Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (14 May 2024) - Russia launches new invasion from the north into Kharkiv, soon to launch second corridor into Sumy. Situation is dire

[Uaarkson]

3 minutes ago, Link200 said:

I don't expect a full on nuke being used in Ukraine. The fallout would just go into Russia. Winds *generally* flow west to east.

 

The jetstream is sitting right on top of Ukraine currently and would just pump radioactive crap into Russia.

The long-term radioactive fallout of a low-yield, tactical air burst would be negligible. Even larger bombs don’t generate problematic levels of fallout unless they’re detonated at ground level.

[Link200]

That is why I said "full on nuke." 😉

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

The CIA Director echoes my sentiment regarding the use of tactical/low-yield nukes by Russia:

 

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On Thursday, the CIA director William Burns said that Russia’s poor military performance raised the risk that Putin could deploy a nuclear weapon. He made his remarks in an address at Georgia Tech, reported by The Hill:

 

"Given the potential desperation of Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they’ve faced so far militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons."

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 16 April 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 16 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukraine’s sinking of the Moskva was a significant event that has likely triggered intensified Russian air and missile attacks in retaliation, but the decisive operations of this phase of the war will still be conducted on the ground in eastern Ukraine. T

 

 

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Ukraine’s sinking of the Moskva was a significant event that has likely triggered intensified Russian air and missile attacks in retaliation, but the decisive operations of this phase of the war will still be conducted on the ground in eastern Ukraine. The commitment of the Black Sea Fleet’s naval infantry to the fight around Mariupol some weeks ago meant that Russian naval operations would play a supporting role in the conflict. Increased Russian air and missile attacks are also unlikely to have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war, since there is no reason to assess that Russia has been holding enough air and missile capability in reserve to tip the balance if it is now committed. This report, and likely future reports as well, will thus remain focused on the ground operations, especially those in eastern Ukraine.

 

Russian forces continued to amass troops around Izyum in preparation for continuing offensive operations in eastern Ukraine. The Russians continued small-scale attacks in the vicinities of Izyum, Popasna, and the area around Rubizhne and Severodonetsk—sometimes with artillery, sometimes with mechanized forces. These attacks have not made significant gains so far. It is unclear if they are part of a rolling offensive operation into which Russian reinforcements will be fed as they become available or if they are setting conditions for a larger-scale, better-coordinated offensive that will start soon.

 

The specific terrain on which battles in eastern Ukraine will be fought may constrain the Russians’ ability to take advantage of the number of forces they are amassing for the attack. Eastern Ukraine is famous for being superb terrain for large-scale mechanized maneuver because of the World War II campaigns of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. It is far from clear, however, that Russian forces will find it much more conducive to rapid decisive mechanized operations than other parts of the theater. The Russians have struggled repeatedly to seize built-up areas rapidly or even to reduce them once encircled. They will have to seize several significant population centers to achieve their apparent objectives in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, however, including Severodonetsk, Rubizhne, Lysychansk, Slovyansk, and Kramatorsk, as well as several smaller towns. The difficulties they have encountered taking Rubizhne do not bode well for their rapid success against other built-up areas. The ground itself is also challenging as it is crisscrossed by many small water features and, at the moment, still very muddy. The reinforcements the Russians are bringing into this part of the theater will help, of course, but large numbers of much fresher Russian troops struggled to take relatively small population centers north, west, and northeast of Kyiv even before getting into the Kyiv suburbs proper. The Russians must take the major population centers in Donetsk and Luhansk, however, if they are to achieve the operation’s stated goals.

 

Russian forces will likely continue operating along three primary axes of advance in Donbas: from Izyum south via Slovyansk toward Russian-controlled Donetsk Oblast near Debaltseve; from Rubizhne and Severodonetsk southwest toward the Izyum-Debaltseve highway; and from Popasna west toward that highway. They may open an additional axis of advance from near Donetsk City to the north toward Kramatorsk as well, according to the Ukrainian General Staff.[1] The Russian main effort currently appears to be from Izyum southeast along the highway to Slovyansk. The drive west from Popasna is presumably meant to reach the Izyum-Debaltseve highway, possibly setting conditions to encircle or drive off Ukrainian forces defending against a Russian advance from the Debaltseve area to the northwest. The purpose of the direct assaults on Severodonetsk and Rubizhne is less clear. The Russians may be trying to seize those cities as part of the objective to seize Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, rather than waiting until they have been encircled and trying to reduce them at that point. They may alternatively be seeking to fix Ukrainian forces in that northeastern sector of the salient the Russians intend to encircle. The general pattern of operations and apparent movements of Russian reinforcements suggest that the drive from Izyum to the southwest will be the main effort in this part of the theater but that the Russians will continue to attack on multiple axes that are not immediately mutually supporting.

