Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 11, 2023 Share Posted June 11, 2023 ISW analysis for 10 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 10, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 10. Russian sources reported Ukrainian activity in Luhansk Oblast near Bilohorivka. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 10. Russian sources reported Ukrainian activity in Luhansk Oblast near Bilohorivka.[1] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty noted that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 1,400m in unspecified areas of the Bakhmut front, and Russian milbloggers reported Ukrainian advances northwest and northeast of Bakhmut.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian troops conducted localized attacks in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, particularly in the Velyka Novosilka area.[3] Geolocated footage posted on June 10 additionally indicates that Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast made localized gains during counterattacks southwest and southeast of Orikhiv, and Russian milbloggers continued to claim that Russian forces in this area are successfully defending against attempted Ukrainian advances.[4] Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine are relying on three main components: early detection and destruction of Ukrainian assault formations, massive use of anti-tank weapons, and mining of territories near Russian defensive positions.[5] The milblogger claimed that minefields have a twofold effect by initially damaging Ukrainian armored vehicles when they attempt to breakthrough the minefield and then again when they retreat from the area.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces responded to the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast following established Russian doctrine, which calls for a first echelon of troops to repel or slow attacking forces with minefields, fortifications, and strongpoints, and a second echelon of forces to counterattack against any enemy breakthrough.[7] Russian reporting of Ukrainian assaults in southern Ukraine in recent days suggests a pattern in which Ukrainian forces conduct limited breakthroughs and temporarily occupy new positions before Russian forces later recapture or push Ukrainian forces out of those positions.[8] This tactical pattern indicates that Russian forces have likely maintained doctrinally sound defensive operations in southern Ukraine, though as ISW previously reported, defending units of the 58th CAA are likely some of the most effective Russian units currently deployed in Ukraine.[9] Russian milbloggers continue to highlight reported superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities as key to disrupting Ukrainian attacks. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian EW units are disrupting Ukrainian communications as well as aviation units and alleged that some Ukrainian mechanized groups were not prepared to fight without communications or with suppressed GPS.[10] Another milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted their own “electronic counter measures” against Russian reconnaissance and control capabilities in areas where there are Ukrainian assaults but that these attempts were unsuccessful.[11] Russian forces have reportedly successfully improved their EW use throughout the invasion of Ukraine.[12] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have tactical advantages in conducting assaults at night due to Western-provided equipment with superior night optics systems. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are launching assaults at night because Western-provided equipment provides Ukrainian forces with “excellent” night vision optics.[13] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov also claimed that night assaults allow Ukrainian forces to more effectively use Western-provided equipment.[14] Russian sources have widely claimed that Ukrainian forces have started or intensified assaults at night in recent days, and Ukrainian forces may be increasingly leveraging the advantages provided by Western systems.[15] Russian sources continue to highlight the role of scarce military district-level Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems against Ukrainian attacks, though Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two of these key systems in recent days. Geolocated footage published on June 8 and 9 confirms that Ukrainian forces have used Western precision munitions (reportedly the Paladin 155mm artillery system) to destroy at least two Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems – highly destructive but scarce artillery assets controlled at the Russian military district level – in western and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[16] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) highlighted the role of Russian thermobaric artillery systems in striking Ukrainian positions on the western Zaporizhia Oblast frontline.[17] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian thermobaric artillery units have consistently fired on Ukrainian forces on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border and in western Zaporizhia Oblast for the past several days and characterized the units as essential to repelling Ukrainian frontal assaults.[18] Russian forces’ apparent reliance on specific artillery assets is noteworthy, as precision Ukrainian strikes on these systems could potentially complicate Russian defensive capabilities and Russian forces are unlikely to possess enough TOS-1A systems to provide the same level of fire support all along the front line. Ukrainian forces are currently attempting an extraordinarily difficult tactical operation – a frontal assault against prepared defensive positions, further complicated by a lack of air superiority – and these initial assaults should not be extrapolated to predict all Ukrainian operations. Ukrainian forces are unsurprisingly taking casualties in initial attacks against some of the best-prepared Russian forces in Ukraine. However, initial attacks – and particularly selected footage that Russian sources are intentionally disseminating and highlighting – are not representative of all Ukrainian operations. The Russian military remains dangerous and Ukrainian forces certainly face a hard fight, but Ukraine has not yet committed the vast majority of its counteroffensive forces and Russian defenses are not uniformly strong along all sectors of the front line. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov established a clear rhetorical line between criticizing the Russian MoD and criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin in a statement on June 9. Kadyrov published a post to Telegram on June 9 outlining the details of a private phone call that occurred between Kadyrov and Wagner Group financier Yevgen Prigozhin in late May after Kadyrov and Prigozhin reportedly reached an agreement for Chechen forces to replace Wagner in Bakhmut.[19] The interactions between Kadyrov and Prigozhin rapidly deteriorated in subsequent days, but Prigozhin claimed that he personally called Kadyrov on June 1 to resolve their dispute.[20] Kadyrov claimed on June 9 that he genuinely believed he was doing his best to help Prigozhin by offering for Chechen troops to replace Wagner fighters but that Prigozhin’s tone towards Kadyrov and the Chechen troops changed suddenly, and Kadyrov felt as though he had to personally mitigate.[21] Kadyrov also noted that he himself has occasionally criticized the Russian MoD but rhetorically drew a line against criticizing Putin directly, claiming he has always understood that Putin’s position as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces means that Putin has the best understanding of battlefield realities.[22] Kadyrov then criticized Wagner for being a weak and ineffective force when faced with the same operational restraints as Chechen forces in previous phases of the war.[23] Kadyrov’s message likely sought to signal his loyalty to Putin and portray Prigozhin as further at odds with the overall Russian military leadership. Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian operational airfield during another missile and drone strike on Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10. Ukrainian Air Force Command reported on June 10 that Russian forces launched eight ground-based missiles of various types and 35 Shahed-type drones at Ukraine from the northern and southern directions and hit an operational airfield in Poltava Oblast with Iskander ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and Iranian-made drones.[24] Poltava Oblast Head Dmytro Lunin noted that the strike damaged airfield infrastructure and other unspecified equipment.[25] Former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) spokesperson Eduard Basurin praised the strike for “finally” targeting Ukrainian airfields.[26] ISW recently assessed that Russia is conducting a new air campaign to target Ukrainian counteroffensive capabilities, and Russian sources will likely use reporting of such strikes to frame the current air campaign as proactive and effective over the backdrop of Ukrainian counterattacks throughout the theater.[27] Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 10. Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine. Russian milbloggers continue to highlight reported superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities as key to disrupting Ukrainian attacks. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have tactical advantages in conducting assaults at night due to Western-provided equipment with superior night optics systems. Russian sources continue to highlight the role of scarce military district-level Russian TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems in defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, though Ukrainian forces destroyed at least two of these key systems in recent days. Ukrainian forces are currently attempting an extraordinarily difficult tactical operation – a frontal assault against prepared defensive positions, further complicated by a lack of air superiority – and these initial assaults should not be extrapolated to predict all Ukrainian operations. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov established a clear rhetorical line between criticizing the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian forces targeted a Ukrainian operational airfield during another missile and drone strike on Ukraine on the night of June 9 to 10. Russian forces made marginal advances northeast of Kupyansk and continued ground attacks near Kreminna. Russian and Ukrainian forces both continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area. Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and have made marginal gains in the area as of June 10. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on June 10 that it plans to formalize the organization of volunteer formations. Russia is further consolidating a centralized media apparatus in occupied areas. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 11, 2023 Share Posted June 11, 2023 Quote Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are continuing to defend against Ukrainian attacks in accord with sound tactical defensive doctrine. A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine are relying on three main components: early detection and destruction of Ukrainian assault formations, massive use of anti-tank weapons, and mining of territories near Russian defensive positions.[5] The milblogger claimed that minefields have a twofold effect by initially damaging Ukrainian armored vehicles when they attempt to breakthrough the minefield and then again when they retreat from the area.[6] ISW previously assessed that Russian forces responded to the start of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast following established Russian doctrine, which calls for a first echelon of troops to repel or slow attacking forces with minefields, fortifications, and strongpoints, and a second echelon of forces to counterattack against any enemy breakthrough.