Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[SuperSpreader]

27 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

Painting of HIMARS:

 

Shoulda been uncle Sam 

[Nokra]

22 minutes ago, SuperSpreader said:

Shoulda been uncle Sam Jeb

FTFY

[Air_Delivery]

2 hours ago, Nokra said:

Jeb!

FTFY

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 01 October 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 1 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

---

Ukrainian forces inflicted another significant operational defeat on Russia and liberated Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, on October 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lyman to “more advantageous positions” to

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Ukrainian forces inflicted another significant operational defeat on Russia and liberated Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, on October 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lyman to “more advantageous positions” to avoid the “threat of encirclement” in the settlement.[1] Social media footage and Ukrainian military officials confirmed that Ukrainian forces have entered Lyman and are likely clearing the settlement as of October 1.

 

The Russian information space – composed of Kremlin propagandists, pundits, and milbloggers – registered the defeat as the result of the Russian military command’s failure to send reinforcements in a timely manner, while openly criticizing repeated bureaucratic failures during the mobilization.[2] Russian commentators overwhelmingly expressed their hopes that partial mobilization would generate enough force to resume offensive operations and regain the initiative. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, apparently devastated by the defeat in Lyman, called on Russia to continue to fight to ”liberate” the four annexed territories with all available means including low-yield nuclear weapons.[3]

 

Kadyrov’s rant is similar to the disorganized and often hyperbolic milblogger rants that call for the Kremlin to continue the war in Ukraine, and his call for the use of nuclear weapons was not representative of the discourse within the Russian information space. Russian federal TV channels and ultra-hawkish milbloggers have often discussed Russian nuclear capabilities as part of their efforts to stoke patriotic sentiments among Russian domestic audiences, and Kadyrov’s statement was not especially noteworthy in this context.

 

Kadyrov’s call for using tactical nuclear weapons is likely inconsistent with his demands to continue the “special military operation” to bring more Ukrainian territory under Russian control. The Russian military in its current state is almost certainly unable to operate on a nuclear battlefield even though it has the necessary equipment and has historically trained its units to do so. The chaotic agglomeration of exhausted contract soldiers, hastily mobilized reservists, conscripts, and mercenaries that currently comprise the Russian ground forces could not function in a nuclear environment.  Any areas affected by Russian tactical nuclear weapons would thus be impassable for the Russians, likely precluding Russian advances. This consideration is another factor that reduces the likelihood of Russian tactical nuclear weapons use.

 

Kadyrov blamed the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Colonel General Alexander Lapin, for failures around Lyman. Kadyrov’s attacks gained significant traction within the Russian information space and indicate that the rift between Russian traditional and non-traditional forces is likely growing. Kadyrov stated that Lapin, responsible for the ”central” group of forces in Ukraine, failed to properly equip units operating in the Lyman area and moved his headquarters far from the frontlines. Kadyrov also accused the Russian General Staff and specifically Chief of the General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, of covering up Lapin’s failures. Wagner Group financier Evgeniy Prigozhin publicly agreed with Kadyrov’s criticism of Lapin, saying that the higher military command should fight “barefoot with machine guns on the frontlines.”[4] Milbloggers and state television hosts praised Kadyrov‘s and Prigozhin’s critiques of the Russian military command, adding that the command is corrupt and disinterested in Russian strategic goals.[5] Kadyrov, Lapin, and Prigozhin are all operating in the Donbas sector, and such comments indicate the strains within the Russian forces operating in Ukraine and their leadership. The Kremlin may be amplifying such criticism to set informational conditions for personnel changes within the higher military command in weeks to come.

 

The defeat around Lyman also indicates that Russian President Vladimir Putin – who has reportedly been micromanaging Russian commanders on the ground – is deprioritizing defending Luhansk Oblast in favor of holding occupied territories in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian and Russian sources consistently indicate that Russian forces continued to reinforce Russian positions in Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts, despite the recent collapse of the Kharkiv-Izyum front and even as the Russian positions around Lyman collapsed.[6] The decision not to reinforce vulnerable Kupyansk or Lyman front lines was almost certainly Putin’s, not that of the military command, and suggests that Putin cares far more about holding the strategic terrain of Kherson and Zaporizhia oblasts than he does about Luhansk Oblast.