 

Ukrainian officials report that Russia has concentrated as many as 22 battalion tactical groups (BTGs) in the vicinity of Izyum, but the Russians will struggle to take advantage of that force concentration if they cannot open up parallel axes of advance—something they have notably struggled to do in other parts of the theater. Russian forces are apparently attempting to drive southwest from Izyum toward Barvinkove, which could allow them to open up an axis of advance in addition to the main Izyum-Slovyansk highway. But Barvinkove is a large enough settlement to delay the Russian advance if Ukrainian forces hold it, and the route from Izyum to Barvinkove is not really parallel to the Izyum-Slovyansk highway—Barvinkove is roughly 50 kilometers west of Slovyansk. Taking Barvinkove does not cut the only Ukrainian ground line of communication (GLOC) to Slovyansk, moreover, as another main GLOC to Slovyansk from the west runs through Kramatorsk, about 45 kilometers southeast of Barvinkove.

 

The individual Russian offensives in the east are thus unlikely to proceed dramatically more successfully than similar operations around Kyiv unless the Russians change their operational patterns significantly. The Russians could overwhelm the Ukrainian defenders by the sheer number of different axes of advance forcing the Ukrainians to spread themselves too thinly. But the Ukrainians’ demonstrated will and ability to hold much larger Russian forces at bay in built-up areas for a considerable time suggests that many if not most or even all of these Russian drives will stall. This discussion does not take account of the quality and physical and psychological state of the Russian forces, which we have considered in detail in previous reports, and which makes a sudden dramatic Russian offensive success even less likely.

 

Key Takeaways

• The Russians and their proxies appear to be preparing to declare victory in the Battle of Mariupol, as Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) head Denis Pushilin opened a United Russia party office in the city.
• Russian reinforcements drawn from troops that had fought around Kyiv have appeared in eastern Ukraine. Those reinforcements have not received sufficient time to recover physically or mentally from their losses and defeat around Kyiv and are unlikely to generate combat power proportionate to their numbers.
• Ukrainian officials claim that the Russians canceled the deployment to Syria of one of the last combat units that had not previously seen combat in Ukraine and sent that unit toward Donbas.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

On 4/15/2022 at 4:50 PM, CayceG said:

That's literally carpet bombing. They're carpet bombing the Azovstal plant. They used Tu-22Ms to do it in Syria, and they're doing it here. 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Zaku3]

 

This could be a pic of the Moskva. Unable to conform but strong Beatty energy.

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

4 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Strong “#2 leader of al qaeda” energy in Russia 

[CayceG]

2 hours ago, Zaku3 said:

 

This could be a pic of the Moskva. Unable to conform but strong Beatty energy.

 

It's not. It's been floating around the internet for a few days. Originally, it was posted by a Korean dude and said it was from the inside of another more modern Russian ship--a Steregushchy class corvette. 

[CitizenVectron]

 

Also sounds like the 35th marines have been making attacks in Kherson Oblast. That's surprising because they were based in Odessa as part of the guard duty inc ase of amphibious assault. I guess Ukraine figures that is no longer likely, which will free up some south-eastern forces for action in Kherson.

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

From the sounds of it, Ukraine's forces have been making progress in the last few days in Kharkiv and Luhansk. They appear to be trying to enclose the Russian forces in Izyum, which were themselves trying to encircle the Ukrainian eastern army. Izyum is 120+ miles from the Russian border, and across two rivers. If Ukraine can cut the 20+ BTGs off that are stationed there, it could be decisive in Donbas.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CayceG]

This is an the Moskva after being struck by Ukrainian missiles. 

 

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

I don't see how Russia recovers financially from this war. They can't afford to rebuild half of what they've lost...and they don't even have the manufacturing capability. I think this marks the end of Russia's status as "great power". RIP 1991-2022.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CayceG]

53 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

I don't see how Russia recovers financially from this war. They can't afford to rebuild half of what they've lost...and they don't even have the manufacturing capability. I think this marks the end of Russia's status as "great power". RIP 1991-2022.

 

 

As long as they maintain their nuclear arsenal, they will absolutely remain a great power. 

 

 

 

That said...

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Grain of salt, but Ukraine might believe that the promised mega assault in Donbas might not happen:

 

 

[ThreePi]

Putin has lied to the people of Moscow every single step of the way, why not just pull out and say you accomplished your goals and achieved great victory?

[skillzdadirecta]

2 hours ago, ThreePi said:

Putin has lied to the people of Moscow every single step of the way, why not just pull out and say you accomplished your goals and achieved great victory?

Just pull a Trump and say you won when you really lost. 

[Air_Delivery]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Quite a number of Russian missile strikes overnight, especially targeting Lviv.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

7 hours ago, ThreePi said:

Putin has lied to the people of Moscow every single step of the way, why not just pull out and say you accomplished your goals and achieved great victory?

 

There is every possibility that could occur on May 9 (Victory Day).

[CitizenVectron]

Thread by @PhillipsPOBrien on Thread Reader App

THREADREADERAPP.COM

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@PhillipsPOBrien: Ukrainian counterattack and how it will basically choke off any large Russian offensive in the Donbas unless the Russians move very quickly to regain road access to...

 

Thread on how the main Russian forces in Donbas are massed at Izyum and rely on a single road that Ukraine appears to be trying to cut off:

 

 

The maps make it seem like Russia controls large areas of Ukraine...but on reality they only really control the roads and are afraid to leave them.

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

1 hour ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

There is every possibility that could occur on May 9 (Victory Day).