[7] Russian reporting of Ukrainian assaults in southern Ukraine in recent days suggests a pattern in which Ukrainian forces conduct limited breakthroughs and temporarily occupy new positions before Russian forces later recapture or push Ukrainian forces out of those positions.[8] This tactical pattern indicates that Russian forces have likely maintained doctrinally sound defensive operations in southern Ukraine, though as ISW previously reported, defending units of the 58th CAA are likely some of the most effective Russian units currently deployed in Ukraine. This is going to be an absolute slog for the UAF and, quite frankly, I'm not especially optimistic that any significant gains (if any) will be made in the south. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted June 11, 2023 Author Share Posted June 11, 2023 Ukraine is making decent gains in Donetsk Oblast, moving multiple kilometers deep. Wouldn't call it a major breakthrough yet, but Russians are abandoning positions before Ukraine even gets there. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted June 11, 2023 Author Share Posted June 11, 2023 Ukraine appears to have captured Makarivka, Donetsk. That would mean they've advanced 6km in the last 24 hours in Donetsk. There are rains coming to Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk, meaning the push might slow for a week. However, there are rumblings of armour movement in Kharkiv. It truly does appear (so far) that Ukraine isn't making one or two large thrusts, but instead dozens of smaller thrusts across the entire country, trying to find points to breakthrough and get behind the Russian lines. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 12, 2023 Share Posted June 12, 2023 ISW analysis for 11 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 11, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three areas of the front and made territorial gains on June 10 and 11. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three areas of the front and made territorial gains on June 10 and 11. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and Russian sources reported continued Ukrainian ground attacks on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.[1] Geolocated footage and Russian sources indicated that Ukrainian forces liberated multiple settlements during continued ground attacks south, southwest, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast.[2] Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces continued to attack southwest of Orikhiv in Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces made gains in this area.[3] Ukrainian forces made visually verified advances in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast, which Russian sources confirmed but sought to downplay. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 300 to 1,500 meters in southern Ukraine.[4] Malyar and other Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces made gains south of Velyka Novosilka between June 10 and 11, including liberating Makarivka, Neskuchne, Blahodatne, Storozheve, and Novodarivka.[5] Some Russian sources reported that battles are ongoing in “grey zone” or contested areas or that Ukrainian forces are operating in areas that Russian forces did not fully occupy before Ukrainian attacks in southern Ukraine.[6] Russian sources are likely referring to Ukrainian territorial advances through Russian defenses as capturing ”grey zones” in order to downplay Ukrainian gains and omit reporting on Ukrainian forces breaking through defensive lines. Ukrainian forces liberated several towns, but claims of a Ukrainian “breakthrough” are premature at this time. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces are transferring their most combat-capable units from the Kherson direction to the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions. Malyar stated on June 11 that Russian forces are transferring elements of the 49th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) and unspecified naval infantry and airborne forces elements from the Kherson direction in connection with the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[7] Malyar noted that Russian forces likely blew the KHPP dam in order to shorten their defensive lines in Kherson Oblast as part of the response to the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Flooding downriver of the KHPP has drained the Kakhovka Reservoir, resulting in landmasses emerging from the water. It is unclear how these terrain changes will affect maneuver warfare in southern Ukraine at this time.[8] If the terrain changes from flooding in the Dnipro River do not foreclose any possible Ukrainian river crossings in coming weeks and months, Russian forces may struggle to defend Kherson Oblast with remaining or then-available units if and when Ukrainian forces choose to conduct offensive operations across the river, assuming they have the ability to do so. Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone strikes targeting eastern Ukrainian border areas overnight on June 10 to 11. Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down six Russian Shahed drones that targeted border areas in Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts overnight.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces are working to produce more high-precision, long-range ballistic missiles and stated that Ukraine’s stock of Western air defense systems is currently insufficient to replace its stock of Soviet air defense systems.[10] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin characterized the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) plan to formalize volunteer formations by July 1 as an attack on him and his forces. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on June 10 that all volunteer formations must sign military contracts with the Russian MoD by July 1.[11] Prigozhin defensively claimed that Wagner private military company’s (PMC) servicemen will not sign contracts with the Russian MoD in his media response to Shoigu’s announcement.[12] Prigozhin proceeded to criticize Shoigu and the structure of the Russian Armed Forces and specified that Wagner is entirely subordinate to the interests of Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Prigozhin’s mention of Putin as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief closely mirrors the language Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov used in his accusation on June 9 that Prigozhin is being insubordinate to Putin.[13] Prigozhin also noted that Wagner approves its actions with the Russian military command via Wagner-affiliated Army General Sergei Surovikin. Some members of Russia’s veteran community indicated Shoigu’s statement is not intended to target Wagner. A member of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee (and former commander of the 58th Combined Arms Army) Viktor Sobolev stated that Shoigu’s order excludes Wagner.[14] Sobolev is an avid critic of Wagner and claimed that Wagner personnel are mercenaries, not volunteers.[15] Former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin supported the order and stated that cohesive armies win wars rather than separate detachments or private military companies (PMCs).[16] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger contrarily (baselessly) claimed that Wagner is not a PMC and that a secret decree legalized Wagner’s existence in Russia.[17] The milblogger also claimed that Shoigu and the Russian MoD are Girkin’s patrons who are using Girkin to prevent Prigozhin from assuming more authority and reshuffling leadership in the Russian MoD. Russia and Ukraine conducted a near one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange on June 11. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukraine returned 94 Russian POWs of unspecified ranks to Russia.[18] Ukrainian Presidental Office Head Andriy Yermak reported that Russia returned two Ukrainian officers and 93 privates and sergeants to Ukraine.[19] Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three areas of the front and made territorial gains on June 10 and 11. Ukrainian forces made visually verified advances in western Donetsk Oblast and western Zaporizhia Oblast, which Russian sources confirmed but sought to downplay. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces are transferring their most combat-capable units from the Kherson direction to the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions. Russian forces conducted a limited series of drone strikes targeting eastern Ukrainian border areas overnight on June 10 to 11. Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin characterized the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) plan to formalize volunteer formations by July 1 as an attack on him and his forces. Russia and Ukraine conducted a near one-for-one prisoner of war (POW) exchange. Russian forces continued limited ground attacks south of Kreminna. Ukrainian and Russian forces continued limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Ukrainian forces made gains near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and in western Zaporizhia Oblast as of June 10. Russian milbloggers claimed that rain along the Zaporizhia Oblast front may slow Ukrainian operations in the coming days. The Republic of Chechnya reportedly formed two new regiments – Akhmat-Russia and Akhmat-Chechnya – equipped with commercially-available Chinese armored equipment. Saboteurs, reportedly including Ukrainian partisans, conducted two discrete improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against railways in occupied Kherson Oblast and Crimea. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Kal-El814 Posted June 12, 2023 Share Posted June 12, 2023 I routinely feel foolish and ignorant of what’s happening in this war, but at least I’d never do this. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Uaarkson Posted June 12, 2023 Share Posted June 12, 2023 16 minutes ago, Kal-El814 said: I routinely feel foolish and ignorant of what’s happening in this war, but at least I’d never do this. Wow. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted June 12, 2023 Author Share Posted June 12, 2023 "How the bridge collapse in Philadelphia could become America's 9/11" 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted June 12, 2023 Author Share Posted June 12, 2023 There was a video recently a FPV Lancet Russian drone taking out a Leopard 2 tank, and people were doomposting about it. Well, turns out the tank was a wooden decoy from Ukraine, and Ukraine has provided the receipts (showing it set up, video of the aftermath, etc). Ukraine has also said (I can't confirm it true) that the IRIS-T radar/AA system destroyed in a recent Russian drone strike was also a decoy. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
