Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (30 May 2024) - Biden gives Ukraine permission to strike some targets inside Russia with American weapons

[ThreePi]

What are the odds that Prigozhin has ever actually fired a weapon in real combat? Is it less than 1%?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

2 minutes ago, ThreePi said:

What are the odds that Prigozhin has ever actually fired a weapon in real combat? Is it less than 1%?

 

Far less than 1%

[CitizenVectron]

He's probably cooked a few meals as part of his catering past that have done more damage to bowels than any bullet.

[CitizenVectron]

Maybe it's Medvedev's usual binge-drinking, or maybe it's real:

 

[TUFKAK]

18 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

Far less than 1%

With that trigger “discipline” absolutely 

[CitizenVectron]

lol wtf, wild stuff:

 

Ukraine�s Defence Intelligence lured Russian Mi-8 helicopter into Ukraine

WWW.PRAVDA.COM.UA

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Recently, a Mi-8 helicopter of the Russian Armed Forces ended up in Ukraine as a result of a long-term special operation of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

 

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Ukrainian intelligence lured a pilot of a Mi-8 AMTSh to Ukraine. The helicopter crew made a flight between two air bases and transported parts for Su-27 and Su-30 fighter jets.

 

Along with the pilot on board were two crew members who did not know where the helicopter was actually flying.

 

The Mі-8 landed in Kharkiv Oblast.

 

Ukraine not only convinced an Mi-8 pilot to defect, they got him to first fly to a Russian airbase and pick up a bunch of spare parts for Su-27 and Su-30 fighters. He then flew into Ukraine and landed at an airbase. His two crewmates, who were unaware of the defection and did not know where they were landing, were killed by Ukrainian forces. Not sure if there was a firefight or what happened.

 

The pilot had his family escape into Ukraine beforehand, somehow:

 

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The pilot remained in Ukraine, and his family was taken there in advance. Now, the pilot and his family are in Ukraine.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine apparently launched multiple drones at Moscow this evening. They also took out an S-300/400 air defense battery in Crimea. The last time they did that, a larger strike followed shortly after at nearby strategic targets. Tomorrow is Ukrainian independence day (from the Soviet Union), so I would expect a few high-profile attacks for PR/morale purposes.

[CitizenVectron]

At current rates, Ukraine appears to be destroying Russian artillery at a rate of approximately 500+ per month. That's insane, and would cripple any nation that didn't have the 100-year stockpile of the Soviet Union.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 22 August 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 22, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued to make advances in and around Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of August 22 amid indications that Russian forces likely have a limited presence in the settlement. Geolocated footage published on August 21 and 22

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on August 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the August 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces continued to make advances in and around Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of August 22 amid indications that Russian forces likely have a limited presence in the settlement. Geolocated footage published on August 21 and 22 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced in southeastern Robotyne and east of the settlement near Novopokrovka (13km southeast of Orikhiv).[1]  The Ukrainian 47th Mechanized Brigade published a video on August 22 showing its personnel successfully evacuating civilians from Robotyne while accompanied by Ukrainian journalists.[2] The 47th Mechanized Brigade stated that its personnel broke through multi-echelon Russian defensive lines near Robotyne and have entered the settlement.[3] The evacuations and the presence of Ukrainian journalists suggests that areas of Robotyne may be relatively secure due to diminished Russian positions in the settlement itself and the nearby area. Russian maximalist claims that Ukrainian forces only maintain positions on the very northern outskirts of the settlement are likely false given the footage and reporting from the 47th Brigade. Most Russian milbloggers continue to acknowledge that Ukrainian forces hold positions in much of northern Robotyne and that Russian forces likely control at most positions on the southern outskirts of the settlement at this time.[4]

 

 

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Russian forces appear to be concentrating their limited available reinforcements from elsewhere in the theater in the Orikhiv direction in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian military journalist Konstantin Mashovets reported that elements of the 108th Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) deployed near Robotyne as of August 16 and near Novopokrovka as of August 20.[5] Elements of the 108th were deployed near the Antonivsky Bridge as of July 29, and the “Sokol” Volunteer Battalion of the 108th VDV Regiment was reportedly operating near Staromayorske and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area as of August 14.[6] Elements of the 7th VDV Division’s 56th Regiment have likely been engaged in fighting in the immediate vicinity of Robotyne since early August.[7] Elements of the 7th VDV Division's 247th Regiment appear to be still operating south of Velyka Novosilka in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, although a prominent Russian milblogger suggested that some elements may be operating in the Robotyne area.[8] Elements of the 7th VDV Division's air assault regiments may be deployed across two axis as separate battalions and platoons, however. ISW previously assessed that the lateral redeployment of elements of the 7th VDV Division to the Robotyne area suggested that Ukrainian forces had severely degraded Russian forces in the area, and the possible commitment of elements of all three of its air assault regiments may suggest the further deterioration of the Russian situation in the area. 

