Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (13 June 2024) - US and Ukraine sign bilateral security agreement for long-term supply and cooperation

[CitizenVectron]

That's a big blow to their airlift capabilities, which is great. 

 

Something else I've seen mentioned is that Ukraine is now self-producing a number of drones which are intended to shoot shrapnel instead of damage via explosion. Some apparently even use wood/cardboard as part of their frame. The idea is that if a drone can shotgun some hot shrapnel at targets like parked planes, they can do enough damage to disable them for a long time (especially since Russia has major issues with logistics/supply). 

[CitizenVectron]

There is apparently a second drone strike on Pskov right now. Or, at least, the Russians are using AA and small arms fire against what they think are drones. No reports of damage, yet.

[mclumber1]

1 hour ago, CitizenVectron said:

There is apparently a second drone strike on Pskov right now. Or, at least, the Russians are using AA and small arms fire against what they think are drones. No reports of damage, yet.

 

From the Kyiv Independent: 

 

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Russian official claims 'unidentified object' over Pskov Oblast. Pskov Oblast Governor Mikhail Vedernikov claimed that an unknown aerial object was detected in the region on Aug. 31.

 

Even the aliens are tired of Russia's shit

[Jason]

3 minutes ago, mclumber1 said:

Even the aliens are tired of Russia's shit

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 31 August 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 31, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31 and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on August 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31 and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front. The Ukrainian General Staff and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions and achieved unspecified success in the direction of Novodanylivka-Novoprokopivka (5km to 13km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[1] Malyar also stated that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success in the Bakhmut direction.[2] Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of Missile Forces and Artillery and Unmanned Systems of the General Staff Brigadier General Serhiy Baranov stated that Ukrainian forces have reached parity in counterbattery capabilities with Russian forces.[3] Baranov stated that NATO-provided artillery systems with ranges of 30km to 40km allow Ukrainian forces to destroy Russian artillery systems and force Russian forces to move their artillery further from the frontline.[4] Ukrainian officials previously made statements in late July indicating that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign is successfully degrading Russian counterbattery capabilities.[5] Russian sources have repeatedly expressed concerns since mid-July over the lack of Russian counterbattery artillery capabilities, particularly in southern Ukraine.[6]

 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted Ukraine’s domestic production of long-range missiles on August 31, likely as part of a coordinated Ukrainian campaign promoting increased Ukrainian strike capabilities against Russian deep rear areas. Zelensky stated that a Ukrainian-produced long-range weapon successfully hit a target 700 kilometers away, but did not provide further details about the strike or the weapon.[7] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov previously stated on August 26 that a new but unspecified Ukrainian-made missile struck a Russian S-400 air defense system in Crimea on August 23, and Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Head Major General Kyrylo Budanov stated on August 24 that Ukrainian forces have the ability to strike any part of occupied Crimea.[8]

 

Russian authorities arrested a notable fringe ultranationalist Russian milblogger on accusations of discrediting the Russian military, likely as part of centralized efforts to silence some critical milblogger voices without prompting a general backlash. Russian authorities arrested Andrei Kurshin, who reportedly runs the Telegram channel “Moscow Calling,” on August 31 but did not specify what content Kurshin posted that prompted the charges.[9] The “Moscow Calling” channel routinely criticizes Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and notably commonly attacks many aspects of Russia’s military conduct of the war in Ukraine while supporting the ultranationalist goals underpinning the war itself. The wider Russian ultranationalist information space welcomed Kurshin’s arrest and noted that he routinely discredited the Russian military by mocking Russian military deaths and writing ”vile” thoughts about the Russian war effort.[10] ”Moscow Calling” also regularly supports imprisoned Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin, likely generating further Kremlin opposition towards Kurshin.[11] Elements of the wider Russian ultranationalist community revealed Kurshin's previously anonymous identity in April after he joked about the assassination of Russian milblogger Maksim Fomin (Vladlen Tatarsky), and at the time milbloggers called on Russian authorities to punish Kurshin for fostering anti-government attitudes online.[12] Kurshin and Girkin’s arrests suggest that the Kremlin may be arresting prominent ultranationalist voices that the wider community largely reviles to avoid backlash as the Kremlin intensifies its effort to increase its long-term control over the Russian information space.[13] Kurshin’s arrest does not necessarily portend wider repression of more mainstream Russian milbloggers. Milblogger reactions, including those who have been outright critical of the Russian military leadership, additionally suggest that the milblogger community has been and is willing to establish unofficial guidelines for what is permissible criticism of the war and the Russian leadership. The Kremlin likely benefits from and encourages this self-policing, to a certain degree, among milbloggers - tolerating some criticism while cultivating key milbloggers and seeking to silence particularly critical voices.  