mclumber1 Posted June 12, 2023 Share Posted June 12, 2023 As shitty as it is that the Russians blew up that dam, and there is definitely a humanitarian crisis and environmental damage because of it, it just doesn't bother me as much as many of the other war crimes Russia has perpetrated. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 13, 2023 Share Posted June 13, 2023 ISW analysis for 12 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 12, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and made territorial gains on June 12. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on June 12 that Ukrainian forces in the Donetsk and Tavrisk Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and made territorial gains on June 12. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on June 12 that Ukrainian forces in the Donetsk and Tavrisk (Zaporizhia) directions have advanced 6.5km and retaken 90 square kilometers of territory over the past week.[1] Malyar added that Ukrainian forces liberated one settlement in western Zaporizhia Oblast and six settlements in eastern Zaporizhia and western Donetsk oblasts in the same period. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated that Ukrainian troops continued counterattacks on the flanks of Bakhmut and advanced 250 to 700 meters in unspecified areas on the outskirts of the city.[2] Russian sources noted that Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks on Russian positions southwest, north and northwest of Bakhmut, particularly near Berkhivka (3km northwest of Bakhmut).[3] Geolocated footage posted on June 12 additionally indicates that Ukrainian forces have made limited advances in western Donetsk Oblast south of Velyka Novosilka.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are trying to counterattack in this area and that fighting continued in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area over the course of June 12.[5] Russian milbloggers additionally reported Ukrainian combat activity in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Orikhiv, but noted that the intensity of attacks on this sector has decreased somewhat.[6] Russian forces reportedly launched a counterattack on June 12 in western Donetsk Oblast following Ukrainian tactical gains near the Vremivka salient on June 11. Russian sources reported that elements of the Russian 127th Motorized Rifle Division (5th Combined Arms Army, Eastern Military District) launched a large counterattack against Ukrainian forces in the Vremivka salient on June 12.[7] Russian forces have made no confirmed territorial gains in these counterattacks as of this publication, though some Russian sources reported that Russian forces recaptured Makarivka (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[8] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces still control Makarivka as of June 12.[9] A Russian source reported that fighting in the Vremivka salient as ongoing and that the results of the battle are unclear.[10] Ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin claimed that, if true, these reports confirm the success of Russian flexible defense tactics in the area and that the Russian military command cares more about wearing down Ukrainian forces than regaining territory.[11] Girkin claimed that the typical defense of Russian forces is to retreat to rear areas to draw Ukrainian infantry out from Ukrainian air defense and electronic warfare coverage. Girkin claimed that Russian forces then attack the area with tank and air defense support in order to prevent the Ukrainian forces from deploying air defense elements forward to newly gained areas. Russian milbloggers claimed that poor weather conditions grounded Russian aircraft, impeding Russian defenses against Ukrainian attacks near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces managed to make tactical gains on June 11 due to heavy rain and fog preventing Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) and army aviation (rotary wing aircraft) from striking Ukrainian force concentrations.[12] Russian sources reported that Russian VKS and army aviation resumed intense airstrikes against Ukrainian forces on June 12 after the rain cleared.[13] Girkin claimed that the weather will play an important role in determining the outcome of operations in this sector in the coming days.[14] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on June 11 that he had received an order from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to subordinate his forces to Russian military command.[15] Prigozhin published a claimed segment of the letter from the Russian MoD, which instructs Wagner and other Russian volunteer military formations to inform the Joint Staff of Russian Grouping of Forces about their numbers of forces, reserves, and the supplies they have received from the Russian MoD by June 15.[16] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu previously announced on June 10 that Russian volunteer personnel must sign contracts directly with the Russian MoD by July 1.[17] Prigozhin later claimed that Wagner is receiving 2.5 times more recruits after the recent “provocative announcements about the need to terminate the existence of Wagner private military company [PMC],” stating that Russian volunteers are joining Wagner to avoid signing contracts with the Russian MoD.[18] Prigozhin accused the Russian MoD of using this formalization effort to harm Wagner amidst the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensives.[19] The Russian MoD formalization efforts are likely intended to centralize control of Russian irregular personnel and supplies to respond to Ukraine’s counteroffensive, as well as restrict Prigozhin's independence. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger claimed that Shoigu’s new decree legalizes the destruction of PMCs and that the Russian MoD will use this decree to stop providing Wagner forces with ammunition, medical assistance, and military equipment.[20] A member of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee (and an avid critic of Wagner) Viktor Sobolev claimed that the Russian MoD will not permit volunteers to participate in hostilities without signing a military contract with the Russian MoD, which may make it illegal for Wagner forces to operate on the frontlines.[21] Russian milbloggers implied that the order may allow the Russian MoD to retain contract servicemen longer on the frontlines, as they claim the Russian MoD is less likely to abide by contract periods than PMCs like Wagner.[22] One prominent milblogger claimed that the timing of Shoigu’s announcement is strange given that Ukrainian forces just launched a counteroffensive, and another noted that the Russian MoD is prioritizing bureaucratically eliminating Wagner instead of focusing on the counteroffensive.[23] The Russian military command similarly ordered formalization of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) militias in January and February ahead of the Russian winter offensive.[24] Shoigu and the Russian military command may be leverage possibly regaining some favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin after Russian forces successfully conducted some defensive operations in southern Ukraine to pursue the formalization of Russian irregular forces that they likely originally planned in winter 2023. Prigozhin’s operations on the Bakhmut frontline in winter and spring 2023 and the Russian MoD’s lack of decisive victories in Donbas may have limited the Russian MoD’s ability to pursue its desired formalization of Russian forces. The move is likely militarily sound and in part unrelated to the dispute with Prigozhin, as a formal accounting and direct control of Russia’s array of irregular formations will likely enable the Russian military command to redeploy forces as needed. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to rhetorically align himself with the Russian MoD and further distance himself from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Kadyrov reported on June 12 that several Chechen commanders, including Akhmat Special Forces Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov, met with Russian Deputy Chief of the General Staff Colonel General Alexei Kim to sign a military contract with the Russian MoD that will grant Akhmat forces the same legal status, rights, and benefits as official MoD personnel.[25] Kadyrov emphasized the importance of this contract for the effectiveness of Akhmat troops and claimed that Chechen fighters have been instrumental in supporting Russian operations in Ukraine.[26] Kadyrov’s public display of agreement with the Russian MoD further aligns him and Akhmat troops with the official Russian military apparatus while further distancing Kadyrov from Prigozhin, who notably is pushing back on the MoD contracts as a direct attack on the Wagner Group.[27] Kadyrov will likely continue efforts to curry favor with the MoD as he tries to increase the prominence of Chechen troops. Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front on June 12. Russian forces reportedly launched a counterattack on June 12 following Ukrainian tactical gains near the Vremivka salient in western Donetsk Oblast on June 11. Russian milbloggers claimed that poor weather conditions grounded Russian aircraft, impeding Russian defenses against Ukrainian attacks near the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced on June 11 that he had received an order from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to subordinate his forces under the Russian military command. The Russian MoD formalization efforts are likely intended to centralize control of Russian irregular personnel and supplies to respond to Ukraine’s counteroffensive, as well as restrict Prigozhin's independence. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to rhetorically align himself with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and further distancing himself from Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks south of Kreminna. Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and made gains as of June 12. Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces conducted limited counteroffensive operations southwest of Orikhiv. Social media video footage circulated on June 12 reportedly shows Russian barrier troops shooting Russian forces that abandoned their positions somewhere in Ukraine. Russia continues to strengthen the legal regime in occupied areas of Ukraine under martial law. 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Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 14, 2023 Share Posted June 14, 2023 ISW analysis for 13 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 13, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made further limited territorial gains on June 13. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced by 250 meters northeast of Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30 pm ET on June 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made further limited territorial gains on June 13. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces advanced by 250 meters northeast of Bakhmut and by 200 meters south of Bakhmut.[1] Malyar also reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 500-1,000m in the past 24 hours around the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, liberating around three square kilometers of territory in the area.[2] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 100 square kilometers of territory since beginning counteroffensive operations.[3] Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed on June 13 that he assesses that Ukrainian forces have likely liberated more than 100 square kilometers.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground assaults southwest of Orikhiv and south of Hulyaipole in western Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of June 12 to 13.[5] Russian sources widely reported that the tempo of Ukrainian operations in the Orikhiv area has declined in recent days.[6]Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Environmental Safety Department and Mine Action representative Major Vladyslav Dudar reported on June 13 that Russian forces are regularly destroying small dams in localized areas of southern Ukraine to disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[7] Russian President Vladimir Putin met with 18 prominent Russian milbloggers and war correspondents to discuss the progress of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on June 13.[8] Putin largely met with milbloggers closely associated with the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company and other state-owned outlets, notably excluding milbloggers who have been more critical of Putin’s war effort.[9] Putin addressed several key milblogger concerns relating to the Ukrainian counteroffensive, Russian objectives in Ukraine, Russian mobilization and the possibility of imposing martial law, the formalization of private military companies (PMCs), and hostile incursions into Belgorod Oblast. Putin discussed the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and signaled that he believes Russia can outlast Western military support for Ukraine. Putin stated that Russian objectives have not fundamentally changed, reiterating boilerplate rhetoric and false narratives accusing Ukraine and NATO of initiating the war.[10] Putin added that the West can push Ukraine into negotiations with Russia by stopping the supplies of military aid to Ukraine.[11] Putin noted that Ukrainian forces launched a ”massive” counteroffensive on June 4 and noted that Ukrainian forces attacked in southwestern Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts, claiming they suffered significant losses. Putin claimed that Ukraine has lost 160 tanks and claimed that 30 percent of Ukraine’s casualties are killed in action, whereas Russian forces have lost only 54 tanks. Putin may be attempting to systematically amplify and misrepresent Ukrainian losses of Western military equipment to portray Ukraine’s counteroffensive as failed and discourage the West from continuing to support Ukraine. Former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin observed that Putin’s comments indicate that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to misinform him about the true situation on the battlefield.[12] Putin indicated that he is unwilling to announce a second wave of mobilization or declare martial law, despite maintaining his maximalist objectives in Ukraine. Putin acknowledged that some Russian “public figures” are discussing the urgent need for mobilization but noted that there “is currently no need today” for mobilization. Putin boasted about Russian contract service recruitment efforts using rhetoric consistent with ISW’s previous assessments that Putin is disinterested in announcing another mobilization wave and is instead prioritizing volunteer recruitment.[13] Putin also downplayed milbloggers’ concern over the Kremlin’s decision to not declare full-scale martial law throughout Russia, stating that Russia needs to expand its law enforcement rather than declare martial law. ISW continues to assess that Putin is a risk-averse actor who is hesitant to upset Russian society by ordering another mobilization wave or establishing martial law throughout Russia, indicating that Putin has not yet decided to fully commit to fighting a total war. Putin’s statements likely aim to reassure his constituencies that he does not intend to expand the “special military operation” further. Putin aimed to assuage widespread discontent in the Russian information space about limited cross border raids by pro-Ukraine forces into Belgorod Oblast, drone strikes across Russia, and border security in general. Putin stated that Russian forces do not plan to divert forces from other sectors of the frontline in Ukraine to Belgorod and other border oblasts in response to border incursions and drone strikes on Russian territory.[14] Putin stated that Russian leadership is considering creating a buffer zone within Ukraine to prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching Russian territory, but caveated the suggestion by saying that Russian officials will not immediately create a buffer zone and will examine how the situation develops.[15] Russian officials have previously responded to limited tactical activity in Belgorod Oblast and other border oblasts by calling for a Russian offensive to push Ukrainian forces away from the international border with Russia in Kharkiv Oblast.[16] Putin’s comments indicate that the Kremlin does not intend to react to cross-border operations in an effort to preserve forces for combat in Ukraine, despite growing discontent within Russia prompted by the raids. Putin also confirmed that Russian conscripts are serving in Belgorod Oblast and that Colonel General Alexander Lapin commanded conscripts to repel the pro-Ukrainian all-Russian limited raids in Belgorod Oblast. Russian forces are likely deploying conscripts to serve in border oblasts due to a lack of reserves and an unwillingness to transfer forces away from the frontline elsewhere in Ukraine. ISW previously assessed that limited raids and border shelling in Belgorod Oblast have become a notable focal point for criticism against the Russian military leadership, and Putin is likely attempting to address critiques that he has ignored the situation there in order to insulate himself from further criticism.[17] Putin discussed the importance of formalizing volunteer formations, supporting the Russian MoD’s measures to centralize its control over operations in Ukraine. Putin claimed that all volunteer formations serving in Ukraine must sign military contracts with the Russian MoD to “bring everything in line with common sense, established practice, and the law” and to ensure that individual volunteers can legally receive state social benefits.[18] Putin emphasized that the Russian government cannot provide social guarantees to volunteer structures without signed contracts.[19] Putin’s emphasis on the legality of volunteer formations suggests that Putin may be intending to either assert direct control over or set conditions to ban state assistance to select private military organizations (PMCs) such as the Wagner Group, which are technically illegal under the Russian law. Putin is likely continuing to publicly engage with, and platform select pro-Kremlin milbloggers to further leverage the community to expand his support among Russian ultranationalists. Putin previously held a closed-door meeting with milbloggers on June 17, 2022, to defuse growing discontent about Russian setbacks in Ukraine, and has occasionally interacted with the pro-Kremlin milblogger community since.[20] ISW previously assessed that the milblogger community rose to prominence likely as a direct result of the Kremlin’s failure to establish an effective social media presence as well as its general failure to prepare the Russian public for a serious and protracted war.[21] The Kremlin has protected Russian milbloggers from criticism and calls for censorship and has rewarded select milbloggers with official positions to co-opt their audience and gain access to their close ties to prominent nationalist and pro-war groups.[22] Putin’s highly publicized meeting with the milbloggers is reflective of the Kremlin’s promotion of this group in the previous year and suggests that Putin intends to further elevate their standing. Putin is likely setting information conditions to prevent potential lines of attack against the Kremlin in the event of Russian failure. Putin may also be increasingly aware that committed pro-war figures are his key constituency as he calls on the Russian public to prepare for a protracted war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely aware that key pro-war figures will be crucial to rallying the rest of society to that effort, and Putin’s engagement with these milbloggers may suggest that the Kremlin will increasingly rely on the wider ultranationalist community to maintain support for the war effort. Russian sources claimed that a Ukrainian missile strike killed Chief of Staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) Major General Sergei Goryachev in Zaporizhia Oblast.[23] ISW has observed other elements of the Eastern Military District including elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army and 5th Combined Arms Army operating in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[24] Goryachev’s reported death in Zaporizhia Oblast could suggest that Russian forces have dedicated elements of the 35th Combined Arms Army to operations in Zaporizhia Oblast and that some Russian senior military command officials continue to operate close to the frontline and remain exposed to accurate Ukrainian strikes.[25] Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 13. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 16 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles and four Shahed 131/136 drones that targeted infrastructure facilities in Kharkiv Oblast and residential buildings in Kryvyi Rih.[26] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed 11 Kh101/555 missiles and one Shahed drone.[27] Russian authorities continue to express increasing concern over information related to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) reportedly arrested two defense sector employees for allegedly collaborating with Ukraine and Germany.[28] A Russian milblogger claimed that the FSB arrested an engineer at the end of May who worked in the defense industry and collaborated with the Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR).[29] Russian opposition news outlet SOTA reported that the FSB arrested a former employee of a defense enterprise for allegedly providing information to Germany about the Russian defense industry.[30] ISW has previously reported on Russian authorities arresting individuals with reported access to DIB-related information.[31] Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made further limited territorial gains on June 13. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with 18 prominent Russian milbloggers and war correspondents to discuss the progress of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on June 13. Putin discussed the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and signaled that he believes Russia can outlast Western military support for Ukraine. Putin indicated that he is unwilling to announce a second wave of mobilization or declare martial law, despite maintaining his maximalist objectives in Ukraine. Putin aimed to assuage widespread discontent in the Russian information space about limited cross-border raids by pro-Ukraine forces into Belgorod Oblast, drone strikes across Russia, and border security in general. Putin discussed the importance of formalizing volunteer formations, supporting the Russian MoD’s measures to centralize its control over operations in Ukraine. Putin is likely continuing to publicly engage with, and platform select pro-Kremlin milbloggers to further leverage the community to expand his support among Russian ultranationalists. Russian sources claimed that a Ukrainian missile strike killed Chief of Staff of the 35th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) Major General Sergei Goryachev in Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 13. Russian authorities continue to express increasing concern over information related to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Russian forces continued ground attacks on the Kreminna frontline but did not conduct offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line. Ukrainian forces continued to advance on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks, while Russian forces launched counterattacks in the vicinity of Bakhmut. Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and are transferring additional forces from east (left) bank Kherson Oblast to reinforce the direction. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that the Russian military has recruited 150,000 contract servicemembers as well as over 6,000 volunteers since January 2023. Russian occupation officials in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast are reportedly continuing evacuation efforts, although are likely continuing to deny services to some residents in flooded areas. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted June 15, 2023 Share Posted June 15, 2023 Prigozhin leaked location of Putin ally wounded in Ukraine—Russian colonel WWW.NEWSWEEK.COM "Prigozhinites" collaborated with "enemy intelligence," said Roman Venevitin, who was recently captured and held briefly by the Wagner Group. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
marioandsonic Posted June 15, 2023 Share Posted June 15, 2023 I haven't been following this thread for a while. Is Russia now winning? I thought they were doing really badly at first? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
ThreePi Posted June 15, 2023 Share Posted June 15, 2023 16 minutes ago, marioandsonic said: I haven't been following this thread for a while. Is Russia now winning? I thought they were doing really badly at first? What gives you the impression they're winning? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