 

Ukrainian offensive operations in other sectors of the front remain important because they can fix Russian units in place and prevent further lateral reinforcements. Criticisms of continued Ukrainian efforts in other sectors and calls for Ukraine to concentrate all available reserves on a single axis are thus problematic.  Ukrainian offensive operations around Bakhmut have fixed elements of multiple Russian airborne divisions and separate brigades in that area, as ISW has previously noted, rendering them likely unavailable to stiffen Russian resistance in the south.[9]  Ukrainian offensive operations south of Velyka Novosilka proceeding in parallel with operations toward Melitopol present Russian defenders with multiple dilemmas and the need to choose which axis to reinforce. Sound campaign design requires balancing between weighting a decisive main effort and avoiding allowing the enemy to concentrate all reserves on stopping a single obvious thrust.

 

 

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The Ukrainian advance in the Robotyne area brings Ukrainian forces closer to launching operations against second lines of defense that may be relatively weaker than the first Russian defensive line in the area. ISW has not observed any new Russian formations or units arrive in western Zaporizhia Oblast beyond the lateral transfer of the elements of the 7th VDV Division and the arrival of “Akhmat-Yug" Battalion elements in August.[10] Elements of the 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (19th Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) previously operating near Nesteryanka (12km northwest of Robotyne) have reportedly arrived in the immediate vicinity of Robotyne, likely to reinforce failing Russian defenses in the area.[11] Russian forces deployed to the wider western Zaporizhia Oblast operational direction have been defending against Ukrainian counteroffensives since the start of the counteroffensive without rotation.[12] Russian forces do not appear to have uncommitted regular units in Zaporizhia Oblast. All elements of the Russian grouping in Zaporizhia Oblast that ISW observed in the area in the months leading up to the counteroffensive have since been engaged in defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast or in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[13] ISW has since observed additional Russian elements that were likely already in the area only after they started defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, however, and it remains possible that some yet unobserved and uncommitted elements may occupy positions at secondary lines of defense.[14]

 

The lack of observed Russian formations and units at secondary lines of defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast may suggest that elements of units and formations already engaged in fighting may occupy these positions. Russian tactical reporting about counterattacks in the Robotyne area suggests that the 22nd and 45th Spetsnaz Brigades occupy positions behind the first line of defense and possibly at the second.[15] Elements of the 22nd and 45th Spetsnaz Brigades appear to be responsible for launching counterattacks against significant Ukrainian advances in the area and therefore are likely degraded.[16] The likely lack of Russian operational reserves, together with the limited lateral transfers to western Zaporizhia Oblast and observed separate uncommitted units at second lines of defense, suggests that second lines of Russian defense may be significantly less heavily defended. The Russian formations and units currently occupying secondary lines of defense are largely unknown at this time, however, and ISW offers this assessment with low confidence.

 

Russian forces appear concerned about recent Ukrainian advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.  Satellite imagery from November 2022, December 2022, and August 2023 shows that Russian forces have notably sped up the expansion of defensive fortifications near Chervonoselivka (38km southwest of Velyka Novosilka and 27km from the current frontline) in Zaporizhia Oblast over the last month.[17] Ukrainian Colonel Petro Chernyk stated that all conditions are set for Ukrainian forces to enter the Northern Azov region and “demolish“ Russian positions in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea.[18] Chernyk stated that Russian forces are strengthening their positions on the Perekop Isthmus (around 160km north of Sevastopol) and are building three lines of defense in the area.[19] Chernyk suggested that Russian forces would not have built additional defenses if they were sure they could hold their positions on the Perekop Isthmus.[20] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Major General Kyrylo Budanov stated that Russian forces have created four unspecified “groups” in Crimea in preparation for a Ukrainian counteroffensive and noted that this has never happened before.[21] The construction of additional defensive fortifications in Zaporizhia Oblast and on the Perekop Isthmus and the creation of four unspecified “groups” in Crimea may indicate that Russian forces are growing increasingly concerned about recent Ukrainian advances along the southern front.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to renegotiate the Black Sea Grain Initiative until all of Russia’s extensive terms are met during the BRICS Business Forum in South Africa on August 22. Putin claimed that the West ignored obligations to Russia for the export of grain and fertilizer abroad and that the West prevented Russia from transferring free mineral fertilizers to unspecified countries.[22] Putin claimed that Russia has refused to extend the grain deal since July 18 and will continue to refuse until all Russia’s conditions are met.[23] Putin, nevertheless, reiterated Russia’s promise to send six African countries 25,000 to 50,000 tons of grain for free.[24] Putin’s promotion of Russian agricultural exports to Africa is likely aimed at mitigating dissatisfaction from African countries at Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal and Russia’s destruction of about 180,000 tons of Ukrainian grain, some of which was likely intended for Africa.[25] Putin delivered the remarks via teleconference as Russian and South African concerns about South Africa’s status as a signatory to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Putin’s ICC arrest warrant have shadowed the BRICS forum in the past months.[26]

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be trying to increase Wagner’s presence in Africa as part of an effort to maintain Wagner as a cohesive and independent organization. A Wagner recruitment Telegram channel announced on July 30 that Wagner stopped all recruitment and that all Russian regional recruitment centers suspended work indefinitely before advertising new jobs on August 21.[27] An OSINT monitoring group, “All Eyes on Wagner,” reported on August 22 that Wagner sources have been advertising jobs in the Middle East and Africa following Prigozhin’s August 21 claim that Wagner is expanding its presence in Africa.[28] The advertisement reportedly offers a monthly salary of 150,000 rubles (about $1,500) for jobs in the Middle East and 195,000 to 250,000 rubles (about $2,050 to $2,640) for jobs in Africa.[29] A Wagner recruitment Telegram channel consistently advertised the monthly salary for Wagner positions in Ukraine as 240,000 rubles (about $2,530) since the start of 2023.[30] The significant decrease in salary is consistent with recent reports that Wagner is financially struggling and may be losing personnel due to salary cuts.[31] ISW continues to assess that Wagner‘s new recruitment effort may indicate that Prigozhin is attempting to secure a contract in Africa and deploy existing and new personnel from Russia and Belarus, actions that Prigozhin may see as Wagner’s final option to maintain its independence from the Russian MoD.[32]

 

A Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) delegation arrived in Libya on August 22, likely as part of the Russian MoD’s efforts to set conditions to possibly replace the Wagner Group with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs). Libyan National Army Commander Marshal Khalifa Haftar invited the Russian MoD delegation, led by Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, to Libya to discuss bilateral cooperation in combating international terrorism and other issues.[33]  ISW has observed evidence indicating that Wagner forces continue to operate in Mali, Libya, and the Central African Republic.[34] The arrival of a Russian MoD delegation in Libya indicates that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu likely maintains his reported objectives of taking over Russia’s relationships with African countries and replacing Wagner with MoD-affiliated PMCs.[35]

 

Claims that the Russian MoD formally dismissed nominal Russian deputy theater commander in Ukraine Army General Sergei Surovikin as commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) generated a muted response among Russian milbloggers. Russian opposition journalist Alexey Venidiktov claimed on August 22 that the Russian MoD issued a decree dismissing Surovikin as the commander of the VKS.[36] Russian media figure Ksenia Sobchak claimed that the Russian MoD issued a closed decree dismissing Surovikin on August 18.[37] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that news of Surovikin’s alleged dismissal is not new and does not change anything because Russian authorities removed Surovikin from power immediately after Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion.[38]  

 

