Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[Air_Delivery]

3 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

Like SFLU said, it's impossible to predict. But there are some major points along a prospective advance that will blunt the pace of Ukraine's advance. 

 

One is Kherson itself. 

It's a city. Urban combat is massively different than the open-field advances and small village fighting Ukraine has been doing in the Kherson area and near Kharkiv. Ukraine taking Kherson will be a completely different animal to what Ukraine has done before. 

I don't think the Russians are keen to make a last stand in urban combat. This isn't going to be a azov regiment in Mariupol situation.

[CayceG]

6 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said:

I don't think the Russians are keen to make a last stand in urban combat. This isn't going to be a azov regiment in Mariupol situation.

 

The way out of Kherson is 30 miles northeast of the city, and the Ukrainians are going to reach that before they reach Kherson itself. Maybe Ukraine shifts their attacks to allow the Russians to leave the city and go around. But the Russians won't be able to leave Kherson with their equipment over the bridge in the city. They'll have to retreat on foot. 

 

You're right that there won't be a last stand. But the pressure won't be 'hold at all costs.' The pressure will be orders from above preventing a retreat. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

In addition, the terrain in the Kherson region is open steppe which means that advancing Ukrainian forces will be very much exposed in the open to Russian artillery/drone/etc. strikes.  It wouldn't surprise me if Ukraine takes a more "conservative", slower approach in order to minimize such vulnerabilities as much as possible.

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russians are stuck in this weird position where they have to insist that Ukrainians are weak and inferior...but also can't really insist that, because then how do you explain why Russia is losing to such inferior people?

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

I am glad that the world is learning about the character of Ukraine and its people, even if through such a terrible war. Here, civilians who have been subjugated by Russia for months come and thank the Ukrainian soldiers who have liberated their town, and even though they have no power or running water or reliable anything, give food to the soldiers:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Good thread about the tough choices Russia faces in Kherson. Basically, because Kherson is the steppe—and even though that makes Ukrainian advance exposed, as Wade has said—it becomes impossible for Russia to stop retreating and set a new defensive line. Their online choice is to pull back to a natural barrier: either the Dnipro (smart, but a bigger retreat), or the Inhulets (less of a retreat, but opens them up to constant artillery/HIMARS fire). The tl;dr is that Russia holding onto anything west of the Dnipro River is almost impossible over the next week or two. The only thing holding Ukraine back at this point is being unwilling to extend themselves too quickly (which is smart).

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

In what can surely only be a positive thing for Russia, their conscripts aren't being paid or fed, and aren't happy:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Things are moving fast. Ukraine may have taken Snihurivka in Kherson, which is the logistics hub splitting the Russian-occupied areas. This effectively cuts the roads/highways in two. At this point, even half of the Russian forces now can only easily reach one of two surviving bridges over the Dnipro (and both are too damaged for heavy vehicles).

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

NATO...Errrr Ukrainian forces advancing near Kherson in Humvees.

[Air_Delivery]

US officials say Ukraine was behind car bomb that killed daughter of Russian nationalist: NYT

THEHILL.COM

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U.S. intelligence officials allege Ukraine was responsible for a car bomb that killed the daughter of a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, The New York Times reported on Wednesday…

 

[Jwheel86]

 

[Brian]

Russian strategy is to burden Ukraine with feeding their population.  Clearly Putin is following DeSantis lead 

[SuperSpreader]

2 hours ago, Brian said:

Russian strategy is to burden Ukraine with feeding their population.  Clearly Putin is following DeSantis lead 

Guantanamo? What's going on there these days 

[Jason]

2 minutes ago, SuperSpreader said:

Guantanamo? What's going on there these days 

 

January 6 chuds asking get to sent there I think

[SuperSpreader]

Just now, Jason said:

 

January 6 chuds asking get to sent there I think

 

Russians and Jan 6 chuds sitting in Guantanamo

 

P-E-G-G-I-N-G 

 

First comes love then comes marriage

 

Here comes MAGA with a..