 

Russia is likely setting conditions to assume legal responsibility for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Russian authorities detained the general director of the ZNPP, Ihor Murashov, on September 30.[7] A Russian miblogger claimed that Murashov’s detention will have no tangible impact on the operation of the plant since the power units are already shut down and stated that authorities are currently undertaking ”routine“ legal work to transfer control of the plant to Russian state nuclear energy corporation Rosatom and create a new legal entity for the ZNPP.[8] Murashov’s detention and the ”legal” process of transferring control of the ZNPP to Rosatom are noteworthy indications that Russian authorities will likely seek to exploit their control of the ZNPP to pressure the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to legitimize the illegal Russian annexations of occupied Ukrainian territory by coercing it to acknowledge Russia‘s legal control over the ZNPP.

 

Russian forces conducted a failed ground attack on Kozacha Lopan in northern Kharkiv Oblast on October 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack on Kozacha Lopan, 5km from the Kharkiv Oblast-Russia border.[9] Such attacks indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin likely retains the aim of regaining control of territory beyond the oblasts he has illegally annexed and is willing to allocate Russian military assets to such offensive actions rather than dedicating them to defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Donbas.

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces liberated Lyman and are likely clearing the settlement as of October 1.
• Russia is likely setting conditions to assume legal responsibility for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
• Ukrainian troops are continuing to conduct counteroffensive operations in Kherson Oblast and setting conditions for future advances.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas of Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued routine strikes against Ukrainian rear areas in the south.
• Russian military leadership is continuing to compromise the future reconstitution of the force by prioritizing the immediate mobilization of as many bodies as possible for ongoing fighting in Ukraine.
• Russian mobilization authorities continue to carry out discriminatory mobilization practices.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Sounds like one of the Russian lines in northern Kherson collapsed and Ukraine pushed over 20km before the Russians established a second line. Ukraine making slow but good progress in Kherson (while making incredible progress in Kharkiv/Donetsk).

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

lol yeah I wonder what happened to them. Surely no Russian commanders sold them.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Let's also look at the change in territory over the last few months:

 

June: Russia + 1,500km²

July: Russia + 165km²

Aug: Russia + 460km²

Sept: Ukraine + 10,600km²

 

A lot of this comes down to defense in depth. Ukraine set up multiple lines of defense, and each time the Russians managed to push forward and the situation became untenable, Ukraine would withdraw back a few km and start again. Russia isn't doing this. Instead, they are basically just massing forces along the frontline and ordering them not to retreat. When Ukraine begins to encircle them, they either surrender or flee. But when they flee, they fall back to locations with no defensive positions set up, so it just repeats.

[silentbob]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Several reports this afternoon are pointing towards multiple UAF breakthroughs in the northern Kherson region and an effective collapse of Russian forces near Kremmina, which was supposed to be their fallback defensive position after their withdrawal from Lyman.

[ThreePi]

42 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

Several reports this afternoon are pointing towards multiple UAF breakthroughs in the northern Kherson region and an effective collapse of Russian forces near Kremmina, which was supposed to be their fallback defensive position after their withdrawal from Lyman.

 

Make them fall back all the way to Moscow!

[CitizenVectron]

43 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

Several reports this afternoon are pointing towards multiple UAF breakthroughs in the northern Kherson region and an effective collapse of Russian forces near Kremmina, which was supposed to be their fallback defensive position after their withdrawal from Lyman.

 

This appears to be what Ukraine is doing on Kherson (two separate drives towards Nova Khakova:

 

 

Morale is high right now in the Ukrainian military:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russian soldiers are using social media to try and get in touch with their commanders for field support as they can't reach them through the chain of command. That's a good sign of military cohesion:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

The Donetsk rout (continuation of the Kharkiv offense):

 

But even more important, the Kherson offense:

 

 

 

If Ukraine is actually near Beryslav, then it's a rout. That's 50km further than initial estimates. Could be incorrect, though.

 

Edit - ah, my phone keeps autocorrecting rout 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Jason]

50 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

The Donetsk rout (continuation of the Kharkiv offense):

 

But even more important, the Kherson offense:

 

 

 

If Ukraine is actually near Beryslav, then it's a rout. That's 50km further than initial estimates. Could be incorrect, though.

 

Edit - ah, my phone keeps autocorrecting rout 

 

Is Rashist supposed to be Fascist?