 

Russian military authorities allegedly ordered the detention of three Russian milbloggers who have recently criticized the Russian MoD – a move that sparked a backlash in only a small corner of the Russian information space. Russian milbloggers claimed that the commander of the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and possibly a high-level Russian military official ordered Russian Military Counterintelligence to detain the three Russian milbloggers who have recently been critical of the Russian MoD’s handling of issues within the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.[14] Reactions to the detention orders were largely isolated to the small community that has been perpetuating discussions about the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade since August 25, indicating that the Russian MoD is likely choosing targets whose punishment will not have significant repercussions in the Russian information space and this discussion is unlikely to last in the wider milblogger space.[15]

 

Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin and his associates conducted likely futile political maneuvers intended to coalesce into a coherent and meaningful political opposition group. Girkin announced on August 31 that he intends to run for president in the 2024 Russian presidential elections, but primarily used the announcement to reiterate his longstanding critiques of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[16] Girkin’s theoretical “campaign” will have little to no impact and should not be construed as a direct political threat to the Kremlin. Girkin criticized Putin for being an ineffective military leader, failing to remove inept senior officials, and for prioritizing rich billionaires and longtime friends over the needs of Russia - all of which are longstanding rhetorical points from Girkin.[17] Girkin’s announcement is not a serious presidential bid (and the Kremlin will not allow it to be one) but rather an attempt to bring attention to Girkin’s imprisonment, his longtime criticisms of Putin, and his attempts to form a political movement. Kirill Fedorov, member of the Girkin-run Angry Patriots Club, stated that Girkin’s presidential announcement is a surprise and that the Angry Patriots Club had previously decided against Girkin or other members participating in the coming electoral cycle after Girkin’s arrest, and did not discuss the possibility of Girkin running for president during a recent meeting.[18] The Russian Movement in Support of Strelkov (Igor Girkin) announced on August 30 that it formed the ”Russian Strelkov Movement” and unanimously elected Girkin as its head, one of many recent political announcements likely aimed at preventing the movement from fracturing without Girkin's leadership and voice to hold the movement together.[19] Girkin’s August 31 announcement prompted limited reactions in the Russian ultranationalist information space that largely centered around confusion, sarcastic support, and criticism of the alleged presidential bid due to Girkin‘s and Russia‘s current political situations.[20] Prior announcements about the formation of political movements from Girkin’s associates have not resulted in any significant reaction, and the Angry Patriots Club is likely desperate to maintain relevance and cohesion with Girkin imprisoned.[21]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut in Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31 and reportedly advanced in both sectors of the front.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky highlighted Ukraine’s domestic production of long-range missiles on August 31, likely as part of a coordinated Ukrainian campaign promoting increased Ukrainian strike capabilities against Russian deep rear areas.
• Russian authorities arrested a notable fringe ultranationalist Russian milblogger on accusations of discrediting the Russian military, likely as part of centralized efforts to silence some critical milblogger voices without prompting a general backlash.
• Russian military authorities allegedly ordered the detention of three Russian milbloggers who have recently criticized the Russian MoD – a move that sparked a backlash in only a small corner of the Russian information space.
• Imprisoned Russian ultranationalist Igor Girkin and his associates conducted likely futile political maneuvers intended to coalesce into a coherent and meaningful political opposition group.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and unsuccessfully counterattacked in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on August 31.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children to Russia and Russify Ukrainian youth.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 01 September 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 1, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported that the Russian military deployed elements of a newly created “reserve army” (the 25th CAA) to enable units currently on the frontline in Luhansk Oblast to laterally redeploy to def

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported that the Russian military deployed elements of a newly created “reserve army” (the 25th CAA) to enable units currently on the frontline in Luhansk Oblast to laterally redeploy to defend against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine. Budanov stated on August 31 that the Russian military deployed elements of the newly formed 25th Combined Arms Army (reportedly formed under the Eastern Military District) to replace elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (Central Military District) in the Kupyansk direction, and that these elements of the 41st Combined Arms Army (CAA) began a “slow” redeployment to an unspecified area in southern Ukraine.[1] Elements of the 41st CAA’s 35th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade and 90th Tank Division participated in the failed Russian winter 2023 offensive operation in Luhansk Oblast and have continued limited offensive activity along the Svatove-Kreminna line through now.[2] These units are likely degraded and have been operating without brigade and regiment level rotations like many frontline Russian units throughout the theater. ISW previously assessed that a lack of operational reserves would force the Russian command to conduct further lateral redeployments and make tough decisions about what sectors of the front to prioritize.[3] The Russian military command appears to have deployed elements of the newly formed and likely low quality or understrength 25th CAA to Luhansk Oblast to free up the relatively more effective 41st CAA elements for southern Ukraine. Budanov added that elements of the 25th CAA are already participating in hostilities in Luhansk Oblast.[4]

 

The 25th Combined Arms Army is unlikely to be combat effective at scale given its rushed deployment, ahead of a previously reported intended deployment date of December 2023. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) formed a “reserve army” at the end of June, likely referencing the 25th CAA, which began recruiting personnel from the Russian Far East in mid-May.[5] The 25th CAA will reportedly consist of 30,000 contract personnel in two motorized rifle divisions as well as an unspecified number of tank and artillery battalions, although it is unclear what elements have actually formed to date.[6] Budanov stated that Russian forces formed the 25th CAA as a ”strategic“ reserve and did not intend for the formation to be combat ready before October or November 2023.[7] A Russian administrator in Dalnegorsk, Primorsky Krai posted a recruitment ad for the 25th CAA on June 5 that claimed that the 25th CAA would train personnel from September 1 to December 1 and then deploy to either Zaporizhia or Kherson Oblast - ISW has not independently observed reporting of the October or November date Budanov cited but has no reason to question this statement.[8] Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department Oleksii Hromov stated on July 5 that the 25th CAA would not be combat ready until at least 2024.[9] Budanov noted that the 25th CAA elements that have arrived in Luhansk Oblast are understaffed and lack training, unsurprising due to their accelerated deployment.[10] ISW cannot yet independently verify that elements of the 25th CAA are operating in Luhansk Oblast, and the scale of the 25th CAA’s commitment is unclear from Budanov’s comments. The current size and capabilities of the elements of the 25th CAA deployed to Ukraine five months prematurely are unclear. The formation is likely either severely understaffed and not near the paper strength of two divisions, or is poorly trained much like initial Russian mobilized units in fall 2022, or both.

 

The Russian command likely views the deployment of a combat ineffective formation to Luhansk Oblast as a tolerable risk given the relatively lower tempo of operations along much of the Luhansk Oblast frontline. The recent lateral redeployment of elements of the 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Division from the Kreminna area in Luhansk Oblast to the Robotyne area in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late August further suggests that the Russian military command likely views this sector of the front as relatively safe.[11] Ukrainian forces are conducting limited ground attacks in Luhansk Oblast compared to other areas of the front.

 

Additional Russian lateral redeployments and the immediate commitment of intended operational reserves suggest that short term reinforcement needs are impeding intended long-term reconstitution efforts. The redeployment of elements of the 41st CAA to southern Ukraine is the third major Russian lateral redeployment since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in June and the second in recent weeks.[12] Russian formations at the division level (and in some areas lower) defending in southern Ukraine have done so without rotation since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive, and these forces have committed substantial material, manpower, and effort to hold back Ukrainian advances.[13] The second lateral deployment in the span of a few weeks suggests an increasing Russian concern about the stability of Russian defenses in light of Ukrainian advances around Robotyne. The creation of the 25th CAA is likely a part of Shoigu’s long-term objective previously announced in January 2023 to form several new major ground forces formations, and the deployment of elements of the 25th CAA to avoid creating gaps in the Russian defense suggests that the immediate threat of a Ukrainian breakthrough is serious enough to supersede that effort.[14]

