists AFVs, IFVs, APCs, MRAPs and IMVs. I added up the latter under the assumption that this "APV" category includes all of those. Similar issues exist for some of the others. Anyhow, with that out of the way, we can immediately see that there's quite a difference. Of course, the OSINT data is only a lower bound since you can't expect every loss to be visually confirmed (particularly in the case of aircraft which might limp back to their own territory before crashing or not crashing). And it's not like we have direct access to the military's own after-action reports/strike effectiveness assessments. The question is, I suppose, whether it is reasonable to assume that there'd be, as in some of these categories, more than three times as many "actual" losses as visually confirmed ones. Is less than ~30% being visually confirmed by openly available data a lot or not? My lame take-away here would be that it's hard to arrive at a confident conclusion. Had the Ukie numbers been very close to the OSINT ones it would have been sensible to just accept them at face value. But with those discrepancies it might go either way. They could still be somewhat accurate and just reflect the natural gap between what's outright provable and what's hidden (at least to civilians) by the fog of war. Or they could be padded which wouldn't be surprising either. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 At least for the "Aircraft" category, I'm fairly certain that the Oryx data is closer to reality than the UAF data. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 Not that I disagree since I've got no idea myself but how come? Again, with aircraft in particular I can see why there would be less photographic evidence. Say a R*ssian jet flew a sortie, turns around to return to its airfield and gets hit by some Ukie rocket on its way back. Depending on how catastrophic the damage is, it might only crash a few kilometers further on rather than immediately. Or maybe even still manage to land somewhat intact. Either way, you wouldn't expect OSINT to count these cases properly most of the time unless there was footage of the hit itself and/or satellite imagery of the aftermath. Only ones crashing in some field within areas of Ukrainian control would be likely to be photographed and listed as a loss. To some extent this might explain the MRLS and artillery figures as well since those are generally positioned further away from the front than, say, tanks or IFVs and such (and thus be less likely to be photographed by Ukies). Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted February 12, 2023 Author Share Posted February 12, 2023 Ukie is considered an infantile and derogatory term, please do not use it. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 Nah, fam, I need you to stop policing my language, it's getting tiresome. What's next, coming at me for saying "Aussies", "Ruskies", "Frenchies" or "Paddies"? Go pick up a book on linguistics, clipping is a ubiquitous way to form hypocorisms. I'll keep calling Ukies Ukies and vatniks v#@!%&§s. So go pick something more worthwhile to do with your limited time here on Earth. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
mclumber1 Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 If we are going to police slurs like ukie (which sounds almost wholesome to me) , it does seem incongruous to not do the same for something like vatnik. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted February 12, 2023 Author Share Posted February 12, 2023 Demut is just so dumb. He probably doesn't respect pronouns, either. Honestly, I'm done in this thread if he's around. Can't believe we tolerate him returning. Bye. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 19 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said: Demut is just so dumb. The irony! 19 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said: Can't believe we tolerate him returning. What's there to tolerate, you drama queen? Did I miss something? Are you the arbiter of who gets to post here or something? Did me not posting for a couple of years disqualify me from doing so again in the present? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 12, 2023 Share Posted February 12, 2023 This is really bloody tiresome nonsense. Ukrainians will be referred to as Ukrainians (not "Ukies") and Russians will be referred to as Russians (not "Russkies") in this thread. Period. End of story. My board. My money. My rules. Don't like it? Just let me know and I'll be more than happy to show you the door. I'm too old and too tired for this petty nonsense. 2 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 13, 2023 Share Posted February 13, 2023 6 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said: This is really bloody tiresome nonsense. 100% agreed. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted February 13, 2023 Share Posted February 13, 2023 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 13, 2023 Share Posted February 13, 2023 Why does Prigozhin look so much like a ball sack? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CayceG Posted February 13, 2023 Share Posted February 13, 2023 4 hours ago, Air_Delivery said: I'm not sure this is true. It seems like it'll be easy to test though. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 13, 2023 Share Posted February 13, 2023 ISW analysis for 12 February 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Russia has partially regained the ability to conduct successful information campaigns in support of strategic objectives and even discrete operational aims. Russian hybrid warfare theory has long called for the integration of information campaigns and Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. ISW is publishing an abbreviated campaign update today, February 12. This report focuses on the impact of Russian information operations on delaying and deterring Western transfers of high-end weapons systems and other military aid to Ukraine. Russia has partially reconstituted its ability to conduct information operations as part of its hybrid warfare campaigns in support of military operations. These information operations will continue to emerge as Russia attempts to set conditions for upcoming operations and mitigate setbacks, and the West must critically evaluate the context of Russian information operations and avoid simply interacting with them on their own terms. Russia has partially regained the ability to conduct successful information campaigns in support of strategic objectives and even discrete operational aims. Russian hybrid warfare theory has long called for the integration of information campaigns and military operations, with information operations sometimes taking precedence over kinetic activity.[1] Russia skillfully conducted multiple information campaigns over the two decades preceding the re-invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, most notably those that supported the Minsk II Accords in which Germany and France accepted Russia as a mediator rather than a belligerent in Ukraine.[2] The Biden Administration conducted a remarkable and successful counter-information campaign in the months leading up to the February 2022 full-scale invasion, however, disrupting multiple Russian information campaigns intended to induce Ukrainian surrender, separate Ukraine from the West, and create favorable conditions for the re-invasion.[3] The Biden Administration and the West have also cut off and derailed Kremlin-controlled media operations in the United States and Europe since the start of the re-invasion, causing the Kremlin to struggle to conduct successful information operations.[4] Moscow, as a result, has been unable to achieve the objectives that its pre-re-invasion campaigns had been pursuing. Russia has, however, reconstituted the ability to conduct discrete information campaigns in support of specific strategic objectives and to tailor those campaigns to mitigate battlefield setbacks and to set conditions for future planned operations. Russian information campaigns have supported a continuous strategic objective of deterring or slowing the West’s provision of material support to Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin likely bought into his own pre-invasion narrative that the West would not support Ukraine but would instead seek to maintain good relations with Russia, fueling his hopes for a speedy victory in Ukraine.[5] Putin soon realized that the war would protract due to his military’s inability to achieve decisive victories and Ukraine’s surprising (to him) determination to resist, and because of the West’s surprising (to him) willingness to support Ukraine’s resistance.[6] Putin thereupon began to focus on feeding the arguments Western leaders were making to themselves about the dangers of providing Ukraine with too much materiel or certain kinds of materiel.[7] These Russian information campaigns have been continuous in their pursuit of the common aim of inhibiting Western support for Ukraine regardless of battlefield conditions. The operational-level information campaigns discussed below nest into this strategic purpose, suitably adjusted for the specific battlefield circumstances of the moment. Russia’s operational-level information campaigns aim either to set conditions for planned Russian operations or to mitigate Russian military failures. Russia shapes the information space in preparation for offensive operations to impede Ukraine’s ability to retain the battlefield initiative or prepare for the offensives. Russia also uses information campaigns to deter the West from supporting Ukraine’s counteroffensive efforts and exploitation of Russian military setbacks. Some of these Russian information campaigns are also intended to reestablish Russia’s geostrategic deterrence by rebuilding the projection of power that had been the focus and hallmark of Russian information campaigns before the 2022 re-invasion.[8] Russia uses the narrative that Ukraine is incapable of defeating Russia because of inherent power disparities between the two states to mitigate major Russian setbacks or Russian failures to achieve rapid successes in major offensive operations. Russian information campaigns earlier in the invasion relied on amplifying the assumption that Russia possesses the “second largest military in the world” with advanced military capabilities. These information operations aimed to mislead the West and Ukraine into believing that any transfers of military equipment would be irrelevant because Ukraine would not be able to withstand rapidly unfolding offensive operations from different directions and would be vulnerable to Russian attack. The Kremlin, for example, threatened that Russia would view continuing Western military aid shipments to Ukraine as legitimate military targets in early March 2022.[9] The Russians have not shown the dynamic targeting capabilities needed to strike Western materiel moving into and through Ukraine throughout the first year of the war, however, and have instead resorted to wasting their precision weapons on striking fixed civilian energy infrastructure throughout Ukraine. The Kremlin reframed its information operations to exaggerate the importance of every tactical advance following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast and redeployment to Donbas in spring-summer 2022. The narrative adjusted the idea of Russian military might from sweeping offensive operations that were no longer possible to make much of steady and grinding gains on the frontlines.[10] This narrative aimed to demoralize Ukrainians and convince the West of Ukraine’s inability to stand against the supposedly overwhelming force enabling Russia’s costly advances, which ultimately culminated throughout the theater without achieving decisive strategic effects.[11] The exaggerating of minor victories also allowed the Kremlin to explain away the slow pace of offensives to domestic audiences who were conditioned to expect Russia’s rapid success in Ukraine.[12] Both versions of the narrative—the anticipated blitzkrieg at the start of the war and the impression of an unstoppable, if slow, advance during its second phase—were intended in part to deter Western aid provision. They sought to reinforce pre-invasion perceptions of Russian power and to trivialize Ukraine’s successful resistance in hopes that the West would give up on supporting Ukraine’s efforts to win the war. In this, they failed. Russia intensified narratives about the risk of nuclear escalation in September-November 2022 to reestablish deterrence and dissuade the West from providing Ukraine the materiel needed to continue its counteroffensives following devastating Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast. Putin began making deliberately vague and general references to nuclear use during his annexation speech on September 30 following sweeping Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast.[13] The spike in nuclear rhetoric also followed Putin’s unpopular September 21 mobilization order, which had made Putin vulnerable within both the international and the domestic spheres.[14] Putin and key Kremlin officials intensified nuclear escalation rhetoric throughout October 2022, eventually culminating in early to mid-November likely as a result of growing international dialogue with Russia and pushback against his nuclear threats.[15] Putin has often used thinly-veiled nuclear threats to project the idea that Russia is a great power with which the West should avoid confrontation.[16] The nuclear information operation in fall 2022, however, was likely specifically intended to deter the West from immediately reinforcing Ukraine’s sweeping counteroffensives in eastern and southern Ukraine by stoking irrational and unjustified fears that Putin might react to a Ukrainian victory with nuclear escalation. Putin remains a highly calculating and risk-averse actor who will continue to exploit Russia’s nuclear capabilities and Western fear of nuclear escalation to project his power in the West and Russia without actually risking a nuclear exchange with NATO.[17] Putin also likely sought with these information operations to reestablish Russia’s standing as a great power in the world and to save face domestically following humiliating military setbacks. It is now clear that the Russian information campaign centering on peace negotiations that intensified in December 2022 was aimed—among other things—at delaying the provision of Western tanks and other advanced equipment essential for the continuation of Ukrainian mechanized counteroffensives in order to set conditions for Russia’s own planned offensives. The Kremlin sharply amplified a false negotiations narrative throughout December 2022, with numerous Russian officials giving intentionally misleading signals of Moscow’s willingness to engage in serious negotiations with Ukraine.[18] The Kremlin originally introduced this information operation in early September 2022 after Ukraine announced the start of counteroffensive operations (ostensibly in Kherson Oblast) but prior to Ukraine’s liberation of much of Kharkiv Oblast, and Putin mentioned the idea of a return to the negotiation table in his September 30 annexation speech.[19] The Kremlin, however, consistently retained its maximalist goals and did not offer any serious bases for negotiations. The intensification of the narrative in winter 2022 coincided with Russian preparations for a major offensive operation planned for early 2023, and the Kremlin sought to capitalize on the Western desire for peace negotiations and thereby discourage the provision of Western tanks to Ukraine before Russia was able to regain the initiative in eastern Ukraine.[20] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov notably signaled the end of the information operation, for the time, by announcing that Russia would continue to pursue a military solution in Ukraine on December 27.[21] It was too late, by that point, for the West to send tanks in time to interfere with the Russian offensive operation that began roughly a month later. The Russian peace-talks narrative was not, to be sure, the only or even the main reason for the delay in the Western provision of tanks to Ukraine. The timing of its onset, intensification, and dropping by the Kremlin, however, strongly suggests that it was timed to support the now ongoing Russian offensive. Russia continues its shaping effort targeting Western provisions of long-range weapons and tanks to Ukraine by spreading the narrative that Ukraine will deliberately threaten Russia with these weapons instead of prioritizing the liberation of its Russian-occupied territories. Putin accused the United States of purposely protracting the war on December 22, 2022, following the US authorization to transfer Patriot air-defense systems to Ukraine on December 21, 2022.[22] Putin absurdly implied that Ukraine would use Patriots (defensive air-defense systems) to strike Russian territory, even as Ukraine begged for these systems to stop Russia’s ongoing air and missile campaign on Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the fall of 2022. This information operation was intended, like the negotiations information campaign, to stall Western aid that would disrupt ongoing and planned Russian military operations. Kremlin officials are continuing to foster the narrative that Western transfers of longer-range precision rocket systems and Leopard tanks pose some new threat to Russian security, even though they pose no greater threat than the provision of Soviet tanks or other precision systems.[23] Ukrainians have not used Western-provided HIMARS systems to strike Russian territory even though those systems already brought important locations within Russia into range. And the idea that Ukraine will mount an invasion of Russia with Germany‘s Leopards is laughable. The purpose of this Russian information campaign is two-fold: first, to delay the arrival of Western tanks for as long as possible in order to delay the resumption of Ukrainian counter-offensives and buy time for Russia’s own offensive operations, and second, to disrupt the formulation of a coherent Western approach to shifting Ukraine fully to Western weapons systems—something the West will have to do eventually as it has run through its stocks of Soviet-era weapons and cannot produce or acquire more of them. Russia will continue to weaponize information operations to directly support discrete military operations in Ukraine—especially after it has regained the initiative on the frontlines in eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin is resuming a narrative exaggerating Russian frontline victories with the ongoing offensives on Bakhmut and Lyman. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is proudly parading victories over captured settlements around Bakhmut, but the impact of such information operations is waning—both Ukraine and pro-war Russian nationalists have become less willing to accept claims of inevitable Russian victory at face value because of the year of Russian military incompetence.[24] But these information operations can nevertheless regain traction if Russian forces begin to make significant gains, and Russian information operations that appear to be ineffective now can nevertheless set conditions to become much more potent when circumstances change. The Kremlin appears to be developing other narratives at the time of this publication as well, with nationalist officials making outlandish nuclear threats as a response to recent Western weapons provisions and transfer pledges.[25] Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin also started to resume the canard of Russia’s willingness to negotiate with Ukraine “without preconditions” on February 11 but “on the basis of the reality that exists today” and with consideration for Russia’s maximalist objectives—conditions, in other words, that still amount to Ukrainian surrender.[26] The Kremlin may also reintroduce the stalemate narrative that it had previously used to discount Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kherson in late August 2022.[27] Vershinin’s statement may be an evolved peace-talks narrative that seeks to pressure the West to force preemptive concessions on Ukraine or preempt the culmination of the Russian operations in Donbas. It may also be a continuation of Russian efforts to delay and disrupt the provision of weapons systems Ukraine needs to take advantage of that culmination. The West should consider that Russian discussions of negotiations may not be about negotiations or conditions for peace at all, but may rather be information campaigns specifically targeted at getting Russia through windows of opportunity or vulnerability on the battlefield. All these information campaigns will support overarching Kremlin strategic aims of splitting the West from Ukraine, deterring or delaying the provision of Western materiel, and generally undermining Western support for Ukraine and the cohesion of the Western coalition. Many information campaigns will also pursue specific operational objectives setting conditions for planned Russian military undertakings. Western leaders must recognize these operations for what they are within the context of battlefield events and resist the temptation to engage with Russian information operations purely on their own terms. More of these narratives will emerge, and the West must critically consider battlefield realities to undermine the effectiveness of the Russian hybrid-warfare efforts. The West must monitor the emergence and intensification of certain information operations at particular times to properly assess and react to these campaigns, just as the Biden Administration did before the full-scale invasion in February 2022. Russia’s ability to conduct skillful information campaigns in support of hybrid warfare efforts was severely damaged by the Biden Administration’s skillful counter-information campaign and by Russia’s own actions and failures in Ukraine. But Putin is working to restore his capabilities in this area and is achieving limited but important successes, especially when he can shape information campaigns that resonate with discussions and fears that are already salient in the West. Key inflections in ongoing military operations on February 12: Ukrainian officials continued to question the Russian military’s ability to launch large-scale strategic offensive operations in Ukraine.[28] The UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces have likely suffered the highest rate of casualties in Ukraine since the first weeks of the invasion based on statistics obtained from the Ukrainian General Staff, with an average of 824 casualties per day in the past week.[29] The UK MoD stated that they cannot verify the Ukrainian General Staff’s methodology for counting Russian casualties. A Russian State Duma parliamentarian called for increased censorship legislation to protect Russian military figures from criticism.[30] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) released an intercepted call excerpt of Shahed drone operators in Ukraine speaking in Kurdish and Farsi and stated that Russian forces may be using Kurdish mercenaries to operate Iranian drones in Ukraine.[31] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are continuing offensive operations northwest of Svatove.[32] Russian forces continued offensive operations around Kreminna with a reported 23 combat clashes in the area.[33] Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.[34] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that Wagner Group forces seized Krasna Hora north of Bakhmut.[35] Prigozhin also falsely claimed that Wagner Group forces are the only Russian forces within a 50km radius of Bakhmut.[36] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces in Kherson Oblast lack the capability to start a full-scale offensive, supporting ISW’s prior assessments.[37] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative Vadym Skibitsky stated that Ukrainian officials believe that Russian officials will postpone a planned second wave of mobilization because of persisting problems associated with the first mobilization wave.[38] Russian sources claimed that Russia may build a Black Sea Fleet base in occupied Mariupol.[39] CNN published an interview with two POWs who were Wagner Group prison recruits who claimed that Wagner Group severely misled recruits about the nature of the war and combat missions.[40] The fighters claimed that Wagner forces used prison recruits in human-wave assaults in summer assaults around Lysychansk and sustained high casualties. Quote Significant activity in Belarus (ISW assesses that a Russian or Belarusian attack into northern Ukraine in early 2023 is extraordinarily unlikely and has thus restructured this section of the update. It will no longer include counter-indicators for such an offensive. ISW will continue to report daily observed Russian and Belarusian military activity in Belarus, but these are not indicators that Russian and Belarusian forces are preparing for an imminent attack on Ukraine from Belarus. ISW will revise this text and its assessment if it observes any unambiguous indicators that Russia or Belarus is preparing to attack northern Ukraine.) Ukrainian Commander of the Joint Forces Serhiy Nayev reportedly stated on February 11 that there are 9,000 Russian military personnel with 60 armored vehicles and 40 artillery installations in Belarus.[41] Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 13, 2023 Share Posted February 13, 2023 Jomini of the West's "SITREP" for 01 February 2023 - 07 February 2023: Jomini of the West (@JominiW): "1/ Ukraine TVD, 1-7 FEB 23. The first week of February saw the Russian Winter Offensive move into full swing as major pushes were made in Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Vuhledar. The Russians made some gains but Ukrainian defenses held. #UkraineRussiaWar #RussianArmy #UkraineFrontLines"|nitter NITTER.NL 1/ Ukraine TVD, 1-7 FEB 23. The first week of February saw the Russian Winter Offensive move into full swing as major pushes were made in Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Vuhledar. The Russians made some gains but Ukrainian defenses held. #UkraineRussiaWar #RussianArmy #UkraineFrontLines Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 13, 2023 Share Posted February 13, 2023 1 hour ago, CayceG said: I'm not sure this is true. It seems like it'll be easy to test though. Well ... Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 14, 2023 Share Posted February 14, 2023 ISW analysis for 13 February 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Moscow continues to leverage its relationship with Iran to provide military support for the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) intercepted audio on February 10 reportedly of two Shahed drone operators coordinating Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Moscow continues to leverage its relationship with Iran to provide military support for the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) intercepted audio on February 10 reportedly of two Shahed drone operators coordinating targets in what the GUR claimed was a "Kurdish dialect interspersed with Farsi words."[1] ISW cannot identify the dialect in the audio intercept with high confidence, but the fact that the individuals in the audio clip are Shahed operators indicates that they may be operators from Iranian Kurdistan who are likely affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is far less likely that Russia has been able to identify or import individual Kurdish militants with experience operating drones to conduct Shahed strikes on Ukraine. ISW has previously reported that IRGC-affiliated elements are likely supporting Russia’s use Shahed drones by acting as operators and trainers, and the operators in the GUR intercept are likely part of the same line of effort.[2] UK outlet The Guardian relatedly reported on February 13 that Iran has smuggled at least 18 long-range drones to Russia using boats and Iranian state-owned aircraft.[3] The Guardian found that these shipments include six Mohajer-6 drones and 12 Shahed-121 and 129 drones, which have air-to-ground strike capabilities and are designed to deliver a payload to the target and return to base, unlike the Shahed-131 and 136 loitering munition-type drones that Russian forces have widely used in Ukraine thus far.[4] Russian milbloggers noted on February 13 that IRGC-affiliated Il-76 cargo aircraft routinely fly to Russia, suggesting that Tehran consistently provides Moscow with a variety of material using IRGC-affiliated planes.[5] These data points, taken in tandem, suggest that Russia continues to rely on Iran for military and technological support in Ukraine and that some Iranian personnel are likely in Ukraine directly supporting Russian attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, as ISW has previously reported.[6] The Wagner Group’s continued dissemination of deliberately brutal extrajudicial execution videos and generally graphic content is normalizing an increasing level of brutality and thuggishness within the domestic Russian information space. A Wagner Group-affiliated Telegram channel posted a video on February 12 showing the brutal execution of former Wagner fighter Dmitry Yakushchenko with a sledgehammer.[7] Yakushchenko reportedly was convicted of robbery and murder in Crimea and was serving a 19-year sentence when he joined Wagner.[8] The Wagner-affiliated Telegram channel accused Yakushchenko of defecting to Ukraine and posted a video reportedly of Yakushchenko expressing pro-Ukrainian sentiments while in Ukrainian captivity.[9] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin later posted a video that appears to be of Yakushchenko alive and uninjured and thanking Wagner for forgiveness.[10] Whether the videos of Yakushchenko’s execution or alleged proof-of-life are real—or in what sequence they might have been recorded—are less important than the wider issue highlighted by the creation and dissemination of such videos. Several prominent milbloggers responded positively to the execution video, claiming that such vicious and inhumane killing is an appropriate way for Wagner to deal with betrayal in its ranks.[11] The Wagner-affiliated channel that originally circulated the video claimed that being accused of brutality during a war is like getting fined for speeding during a car race, which is the same remark made by the channel following the summary execution of ex-Wagner fighter Yevgeny Nuzhin in November 2022.[12] The continued justification and glorification of such brutal tactics is symptomatic of the wider pathology that Wagner has come to represent—one where excessive and performative violence is taken as a necessary tactic of military practice. Many military justice systems, including America's, include death penalties for various crimes, particularly in combat. Militaries fighting for healthy societies that are themselves professional and well-disciplined do not, however, conduct executions with sledgehammers nor do they glory in the vicious brutality of the capital punishments they execute. The Kremlin will likely need to balance its continued desire to use Wagner as a stop-gap measure in pursuing operations in Ukraine with the damage that the increasingly evident chaotic brutality that Wagner has come to institutionalize is inflicting on Russian society. Russian authorities are increasingly undertaking measures to promote self-censorship in Russia under the guise of countering increased information threats resulting from the invasion of Ukraine. A representative of Russia’s Main Radio Frequency Center (GRChTs), a subsidiary of Russian state media censor Roskomnazdor, announced the launch of the "Okulus" automatic search system that automates scanning text, images, and video footage to detect state-censored content, extremist themes, calls for mass illegal activity, suicide, and pro-drug and pro-LGBTQ content (which Moscow apparently views as posing a national security threat). The GRChTs will reportedly fully develop Okulus by 2025.[13] The Russian Okulus has no connection to any technology offerings of Western companies that have similar names. The GRChTs claimed that an unprecedented amount of fake information disseminated at high speed has flooded the Russian information space following the start of the invasion of Ukraine and that Okulus can analyze 200,000 images per day (an increase from the manual processing of 106 images and 101 videos per day) to address this increase in information.[14] A Belarusian hacker group that supposedly hacked into Okulus claimed that GRChTs programmed Okulus to find personal insults directed at Russian President Vladimir Putin, including comparisons to unflattering figures.[15] Okulus, alongside other recent Kremlin efforts to digitize Russian society while simultaneously expanding control of digital Russia, are likely efforts to scare Russians into further self-censorship. It is also unclear to what extent the Kremlin will shield critical milbloggers from such systems. Independent Russian language opposition outlet Meduza reported that Roskomnazdor may soon ban YouTube and that Russian state-affiliated social media outlet VK is expanding its social media monopoly to recruit famous Russian-language content creators on YouTube to its video service. VK is also attempting to expand its music streaming service, likely in an effort to eliminate Russians’ interactions with unwanted content.[16] Russian authorities also seek to expand the scope of rhetoric eligible for censorship. A United Russia State Duma Deputy announced on February 12 that he is planning to propose legislation to introduce criminal liability for insulting Russian military figures with the titles "Hero of Russia" and "Hero of the USSR."[17] The Kremlin’s collective skin appears to be thinning as the war protracts at a rate that can be measured by the number of phrases and words Russians are forbidden to say. Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to publicly stand by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as Russian forces continue to suffer catastrophic casualties around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast. Putin commented on a Russian state TV show recorded on February 9 and broadcast on February 12 that Russian "naval infantry is working as it should right now" and that the Pacific and Northern fleets are "heroically fighting."[18] Putin likely deliberately praised his Pacific and Northern fleets against the backdrop of highly published and substantial losses to mechanized elements of the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade of the Pacific Fleet in their assault on Vuhledar.[19] The Russian MoD had been silent regarding Russian losses in Vuhledar, and Putin’s comment follows Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu’s statement on February 7 that Russian forces are successfully developing an offensive in Vuhledar.[20] Putin is likely deliberately doubling down on the Russian MoD’s extremely overly optimistic description of the Vuhledar frontline to sustain the narrative of an imminent and sweeping major Russian offensive in Donetsk Oblast. Putin is also likely refraining from siding with critical milbloggers who had been increasingly accusing the Russian MoD and military command of failing to learn from their previous mistakes when conducting mechanized drives.[21] Putin’s comment, however, may also signal an intent to reinforce the assault on Vuhledar with more mobilized forces or by recommitting remaining Northern Fleet elements to the area.[22] ISW recently observed Ukrainian forces destroying Russian surface-to-air missile systems—reportedly belonging to the 80th Separate Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade of the Northern Fleet—in occupied Kherson Oblast.[23] Ukrainian officials have also previously reported that the Russian military had been accumulating some forces in Mariupol, just 75km southeast of Vuhledar.[24] These indicators suggest that Russian forces, including elements of the Northern Fleet, may be preparing for commitment to Vuhledar. Putin may have been signaling his continued support for Russian forces there to offset news of significant defeats to conventional Russian units on critical sectors of the front. The Russian military’s use of mobilized personnel as replacements in battle-damaged units is unlikely to generate sufficient offensive capabilities for a large-scale and rapid mechanized advance. Representative of the Ukrainian Tavriisk operational direction, Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, stated that the Russian military will need to restaff the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade for the third time due to its losses in Vuhledar and previous military failures around Kyiv Oblast and Pavlivka, Donetsk Oblast.[25] Dmytrashkivskyi noted that the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade had 5,000 servicemen prior to its defeat in Vuhledar. A Russian serviceman from the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade who participated in an assault on Vuhledar told a Russian opposition outlet that the brigade was 80% to 90% staffed with mobilized men because the Russian military command consistently reinforces Russian units with mobilized servicemen.[26] Russia’s continued reliance on mobilized men who were unable to perform military tasks such as identifying and detecting minefields or knowing what to do having blundered into them during the assault indicates that these mobilized elements do not have the necessary combat experience necessary to stage a successful mechanized offensive. These mobilized men have likely received limited individual training and lack the unit cohesion and professional training or experience necessary for large-scale mechanized offensives. Russia may deploy additional mobilized elements that may be able to conduct sound defensive operations or attrition-based offensive operations to the Vuhledar frontline, but these mobilized soldiers are unlikely to become effective mechanized elements capable of mounting successful offensive operations in any short period of months. Key Takeaways Moscow continues to leverage its relationship with Iran to provide military support for the war in Ukraine. The Wagner Group’s continued dissemination of deliberately brutal extrajudicial execution videos and generally graphic content is normalizing an increasing level of brutality and thuggishness within the domestic Russian information space. Russian military command is facing challenges integrating irregular armed formations with conventional forces. Russian authorities are increasingly undertaking measures to promote self-censorship in Russia under the guise of countering increased information threats resulting from the invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to publicly stand by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) as his naval infantry continues to suffer catastrophic casualties around Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna. Russian forces made marginal territorial gains near Bakhmut and continued to conduct ground attacks across the Donetsk Oblast front line. Russian forces unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast while continuing to fortify their positions in the region. Russian officials and regime-linked actors continue to exploit assets from captured Ukrainian cities for economic and military benefit. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 14, 2023 Share Posted February 14, 2023 Composer Mick Gordon is donating his fee from Atomic Heart to Ukrainian humanitarian relief efforts: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 14, 2023 Share Posted February 14, 2023 Poor guy can't catch a break, huh. Well, good for him. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 15, 2023 Share Posted February 15, 2023 ISW analysis for 14 February 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 14, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signaled on February 14 that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s 54 member states will continue to support Ukraine in the long run. Austin stated that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (a coalition of 54 states s Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signaled on February 14 that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s 54 member states will continue to support Ukraine in the long run. Austin stated that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (a coalition of 54 states supporting Ukraine’s defense) will “support Ukraine's fight for freedom over the long haul” and will support Ukraine during a spring counteroffensive.[1] The Washington Post reported on February 13 that the Biden administration will announce a new aid package for Ukraine “in the next week.”[2] The Washington Post reported that US officials have privately signaled to Ukraine that Western security aid to Ukraine is finite, however. The Washington Post reported on February 13 that an anonymous US government official stated that US government officials are trying to “impress upon [Ukrainian officials] that [the US Government] can’t do anything and everything forever.”[3] The Washington Post also reported that US officials stated that recent Western aid packages for Ukraine “represent Kyiv’s best chance to decisively change the course of the war.“[4] Western reporting indicates that there continue to be Western concerns about Ukraine’s determination to hold Bakhmut. The Washington Post also reported that US defense planners assess that Ukrainian forces are unable to simultaneously defend Bakhmut and launch a spring counteroffensive and have urged Ukraine to prioritize the spring counteroffensive over defending Bakhmut.[5] ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s decision to defend Bakhmut is likely a strategically sound effort despite its costs for Ukraine.[6] Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut has forced the Kremlin to expend much of the Wagner Group as a force and commit high-value Russian airborne forces to sustain attritional advances.[7] Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut has degraded significant Russian forces and will likely set favorable conditions for a future Ukrainian counteroffensive. Had Russian troops taken Bakhmut without significant Ukrainian resistance they could have hoped to expand operations in ways that could have forced Ukraine to construct hasty defensive positions in less favorable terrain. Therefore, Ukraine’s defense of Bakhmut and undertaking an effort to set conditions for a counteroffensive are likely complementary, not mutually exclusive, activities considering that Russian forces would have continued their offensive beyond Bakhmut had Ukraine yielded the city earlier. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly recruiting convicts and mimicking the Wagner Group’s treatment of convicts as cannon fodder. CNN reported that the Russian MoD had been directly recruiting prisoners who deployed to Soledar, Donetsk Oblast, into formations of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) 2nd Army Corps in October 2022.[8] Convicts complained to CNN about gruesome abuses and noted that they suffered heavy casualties after they were ordered to storm Ukrainian defensive positions. CNN also obtained a recording from a deceased convict who feared that the Russian MoD would execute him after he survived an assault on Soledar, though this soldier was killed in action days later anyway. These convicts specified that the Russian MoD recruited them after Wagner Group initially overlooked them, and even accused Russian forces of conducting deliberate friendly fire against the convicts. The Russian MoD’s decision to recruit prisoners is an indicator that the Kremlin seeks to exploit convicts for future human wave attacks in a similar fashion as the Wagner Group despite convicts’ limited combat effectiveness. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate Andriy Usov stated that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov are creating a convict cannon fodder reserve that they could directly control through the MoD’s own private military companies.[9] Russian MoD’s integration of these convict forces into the LNR formations also may suggest that Russian military commanders are attempting to avoid the restructuring of some of their conventional units to fit underprepared convicts. ISW had previously observed instances of Russian proxy armed formations receiving poor treatment from Russian conventional forces, and the Russian command may have sought to not further disturb unit morale by integrating convicts.[10] The Russian MoD’s recruitment of prisoners in fall 2022 may also coincide with the intensifying criticism from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Prigozhin began to publicly attack Russian military commanders in early October, and the Russian MoD’s intervention in his recruitment scheme may have ignited some of these grievances with the conventional Russian military and MoD bureaucracy.[11] A representative for the Russian prisoner group Gulagu.net also noted that many in Moscow began to fear Prigozhin and his unpredictable and ever-growing large “organized criminal group of mercenaries and killers.”[12] The Kremlin has since been distancing itself from Wagner—both rhetorically and by likely depriving Prigozhin of the ability to recruit and train convicts. The Ukrainian General Staff, for example, reported that Russian MoD began to use the Kadamovsky Training Ground in Rostov Oblast to train mobilized and volunteer personnel for a few weeks, while Wagner had not been able to train at the training ground since the beginning of 2023.[13] Key Takeaways US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin signaled on February 14 that the Ukraine Defense Contact Group’s 54 member states will continue to support Ukraine in the long run. The Washington Post reported that US officials have privately signaled to Ukraine that Western security aid to Ukraine is finite, however. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly recruiting convicts and mimicking the Wagner Group’s treatment of convicts as cannon fodder. Russian forces continued offensive actions in the Kupyansk direction and along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 14. Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the western outskirts of Donetsk City on February 14. Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast or in Kherson, Mykolaiv, or western Zaporizhia oblasts on February 14. Russian ground forces on the Kola Peninsula in northwestern Russia have been reduced to one-fifth of their initial strength numbers before the invasion of Ukraine, supporting ISW’s longtime assessment that the Kremlin is not concerned about a NATO conventional military threat against Russia. A Ukrainian and Tatar partisan group reportedly conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a car carrying two Russian military personnel and two Russian special service representatives in Nova Kakhovka on February 10. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko may meet on February 17. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 16, 2023 Share Posted February 16, 2023 ISW analysis for 15 February 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 15, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Russia’s costly military campaign in Ukraine has likely significantly depleted Russian equipment and manpower reserves necessary to sustain a successful large-scale offensive in eastern Ukraine. UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace told the BBC that the UK h Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Russia’s costly military campaign in Ukraine has likely significantly depleted Russian equipment and manpower reserves necessary to sustain a successful large-scale offensive in eastern Ukraine. UK Defense Secretary Ben Wallace told the BBC that the UK had not seen the Russian “massing of a single force to punch through in a big offensive” and noted that Russians are now trying to advance in Donbas at a “huge cost.”[1] Wallace estimated that Russia could have committed up to 97 percent of its army to the fight in Ukraine and that its combat effectiveness has decreased by 40 percent due to an “almost First World War level of attrition” that measures Russian advances in meters in human wave attacks. ISW cannot independently confirm Wallace’s estimates, but his observation that Russia lacks sufficient mechanized combat power for a breakthrough aligns with previous ISW assessments that the conventional Russian military must undergo significant reconstitution before regaining the ability to conduct effective maneuver warfare.[2] Wallace’s observations also suggest that Russia does not have untapped combat-ready reserves capable of executing a large-scale offensive, which is also ISW’s assessment. Russia’s inability to regenerate expended mechanized vehicles in the short term further restricts Russian maneuver warfare capabilities. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) reported that Russia lost about 50 percent of its T-72B and T-72B3M tanks and many T-80 tanks, forcing Russian forces to rely on older equipment.[3] Wallace noted that two-thirds of Russia’s tanks are destroyed or unusable. The UK Ministry of Defense assessed that the Kremlin likely recognizes that Russia’s low industrial output is a “critical weakness,” and that Russian production is not meeting the Kremlin’s long-term requirements.[4] Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, for example, called for increased production of weapons and modern tanks on February 9.[5] The Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) noted that Russia is still capable of producing large quantities of small arms, missiles, and tanks but that its defense industry base (DIB) will continue to struggle to offset the effects of Western sanctions.[6] The NIS added that Russia will also need to undergo an extensive effort to set up new production lines and will need time to recruit and train workers. Some Russian defense firms continue to complain that they do not have sufficient personnel to support the intensified industrial effort, while Russian pro-war milbloggers noted that Russia needs to immediately embark on modernization and personnel recruitment efforts to solve issues with tank production.[7] Such measures are unlikely to increase the Russian defense industry’s capacity to produce tanks rapidly and at scale, and would certainly not do so in time to affect the outcome of the current Russian offensive or of a Ukrainian counter-offensive launched in the coming months. The timely Western provisions of tanks and armored vehicles to Ukraine would further offset Russia’s ability to conduct mechanized warfare as Russia struggles to restart its defense production in the immediate term. Ukraine likely continues to have a window of opportunity to initiate large-scale counteroffensives over the next few months, but its ability to do so likely rests heavily on the speed and scale at which the West provides it the necessary materiel, particularly tanks and armored vehicles. Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to announce measures for further escalation of the war in Ukraine, major new Russian mobilization initiatives, or any other significant policy in his planned address to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 21. The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly to the Russian State Duma and Federation Council is an annual speech introduced to the Russian constitution in February 1994 that is roughly equivalent to the US President’s annual State of the Union Address. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on February 15 that Russian federal television channels will set aside an hour to broadcast Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly on February 21.[8] Putin postponed his annual address to the Federal Assembly several times in 2022 likely in hopes of eventually using this speech to celebrate sweeping Russian victories in Ukraine but was unable to do so due to the lack of such victories and amidst heightened criticism of the Kremlin’s management of the war.[9] Putin has delivered unimpressive addresses in recent months to mark symbolic anniversaries and dates and likely scheduled his postponed address to coincide with the first anniversary of Russia’s recognition of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR/LNR).[10] Putin will likely repackage Russian measures to integrate occupied territories into the Russian Federation as a novel achievement. Russian military failures in Ukraine continue to deny Putin the ability to present military success to the Russian public. The Russian military has not achieved significant operational success in Ukraine since the capture of Severodonetsk in July 2022. Ukrainian forces have liberated almost 18,000 square kilometers of territory since then. Putin may have scheduled the address to the federal assembly in the expectation that Russian forces would secure at least a tactical success in the Bakhmut area, although Russian forces have only gained about 500 square kilometers in the Bakhmut area in intensive campaigning since July 4, 2022, while suffering extravagant casualties. Putin could announce the start of a subsequent mobilization wave, although most indicators and assessments suggest that he will not do so at this time.[11] ISW, along with UK Defense Minister Ben Wallace, assesses that the Russian military has already committed a significant number of its available formations to intensified offensive operations in Ukraine and that the lack of large uncommitted reserves will likely prevent Putin from announcing the start of an entirely new large-scale offensive effort.[12] Putin will likely continue to deliver insignificant public addresses as the absence of Russian military success in Ukraine deprives him of the opportunity to claim or convincingly promise a victory of any significance. The stubborn Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut itself, despite the cost in Ukrainian lives and materiel, would prevent Putin from even claiming that Russia has secured that city on the war’s anniversary, a claim that could give Putin, the Russian military, and the Russian public renewed hope of winning and possibly increase the Kremlin’s willingness to demand more of its people to press on. The Kremlin continues to pursue efforts to censor dissent through societal intimidation tactics. Russian Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko proposed on February 15 that federal communication supervisor Roskomnadzor publish a list of Telegram channels that are hostile to Russia and label such channels with icons indicating this status.[13] The Kremlin is unable to force Telegram to introduce these icons and is seemingly unwilling to block Telegram, which pro-Russian milbloggers use heavily to speak to the Russian people. The list is likely meant instead to intimidate the Russian public into refraining from engaging with content that the Kremlin deems to be dangerous to Russian security. The Kremlin is likely to include independent media, Western sources, and opposition outlets on the list. The Kremlin is highly unlikely to use the measure to target milbloggers, even those critical of the Russian military or the Kremlin itself, as they continue to appeal to the ultra-nationalist pro-war community that is their audience. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on February 15 that Iran and Russia were creating and sharing technology on high-precision bombs, missiles for UAVs, and attack aircraft. The milblogger alleged that Russia has agreed to purchase over 100,000 Iranian artillery and mortar rounds and especially 152mm rounds. Rybar stated that Iran possesses large stocks of 122mm shells for D-30 howitzers and BM-21 Grad Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). The milblogger suggested that Russia could employ Iranian proxies and partners in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and other unnamed countries to fight in Ukraine.[14] Key Takeaways Russia’s costly military campaign in Ukraine has likely significantly depleted Russian equipment and manpower reserves necessary to sustain a successful large-scale offensive in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s inability to reconstruct spent mechanized material in the short term further restricts the Russian military’s mechanized maneuver warfare capabilities. Russian President Vladimir Putin is unlikely to announce measures for further escalation of the war in Ukraine, major new Russian mobilization initiatives, or any other significant policy in his planned address to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 21. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove and along the Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, along the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources implied that Ukrainian forces may hold positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, although ISW has not observed any confirmation of the claim. The Kremlin continues to fund its war efforts in Ukraine from regional budgets. The Russian government continues to further integrate occupied territories into Russian governance structures. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted February 16, 2023 Share Posted February 16, 2023 Top Russian Military Official Dead After Fall From 16th Floor WWW.THEDAILYBEAST.COM Marina Yankina handled cash flows for the Western Military District. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
TUFKAK Posted February 16, 2023 Share Posted February 16, 2023 2 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said: Top Russian Military Official Dead After Fall From 16th Floor WWW.THEDAILYBEAST.COM Marina Yankina handled cash flows for the Western Military District. Did he stab himself on the way down? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Demut Posted February 16, 2023 Share Posted February 16, 2023 Marina is a woman's name (note the -a ending). This was her: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted February 17, 2023 Share Posted February 17, 2023 Crazy footage Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted February 17, 2023 Author Share Posted February 17, 2023 Russia ‘loses 2,000 troops for every 100 yards won’ WWW.THETIMES.CO.UK Nato is racing against the clock to get anti-aircraft missiles and ammunition to Ukraine after American intelligence warned that Russia will switch to “aerial combat” in a new spring offensive against Kyiv. In a briefing to Nato defence ministers in Brussels, US officials warned that there was “a lot Russia also appear to be massing airplanes along their border. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted February 17, 2023 Share Posted February 17, 2023 ISW analysis for 16 February 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Russian forces conducted another missile strike on infrastructure facilities throughout Ukraine on February 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces fired 32 air- and sea-launched missiles at Ukraine, including 12 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Russian forces conducted another missile strike on infrastructure facilities throughout Ukraine on February 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces fired 32 air- and sea-launched missiles at Ukraine, including 12 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from Tu-95MS aircraft over the Caspian Sea, 8 Kalibr cruise missiles from a Black Sea frigate, 12 Kh-22 cruise missiles from Tu-22M3 long-range bombers over Kursk Oblast, and 2 Kh-59 cruise missiles from Su-35 aircraft over Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Ukrainian air defense reportedly shot down 14 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and 2 Kh-59 cruise missiles, 6 over Mykolaiv Oblast, 2 over Kherson Oblast, and the remainder over western regions of Ukraine.[2] Russian missiles struck infrastructure targets in Lviv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Air Force Command spokesperson Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces have changed their tactics and are launching cruise missiles at night, instead of in the middle of day, in order to take Ukrainian air defense forces by surprise.[4] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Federation Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova on February 16, confirming that the Kremlin is directly involved in facilitating the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families. During an in-person working meeting with Lvova-Belova, Putin stated that the number of applications submitted by Russian citizens for the adoption of children from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts is growing significantly.[5] Lvova-Belova noted that she herself adopted a child from Mariupol and stated that she has particularly been working with Russian families to facilitate the placement of Ukrainian children into Russian homes, highlighting the story of one Moscow Oblast family who took custody of nine children.[6] Lvova-Belova confirmed that Russian regional governors are facilitating adoption efforts and emphasized the role of Chechen Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s efforts to work with her on programs for “difficult teenagers.”[7] Lvova-Belova’s and Putin’s meeting is likely a result of Putin’s January 3 list of instructions to Lvova-Belova and the occupation heads of occupied oblasts directing them to take a number of measures ostensibly to support children in occupied areas of Ukraine.[8] This meeting is additionally noteworthy because it suggests that Putin himself is overseeing and directing efforts to facilitate deportation and adoption programs, which ISW continues to assess may constitute a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[9] Putin also ostensibly made a limited concession to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin during his meeting with Lvova-Belova. Lvova-Belova noted that some servicemembers are fighting for Russia in private military companies (PMCs) but that their families aren’t receiving the same social support as families of other servicemembers.[10] Putin responded that volunteers, contract servicemen, and everyone in the Russian Armed Forces are equal and that Russian officials are working on providing social benefits to all families, including those of PMC fighters. While Putin did not mention the Wagner Group explicitly, the allusion to PMCs suggests that Putin to some degree sees such irregular military formations as equal to conventional Russian forces. The provision of social guarantees to families of PMCs, especially Wagner, would mark an inflection from Putin’s recent attempts to disenfranchise Wagner and move closer to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) establishment, on which ISW has previously reported.[11] Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces aim to capture Bakhmut by the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, which would require a significantly higher rate of Russian advance than anything seen for many months. Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated on February 16 that Russian forces intend to capture Bakhmut by February 24 to mark the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine and plan to conduct a massive series of missile strikes to mark the date.[12] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin recently stated that he expects Wagner Group fighters to encircle Bakhmut by March or April, and Prigozhin‘s pragmatic assessments of Russian advances in the Bakhmut area have generally been closer to tactical realities than assessments forecasting rapid Russian advances.[13] Russian forces do not appear to be quickening their rate of advance around Bakhmut and are unlikely to meet this reported February 24 goal. Ukrainian forces could always decide that the costs associated with holding Bakhmut are too high and voluntarily withdraw from the city, although Ukrainian forces and leaders continue to indicate that they intend to hold the city. ISW previously assessed that the Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut would likely prevent Putin from claiming that Russian forces secured the city on the anniversary of the invasion in an attempt to renew hope in a Russian victory in Ukraine.[14] The Kremlin may launch another series of missile strikes on civilian targets throughout Ukraine to mark the symbolic anniversary as actual military success continues to evade the Russian military. Russian forces are reportedly increasing their use of airpower in Ukraine but are unlikely to dedicate significant amounts of airpower to combat operations over Ukrainian-controlled territory. The Financial Times (FT), citing shared NATO-member intelligence, reported on February 14 that Russia is massing fixed-wing and rotary aircraft near the Russo-Ukrainian border and suggested that Russian fighter jets may support an offensive on the ground.[15] Russian opposition outlet Important Stories, citing an internal Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) source, reported on February 16 that the Russian military is changing tactics and has committed to using large amounts of airpower in Ukraine.[16] A senior NATO official reported that 80 percent of Russia’s airpower remains intact and that Russian forces have been attempting to disable Ukrainian air defenses in preparation for a large strike campaign.[17] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on February 16 that Russian sortie rates have increased over the past week to levels last seen in summer 2022 but noted that Russian forces have not increased their air presence in Ukraine and assessed that Russian forces are not likely preparing for an extended air campaign.[18] US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that current Ukrainian air defense capabilities are not sufficient to combat a renewed wave of air attacks but stated that there are no imminent signs of a massive Russian aerial attack.[19] Important Stories noted that Russian forces have not likely adequately trained enough personnel to fully crew their aircraft.[20] Russian forces would likely suffer unsustainable aircraft losses if they committed aircraft to extended combat operations like a strategic bombing campaign or close air support, especially if Western states provide Ukraine with adequate air defense capabilities. Russia and Ukraine exchanged 202 prisoners-of-war (POWs) in a one-for-one exchange on February 16.[21] Head of the Ukrainian Presidential Office, Andriy Yermak, stated that of the 101 personnel Ukraine received, 94 were taken prisoner in Mariupol and that 63 of them were defenders of the Azovstal plant.[22] A Russian source expressed frustration that the Russian Ministry of Defense casually released Azovstal POWs while Russian authorities imposed a harsh sentence against Russian journalist Maria Ponomarenko for claiming that Russian forces destroyed the Mariupol Drama Theater.[23] A court in Barnaul, Siberia sentenced Ponomarenko on February 15 under the law against the dissemination of fake information about the Russian military to six years in a strict regime penal colony.[24] Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to subtly attack the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) credibility. Wagner Group artillerymen posted a video on social media on February 16 in which they claimed that Wagner Group artillery elements lack artillery ammunition and are “cut off” from ammunition supplies — implying that the Russian MoD is sabotaging Wagner Group’s ammunition supply despite Prigozhin’s claims that the Wagner Group is the main combat-ready force on the frontlines.[25] Prigozhin amplified this narrative when Russian media asked for his comment about the video, stating that these artillerymen are effective fighters simply asking for necessary supplies for success on the battlefield.[26] Prigozhin stated that he personally has had to appeal to “offices in Moscow” to secure resources before and that the fact that he has had to ask for ammunition does not undermine the Russian military's credibility.[27] Prigozhin’s statement nonetheless promotes the larger narrative that the Russian MoD’s incompetence is hamstringing Wagner Group’s frontline forces and supports his larger effort to portray the Russian MoD as ineffective and corrupt.[28] Key Takeaways Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes on infrastructure facilities throughout Ukraine on February 16. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Russian Federation Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova on February 16, confirming that the Kremlin is directly involved in facilitating the deportation and adoption of Ukrainian children into Russian families. Ukrainian officials stated that Russian forces aim to capture Bakhmut by the first anniversary of the invasion of Ukraine, which would require a significantly higher rate of Russian advance than has been recently observed. Russian forces are reportedly increasing their use of airpower in Ukraine but are unlikely to attempt dramatically increased air operations over Ukrainian-controlled territory. Russia and Ukraine exchanged 202 prisoners-of-war (POWs) in a one-for-one exchange. Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin continues to subtly attack the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) credibility. Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna. Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut, along the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activities along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is reportedly continuing its prison recruitment efforts. Russian occupation officials continued efforts to integrate occupied areas into the Russian legal system. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko reiterated his longstanding boilerplate rhetoric that Belarusian forces will attack Ukraine if Ukraine or the West attacks Belarus. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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