As you’ve said before: sure, why not?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 17 April 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces likely captured the Port of Mariupol on April 16 despite Ukrainian General Staff denials, reducing organized Ukrainian resistance in the city to the Azovstal factory in eastern Mariupol. Russian and DNR forces released footage on April 16

 

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Russian forces likely captured the Port of Mariupol on April 16 despite Ukrainian General Staff denials, reducing organized Ukrainian resistance in the city to the Azovstal factory in eastern Mariupol. Russian and DNR forces released footage on April 16 confirming their presence in several key locations in southwestern Mariupol, including the port itself. Isolated groups of Ukrainian troops may remain active in Mariupol outside of the Azovstal factory, but they will likely be cleared out by Russian forces in the coming days. Russian forces likely seek to force the remaining defenders of the Azovstal factory to capitulate through overwhelming firepower to avoid costly clearing operations, but remaining Ukrainian defenders appear intent on staging a final stand. Russian forces will likely complete the capture of Mariupol in the coming week, but final assaults will likely continue to cost them dearly.

 

Russian forces continued to amass on the Izyum axis and in eastern Ukraine, increasingly including low-quality proxy conscripts, in parallel with continuous – and unsuccessful – small-scale attacks. Russian forces did not take any territory on the Izyum axis or in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts in the past 24 hours. Russian forces deploying to eastern Ukraine reportedly continue to face significant morale and supply issues and appear unlikely to intend, or be able to, conduct a major offensive surge in the coming days.[1] Deputy Ukrainian Minister of Defense Anna Malyar stated on April 17 that the Russian military is in no hurry to launch an offensive in eastern Ukraine, having learned from their experience from Kyiv – but Russian forces continue localized attacks and are likely unable to amass the cohesive combat power necessary for a major breakthrough.[2]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces likely captured the Port of Mariupol on April 16 despite Ukrainian General Staff denials.
• Russian forces likely seek to force the remaining defenders of the Azovstal factory to capitulate through overwhelming firepower to avoid costly clearing operations, but remaining Ukrainian defenders appear intent on staging a final stand.
• Evgeny Prigozhin, financier of the Wagner Group, is likely active on the ground in eastern Ukraine to coordinate Wagner Group recruitment and funding.
• Russian forces continued their build up around Izyum but did not conduct any offensive operations.

 

The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on April 16 that the Kremlin is increasingly arresting Russian and proxy officers for failures in Ukraine.[3] The GUR reported Russian military authorities established a commission intended to run from March 2 to April 24 in occupied Horlivka to identify the reasons for personnel shortages among Russian forces. The GUR reported that Russian investigators discovered the commanders of Russia’s 3rd Motor Rifle Brigade was 100% staffed at the beginning of the invasion when it in fact only had 55% of its personnel and arrested two battalion commanders in the brigade. The GUR also reported the FSB arrested DNR Defense Spokesperson Eduard Basurin for his ”careless statement” on April 11 revealing Russian intent to use chemical weapons in Mariupol, though there is still no independent confirmation of the Ukrainian claim of Russian chemical weapons use.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

A failure by Moscow to secure the Donbas by conventional means increases the likelihood of the use of WMD (including tactical nuclear weapons) pretty substantially.

[CayceG]

36 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

A failure by Moscow to secure the Donbas by conventional means increases the likelihood of the use of WMD (including tactical nuclear weapons) pretty substantially.

 

What would they target? I can't think of anything of substance that would change their fortunes. 

 

 

I've long understood nuclear weapons as something beyond being just weapons. They have extremely low utility as actual weapons. Their usefulness lies in their existence as political policy tools. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

8 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

What would they target? I can't think of anything of substance that would change their fortunes. 

 

 

I've long understood nuclear weapons as something beyond being just weapons. They have extremely low utility as actual weapons. Their usefulness lies in their existence as political policy tools. 

 

 

That's your answer.

 

They'll either use it on an "uninhabited" part of central Ukraine or an airburst over a Ukrainian city in order to force a political settlement.

[CayceG]

I guess I don't see the application here and that it would lead to a political settlement. 

 

 

But then again, until about the last week or two of military buildup, I didn't see that they were really going to invade Ukraine. They've done stuff I thought was stupid before!

[CitizenVectron]

24 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

 

That's your answer.

 

They'll either use it on an "uninhabited" part of central Ukraine or an airburst over a Ukrainian city in order to force a political settlement.

 

Perhaps I am naive, but I can't see Ukraine surrendering if Russia uses a nuclear weapon, either on the battlefield or as a "shot across the bow" in the atmosphere above Ukraine. Ukraine knows very well what Russia does to conquered nations, and the risk of nuclear death might actually be considered worth preventing the rape, torture, and purges that would follow Russian occupation.

[Jwheel86]

19 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Perhaps I am naive, but I can't see Ukraine surrendering if Russia uses a nuclear weapon, either on the battlefield or as a "shot across the bow" in the atmosphere above Ukraine. Ukraine knows very well what Russia does to conquered nations, and the risk of nuclear death might actually be considered worth preventing the rape, torture, and purges that would follow Russian occupation.

 

The goal would be to scare the west into pressuring Ukraine to settle.