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 05 October 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 5 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukraine’s northern Kharkiv counteroffensive has not yet culminated after one month of successful operations and is now advancing into western Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces captured Hrekivka and Makiivka in western Luhansk Oblast (approximately 20 km s

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Ukraine’s northern Kharkiv counteroffensive has not yet culminated after one month of successful operations and is now advancing into western Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainian forces captured Hrekivka and Makiivka in western Luhansk Oblast (approximately 20 km southwest of Svatove) on October 5.[1] Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai reported that Ukrainian forces have begun liberating unspecified villages in Luhansk Oblast on October 5.[2] Ukrainian forces began the maneuver phase of their counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast— which has now reached Luhansk Oblast—on September 6.[3] Russian forces have failed to hold the banks of the Oskil and Siverskyi Donets rivers and leverage them as natural boundaries to prevent Ukrainian forces from projecting into vulnerable sections of Russian-occupied northeast Ukraine. The terrain in western Luhansk is suitable for the kind of rapid maneuver warfare that Ukrainian forces used effectively in eastern Kharkiv Oblast in early September, and there are no indications from open sources that the Russian military has substantially reinforced western Luhansk Oblast. Ukraine’s ongoing northern and southern counteroffensives are likely forcing the Kremlin to prioritize the defense of one area of operations at the expense of another, potentially increasing the likelihood of Ukrainian success in both.

 

Russian forces conducted a Shahed-136 drone strike against Bila Tserkva, Kyiv Oblast, on October 5, the first Russian strike in Kyiv Oblast since June.[4] Footage from the aftermath of the strike shows apparent damage to residential structures.[5] Russian milbloggers lauded the destructive capability of the Shahed-136 drones but questioned why Russian forces are using such technology to target areas deep in the Ukrainian rear and far removed from active combat zones. That decision fits into the larger pattern of Russian forces expending high-precision technology on areas of Ukraine that hold limited operational significance.[6]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin took measures to assert full Russian control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Putin issued a decree transferring control of the ZNPP to Russian state company Rosenergoatom on October 5.[7] The ZNPP’s current Ukrainian operator Energoatom announced that its president assumed the position of General Director of the ZNPP on October 5.[8] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian officials are coercing ZNPP workers into obtaining Russian passports and signing employment contracts with Rosenergoatom.[9] International Atomic Energy Agency General Director Rafael Grossi plans to meet with both Ukrainian and Russian officials this week in Kyiv and Moscow to discuss the creation of a “protective zone” around the ZNPP.[10] Russian officials will likely attempt to coerce the IAEA in upcoming discussions and negotiations into recognizing Rosenergoatom’s official control of the ZNPP, and by implication Russia’s illegal annexation of Zaporizhia Oblast.

 

The head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, announced that Putin awarded him the rank of colonel general on October 5.[11] This promotion is particularly noteworthy in the context of the recent controversy surrounding Kadyrov and his direct criticism of Central Military District (CMD) Colonel General Aleksander Lapin, which ISW has previously analyzed.[12] Although ISW has not found official confirmation of Kadyrov’s promotion, Putin may have made the decision to elevate Kadyrov’s rank in order to maintain the support of Kadyrov and Chechen forces while simultaneously pushing back on the Russian Ministry of Defense and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, from whom Putin seems to be rhetorically distancing himself. Kadyrov’s new rank may be a sign that Putin is willing to appease the more radical and vocal calls of the siloviki base at the expense of the conventional military establishment.

 

Increasing domestic critiques of Russia’s “partial mobilization” are likely driving Putin to scapegoat the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and specifically Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Putin deferred mobilization for all students, including part-time and masters students, via a decree on October 5.[13] Putin told Russian outlets that because “the Ministry of Defense did not make timely changes to the legal framework on the list of those who are not subject to mobilization, adjustments have to be made.”[14] That direct critique of the MoD is also an implicit critique of Shoigu, whom Putin appears to be setting up to take the fall for the failures of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The chairperson of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee, Colonel General (Ret.) Andrey Kartapolov, also criticized the MoD on Russian state television on October 5. Kartapolov said that all Russians know the MoD is lying and must stop, but that message is not reaching “individual leaders,” another jab at Shoigu.[15] One Russian milblogger claimed that Kartapolov’s comments demonstrate that Shoigu will soon be “demolished” and “recognized as the main culprit” of Russia’s military failures. The milblogger reminded his readers that it was the Russian MoD and its head that made an “invaluable and huge contribution to the fact that we are now on the verge of a military-political catastrophe.”[16] Another milblogger defended Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen head Ramzan Kadyrov for criticizing the MoD, applauding them for driving necessary change.[17] Kadyrov’s announcement that Putin awarded him the rank of Colonel-General is similarly indicative that Putin is willing to appease the siloviki base that has taken continued rhetorical swings at the MoD establishment.