marioandsonic Posted June 15, 2023 Share Posted June 15, 2023 10 minutes ago, ThreePi said: What gives you the impression they're winning? Just going by the map Commissar posts, it looks like Russia has control over more territory than before. Or am I reading it wrong? Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PaladinSolo Posted June 15, 2023 Share Posted June 15, 2023 4 hours ago, marioandsonic said: Just going by the map Commissar posts, it looks like Russia has control over more territory than before. Or am I reading it wrong? Its basically a stalemate and has been since Ukraine made massive gains last fall. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PaladinSolo Posted June 15, 2023 Share Posted June 15, 2023 Ukrainians were 'ready to eliminate' Russian soldier before dramatic surrender, commander says | CNN WWW.CNN.COM Ukrainian forces spared the life of a Russian soldier when he surrendered to a drone on the battlefield just moments before its operators were about to open fire, a Ukrainian commander has confirmed to CNN. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted June 15, 2023 Share Posted June 15, 2023 2 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said: Ukrainians were 'ready to eliminate' Russian soldier before dramatic surrender, commander says | CNN WWW.CNN.COM Ukrainian forces spared the life of a Russian soldier when he surrendered to a drone on the battlefield just moments before its operators were about to open fire, a Ukrainian commander has confirmed to CNN. I was about to say didn't this happen awhile ago? Then I read the article and its about what happened in May. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted June 15, 2023 Author Share Posted June 15, 2023 8 hours ago, marioandsonic said: I haven't been following this thread for a while. Is Russia now winning? I thought they were doing really badly at first? Not really. Last fall Ukraine retook a bunch of territory in two places: in Kharkiv, they routed the Russians, and in Kherson, they battled for 75 days to retake the Oblast. The battle now is across three major sectors of the southern front, and it is more like Kherson than Kharkiv, since the Russians are actually prepared. The Russians morale is worse (as is their gear, etc), but they still have a lot of mines, artillery, and conscripted bodies. Right now the Ukrainian offensive is likely still in the shaping/probing stage, with Ukraine attempting to get localized breakthroughs. At some point they will likely commit larger forces wherever they think they have the best chance at pushing through. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 15, 2023 Share Posted June 15, 2023 ISW analysis for 14 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 14, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made gains on June 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 14 that Ukrainian troops have advanced between 200 to 500 meters in unspecified Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on June 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made gains on June 14. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 14 that Ukrainian troops have advanced between 200 to 500 meters in unspecified sectors of the Bakhmut front and 300 to 350 meters in unspecified parts of the Zaporizhia direction.[1] Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces are continuing counterattacks on the northwestern, northeastern, and southwestern outskirts of Bakhmut.[2] Ukrainian and Russian sources additionally reported that fighting continued in western Donetsk Oblast, particularly around Makarivka (directly south of Velyka Novosilka), and in western Zaporizhia Oblast south of Orikhiv.[3] Russian milbloggers speculated that heavy rain and poor weather in southern Ukraine may have decreased the tempo of Ukrainian attacks, but Malyar emphasized that weather conditions do not always have an impact of Ukrainian offensive actions.[4] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Valery Shershen noted that Ukrainian forces in the Tavrisk (Zaporizhia) direction are prioritizing strikes on Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems, and ISW has previously assessed that Russian EW capabilities have been critical in complicating Ukrainian attacks on this sector of the front.[5] US Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary Sabrina Singh affirmed the United States’ commitment to partially replacing Ukrainian losses of the US-provided equipment used in counteroffensive operations but noted that there may not be a one-for-one replacement ratio.[6] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a division of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast while they were waiting for the commander of the 20th CAA to give a speech, prompting typical discontent among milbloggers about Russian commanders. ISW has observed both of the 20th CAA’s divisions, the 144th and 3rd Motorized Rifle Divisions, operating in the Kreminna area for the past several months and could not confirm which division was struck by the Ukrainian forces.[7] Russian sources claimed that the division waited two hours in one location while waiting for 20th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Sukhrab Akhmedov to arrive and deliver a speech before the division conducted offensive operations.[8]One milblogger suggested that the reported Ukrainian HIMARS strike killed around 100 Russian personnel and wounded another 100, although ISW has not observed any visual confirmation of the strike or its aftermath.[9] Milbloggers rightfully criticized the poor decision to concentrate a large number of Russian forces within range of Ukrainian fire for such a long time and used the situation to reiterate longstanding critiques of ineffective Russian command.[10] The outrage is reminiscent of previous instances of notable irresponsible Russian military actions resulting in dramatic losses, particularly the December 31, 2022, Ukrainian strike on a large Russian force concentration in Makiivka, Donetsk Oblast.[11] Russian milbloggers previously urged for Russian officials to hold the Russian military leadership accountable for the Makiivka strike, and milbloggers have routinely attempted to place the blame for large scale Russian military failures on individual commanders.[12] Milbloggers complained that Akhmedov and similar commanders continue to occupy key positions instead of being held accountable, a longstanding complaint that is indicative of widespread disdain for the traditional Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) establishment.[13] One milblogger even called for the responsible commanders to be shot in front of their formations, whether they are colonel or generals.[14] Russian sources disseminated conflicting reports about the condition of Russian Duma Deputy and Commander of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch, Adam Delimkhanov, on June 14. ISW has not observed any visual evidence to confirm or deny the contradictory claims about Delimkhanov’s condition. Some Russian sources claimed on June 14 that Delimkhanov was dead or wounded, and some claimed a Ukrainian strike killed or wounded him in an unspecified location.[15] Other Russian sources including Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmat Special Forces Commander Major General Apti Alaudinov, and Russian Duma Deputy Andrey Kartopolov later claimed that Delimkhanov was alive and unharmed.[16] Kadyrov published a video on June 14 of himself with Delimkhanov on an unspecified date after rumors began circulating about Delimkhanov’s condition.[17] Kadyrov then claimed that Ukrainian media was circulating reports of Delimkhanov’s death (ignoring that many of the reports originated from Russian sources) as part of an information operation, but did not elaborate on the intent of the supposed information operation.[18] Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 14. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched six Kh-22 cruise missiles, four Kalibr cruise missiles, and 10 Shahed 131/136 drones and noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed three Kh-22 missiles and nine Shaheds.[19] Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Andriy Kovalev reported that Russian forces targeted infrastructure facilities in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kirovohrad, and Odesa oblasts.[20] Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and made gains on June 14. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck a division of the 20th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) near Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast while they were waiting for the commander of the 20th CAA to give a speech, prompting typical discontent among milbloggers about Russian commanders. Russian sources disseminated conflicting reports about the condition of Russian Duma Deputy and Commander of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch, Adam Delimkhanov, on June 14. ISW has not observed any visual evidence to confirm or deny the contradictory claims about Delimkhanov’s condition. Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on June 14. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the Kupyansk direction and south of Kreminna. Ukrainian and Russian forces continued ground attacks in the Bakhmut area. Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and reportedly made gains in this area as of June 14. Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on June 14. Satellite imagery suggests that Russian helicopters defending against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine are likely deployed to an airfield in Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast. A Russian State Duma bill aimed at raising the conscription age suggests that the Kremlin may be aiming to shield specific generations from the demographic and social impacts of the war in Ukraine. Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to consolidate economic control of occupied territories. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 16, 2023 Share Posted June 16, 2023 ISW analysis for 15 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 15, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and reportedly made gains on June 15. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on June 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and reportedly made gains on June 15. Ukrainian General Staff Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun reported that Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations north and northwest of Bakhmut.[1] Ukraine’s Tavrisk Group of Forces Press Center reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to one kilometer in western Donetsk Oblast and are continuing attempts to improve their tactical positions near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops unsuccessfully attacked southwest and south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast and claimed that Ukrainian forces are increasing the tempo of counteroffensive operations in the area due to improved weather conditions.[3] Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff Brigadier General Oleksii Hromov reported that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to 3km near Mala Tokmachka in western Zaporizhia Oblast and up to 7km near Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast and have liberated seven settlements in those areas since beginning counteroffensive operations.[4] Advisor to the Ukrainian Presidential Office Mykhailo Podolyak however stated on June 15 that Ukrainian forces have yet to launch counteroffensives “as such” but acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive actions, a likely clarification that Ukrainian forces have not yet begun their main effort.[5] ISW assesses that ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations are likely setting conditions for wider Ukrainian counteroffensive objectives that are not immediately clear and therefore represent the initial phase of an ongoing counteroffensive. Russian milbloggers continue to credit alleged superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and defensive doctrine for Russian forces’ successful defenses against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are implementing a “strategic defense” that seeks to attrit advancing Ukrainian forces in extended positional battles along a first line of defense before later launching counterattacks against weakened Ukrainian assault units.