The Kremlin is reportedly planning to cancel gubernatorial elections in the Republic of Khakassia in order to prevent a Russian veteran’s loss and ensure a United Russia victory, likely demonstrating the Kremlin’s concern over domestic support for the war and the fragility of its veneer of electoral legitimacy. Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reported on August 21 that the United Russia candidate in the gubernatorial race in the Republic of Khakassia, State Duma deputy and veteran of the war in Ukraine Sergei Sokol, is likely to lose to incumbent Valentin Konovalov of the Communist Party.[39] Kremlin-backed United Russia leadership reportedly realized that primarily promoting Sokol as a veteran of the war in Ukraine was causing voters to question his qualifications to head a regional government and is reportedly now presenting Sokol as an “effective lobbyist” who will be able to garner more support for Khakassia from the federal government. Meduza reported that the Kremlin, in preparation for Sokol’s loss, is planning to cancel the election citing “allegations of falsifications.”[40] The Central Election Commission has already criticized the local election commission for misusing administrative resources in July.[41] The Kremlin will reportedly give Sokol a “compensatory post” in the regional or federal government and conduct new elections with a new United Russia candidate.[42] The Kremlin will reportedly only cancel the elections if the results are close; if Konovalev wins by a significant margin, the Kremlin, according to a Meduza source close to the Presidential Administration, may recognize the results “in order not to inflame the situation.”[43] ISW previously reported that United Russia electoral campaigns are not highlighting the war in Ukraine out of concerns about voter support for the war.[44] ISW also previously reported that the Kremlin likely fears its electoral legitimacy in upcoming elections may weaken, possibly presenting United Russia with a greater need to falsify and manipulate election results.[45]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued to make advances in and around Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of August 22 amid indications that Russian forces likely have a limited presence in the settlement.
• Russian forces appear to be concentrating their limited available reinforcements from elsewhere in the theater in the Orikhiv direction in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian offensive operations in other sectors of the front remain important because they can fix Russian units in place and prevent further lateral reinforcements. Criticisms of continued Ukrainian efforts in other sectors and calls for Ukraine to concentrate all available reserves on a single axis are thus problematic.
• The Ukrainian advance in the Robotyne area brings Ukrainian forces closer to launching operations against second lines of defense that may be relatively weaker than the first Russian defensive line in the area.
• Russian forces appear concerned about recent Ukrainian advances in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to renegotiate the Black Sea Grain Initiative until all of Russia’s extensive terms are met during the BRICS Business Forum in South Africa on August 22.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may be trying to increase Wagner’s presence in Africa as part of an effort to maintain Wagner as a cohesive and independent organization.
• A Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) delegation arrived in Libya on August 22, likely as part of the Russian MoD’s efforts to set conditions to possibly replace the Wagner Group with MoD-affiliated private military companies (PMCs).
• The Kremlin is reportedly planning to cancel gubernatorial elections in the Republic of Khakassia in order to prevent a Russian veteran’s loss and ensure a United Russia victory, likely demonstrating the Kremlin’s concern over domestic support for the war and the fragility of its veneer of electoral legitimacy.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia on August 22 and advanced in certain areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations on at least two sectors of the front on August 22 and made advances near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian authorities continue their campaign of religious persecution in occupied Ukraine.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New video from Kings & Generals:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Robotyne is confirmed as retaken by Ukraine. Astoundingly, there were still people living in the wreckage of the town. Mostly older women, who came and greeted the troops.

[mclumber1]

Pringles is dead

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Just now, mclumber1 said:

Pringles is dead

 

For those wondering:

 

Ten killed in private jet crash north of Moscow - Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin 'on passenger list'

NEWS.SKY.COM

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Ten people have been killed in a private jet crash north of Moscow - with the Russian Civil Aviation Authority saying Yevgeny Prigozhin was on the passenger list.

 

[CayceG]

Putin has ended Prigozhin's reign as head of Wagner. 

 

Wagner boss Prigozhin killed in plane crash in Russia

T.CO

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Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigozhin killed in plane crash in Russia, with nine other people on board also dead

 

 

The private jet carrying Prigozhin and Dimitry Utkin (the most Nazi looking motherfucker you've ever imagined) was shot down over the Tver region in Russia. 

 

 

 

 

Critical support to V. V. Putin!

 

[mclumber1]

Pringles dun goofed when he didn't go all-in in his coup attempt 

[Mr.Vic20]

[CayceG]

I mean...

 

 

[skillzdadirecta]

[Chris-]

Apparently there’s another plane in his name currently in the air, so this might get even funnier!

[skillzdadirecta]

So… the plane fell out a window?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Just now, skillzdadirecta said:

So… the plane fell out a window?

 

It fell out of a window while drinking a cup of tea.

[Firewithin]

three sure things in life.  death, taxes, and this dude was gonna get got

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

We're all checking to see who won the office pool on this one.

[skillzdadirecta]

Just now, Firewithin said:

three sure things in life.  death, taxes, and this dude was gonna get got

Unless… this is a work and we’re all jabronie marks. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

did I do that right?

[skillzdadirecta]

1 minute ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

We're all checking to see who won the office pool on this one.

Some body picked “plane crash”? Very old school 

[TUFKAK]

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

What a tragic and untimely accident

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

I guess this qualifies as a "hostile takeover" of Wagner by the Russian MoD.

[Kal-El814]

32 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

It fell out of a window while drinking a cup of tea.

 

How many poloniums… I mean sugars do you take with your tea

[CastletonSnob]

Prigozhin is dead?

...Is it wrong to want to celebrate?

[ort]

I think there is like a 75% chance Putin took him out and about a 25% chance he faked his own death. Zero chance this is just random.

[Jwheel86]

Some Russian officials are blaming Ukraine. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

11 minutes ago, CastletonSnob said:

Prigozhin is dead?

...Is it wrong to want to celebrate?

 

It would be wrong to NOT want to celebrate!

[mclumber1]

Between this Pringles incident and the US telling all American citizens to immediately leave Belarus, I do wonder if US intelligence believes something is imminent. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

According to Russian sources, the "council of commanders of PMC Wagner" have confirmed the demises of Prigozhin and Utkin.