 

Putin will likely hold off on firing Shoigu for as long as he feels he can in order to continue to blame Shoigu for ongoing military failures and to build up support among other factions. Shoigu’s replacement will need to take responsibility for failures that occur after his tenure begins. Putin is already working to improve his support among the nationalist milbloggers and the siloviki such as Prigozhin and Kadyrov. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov old reporters on October 5 that Prigozhin “makes a great contribution within his capabilities” to efforts in Russia and Ukraine and declined to answer questions surrounding Prigozhin’s critiques of government officials.[18] A milblogger emphasized on October 5 that Putin “regularly hosts military correspondents, carefully reads their reports, asks the right questions, and receives objective answers,” implicitly contrasting that relationship with the dishonest way in which milbloggers believe the MoD interacts with Putin.[19]

 

Russian authorities detained the manager of several milblogger telegram channels on October 5, indicating that the Kremlin is likely setting limits on what criticism is allowed in the domestic Russian information space. Alexander Khunshtein, the deputy secretary of the General Council of Putin’s political party, United Russia, published footage on October 5 showing Russian authorities detaining Alexei Slobodenyuk.[20] Slobodenyuk is an employee of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Patriot media group and the manager of several milblogger telegrams, the most prominent of which are “Release Z Kraken” and “Skaner.” The telegram channel “Skaner” has featured criticism of major state officials and military personnel, the most prominent of whom are Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov. Russian authorities detained Slobodenyuk on accusations of fraud. His detention suggests that the Kremlin is attempting to set boundaries for which criticism is allowed in the information space and on which high-ranking officials milbloggers and journalists can criticize—Defense Minister Shoigu, Putin‘s likely scapegoat-in-waiting, now appears to be fair game, whereas officials close to Putin such as Lavrov and Putin’s spokesperson are off-limits.

 

Key Takeaways

• The Ukrainian counteroffensive that began in Kharkiv Oblast has not yet culminated and is actively pushing into Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin took measures to assert full Russian control over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
• Russian forces conducted the first strike on Kyiv Oblast since June with a Shahed-136 drone.
• The Head of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, announced that Putin awarded him the rank of Colonel-General.
• Increasing domestic critiques of Russia’s “partial mobilization” are likely driving Putin to scapegoat the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and specifically Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.
• Ukrainian troops likely consolidated positions and regrouped in northern Kherson Oblast after making major gains over in the last 48 hours.
• Russian sources reported Ukrainian offensive preparations northwest, west, and northeast of Kherson City.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 5.
• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the implementation of the Russian “partial mobilization” on October 5.
• Russian citizens who are economically disadvantaged and ethnic minority Russian communities continue to bear a disproportionate burden in mobilization rates and casualty rates according to investigative reports, suggesting that Russian authorities may be deliberately placing poor and minority Russian citizens in more dangerous positions than well-off or ethnic Russians.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin completed the final formality in the process for illegally annexing Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories on October 5.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russia going to kidnap all children in occupied Kherson Oblast (moving them to Crimea) for their "safety":

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russian mibloggers are convinced Ukraine is about to launch a third offensive, this one right down the middle of the south (to split the Russian lands in two):

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

Ohhh great now we need another god damned wall.

[Jason]

15 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

Ohhh great now we need another god damned wall.

 

And Vlad's gonna pay for it. 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Chris-]

I got down a Wikipedia rabbit hole reading about the Chechen Wars (and all the shit that went on with Dagestan - federalism, am I right?) and now the way this invasion went makes complete sense. That part of the world is one big gas leak.

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

Not great!

[outsida]

Ukraine still won’t stop. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 06 October 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 6 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones is not generating asymmetric effects the way the Ukrainian use of US-provided HIMARS systems has done and is unlikely to affect the course of the war significantly. The deputy chief of the Main Operational Department o

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. 