 

Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky continues to highlight the impact of the lack of Russian counter-battery capabilities on Russian morale in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Khodakovsky claimed on September 1 that Russian forces continue to suffer from a lack of counter-battery capabilities in the Novomayorske-Novodonetske-Kermenchyk area (12km to 18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), where Khodakovsky and the “Vostok” Battalion are reportedly defending.[15] Khodakovsky insinuated that Russian forces are experiencing extreme physical and psychological stress in this area due to constant Ukrainian artillery fire and the Russian inability to return fire.[16] Khodakovsky expressed concerns about whether distressed and exhausted Russian forces will be able to defend against a future Ukrainian offensive in this sector of the front.[17]

 

Khodakovsky has previously highlighted similar concerns about the Russian defense in this area, although his recent comments are more negative and defeatist in tone.[18] Khodakovsky’s complaints about the lack of counter-battery capabilities in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and concerns about its impacts on Russian morale are not necessarily indicative of a wider phenomenon in the Russian defense. However, Khodakovsky’s comments likely accurately reflect the situation in his limited but important sector of the frontline as well as the situation for often neglected proxy military formations such as Khodakovsky’s Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) “Vostok” Battalion. Khodakovsky noted on August 31 that Russian forces cannot lose sight of the daily fight against Ukrainian forces while fantasizing about "burying the enemy in the future.”[19] Khodakovsky may believe that senior Russian commanders have done exactly this by letting the situation deteriorate to the point that Russian forces may be unable to defend against future Ukrainian offensives in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.

 

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made some advances on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut, and geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success in the Novodanylivka-Novopokropivka direction (5km to 13km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[21] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv), however.[22] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on July 1 that the US has observed notable Ukrainian progress in the “Zaporizhia area” (likely meaning the western Zaporizhia Oblast direction) in the past 72 hours and that Ukrainian forces have achieved some success against the “second line of Russian defenses” in southern Ukraine.[23] Kirby also stated that anonymous US officials’ criticisms of the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive are unhelpful.[24]

 

Politico confirmed previously-reported numbers of refurbished US Abrams tanks set to arrive in Ukraine by mid-September. Politico confirmed that Ukraine will receive the first 10 of the 31 promised refurbished US Abrams tanks by mid-September following refurbishment in Germany, citing a US Department of Defense official and another source.[25] The US Army Europe and Africa Spokesperson Colonel Martin O’Donnell stated that the US remains committed to delivering the 31 Abrams during an unspecified timeframe in the fall.[26] O’Donnell stated that 200 Ukrainian servicemen recently completed one of the final phases of Abrams training. Ukraine is unlikely to deploy the initial Abrams tanks (two platoons) until the entire brigade set is ready for operations.

 

Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is reportedly visiting multiple African countries as part of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD’s) continued effort to assume control over the Wagner Group’s operations in Africa. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Yevkurov is conducting a tour of various African countries including Burkina Faso and recently visited Libya and Syria in an attempt to replace “private military companies” (PMCs) with Russian MoD-controlled formations.[27] The milblogger also claimed that the Russian MoD is forming a “volunteer corps” to function as an “expeditionary corps” that will include over 20,000 personnel.[28] The “expeditionary corps” may be a reference to the “Rossiyskiy Ekpeditsionniy Korpus” (Russian Expeditionary Corps) PMC that Russian officials are allegedly creating to conduct operations abroad.[29] Bloomberg reported on August 31 that unnamed sources close to the Russian MoD and an unspecified PMC claimed that a Russian MoD-affiliated PMC is positioned to take control of Wagner’s operations in the Central African Republic.[30] ISW has continually observed claims since the Wagner rebellion on June 24 that the Russian MoD is attempting to consolidate control over Wagner operations in Africa.[31]

 

A Russian public opinion poll indicates that there is likely little to no societal discontent around the Wagner Group or its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death, and the true cause of the plane crash will have little impact on both Russian perceptions and the future of the Wagner Group. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center found that roughly equivalent percentages of Russians believe that either Prigozhin’s death was accidental; Russian authorities intentionally orchestrated Prigozhin’s death; Prigozhin is still alive; or the cause of Prigozhin’s death is difficult to determine.[32] Levada Center polls conducted on June 23 and August 23 found that Russians are almost evenly split between disapproving and approving of Prigozhin’s activities.[33] Public opinion on the death of Prigozhin (very likely a Kremlin-directed assassination) would only impact Kremlin or Ministry of Defense decision making if public opposition reached a far higher threshold, and the Kremlin likely in fact benefits from continued disagreement in Russian society over the circumstances of Prigozhin’s death.

 

A fringe Russian milblogger arrested on August 31 for allegedly discrediting the Russian military reportedly pled guilty on September 1.[34] Russian state media outlet TASS reported that Andrey Kurshin, administrator of the “Moscow Calling” Telegram channel, pled guilty to charges for knowingly disseminating false information about the Russian military and faces up to 10 years in prison.[35] Russian media outlet Baza claimed that Russian officials charged Kurshin for posts made on September 14 and November 23, 2022 covering Russian shelling of Zaporizhia Oblast and a strike near a dam on the Inhulets River near Kherson City, respectively.[36] Kurshin, via the “Moscow Calling” channel, has actively criticized the Russian military, Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Kremlin throughout the war for poor Russian conduct, and these specific and older posts are unlikely to be the impetus for Kurshin’s arrest. Russian authorities reportedly arrested prominent ultranationalist Igor Girkin based on Telegram posts two months prior to his arrest but reportedly began investigating Girkin on the same day he levied especially harsh critiques against Russian President Vladimir Putin, as ISW has previously reported.[37]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported that the Russian military deployed elements of a newly created “reserve army” (the 25th CAA) to enable units currently on the frontline in Luhansk Oblast to laterally redeploy to defend against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine.
• The 25th Combined Arms Army is unlikely to be combat effective at scale given its rushed deployment, ahead of a previously reported intended deployment date of December 2023.
• Additional Russian lateral redeployments and the immediate commitment of intended operational reserves suggest that short term reinforcement needs are impeding intended long-term reconstitution efforts.
• Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky continues to highlight the impact of the lack of Russian counter-battery capabilities on Russian morale in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made some advances on September 1.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains.
• Russian occupation officials announced on September 1 that voting began for the Russian regional elections held in occupied Ukraine and will continue in various forms through September 10.
• Russian officials continue efforts to forcibly indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian culture and identity by integrating schools in occupied Ukraine into the Russian educational system.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 02 September 2023;

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 2, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on September 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[1] Russian milbloggers who have recently maintained that Russian forces hold positions in the southern part of Robotyne claimed that Russian forces withdrew from the southern outskirts of the settlement to unspecified positions further south.[2] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on September 1 that Ukrainian forces have overcome the Russian “first line of defense” in some areas of the Zaporizhia direction, but that the situation remains difficult due to additional Russian concrete fortifications and dense minefields.[3]

 

The New York Times reported on September 2 citing Ukrainian military personnel that Russian forces are spreading inflammable agents on mined fields and igniting them with drone-launched grenades while Ukrainian forces clear mines from the areas in an effort to hinder Ukrainian mine clearing efforts that have allowed Ukrainian forces to advance in certain areas.[4] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Commander Colonel Margo Grosberg reported on September 1 that Ukrainian artillery capabilities are “equal or even better” than those of Russian forces and have been able to push Russian artillery units back from the frontline, preventing them from supporting Russian forces.[5] This observation is not universally true across the frontline, as Ukrainian units regularly report coming under heavy Russian artillery fire corrected by Russian drones. Grosberg also stated that Ukrainian forces have been successful at severely damaging Russian artillery radars since July.[6] Russian sources have repeatedly expressed concerns since mid-July over the lack of Russian counterbattery artillery capabilities, particularly in southern Ukraine.[7]

 

Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline. Russian milbloggers claimed that Popov has maintained contact with his former subordinates in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and a Russian insider source claimed that these officers turned to Popov for help instead of their new commander.[8] The Russian military command dismissed Popov as the commander of the 58th CAA (Southern Military District) in early July after he engaged in clear insubordination by attempting to bypass Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and bring his complaints about poor counterbattery capabilities, heavy losses, and a lack of rotations directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[9] Russian sources have routinely expressed concern about the issues that Popov highlighted and their detrimental impacts on the Russian defensive effort in southern Ukraine.[10] Popov partially established a precedent for insubordination, and his conduct reportedly prompted the Russian military command to begin removing similarly insubordinate commanders from frontline units, although not all reports of commanders removed were confirmed.[11] Russian sources claimed that Popov encouraged his former subordinates to report the truth about the front to the higher Russian command, possibly encouraging them to replicate his insubordination.[12] Popov’s contact with his former subordinates, if true, suggests that Popov’s replacement has not won the trust of his subordinates either because he is less competent or because he is less forthright with senior Russian leadership about continuing challenges facing the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia.

 

The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues. Director of the Russian think tank the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, Valery Garbuzov, published an article on August 29 criticizing Russian ruling elites who, he argues, have created and perpetuated a series of “utopian myths” about Russian hegemony, the “crisis of capitalism,” and Russia’s claimed leadership of a global anti-Western coalition.[13] Prominent voices within the Russian ultranationalist information space levied largely coherent criticisms against Garbuzov’s article on September 2, criticizing Garbuzov’s argument and the Russian political and informational structures that allowed Garbuzov to hold a prominent position in the Russian political sphere.[14] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Telegram channels have filled an analytical gap in the Russian information space following the onset of the war in Ukraine that think tanks should fill and continue to do so 18 months later.[15]

 

Prominent Russian milbloggers likely have a monetary incentive to regularly report information about the war in Ukraine that is uncritical of Russian authorities. BBC reported on September 1 that prominent Russian milbloggers claimed that they can make between about 48,000 and 188,000 rubles (about $500 to 1,950) per advertisement on their Telegram channels.[16] BBC reported that an advertising agent working with Wagner-affiliated channels claimed that a prominent Wagner Group-affiliated source made around 31,500 rubles (about $330) per advertisement.[17] The advertising agent told BBC that several employees of RIA FAN, a now-shuttered media outlet affiliated with former Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, received only about 10,500 to 21,800 rubles (about $108 to $226) per advertisement due to their lower subscriber count.[18] BBC noted that Russia’s average monthly salary is about 66,000 rubles (about $685). Prominent milbloggers’ monthly salaries are thus likely much higher than the Russian average. Russian milbloggers are likely economically incentivized to maintain and grow audiences through war reporting that is uncritical of Russian authorities, as criticism of the Russian authorities, resistance to attempted censorship, and potential legal problems could lead to a decrease in advertisements, although milbloggers who present themselves as telling unpleasant truths can also gain large followings. Alexander “Sasha” Kots, a prominent milblogger who also serves on the Kremlin’s Human Rights Council, claimed that milbloggers have a “direct channel to privately communicate information” to the Russian MoD.[19]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced on September 2.
• Select Russian sources claimed that Russian officers of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) defending in Zaporizhia Oblast contacted former 58th CAA commander Major General Ivan Popov due to the worsening situation at the Russian frontline.
• The Russian ultranationalist information space response to a Russian critique of anti-Western mindsets and Russian propaganda demonstrates that the ultranationalist community retains the ability to coalesce around certain issues.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 2.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along at least one sector of the front on September 2 and advanced near Bakhmut, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) has formed its own Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) units, elements of which reportedly operate both on the front line and in far rear areas of occupied Ukraine.
• Russian and occupation authorities are encouraging residents of occupied Ukraine who are residing in Russia to vote in the occupation regional elections, likely to increase voter turnout and the perception of electoral legitimacy.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New videos from Kings & Generals and Perun:

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

‘Everything is ahead of us’: Ukraine breaks Russian stronghold’s first line of defence | Ukraine | The Guardian

WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM

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In an exclusive interview, a leading Ukrainian general says his forces have made a vital breakthrough in near Zaporizhzhia

 

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Ukrainian forces have decisively breached Russia’s first defensive line near Zaporizhzhia after weeks of painstaking mine clearance, and expect faster gains as they press the weaker second line, the general leading the southern counteroffensive has said.

 

Brig Gen Oleksandr Tarnavskiy estimated Russia had devoted 60% of its time and resources into building the first defensive line and only 20% each into the second and third lines because Moscow had not expected Ukrainian forces to get through.

 

“We are now between the first and second defensive lines,” he said, speaking to the Observer in his first interview since the breakthrough. Ukrainian forces were now pushing out on both sides of the breach and consolidating their hold on territory seized in recent fighting, he said.

 

“In the centre of the offensive, we are now completing the destruction of enemy units that provide cover for the retreat of Russian troops behind their second defensive line.”

 

A vast minefield trapped Ukrainian troops for weeks as infantry sappers slowly cleared an assault route on foot. Russian troops behind it “just stood and waited for the Ukrainian army”, picking off vehicles with shells and drones, he said.

 

But now that barrier has been crossed, Russians have been forced into manoeuvres and Ukrainians are back in their tanks and other armoured vehicles. In a sign that Moscow is feeling the pressure, it has redeployed troops to the area from frontlines inside occupied Ukraine – Kherson to the west and Lyman to the north-east – and also from inside Russia, he said.

 

“The enemy is pulling up reserves, not only from Ukraine but also from Russia. But sooner or later, the Russians will run out of all the best soldiers. This will give us an impetus to attack more and faster,” Tarnavskiy said. “Everything is ahead of us.”

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

[Jwheel86]

3 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

I wonder what soviet era jet the US defense industry will magically figure out over a weekend how to bolt it on to. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

29 minutes ago, Jwheel86 said:

 

I wonder what soviet era jet the US defense industry will magically figure out over a weekend how to bolt it on to. 

 

It's absolutely gonna be the MiG-29.

[elbobo]

3 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

It's absolutely gonna be the MiG-29.

 

is there any airplane in Ukraine arsenal that can detect another aircraft at 160-180km?

[CayceG]

3 minutes ago, elbobo said:

 

is there any airplane in Ukraine arsenal that can detect another aircraft at 160-180km?

 

Not really. Their Su-27s and MiG-29s both have a detection range of about 100 km. They'll both make decent platforms to carry the missile. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 03 September 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 3, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

---

Ukrainian military officers offered notably frank and direct commentary about the prospects of further Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast and indicated that the series of prepared Russian defensive positions immediately ahead and further

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on September 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian military officers offered notably frank and direct commentary about the prospects of further Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast and indicated that the series of prepared Russian defensive positions immediately ahead and further south of the Ukrainian advance may be less challenging to Ukrainian forces. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi, who commands the Ukrainian grouping in southern Ukraine, discussed Ukraine’s counteroffensive in an interview with The Guardian on September 2.[1] Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian forces have decisively breached Russian forces’ “first line of defense” and that he expects faster Ukrainian gains as Ukrainian forces press on a weaker “second line” of defense.[2] Ukrainian forces have advanced up to the next series of prepared Russian defensive positions in certain areas in the Robotyne area in western Zaporizhia Oblast, although many Russian sources assert that these positions are the first, not the second, defensive layer in a multi-echeloned Russian defense in southern Ukraine.[3] Ukrainian officials and Russian milbloggers are using different terminology to describe the same positions. Russian sources characterize the first series of positions that Ukrainian forces have previously breached as a forward line without giving it an ordinal number, and the series Ukrainian forces are currently approaching as the first main line of defenses — while Ukrainian forces characterize these positions as Russia’s second line of defenses.

 

Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces devoted 60 percent of their time and resources into building the series of defensive positions that Ukrainian forces have now breached and only 20 percent each to the two subsequent defensive layers further south.[4] This breached series of Russian defensive positions consists of a system of interconnected Russian trenches and dugouts guarded by anti-tank ditches and dense minefields, and Tarnavskyi’s reporting supports ISW’s previous observation that Russian forces may have not extended similarly challenging preparations throughout subsequent series of defensive layers, particularly regarding the density of minefields.[5] Russian defensive positions are not uniform in strength across the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Tarnavskyi’s description of weaker Russian defensive positions may refer only to the immediate Robotyne area. Tarnavskyi also commented on the weight of Ukrainian efforts elsewhere in southern Ukraine and suggested that the Ukrainian advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast is an operational priority.[6]