[CitizenVectron]

22 minutes ago, Jason said:

 

Is Rashist supposed to be Fascist?

 

Basically another slang for Russians in Ukraine (Russian Fascists). Orcs is another popular one.

[Air_Delivery]

Looks like the entire Russian military is on the verge of collapse.  Once the dominos start to fall things tend to happen quickly. 

This war could be mostly over in the next couple months. 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 02 October 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 2 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

---

This campaign assessment special edition focuses on dramatic changes in the Russian information space following the Russian defeat around Lyman and in Kharkiv Oblast and amid the failures of Russia’s partial mobilization. Ukrainian forces made continued g

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

This campaign assessment special edition focuses on dramatic changes in the Russian information space following the Russian defeat around Lyman and in Kharkiv Oblast and amid the failures of Russia’s partial mobilization. Ukrainian forces made continued gains around Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, and have broken through Russian defensive positions in northeastern Kherson Oblast.  Those developments are summarized briefly and will be covered in more detail tomorrow when more confirmation is available.

 

The Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman, combined with the Kremlin’s failure to conduct partial mobilization effectively and fairly are fundamentally changing the Russian information space. Kremlin-sponsored media and Russian milbloggers – a prominent Telegram community composed of Russian war correspondents, former proxy officials, and nationalists – are grieving the loss of Lyman while simultaneously criticizing the bureaucratic failures of the partial mobilization.[1] Kremlin sources and milbloggers are attributing the defeat around Lyman and Kharkiv Oblast to Russian military failures to properly supply and reinforce Russian forces in northern Donbas and complaining about the lack of transparency regarding the progress of the war.[2]

 

Some guests on heavily-edited Kremlin television programs that aired on October 1 even criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to annex four Ukrainian oblasts before securing their administrative borders or even the frontline, expressing doubts about Russia’s ability ever to occupy the entirety of these territories.[3] Kremlin propagandists no longer conceal their disappointment in the conduct of the partial mobilization, frequently discussing the illegal mobilization of some men and noting issues such as alcoholism among newly mobilized forces.[4] Some speaking on live television have expressed the concern that mobilization will not generate the force necessary to regain the initiative on the battlefield, given the poor quality of Russian reserves.[5]

 

The Russian information space has significantly deviated from the narratives preferred by the Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that things are generally under control. The current onslaught of criticism and reporting of operational military details by the Kremlin’s propagandists has come to resemble the milblogger discourse over this past week. The Kremlin narrative had focused on general statements of progress and avoided detailed discussions of current military operations. The Kremlin had never openly recognized a major failure in the war prior to its devastating loss in Kharkiv Oblast, which prompted the partial reserve mobilization.[6]

 

The Russian MoD has consistently focused on exaggerating Russian success in Ukraine with vague optimistic statements while omitting presentations of specific details of the military campaign. The daily Russian MoD briefing has claimed to capture the same villages more than once as ISW and independent investigators have observed, and the Russian MoD rarely releases photographic evidence confirming claims of Russian advances. [7]

The Russian MoD has sought to impose this kind of narrative on the milbloggers as well. Advisor to the Russian Defense Minister Andrey Ilnitsky called on Russian journalists and milbloggers on May 26 to refrain from presenting detailed coverage of the war and to avoid publishing negative information that could help the West infiltrate the Russian information space and win the “hybrid war.”[8]

 

The milbloggers largely disregarded the MoD’s directives, and Putin seemed to support them in this disobedience, rewarding them with a lengthy personal meeting on June 17.[9] Most milbloggers have continued to report Russian battlefield setbacks and to criticize failures in the partial mobilization, often in strident tones. Putin has not apparently punished any major milbloggers for their outspokenness or allowed others to punish them. He has, however, kept their critiques off of the mainstream Russian airwaves. Kremlin mouthpieces on federally-owned TV channels had continued to puppet the MoD and Kremlin lines for the most part—until the partial mobilization.