 

Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones is not generating asymmetric effects the way the Ukrainian use of US-provided HIMARS systems has done and is unlikely to affect the course of the war significantly. The deputy chief of the Main Operational Department of the Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated on October 6 that Russian forces have used a total of 86 Iranian Shahed-136 drones against Ukraine, 60% of which Ukrainian forces have already destroyed.[1] As ISW reported yesterday, Russian forces do not appear to be focusing these drones on asymmetric nodes near the battlefield. They have used many drones against civilian targets in rear areas, likely hoping to generate nonlinear effects through terror. Such efforts are not succeeding. Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Yuri Ignat stated that the Russian army is increasingly using the Iranian-made drones to conserve its stock of high-precision missiles.[2] Russian forces have likely used a non-trivial percentage of the Shahed-136 supply so far if the claims of an anonymous US intelligence official at the end of August were correct that Iran would likely provide ”hundreds” of drones to Russia.[3]

 

The Wagner Private Military Company announced the creation of its own private Telegram channel on October 6, indicating that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may want a voice that is clearly his own to compete with milbloggers and possibly Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, who all have their own Telegram channels. A Telegram channel affiliated with Prigozhin shared the invitation to the Wagner channel, “Peacekeeper.” The Russian-language invitation reads “We arrived from Hell. We are WAGNER - our business is death, and business is going well.”[4] In addition to Peacekeeper, the channel suggested that followers subscribe to the “Novorossiya Z Project,” another private channel. The creation of a group for Wagner to share “uncensored materials from the front” may be in part a recruitment tool but is likely also an attempt to establish a formal means for Prigozhin and his allies to directly influence the information space in much the same way that Kadyrov and the Russian nationalist milbloggers use Telegram. 

 

Key Takeaways

• Russia’s use of Iranian-made drones is not generating asymmetric effects the way the Ukrainian use of US-provided HIMARS systems has done and is unlikely to affect the course of the war significantly.
• The Wagner Private Military Company announced the creation of its own private Telegram channel on October 6, indicating that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may want a voice that is clearly his own to compete with milbloggers and possibly Chechen warlord Ramzan Kadyrov, who all have their own Telegram channels.
• Ukrainian forces likely continued counteroffensive operations in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast near Kupyansk and operations to threaten Russian positions along the Kreminna-Svatove road in western Luhansk Oblast on October 6.
• Russian troops are likely establishing defensive positions in upper Kherson Oblast following the collapse of the Russian line in northeast Kherson.
• Russian troops continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 6 and likely made incremental gains around Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued to conduct routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole, and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 6.
• Local Russian officials appear to be frantically looking for ways to fund their mobilized units as the Kremlin increasingly expects local administrations to pay for the war effort from their own budgets.
• The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on October 6 that Russian forces began the forced mobilization of Ukrainian citizens in Russian-occupied Kremmina and Starobilsk, Luhansk Oblast.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

27 minutes ago, outsida said:

Ukraine still won’t stop. 

 

Kyiv won't be the "target audience" of a tactical nuclear "demonstration".

 

It will be intended to shatter Western resolve.

[SuperSpreader]

9 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

Kyiv won't be the "target audience" of a tactical nuclear "demonstration".

 

It will be intended to shatter Western resolve.

 

I don't think that's gonna work. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

1 minute ago, SuperSpreader said:

 

I don't think that's gonna work. 

 

I think you underestimate the timidity of Western civic society.

[SuperSpreader]

3 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

I think you underestimate the timidity of Western civic society.

True I ain't going in. I'm Mexican fuck y'all. 

[Air_Delivery]

7 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

I think you underestimate the timidity of Western civic society.

I think it just depends. The West has a way of not wanting to rock the boat until it has no choice. When it reaches that point though the pendulum tends to swing the other way and it tends to be too aggressive. I think we are reaching that point and nuclear weapons would be the tipping point. IMO Biden and co will feel they have no choice but an overwhemling response as a show of force not only to Russia, but to China, Iran, Pakastan and anyone else that has any ideas. 

[SuperSpreader]

6 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said:

I think it just depends. The West has a way of not wanting to rock the boat until it has no choice. When it reaches that point though the pendulum tends to swing the other way and it tends to be too aggressive. I think we are reaching that point and nuclear weapons would be the tipping point. IMO Biden and co will feel they have no choice but an overwhemling response as a show of force not only to Russia, but to China, Iran, Pakastan and anyone else that has any ideas. 

 

Yeah I don't see how the US let's it slide like a dismembered reporter. 

[PaladinSolo]

6 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

I think you underestimate the timidity of Western civic society.

I dunno, a couple months of cold weather and they might just be ready to embrace the warm glow of Atom!

[CitizenVectron]

There have been a few reports that the US has delivered new cluster munitions for the HIMARS launchers (m26 cluster rockets no longer used by the US military, but for which hundreds of thousands sit in storage). The Russians are reporting that they've been used, but no confirmations:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Musk appears to be disabling the Ukrainian use of Starlink inside Russian-occupied territory: