Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 03 October 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 3 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains around Lyman and in Kherson Oblast in the last 48 hours. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops made significant breakthroughs in northern Kherson Oblast between October 2 and 3.

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains around Lyman and in Kherson Oblast in the last 48 hours. Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops made significant breakthroughs in northern Kherson Oblast between October 2 and 3.[1] Geolocated footage corroborates Russian claims that Ukrainian troops are continuing to push east of Lyman and may have broken through the Luhansk Oblast border in the direction of Kreminna.[2] As ISW has previously reported, the Russian groupings in northern Kherson Oblast and on the Lyman front were largely comprised of units that had been regarded as among Russia’s premier conventional fighting forces before the war.[3] Elements of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army reportedly withdrew from Lyman to rear positions near Kreminna before October 2.[4] Russian sources previously reported that elements of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), especially the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, are active in Kherson Oblast.[5] Both the 144th Motorized Rifle Division and the 76th Guards Air Assault Division were previously lauded as some of Russia’s most elite forces, and their apparent failures to hold territory against major Ukrainian counter-offensive actions is consistent with ISW’s previous assessment that even the most elite Russian military forces are becoming increasingly degraded as the war continues. This phenomenon was also visible in the collapse of the 4th Tank Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army earlier in the Kharkiv counter-offensive.[6]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin may be continuing efforts to redirect blame for recent Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast. Russian outlet РБК (RBK), citing sources within the Russian regime, reported on October 3 that Lieutenant-General Roman Berdnikov has replaced Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlev as commander of the Western Military District (WMD).[7] As ISW previously assessed, WMD units have been largely operating in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast over the last few months but without a clear commander. Zhuravlev has not been seen for some time, and Putin cycled through two commanders of the “western grouping of forces" in two weeks. Putin may be attempting to redirect the growing anger for Russian losses in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman by assigning a new face prominently to the WMD.[8] This announcement may also be an effort to shield Colonel General Alexander Lapin, commander of the Central Military District (CMD), from widespread criticism for recent Russian failures around Lyman.[9] Putin may seek to shift the blame for future Russian losses in Kharkiv and possibly Luhansk Oblasts to Berdnikov. Criticism of Lapin in recent days has served as a catalyst for wider breakdown within the Russian nationalist information space, and Berdnikov’s appointment may be intended to distract and redirect that growing dissatisfaction.

 

Russian officials released Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) director Ihor Murashov from detention and are likely continuing to undermine Ukrainian control of the plant. Energoatom reported that the Russian military detained Director General of the ZNPP Ihor Murashov on September 30 and released him into Ukrainian-controlled territory on October 3 following talks with International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Raphael Grossi.[10] Russian officials will likely not allow Murashov to return to his position at the ZNPP. Russian officials will likely attempt to use their physical removal of Murashov to assert further control over the nuclear power plant.

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces have made substantial gains around Lyman and in northern Kherson Oblast over the last 24 hours. The Russian units defeated on these fronts were previously considered to be among Russia’s premier conventional fighting forces.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin may use the appointment of Lieutenant-General Roman Berdnikov to the command of the Western Military District to redirect blame for recent or future Russian military failures in Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian officials released the director of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, whom they had illegally detained, and are likely continuing to undermine Ukrainian control of the plant.
• Ukrainian forces made advances on the Oskil River-Kreminna line towards the Luhansk oblast border.
• Ukrainian forces advanced in northern Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin is introducing punitive measures to target the Russian bureaucratic institutions responsible for the execution of partial mobilization.
• Russian officials acknowledged that the Kremlin intends to invade, occupy, and illegally annex additional Ukrainian territory in the south and east and may alter the claimed borders of its occupied territories.
• The Russian State Duma approved the Kremlin’s illegal accession treaties on October 3 and laid out the administrative timeline for integrating illegally annexed Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation.

 

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

5 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

commander of the Western Military District (WMD

What a confusing acronym 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Dr. Mike Martin updates his his theory on how the current Ukrainian offensive operations will bring this conflict to a successful conclusion:

 

 

 

 

 

[Jason]

11 minutes ago, b_m_b_m_b_m said:

What a confusing acronym 

 

Well it's probably DMW in French.

[marioandsonic]

1 hour ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

Dr. Mike Martin updates his his theory on how the current Ukrainian offensive operations will bring this conflict to a successful conclusion:

 

 

 

 

 

I still believe Putin will launch a nuke if things get drastic for the Russian army

[PaladinSolo]

5 hours ago, marioandsonic said:

I still believe Putin will launch a nuke if things get drastic for the Russian army

Nah, cause then its really over for them, NATO begins strikes, its few remaining frenemies like China/India bail on them, they'll take the L and whine about it.

[BloodyHell]

7 hours ago, marioandsonic said:

I still believe Putin will launch a nuke if things get drastic for the Russian army

You have a bad habit of always thinking the worst thing will happen. Nobody is launching a nuke at Ukraine.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russian front is collapsing in northern Kherson.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

46 minutes ago, BloodyHell said:

You have a bad habit of always thinking the worst thing will happen. Nobody is launching a nuke at Ukraine.

 

Discounting that at the very least the possibility exists that a tactical nuclear weapon could be employed is also not particularly warranted either.

 

If anything, the possibility that it could happen has increased in recent days.

[SuperSpreader]

28 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

A fast and easy strike, we will be greeted as liberators 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[marioandsonic]

1 hour ago, BloodyHell said:

You have a bad habit of always thinking the worst thing will happen.

I've been posting here for 11 years.  Are you only realizing this now?

[Jason]

1 hour ago, marioandsonic said:

I've been posting here for 11 years.  Are you only realizing this now?

 

The current persona has to pretend to not know that. 

[CitizenVectron]

More HIMARS incoming:

 

U.S. to send mobile rocket launchers to Ukraine in $625 million aid package

WWW.REUTERS.COM

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The Biden administration's next security assistance package for Ukraine is expected to include four High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) launchers, munitions, mines and mine-resistant vehicles, two sources briefed on the $625 million package told Reuters on Monday.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Looks like the Republican MAGA base has finally been fed enough Tucker and RT propaganda to begin the switch to Russia's side. Only a matter of time before Republican leadership follows:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

I think it's common knowledge that Ukraine set up a "surrender line" for Russian soldiers to call. Apparently, they are now receiving calls from Russians still inside Russia who have been mobilized, wanting to surrender in advance of being deployed:

 

Russian soldiers are surrendering en masse

WWW.PRAVDA.COM.UA

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VALENTYNA ROMANENKO — TUESDAY, 4 OCTOBER 2022, 11:46

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

1 hour ago, CitizenVectron said:

Looks like the Republican MAGA base has finally been fed enough Tucker and RT propaganda to begin the switch to Russia's side. Only a matter of time before Republican leadership follows:

 

 

That 30% is enough to get authorizations through congress with nearly all dems voting in favor, a dynamic you’re likely to see a lot if republicans take at least one chamber

[CitizenVectron]

Russia’s 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (Kherson Oblast) is attempting to "regroup" (i.e. retreat), but cannot do so because Ukraine has destroyed the bridges across the Dnipro, and are panicking.

 

[CitizenVectron]

As Ukraine liberates plans their continued counter-offensive into Luhansk, they are now openly stating that they will not allow civilians to return to major cities as they are retaken. The reason is that most of these cities have centralized heating plants (basically steam is pumped underground to homes from central plants), but the Russians have destroyed them. This makes the large cities inhospitable to human life in winter.

 

 

 

 

[ThreePi]

11 minutes ago, b_m_b_m_b_m said:

That 30% is enough to get authorizations through congress with nearly all dems voting in favor, a dynamic you’re likely to see a lot if republicans take at least one chamber

 

Depends on the Speaker. If they go full Hastert-rule none of that is getting through.

[CitizenVectron]

There is evidence that Ukraine is using friend or foe identification systems in battle. As a result, Ukraine is able to paint their vehicles to appear Russian (with Zs, Vs, etc) and still able to tell them apart from the actual Russians. Russians, however, have no such ability, and so are confused by which vehicles are theirs or Ukraine's: 

 

Thus:

 

 

 

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

13 minutes ago, ThreePi said:

 

Depends on the Speaker. If they go full Hastert-rule none of that is getting through.

Two words: discharge petitions

[CitizenVectron]

 

Changes in territory over the last week. Green = furthest extend of Russian control, blue = recently liberated territory.

[marioandsonic]

24 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Changes in territory over the last week. Green = furthest extend of Russian control, blue = recently liberated territory.

 

Image not found 

[Mr.Vic20]

30 minutes ago, marioandsonic said:

 

Image not found 

THATS how fast they are moving! 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Jesus. The Russians are torturing civilians and removing their crowns and gold teeth. Actual Nazis.

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 04 October 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 4 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on October 4. Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along

 

 

 

Quote

 

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts on October 4. Ukrainian forces liberated several settlements on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along the T2207 highway, forcing Russian forces to retreat to the south toward Kherson City. Ukrainian forces also continued to push south along the Dnipro River and the T0403 highway, severing two Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in northern Kherson Oblast and forcing Russians south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border toward the Beryslav area. Ukrainian military officials noted that the Ukrainian interdiction campaign is crippling Russian attempts to transfer additional ammunition, reserves, mobilized men, and means of defense to frontline positions.[1] Ukrainian forces also continued to advance east of the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that battles are ongoing near the R66 Svatove-Kreminna highway.[2]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization is having more significant short-term impacts on the Russian domestic context than on the war in Ukraine, interacting with Russian battlefield failures to exacerbate fractures in the information space that confuse and undermine Putin’s narratives. Ukrainian sources have rightly observed that the partial mobilization is not a major threat in the short term because the Ukrainian counteroffensive is moving faster than the mobilization can generate effects.[3] Ukrainian Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov even stated that mobilization in Russia is a “gift” to Ukraine because the Kremlin is finding itself in a “dead end,” caught between its failures and its determination to hold what it has seized.[4] The controversies surrounding the poorly executed partial mobilization, coupled with significant Russian defeats in Kharkiv Oblast and around Lyman, have intensified infighting between pro-Putin Russian nationalist factions and are creating new fractures among voices who speak to Putin’s core constituencies.[5]

 

Putin is visibly failing at balancing the competing demands of the Russian nationalists who have become increasingly combative since mobilization began despite sharing Putin’s general war aims and goals in Ukraine. ISW has identified three main factions in the current Russian nationalist information space: Russian milbloggers and war correspondents, former Russian or proxy officers and veterans, and some of the Russian siloviki—people with meaningful power bases and forces of their own. Putin needs to retain the support of all three of these factions. Milbloggers present Putin’s vision to a pro-war audience in both Russia and the proxy republics. The veteran community is helping organize and support force generation campaigns.[6] The siloviki are providing combat power on the battlefield. Putin needs all three factions to sustain his war effort, but the failures in Ukraine combined with the chaotic partial mobilization are seemingly disrupting the radical nationalist community in Russia. Putin is currently trying to appease this community by featuring some milbloggers on state-owned television, allowing siloviki to generate their own forces and continue offensive operations around Bakhmut and Donetsk City, and placating veterans by ordering mobilization and engaging the general public in the war effort as they have long demanded.

 

Russian failures around Lyman galvanized strong and direct criticism of the commander of the Central Military District (CMD), Alexander Lapin, who supposedly commanded the Lyman grouping, as ISW has previously reported.[7] This criticism originated from the siloviki group, spearheaded by Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov and Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. Kadyrov and Prigozhin represent an emerging voice within the regime’s fighting forces that is attacking the more traditional and conventional approach to the war pursued by Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu and the uniformed military command. The chaotic execution of Putin’s mobilization order followed by the collapse of the Lyman pocket ignited tensions between the more vocal and radical Kadyrov-Prigozhin camp, who attacked the MoD and the uniformed military for their poor handling of the war.[8] Putin now finds himself in a dilemma. He cannot risk alienating the Kadyrov-Prigozhin camp, as he desperately needs Kadyrov’s Chechen forces and Prigozhin’s Wagner Group mercenaries to fight in Ukraine.[9] Nor can he disenfranchise the MoD establishment, which provides the overwhelming majority of Russian military power in Ukraine and the institutional underpinnings needed to carry out the mobilization order and continue the war.