[6] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces are maintaining doctrinally sound defensive operations in this sector in which a first echelon of forces repels or slows attacking forces before a second echelon of forces counterattacks against any enemy breakthrough.[7] Another prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian EW complexes prevent Ukrainian forces from using precision-guided munitions guided by GPS coordinates and heavily disrupt Ukrainian radio communication.[8] The milblogger specifically claimed that Russian forces use “Murmansk-BN” EW complexes to disrupt sensors on Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance equipment and “Krasukha-4” EW complexes to suppress connections with satellite signals within a radius of 300km.[9] ISW has previously assessed that Russian EW capabilities have been critical in complicating Ukrainian attacks in the Zaporizhia direction, although it is unclear if continued successful Russian EW tactics are a result of superior capacities or improved Russian employment of these systems. ISW has previously noted that initial Ukrainian assaults and Russian defensive operations should not be extrapolated to predict the outcome of all Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[10] Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine early in the morning of June 15. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that between 00:20 and 04:30 local time on June 15, Russian forces launched four Kh-101/555 cruise missiles from four Tu-95 strategic bombers from over the Caspian Sea and 20 Shahed-typed drones from the northern and southern directions.[11]Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down one of the cruise missiles and all 20 Shaheds.[12] The remaining three cruise missiles struck industrial facilities in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[13] Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the UA Gen Staff Brigadier General Oleksii Hromov notably stated on June 15 that Russian forces have deployed a “Bal” Kh-35 coastal defense system to Bryansk Oblast, which Hromov warned may allow Russian forces to conduct strikes on Ukrainian far-rear areas in Zhytomyr, Kyiv, Poltava, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv oblasts.[14] Russian forces have long repurposed various missile systems, such as S-300 surface-to-air-missile systems, to strike ground targets and compensate for shortages of precision munitions, which is likely why Russian forces have deployed a coastal defense system to a land-locked oblast. The Russian military is advancing initial efforts to stand up new corps- and army-level formations to implement Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announced intent to conduct large-scale force restructuring by 2026, though these new formations are not yet staffed and operational. Independent Western open-source intelligence analysts began reporting in mid-May that Russian military authorities are actively recruiting officers and conscripts from Buryatia and Irkutsk to staff the new 25th Combined Arms Army.[15] The army HQ will reportedly be based in Yekaterinburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast.[16] ISW also previously reported on June 3 that Russia is forming the 40th Army Corps as part of the Southern Military District and actively trying to staff one of the corps’ motorized rifle battalions.[17] Efforts to construct and staff both the 25th Combined Arms Army and 40th Army Corps are likely part of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) implementation of intended large-scale reforms of Russia’s ground forces to optimize for large-scale conventional warfare.[18] It remains unclear how Russian authorities intend to staff corps- and army-level formations to their doctrinal end strengths considering endemic force-generation challenges faced by the Russian military.[19] These formations may in part be intended to integrate a number of ad hoc volunteer formations that have been created over the course of the war in Ukraine, although Russia’s previous attempt to integrate volunteer battalions in the form of the 3rd Army Corps over the summer of 2022 did not yield particularly positive results.[20] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov deployed Chechen “Akhmat” special forces to border areas in Belgorod Oblast, likely as part of a continued effort to align himself with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Kadyrov claimed on June 15 that the Chechen “Zapad Akhmat” Battalion arrived to the Nekhoteevka and Kozinka border checkpoints in Belgorod Oblast on his orders to protect the border from raids into Russian territory.[21] Kadyrov emphasized that the Akhmat forces will work in tandem with other Russian forces to defend Belgorod Oblast and residents of other border areas. Kadyrov likely aims to posture himself and Chechen forces as cooperating with the MoD, directly contrasting with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, who previously threatened to deploy Wagner forces to Belgorod Oblast without permission from the Russian MoD or the Russian military command.[22] Kadyrov has also taken advantage of the frequent Russian information-space discourse about Belgorod Oblast to posture himself as an effective and cooperative military leader without having to commit all Chechen forces to an attritive offensive or defense effort. Western states may provide F-16 fighter aircraft and additional Leopard tanks to Ukraine in the coming months. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced on June 15 that Ukrainian pilots are already training on F-16 aircraft, allowing Western states to provide F-16s to Ukraine on an unspecified timeline.[23] The first of two chambers of the Swiss National Council voted on June 14 to decommission 25 Leopard-2 tanks and send the tanks back to Germany, which would then export the tanks to Ukraine.[24] Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three directions and reportedly made gains on June 15. Russian milbloggers continue to credit alleged superior Russian electronic warfare (EW) capabilities and defensive doctrine for Russian forces’ successful defenses against Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in southern Ukraine. Russian forces conducted another series of drone and missile strikes across Ukraine early in the morning of June 15. The Russian military is advancing initial efforts to stand up new corps- and army-level formations to implement Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s announced intent to conduct large-scale force restructuring by 2026, though these new formations are not yet staffed and operational. Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov deployed Chechen “Akhmat” special forces to border areas in Belgorod Oblast, likely as part of a continued effort to align himself with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Western states may provide F-16 fighter aircraft and additional Leopard tanks to Ukraine in the coming months. Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Ukrainian and Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Bakhmut, and Russian forces have gained territory as of June 15. Ukrainian and Russian forces reportedly continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian intelligence reported that Russian forces are beginning to decommission specialized company-size assault units and transferring their personnel to volunteer formations. Ukrainian partisans reportedly sabotaged a railway in occupied Melitopol, though ISW has observed no visual confirmation or Russian corroboration of the attack. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 16, 2023 Share Posted June 16, 2023 21 year-old CS:GO pro dies in defense of Ukraine | PC Gamer WWW.PCGAMER.COM Ostap 'Oni' Onistrat described by his peers as a national hero. Quote A Ukrainian Counter-Strike pro player, Ostap 'Oni' Onistrat, was killed fighting for Ukraine in the country's ongoing war with Russia. He was 21 years old. Ukraine's Ministry of Defense said Onistrat had been killed by enemy shrapnel on June 3, on the frontline of Vuhledar in the Donetsk region. This is a particularly fierce area in the conflict right now, as the Ukrainian military fights to take back Russian-occupied territory. Onistrat's last competitive Counter-Strike: Global Offensive tournament was, per Sportskeeda, at 2021's ZUEL Championship in 2021, where he played for the Ukrainian team Libertatem as they made their way to a second place finish. "When 21 year old Ostap Onistrat joined the Ukrainian army to defend his country, his father Andriy, a well-known Ukrainian banker, had no second thoughts: he had to be there on the battlefield with his son," reads the notice from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. "He wanted to protect him, to shield his heroic boy from the brutalities of the war... Two days ago Ostap's life was cut short by enemy shrapnel. Another Ukrainian father has lost his son. Ukraine has lost her son. The loss is irreparable. Victory is inevitable. We all owe it to Ostap". "Young Ukrainian CS player died while protecting [Ukraine] and every one of us," said Sergey Bezhanov, a CS:GO coach for the Ukrainian team Monte Esports. "Glory to hero! Only 21 y.o." 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CayceG Posted June 16, 2023 Share Posted June 16, 2023 I don't have words for this. War is an abomination. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 17, 2023 Share Posted June 17, 2023 ISW analysis for 16 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 16, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the front on June 16 and reportedly made gains. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensive operations southwest of Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on June 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the front on June 16 and reportedly made gains. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Ukrainian forces conducted successful counteroffensive operations southwest of Bakhmut near Stupochky (about 12km southwest of Bakhmut); in western Donetsk Oblast near Vuhledar; in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area along the Levadne-Staromaiorske line; and in western Zaporizhia Oblast along the Novodanlylivka-Robotyne line.[1] Geolocated footage posted on June 15 indicates that Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains on the northwestern outskirts of Bakhmut west of Yahidne, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian troops continued counterattacks northwest, west, and southwest of Bakhmut.[2] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking Russian positions south of Velyka Novosilka in western Donetsk Oblast, made gains in central Zaporizhia Oblast just south of Hulyaipole, and mounted offensive operations southwest of Orikhiv.[3] Russian forces targeted Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih with cruise missiles and kamikaze drones on June 15-16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted five missile strikes with Kh-59, Kh-101, and Kh-555 cruise missiles on June 15 and that Ukrainian forces also shot down two Shahed drones.[4] Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Head Serhiy Lysak reported that Russian missiles had targeted two industrial facilities in Kryvyi Rih on June 15.[5] Ukrainian officials also reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted six Russian Kinzhal and six Kaliber missiles that targeted Kyiv Oblast during the day on June 16, coinciding with the visit of several African heads of state in Kyiv.[6] The heads of state of seven African countries met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 16 in Kyiv as part of joint peace mission. President of South Africa Cyril Ramaphosa, President of Zambia Hakainde Hichilema, President of Comoros Azali Assoumani, President of the Republic of the Congo Denis Sassou Nguesso, Prime Minister of Egypt Mostafa Mabdouly, President of Senegal Macky Sall, and a Ugandan representative met with the Ukrainian leadership in Kyiv.