 

The Kremlin’s declaration of partial mobilization exposed the general Russian public to the consequences of the defeat around Kharkiv and then at Lyman, shattering the Kremlin’s efforts to portray the war as limited and generally successful. The Russian defeat around Lyman has generated even more confusion and negative reporting in the mainstream Russian information space than had the Russian withdrawals from Kyiv, Snake Island, or even Kharkiv. The impact of Lyman is likely greater because Russians now fear being mobilized to fix problems on the battlefield. An independent Russian polling organization, the Levada Center, found that more than half of respondents said that they were afraid that the war in Ukraine could lead to general mobilization, whereas the majority of respondents had not voiced such concerns in February 2022.[10] Russians also likely see that the Kremlin is executing the current partial mobilization – which was supposed to be a limited call-up of qualified reservists – in an illegal and deceptive manner, which places more men at the risk of being mobilized to reinforce collapsing frontlines.

 

Putin relies on controlling the information space in Russia to safeguard his regime much more than on the kind of massive oppression apparatus the Soviet Union used, making disorder in the information space potentially even more dangerous to Putin than it was to the Soviets. Putin has never rebuilt the internal repression apparatus the Soviets had in the KGB, Interior Ministry forces, and Red Army to the scale required to crush domestic opposition by force. Putin has not until recently even imposed the kinds of extreme censorship that characterized the Soviet state. Russians have long had nearly free access to the internet, social media, and virtual private networks (VPNs), and Putin has notably refrained from blocking Telegram even though the platform refused his demands to censor its content and even as he has disrupted his people’s access to other platforms. The Russian information space has instead relied on journalists and TV talk-show guests to enforce coerced self-censorship, especially after the Kremlin adopted a law that threatens Russians with up to 15 years in jail for “discrediting the army.”[11] The criticism on Russian federal TV channels of military failings and failings of the partial mobilization effort, especially following the defeat at Lyman, is thus daring and highly unusual for the Kremlin’s propaganda shows. It has brought the tone and tenor of some of the milblogger critiques of Russia’s performance in the war into the homes of average Russians through official Kremlin channels for the first time.

 

Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Private Military Company financier Evgeniy Prigozhin have further damaged the Kremlin’s vulnerable narratives during and after the fall of Lyman. Kadyrov published a hyperbolic rant on October 1 in which he accused the Russian military command of failing to promptly respond to the deteriorating situation around Lyman and stated that Russia needs to liberate the annexed four oblasts with all available means including low-yield nuclear weapons.[12] Prigozhin reiterated Kadyrov’s critiques of the Russian military leadership. The West‘s focus on Kadyrov’s nuclear threat obscured the true importance of these statements. 

 

Kadyrov and Prigozhin are bona fide members of the small group of leaders Russians call siloviki—people with meaningful power bases and either membership in or direct access to Putin’s inner circle. Kadyrov has a history of irresponsible statements and boasts that do not always grab headlines or shape narratives in Russia. Prigozhin is not a normally dominant voice either, although his prominence has grown in recent weeks.[13] But their statements on October 1 have had a profound effect on the Russian information space. Together they broke the Kremlin’s narrative that attempted to soften the blow of the defeat around Lyman. Federal outlets had largely expressed hopeful attitudes that newly mobilized men and deployed reinforcements could either hold the line or conduct counter-attacks in the near future, prior to Kadyrov’s statement.[14] But talk shows on federally-controlled channels picked up immediately on the Kadyrov-Prigozhin statements, prompting commentators on live television to add to the criticism of the higher military command.[15] The Kremlin’s propagandists even had to disrupt the presentation of the former Russian Southern Military District (SMD) Deputy Commander Andrey Gurulyov when he started to blame the higher military command for the defeat in Lyman during a live broadcast.[16]

 

Kadyrov and Prigozhin’s statement likely publicly undermined Putin’s leadership, possibly inadvertently. Kadyrov specifically targeted the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Colonel General Alexander Lapin, and accused Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov of covering up Lapin’s failures in Lyman. Putin had publicly expressed his trust in Lapin when the Russian MoD announced Lapin’s victory around Lysychansk on June 24.[17] Western military officials have also reported that Putin has been making operational military decisions in Ukraine and micromanaging his military command.[18] Putin is thus likely responsible for the decisions not only not to reinforce Lyman but also to attempt to hold it--facts that are probably known to a number of people in his inner circle at least.[19] Kadyrov’s direct attack on Lapin is thus an indirect attack on Putin, whether Kadyrov realizes it or not. Putin and his mouthpieces have been extremely tight-lipped about the performance of the military commanders or their replacements, which makes Kadyrov’s statement and Prigozhin’s echo of it especially noteworthy.