 

The Kadyrov-Prigozhin incident sparked a rift between the siloviki and the milbloggers, with the milbloggers defending Lapin. Milbloggers are criticizing Kadyrov’s attack on Lapin, claiming that it stems from competition between Lapin and Kadyrov-Prigozhin.[10] The Kremlin did not punish Kadyrov or Prigozhin for their direct attacks on Lapin and the Defense Ministry but has instead deflected blame for the Russian defeat in Kharkiv Oblast onto the Western Military District (WMD). Kremlin-affiliated outlets have even interviewed milbloggers who have painted Lapin as a hero for saving the stranded WMD units in Lyman, likely in an effort to divert responsibility for the Russian defeat there onto recently fired WMD Commander Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlev.[11] Milbloggers, who had frequently complimented Kadyrov or Prigozhin before this incident, are now more skeptical of the siloviki community, attacking it for being too self-interested.

 

Fractures are emerging within the Russian milblogger community itself, moreover. Milbloggers have begun increasingly questioning each other's military credentials and rights to offer recommendations for the Russian Armed Forces.[12] One milblogger complained that commentators without appropriate military experience have been improperly criticizing current military commanders and should be focusing on simply portraying the situation on the frontlines without editorializing.[13] These critiques have been largely aimed at the milblogger discourse following the Russian defeat in Lyman and the Kadyrov-Prigozhin incident.[14] These attacks on some milbloggers’ credentials have drawn responses from milbloggers who have met with Putin himself and are being featured on Kremlin-controlled television channels, who now declare that they are the ones who have shown the true shortcomings of the Russian forces to Putin so that he can address them.[15]

 

The veterans’ community is dissatisfied with the execution of Putin’s mobilization. ISW reported in May that an independent Russian veterans’ organization, the All-Russian Officers Assembly, published an open letter calling on Putin to declare war on Ukraine, announce partial mobilization, and form new war-time administrations to execute the mobilization order.[16] Those new administrations would likely have improved or supplanted the military commissariats that have been mishandling the current partial mobilization. The Assembly also encouraged Putin to recognize that Russia is fighting NATO in Ukraine, not Ukrainians, long before this narrative gained prominence in the Kremlin’s justifications for its defeat in Kharkiv Oblast and Lyman. This elder nationalist military community has long been warning Putin of the limitations of his forces, problems in the Russian military-industrial complex, and the failings of the Russian mobilization system. Putin has refused to order general mobilization or declare war against Ukraine, and the partial mobilization has likely been executed as poorly as those who had recommended fixing the mobilization system had feared. Former Deputy Commander of the Russian Southern Military District Andrey Gurulev stated that the Russian military command must disclose its inability to mobilize 300,000 combat-ready reservists and broaden the mobilization criteria if Russia is to have any hope of regaining the initiative in this war.[17] Gurulev even expressed his support for Kadyrov’s and Prigozhin’s attack on Lapin, highlighting the growing fractiousness of the nationalist information space.

 

The fragmentation of the Russian nationalist information space could have significant domestic impacts and could even affect the stability of Putin’s regime. Putin will be unable to meet the mutually exclusive demands of various groups. Kadyrov and Prigozhin are pushing for a change in the way Russia fights the war to one more suited to their unconventional modes of mobilizing personnel and fighting.  The veterans have been pushing for a more traditional overhaul of the Russian higher military command and MoD and for putting Russia on a conventional war footing and the Russian MoD. Russian milbloggers are currently defending the Kremlin’s selection of uniformed commanders while continuing to attack the MoD and making a variety of extreme demands and recommendations of their own—all the while reporting on Russia’s frontline failings in detail even as the MoD tries to silence them. Putin cannot afford to lose the support of any of these groups, nor can satisfy them all as the war wears on and Russian troops continue to sustain losses. The shocks of the Kharkiv and Lyman defeats, energized by the partial mobilization and its poor management, have exposed these deepening fissures within Putin’s core constituencies to the view of all Russians. They could even begin to seed the notion that Putin is not fully in control of his own base. The ramifications of such a development for his regime are hard to predict.