[7] Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Kyiv during the visit, forcing the African leaders to take shelter in bunkers during their meetings.[8] Some Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces did not conduct missile strikes on Kyiv during the African leaders’ visit, while another absurdly claimed that it was the Ukrainian forces that staged the attack.[9] The African leaders will continue their trip onward to St. Petersburg on June 17 to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[10] ISW will assess this trip in total following readouts from the delegation’s visit to Russia. The Kremlin claimed Russia has begun transferring tactical nuclear warheads (under Russian control) to Belarus, in line with previously announced plans. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on June 16 that Russia has moved the first deployment of tactical nuclear warheads to Belarus.[11] Putin stated that Russian forces will deploy the entirety of planned tactical nuclear warheads shipments to Belarus by the end of 2023.[12] ISW previously assessed that the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus is part of a longstanding effort to cement Russia’s de facto military control over Belarus and is highly unlikely to presage any Russian escalation.[13] Select current and former Russian municipal officials signed an open letter calling on the Russian forces to return to the “universally” recognized Russian borders due to the crisis caused by the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam. Municipal officials from Moscow and St. Petersburg as well as Moscow and Leningrad oblasts signed the document, which argued that the destruction of the KHPP dam will affect the ecosystem of the planet, health issues, and the economy for many decades.[14] The letter stated that Putin’s actions since February 24, 2022 have caused unspecified catastrophic events but did not cite continued Russian military operations in Ukraine as a reason for the withdrawal of Russian forces.[15] Non-Kremlin aligned Russian officials may be using public concern about the environmental and humanitarian situation associated with the destruction of the KHPP dam to voice opposition to the war in Ukraine without directly criticizing the war effort itself. The Kremlin has widely set the conditions for crackdowns against anti-war dissent. Russians who hold anti-war sentiments may use the destruction of the KHPP to voice their opposition to the war in a very limited fashion.[16] Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the front on June 16 and reportedly made gains. Russian forces targeted Kyiv and Kryvyi Rih with cruise missiles and kamikaze drones on June 15-16. The heads of state of seven African countries met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 16 in Kyiv as part of a joint peace mission. The Kremlin claimed Russia has begun transferring tactical nuclear warheads (under Russian control) to Belarus, in line with previously announced plans. Select current and former Russian municipal officials signed an open letter calling on Russian forces to return to “universally” recognized Russian borders due to the crisis caused by the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks near Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the Vuhledar area. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border of Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and reportedly made gains in this area. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is attempting to monetarily incentivize the destruction of Ukrainian military equipment, likely to bolster ongoing recruitment efforts. Russian and occupation authorities are attempting to strengthen Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) between Russia and occupied Ukraine. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 17, 2023 Share Posted June 17, 2023 New video from Kings & Generals Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
PaladinSolo Posted June 17, 2023 Share Posted June 17, 2023 Are Russian "Blocking Detachments" Engaging Retreating Soldiers? RYANMCBETH.SUBSTACK.COM Watch now (6 min) | "Enemy at the Gates" wasn't real, but this video just might be. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 18, 2023 Share Posted June 18, 2023 ISW analysis for 17 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 17, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2 pm ET on June 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked on the northern and southern outskirts of Bakhmut.[2] The Russian MoD and other Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces repelled limited Ukrainian ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.[3] Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations south, southwest, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[4] Ukrainian forces also conducted counteroffensive operations southwest and southeast of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to two kilometers in multiple unspecified directions in southern Ukraine.[6] A delegation representing seven African states met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St Petersburg on June 17, following a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky on June 16, to propose a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade. The Egyptian prime minister, a Ugadan presidential envoy, and the presidents of South Africa, Zambia, Comoros, the Republic of the Congo, and Senegal previously visited Kyiv and met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky on June 16, and notably had to take shelter during Russian missile strikes targeting Kyiv.[7] South African President Cyril Ramaphosa corrected his spokesperson’s earlier denials that Russian forces did not conduct attacks on Kyiv during the visit and acknowledged that “such activity does not bode well for establishing peace.”[8] Ramaphosa presented a ten-point generalized peace plan on June 16 calling for an end to hostilities and a negotiated peace settlement that would respect sovereignty and establish security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia.[9] The proposal also calls for securing the movement of grain and fertilizers from both Ukraine and Russia and closer cooperation with African states.[10] Zelensky reiterated that negotiations are only possible after the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine and that Ukraine will not pursue negotiated settlements reminiscent of the Minsk Accords.[11] Putin stated that the Kremlin welcomes the African states’ “balanced” approach to resolving the war in Ukraine in his meeting with the delegation, but did not comment on the feasibility of Ramaphosa’s suggested peace plan.[12] President of Comoros and current African Union Chairperson Azali Asoumani notably used language similar to the Kremlin’s preferred ”Russian world” rhetoric about the war in Ukraine while meeting with Putin, stating that stability in Eastern Europe, Africa, and the world depends on fraternal relationships between neighboring Slavic “friendly nations.”[13] Asoumani also highlighted that peace in Ukraine is important for addressing international food and energy security.[14] Asoumani’s comments and the peace plan’s inclusion of grain shipment guarantees suggest the states involved in the proposal view resolving the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine as their paramount concern. The delegation likely seeks to balance Ukraine and Russia to maintain longstanding bilateral relationships with Russia without fully tying themselves diplomatically to the Kremlin’s war. The Kremlin will likely exploit this proposal to promote Russian information operations aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine and has not demonstrated any intent to engage with any peace process meaningfully. ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin has routinely signaled a false willingness to negotiate a settlement to the war to prompt Western concessions and dissuade Western officials from sending further support to Ukraine.[15] The Kremlin previously intensified this effort to set conditions for its winter-spring 2023 offensive and is likely reamplifying this information operation in an effort to weaken Western support for Ukraine during counteroffensive operations.[16] The Kremlin also used the equally vague peace plan presented by China in the spring of 2023 to amplify this information operation and has not yet attempted to expound upon the broad suggestions in that plan.[17] The Kremlin instead attempted to use stated Chinese interest in negotiating a settlement to the war in Ukraine to pursue desired closer ties with China.[18] The Kremlin will likely use the outreach by these African states to pursue strengthened bilateral and multilateral engagement. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to signal his disinterest in formally subordinating the Wagner private military company (PMC) to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Prigozhin sarcastically criticized the MoD’s formalization efforts on June 17 after previously portraying himself as compliant with the Russian MoD’s order for volunteer formations to sign formal contracts by July 1 and claimed he attempted to submit a contract to formalize Wagner under the Russian MoD.[19] Prigozhin implied that the Russian MoD will confiscate weapons that volunteer units obtained outside of the Russian MoD’s weapon deliveries and noted that inexperienced Russian commanders with higher military education will replace what he claimed are more combat-effective volunteer commanders.[20] Prigozhin added that formalization will destroy hierarchies within volunteer formations and force volunteers to serve in the military without the Russian MoD respecting military contract deadlines. Prigozhin noted that the Russian MoD will not provide sufficient supplies or weapons for volunteers and will mistreat irregular forces. Prigozhin did not discuss the contents of his claimed formalization contract with the Russian MoD on June 17, but a Wagner-affiliated milblogger suggested that Prigozhin demanded a series of powers and concessions from the Russian military command discussed in the force generation section of this update.[21] Prigozhin’s behavior indicates that he is unlikely to subordinate Wagner forces to the Russian MoD unless such a move would grant him more political power within Russia. The New York Times (NYT) released a report supporting ISW’s prior assessment that Russian forces most likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam.[22] NYT cited multiple US and Ukrainian engineering experts who examined diagrams of the KHPP dam, imagery of the destroyed dam foundation, footage of the initial breach, and seismic data. The experts determined that the degree of damage to the dam’s internal structures is consistent with an explosion from within the dam’s internal structures rather than from prior damage. NYT also quoted a senior US military official as saying that the US ruled out an external attack, such as from a missile, rocket, or other projectile, as causing the explosion, and that the US believes that Russian forces most likely caused the internal explosion that caused the dam’s collapse. ISW has assessed since the destruction of the KHPP dam on June 6 that the preponderance of available evidence, reasoning, and rhetoric suggests that Russian forces deliberately damaged the dam.[23] Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front. A delegation representing seven African states met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg following a meeting with Ukrainian President Zelensky on June 16 to propose a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade. The Kremlin will likely exploit this proposal to promote Russian information operations aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine and has not demonstrated any intent to meaningfully engage with any peace process. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continued to signal his disinterest in formally subordinating the Wagner private military company (PMC) to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The New York Times (NYT) released a report supporting ISW’s prior assessment that Russian forces most likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted localized ground attacks west and south of Kreminna. Russian forces and Ukrainian forces continued limited attacks in the Bakhmut area and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Russian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar likely in response to Ukrainian territorial gains in the area on June 16. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces intensified attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Kremlin continues efforts to gradually mobilize Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB). Russian officials are planning several infrastructure projects connecting occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to occupied Crimea, likely to secure new ground lines of communication (GLOCs) for the Russian grouping in southern Ukraine. 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Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 18, 2023 Share Posted June 18, 2023 17 hours ago, PaladinSolo said: Are Russian "Blocking Detachments" Engaging Retreating Soldiers? RYANMCBETH.SUBSTACK.COM Watch now (6 min) | "Enemy at the Gates" wasn't real, but this video just might be. As the video presenter suggests, I'm going with the "blocking detachment" being either NCOs or officers from the unit itself rather than being an actual "blocking detachment". Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted June 19, 2023 Share Posted June 19, 2023 19 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said: As the video presenter suggests, I'm going with the "blocking detachment" being either NCOs or officers from the unit itself rather than being an actual "blocking detachment". Can we at least call them commisars? 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Jwheel86 Posted June 19, 2023 Share Posted June 19, 2023 Very NSFL video of Ukrainian Navy SOF clearing a trench. Spoiler Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CayceG Posted June 19, 2023 Share Posted June 19, 2023 I do not like that our war footage looks exactly like a Call of Duty game. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
TUFKAK Posted June 19, 2023 Share Posted June 19, 2023 Jesus you can tell those poor bastards aren’t adequately trained. That footage makes me need a drink. Ugh Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 19, 2023 Share Posted June 19, 2023 ISW analysis for 18 June 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 18, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 18 and made limited territorial gains. Geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces made limited advances within 30km south of Kreminna.Avdiivka City Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on June 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 18 and made limited territorial gains. Geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces made limited advances within 30km south of Kreminna.[1]Avdiivka City Military Administration Head Vitaliy Barabash reported that Ukrainian forces advanced more than a kilometer north of Avdiivka on the Donetsk City frontline over the past two weeks.[2] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations south, southwest, and southeast of Velyka Novosilka on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and made some localized advances.[3] Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and geolocated footage suggests that Ukrainian forces entered the western part of Pyatykhatky (41km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City), southwest of Orikhiv.[4] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Valeriy Shershen stated that Russian forces continue to counterattack in western Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts, and that Ukrainian forces have “a lot of work.”[5] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Russian forces continue to transfer personnel and heavy military equipment from around Nova Kakhovka and Kakhovka in eastern Kherson Oblast to the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline via Melitopol.[6] Ukrainian forces may be temporarily pausing counteroffensive operations to reevaluate their tactics for future operations. Head of the Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Colonel Margo Grosberg stated on June 16 that he assesses "we won't see an offensive over the next seven days.”[7]The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on June 17 that Ukrainian forces “have mostly paused their advances in recent days” as Ukrainian command reexamines tactics.[8] These reports are consistent with ISW’s recent observations of the scale and approach of localized Ukrainian counterattacks in southern and eastern Ukraine.[9] ISW has previously noted that Ukraine has not yet committed the majority of its available forces to counteroffensive operations and has not yet launched its main effort.[10] Operational pauses are a common feature of major offensive undertakings, and this pause does not signify the end of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. A Wall Street Journal (WSJ) interview with Russian prisoners of war (POWs) indicates continued significant morale and command issues among frontline Russian units and the continued Russian use of “barrier forces” to shoot retreating soldiers.[11]WSJ amplified the statements of three unidentified Russian POWs who voluntarily surrendered to Ukrainian forces during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations near Velyka Novosilka, on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. The POWs reported widespread fear of a Ukrainian counteroffensive among Russian forces on the frontlines. The POWs indicated that the Russian military command sees Russian conscripts and penal recruits as expendable, and claimed Russian officers order injured personnel deemed unfit for service back to the front line and use “barrier forces” to prevent penal recruits in “Storm-Z” units from retreating. Barrier forces are specialized units that threaten to shoot their own personnel either to prevent retreats or to force them to attack, and unverified social media footage recently circulated depicting Russian barrier troops shooting retreating Russian forces in Ukraine.[12] The POWs also indicated that Russian forces struggle to supply and staff their units, including struggling to crew tanks and armored vehicles.[13]The POWs expressed concern about returning to Russia in a POW exchange due to Russian laws prohibiting voluntary surrender to the enemy. EU Internal Market Commissioner Theirry Breton announced on June 18 that the EU is accelerating arms deliveries to Ukraine. Breton referenced a pledge that the EU would supply a million high quality weapons to Ukraine over the coming year and stated that the EU is “going to step up our efforts to deliver arms and ammunition" as “this is a war of high intensity in which [high quality weapons] play a crucial role.”[14] Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly supported select Russian milbloggers’ proposal to create a Presidential Administration working group, likely in an effort to integrate prominent milbloggers into the pro-Kremlin information space. The working group would reportedly include members of the Russian presidential administration and aim to coordinate ideas on the war in Ukraine.[15] It is unclear if and how Russian milbloggers will participate in the Presidential Administration working group, however. Putin’s support of a working group to focus on war reporting suggests that Putin intends to continue to publicly engage with pro-Kremlin mobloggers in an attempt to expand his support in the ultranationalist community. The Kremlin has previously coopted prominent Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers by offering them official roles on the Russian Human Rights Council and in the Mobilization Working Group likely in exchange for amplifying pro-Kremlin rhetoric.[16] Key Takeaways Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive actions on at least four sectors of the front on June 18 and made limited territorial gains. Ukrainian forces may be temporarily pausing counteroffensive operations to reevaluate their tactics for future operations. A Wall Street Journal (WSJ) interview with Russian prisoners of war (POWs) indicates continued significant morale and command issues among frontline Russian units and the continued Russian use of “barrier forces” to shoot retreating soldiers. EU Internal Market Commissioner Theirry Breton announced on June 18 that the EU is accelerating arms deliveries to Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly supported select Russian milbloggers’ proposal to create a Presidential Administration working group, likely in an effort to integrate prominent milbloggers into the pro-Kremlin information space. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Svatove and south of Kreminna. Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces continued to repel Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast Some Russian ultranationalist figures are concerned that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s efforts to formalize volunteer formations will trigger command changes and degrade combat effectiveness. Russian occupation officials are continuing to prioritize medical treatment for Russian military personnel in occupied Mariupol, reportedly significantly increasing the civilian mortality rate in the city. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted June 19, 2023 Share Posted June 19, 2023 Ukraine’s Armor Appears To Have A Russian Attack Helicopter Problem WWW.THEDRIVE.COM Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters’ presence at the front highlights the need for highly mobile and survivable short-range air defenses. Quote As Ukraine presses on with its counteroffensive in the south and east, making incremental advances in the process, there is evidence that Russia may be starting to enjoy more aerial access over critical areas near the front lines. As Russia continues to adapt its application of air power, after a fairly dismal start to the campaign, some of its aircraft are now able to operate in a less restricted way, or at least Russia is willing to take on more risk in doing so. Either way, this will put further pressure on the Ukrainian forces, raising questions, in particular, about the availability of mobile short-range air defense systems, or SHORAD. At the very least, as Ukraine gets away from its more entrenched and fixed air defense capabilities, the importance of SHORAD is only going to be underscored. As The War Zone has discussed in the past, SHORAD is fundamental to the protection of friendly units close to the front lines, including armored ones, defending them against a wide variety of aerial threats, ranging from low-flying fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters to larger drones and cruise missiles, and even smaller drones carrying improvised explosive devices. Speaking recently about the counteroffensive in the Zaporizhzhia region, in the southeast of the country, Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Hanna Malyar noted: “Our troops are moving in the conditions of extremely fierce battles,” before pointing to the particular threat posed by “the enemy’s aviation and artillery superiority.” President Zelensky echoed those same sentiments recently, as well. Multiple accounts — including from the media arm of the Russian Ministry of Defense itself — now document how Russian aviation is operating very close to the front lines, with attack helicopters presenting an especially serious threat to the Ukrainian counteroffensive in areas where armored advances are orchestrated. In particular, the Ka-52 Hokum has been repeatedly mentioned. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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