 

Putin likely recognizes the dangerous path Kadyrov and Prigozhin had begun to walk, prompting push-back by Kremlin-controlled voices and milbloggers against the direct critiques of military commanders. Federal television channels characterized Kadyrov’s statements against Lapin as rather “harsh,” while milbloggers argued that the Russian MoD is more responsible for the defeat claiming that Lapin was not in command of the Lyman garrison.[20]

 

Putin has not previously censored nationalist milblogger figures, Kadyrov, war correspondents, and former proxy officials, likely because he has seen them as voices pushing for his preferred policies that Russians willing to support him are more likely to trust. ISW has previously assessed that Putin is likely attempting to keep the milbloggers on his side and to use them to establish new scapegoats for his failures in Ukraine.[21] Putin may also have obtained a more unvarnished view of what is occurring on the frontlines than he was getting from the chain of command, which may be one of the reasons he met with the milbloggers in mid-June. Milbloggers likely have a reputation with their audiences of being more accurate sources than the Russian MoD because they report setbacks and mistakes while advancing pro-war and patriotic views. Putin likely seeks to retain the favor of the audience these nationalist figures reach as they promote his grandiose vision for the war.

 

The milblogger community may begin to undermine Putin’s narratives to his core audience amidst the defeats and failures of the Russian war in Ukraine, however, especially as their narratives spread to mainstream Kremlin-controlled outlets. Milbloggers are increasingly appearing on Russian state television and in Kremlin-affiliated outlets following the collapse of the Kharkiv frontline and are boldly pointing out failures in the Russian military campaign while exaggerating the need for Russia to win the war and the price Russians should be prepared to pay.[22] Putin likely attempted to win back some of the milbloggers by inviting them to his annexation speech in Moscow and by integrating them into the mainstream media.[23] But mibloggers are fueling impossible expectations and making demands that Putin and the Russian government cannot possibly meet. They insist that Putin seize all of Ukraine when Russian forces are only capable of making incremental territorial gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka. They are calling on Russian military recruitment centers and the Russian MoD to fix the generational bureaucratic issues plaguing partial mobilization. They are likely adding to the domestic problems Putin will face in the coming months, however much it may seem to Putin that they are helping him through a hard time.

 

Putin may be experiencing an odd variant of the problems Mikhail Gorbachev encountered resulting from his glasnost’ (openness) policy. Gorbachev partially opened the Soviet information space in the mid-1980s in the hopes that Soviet citizens would give him insight into the causes of bureaucratic dysfunction within the Soviet state that he could not identify from above. But Soviet citizens did not stop where Gorbachev wanted or expected them to and instead began attacking the entire Soviet system. The reforms (perestroika) he initiated after a period of glasnost’ ended up destroying the Soviet Union rather than strengthening it.

 

Putin is no doubt fully aware of this pattern and surely has no intention of repeating it.  He has never established Soviet-level degrees of control over the Russian information space even as he has steadily narrowed it to only platforms he tolerates. He has absolved the milbloggers of having to adhere to Kremlin-approved narratives while keeping open the platform on which they present to a core constituency on which he relies, and he is now mainstreaming them further.  It remains to be seen how much Putin will tolerate and what will happen if and when he attempts to shut down the milbloggers and their critiques, increasingly of his own decisions, that he has allowed for the moment to circulate in Russia.

 

Key inflections in ongoing military operations on October 2:

• Ukrainian forces continued to liberate settlements east and northeast of Lyman and have liberated Torske in Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces withdrew from their positions northeast of Lyman, likely to positions around Kreminna and along the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[24]
• Ukrainian forces continued to advance on settlements east of Kupyansk and liberated Kisharivka in Kharkiv Oblast.[25]
• Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful assaults around Bakhmut, Vyimka, and Avdiivka.[26]
• Ukrainian forces resumed counteroffensives in northern Kherson Oblast and have secured positions in Zolota Balka and Khreshchenivka. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also liberated Shevchekivka and Lyubymivka, pushing Russian forces to new defensive positions around Mykailivka.[27]
• Russian forces continued to target Kryvyi Rih and Mykolaiv Oblast with Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones.[28]
• Russian State Duma MPs withdrew a law that would have given mobilized men a one-time payment of 300,000 rubles (about $4,980) and other benefits, without providing a reason for their decision.[29] Ukrainian military officials stated that Russian forces are forming a motorized rifle division with mobilized men from Crimea, Krasnodar Krai, and the Republic of Adygea.[30]
• Russian President Vladimir Putin submitted a draft law to the State Duma on admitting the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and Zaporizhia and Kherson Oblasts, to the Russian Federation.[31]

 

 

 

 

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

The apartheid auto guy has a poll about Ukraine and the Ukraine ambassador to Germany is very mad about it (rightfully so)

 

[CayceG]

11 minutes ago, b_m_b_m_b_m said:

The apartheid auto guy has a poll about Ukraine and the Ukraine ambassador to Germany is very mad about it (rightfully so)

 

 

 

I won't be surprised if Musk discontinues Starlink service in Ukraine to spite the Ambassador because of this. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

I see.

 

Kremlin unclear on which parts of Ukraine it has ‘annexed’ | Russia | The Guardian

WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM

---

Comments by Putin’s spokesperson reflect fact that Russia does not control parts of regions it claims to have annexed

 

Quote

 

The Kremlin is still determining which areas of occupied Ukraine it has “annexed”, Vladimir Putin’s spokesperson has said, suggesting Russia does not know where its self-declared international borders are.

 

The surprising admission came in a phone call with journalists, during which Dmitry Peskov was peppered with requests to clarify to which Ukrainian territory Putin had laid claim at a pomp-filled Kremlin ceremony last week.

 

 

Quote

 

Peskov said Donetsk and Luhansk regions in their entirety were part of Russia, despite Russia’s lack of total control over their regions.

 

But Peskow said: “We will continue consultations with the population regarding the borders of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions.”

 

Asked for clarification on the issue, which would also define where Russia’s self-declared international borders are located, Peskov said: “This is the definitive answer for now.”

 

 

[Jason]

1 hour ago, CayceG said:

 

 

I won't be surprised if Musk discontinues Starlink service in Ukraine to spite the Ambassador because of this. 

 

 

 

[mclumber1]

Oh shit VZ is getting in on the roasting too!

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

This strategy has been working very well for Ukraine:

 

 

[Jason]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

Ukraine appears to be advancing in Kherson by 10-20km per day in some places. They theoretically could retake everything west of the Dnipro in a week or two, if the Russians keep fleeing.

[marioandsonic]

22 hours ago, Air_Delivery said:

Looks like the entire Russian military is on the verge of collapse.  Once the dominos start to fall things tend to happen quickly. 

This war could be mostly over in the next couple months. 

 

I doubt Putin would willingly end the war, no matter how bad things get for Russia.  The only way I can see it ending is if there's a coup and Putin is kicked out, or Putin just says fuck it and does something unthinkable.

[SuperSpreader]

There's a lot of Russian money in crypto and tech and that's why these people play dumb.

[SuperSpreader]

8 minutes ago, marioandsonic said:

 

I doubt Putin would willingly end the war, no matter how bad things get for Russia.  The only way I can see it ending is if there's a coup and Putin is kicked out, or Putin just says fuck it and does something unthinkable.

I can see him claim victory after losing.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

5 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

This strategy has been working very well for Ukraine:

 

 

 

This strategy of "envelopment with an exit" appears to have an inherent emphasis on "encouraging" the Russians to leave with (most of) their lives intact while abandoning their equipment.  In this way, the Russians don't feel compelled to make a last stand which would be costly to both them and the advancing UAF units.

[mclumber1]

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

18 minutes ago, mclumber1 said:

 

 

 

Even the use of tactical nuclear warheads in Ukraine is not likely to deter Ukraine from attempting to retake its land. We've all seen what Russians do when they conquer a land (rape, pillage, kidnap children, etc), so from what I've read and seen, Ukrainians would rather die than be conquered. Obviously easy to say that without being tested, but I do believe that Ukraine won't back down, even if Russia uses nuclear weapons. Having said that, it's the US' escalation that is the unknown.

[Uaarkson]

LET’S ACCELERATE THIS BITCH 

[CayceG]

It isn't a nuclear convoy. 

 

It's a convoy of vehicles from a nuclear rocket forces unit. Troops from similar units had been deployed away from their silos to Ukraine. It makes sense that the Russian MoD would be raiding their equipment stocks for vehicles just like they did the soldiers.