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued to make significant gains in Kherson Oblast while simultaneously continuing advances in Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization is having more significant short-term impacts on the Russian domestic context than on the war in Ukraine, catalyzing fractures in the information space that confuse and undermine Putin’s narratives.
• Ukrainian forces continued to make substantial gains in northern Kherson Oblast on October 4, beginning to collapse the sparsely-manned Russian lines in that area.
• Ukrainian forces continued to make gains in eastern Kharkiv Oblast west of Svatove on October 4, pushing past the Oskil River and increasingly threatening Russian positions in Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to conduct artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyiapole and in Dnipropetrovsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts on October 4.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks in Donetsk Oblast on October 4.
• The Kremlin effectively ordered local Russian administrations and non-Ministry of Defense institutions to fund a significant part of the mobilization effort from local budgets.
• Russian security officials are attempting to maintain their domestic security apparatus as Putin’s partial mobilization drains the Russian security sector to generate additional forces to fight in Ukraine.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine is capturing so much (working) Russian gear that it's allowing them to increase the size of their mechanized forces:

 

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"One Ukrainian battalion, the Carpathian Sich, seized 10 modern T-80 tanks and five 2S5 Giatsint 152-mm self-propelled howitzers after it entered the town of Izyum last month, said its deputy chief of staff, Ruslan Andriyko.

 

“We’ve got so many trophies that we don’t even know what to do with them,” he said. “We started off as an infantry battalion, and now we are sort of becoming a mechanized battalion.”

 

 

[marioandsonic]

At this rate, how long would it take for Ukrain to take back all of their territory from Russia?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

51 minutes ago, marioandsonic said:

At this rate, how long would it take for Ukrain to take back all of their territory from Russia?

 

Because of the nature of war, that's absolutely impossible to predict because of the multiplicity of variables involved - it could be a matter of days if the Russian military continues to collapse at the current rate or it could be months if their resistance stiffens in the south and the onset of winter.

[CayceG]

1 hour ago, marioandsonic said:

At this rate, how long would it take for Ukrain to take back all of their territory from Russia?

 

Like SFLU said, it's impossible to predict. But there are some major points along a prospective advance that will blunt the pace of Ukraine's advance. 

 

One is Kherson itself. 

It's a city. Urban combat is massively different than the open-field advances and small village fighting Ukraine has been doing in the Kherson area and near Kharkiv. Ukraine taking Kherson will be a completely different animal to what Ukraine has done before. 

 

Two is the Dnieper River. 

There are two crossings the Russians have captured across the Dnieper. One at Kherson is out of commission due to Ukrainian artillery strikes. The other at Novo Kakhova is damaged and might not be suitable for allowing for mechanized units to cross. The river itself at this point in its course is 2/3 of a mile wide. 

If Ukraine wants to allow for a Russian retreat from Kherson or trap them there and force a surrender, that's fine. But those Ukrainian units won't be able to cross that river without repairing the bridges to allow for their forces to cross. That will take months. 

 

Three is the other fortified cities that Russia has held since 2014--Donetsk and Luhansk. See my answer on Kherson above for urban fighting, but this will be much harder since the population in these areas might be less welcoming of Ukrainian forces. This doesn't even take into account the more difficult terrain here compared to the flatlands and rolling hills they've advanced through so far. 

 

Four is the fortified Azov coast. Mariupol, Berdyansk, Melitopol, and Tokmak are key points for Russia that they've likely fortified as rear supply lines to provide support for the front lines of Kherson and the 'central' line of contact on the left bank of the Dnieper. 

 

Lastly is Crimea itself. That just isn't going to happen. I understand the talk from Ukraine about going all the way to the Kerch Bridge, but this is just unrealistic. The thing I see happening is if Ukraine can capture all the way to the isthmus between Crimea and mainland Ukraine, they should turn it into a DMZ or a miles-wide minefield to prevent invasion from that direction ever again.