 

Ukrainian military officials particularly noted that advancing Ukrainian forces can operate more freely in areas with sparser Russian minefields. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated on September 3 that minefields near the next series of Russian defensive positions are less dense than the initial defensive layer that Ukrainian forces advanced through.[7] Shtupun and Tarnavskyi both stated that Ukrainian forces are deploying more vehicles in these areas and maneuvering more equipment and troops towards the next Russian defensive layer, but they acknowledged that minefields will still present a significant threat.[8] Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian forces spent more time on mine clearing than they expected to at the beginning of the counteroffensive and that consistent Russian artillery and aviation fire forced Ukrainian infantry to conduct mine clearing only at night.[9] Shtupun added that heavy minefields forced Ukrainian breaching operations onto narrow paths — the exact intent of minefields under Russian defensive doctrine.[10] Ukrainian forces may now be better positioned to maneuver more freely in the tactical rear of the breached Russian defensive layer. Tarnavskyi’s description of the Russian minefields may pertain only to the immediate Robotyne area, and Ukrainian forces may encounter heavily dense minefields at certain sections of subsequent series of Russian defensive positions. Although Ukrainian forces certainly face further hard fighting regardless, Tarnavskyi characterized Ukrainian forces as having successfully broken through the most difficult Russian defenses.

 

Ukrainian military officials noted that the strength of the next series of Russian defensive positions around Robotyne will likely depend on Russian force composition in the area. Tarnavskyi stated that Ukrainian forces in the Robotyne area are destroying the Russian units that provide cover for retreating Russian forces and that Russian forces are operating in defensive “patches,” likely referring to strongpoints rather than a continuous defensive line.[11] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksandr Rodyansky stated that upcoming Russian defenses are not as well protected.[12] Shtupun also noted that Russian forces are deploying reserves of unknown quality to defend in the area.[13] Shtupun is likely referencing the lateral redeployment of previously degraded elements of the 7th Guards Airborne and 76th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Divisions to the Robotyne area from elsewhere in the theater.[14] Tarnavskyi stated that Russian forces are deploying reserves from both Ukraine and within Russia, likely referencing Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov’s statement on September 1 that the Russian military deployed elements of a newly created “reserve army” (the 25th CAA) to allow Russian forces to conduct further lateral redeployments to strengthen the defense in southern Ukraine.[15] Tarnavskyi noted that Russian forces will run out of their best soldiers sooner or later, giving Ukrainian forces an impetus to attack more often.[16] Tarnavskyi acknowledged that Ukrainian forces are also losing their “strongest and best” and must therefore concentrate on certain areas of the front as a result.[17] Shtupun optimistically noted that additional Ukrainian successes will allow Ukrainian forces to commit more personnel to the ongoing Ukrainian breach of Russian defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[18]

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[19] Geolocated footage published on September 2 and 3 indicates that Ukrainian forces control southern Klishchiivka.[20] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified successes in the direction of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[21]

 

Several Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson Oblast. Generally reliable Russian milbloggers have consistently claimed since August 30 that Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the left bank of the Dnipro River northwest of Pidstepne and in the Antonivsky Bridge area.[22] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces have been able to transfer supplies and personnel to positions on the left bank during the past week.[23] Another milblogger claimed that units of mobilized personnel and volunteers are defending in the Kherson direction after unspecified Airborne (VDV) elements departed for Zaporizhia Oblast.[24] The milblogger is likely referring to elements of the 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division, which ISW observed deploying from the Kherson direction to the Robotyne area in Zaporizhia Oblast in late August.[25] The Kherson Oblast area is likely relatively poorly defended if the milblogger’s claims of mobilized personnel and volunteers replacing VDV elements are true.  

 

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes targeting Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast on September 3. Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 22 of the 25 Shahed drones that Russian forces launched from Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea.[26] Most Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian drones struck Ukrainian port infrastructure in Reni, Odesa Oblast.[27] Several Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian strikes primarily targeted Ukrainian military fuel storage facilities near the ports.[28] Russian sources claimed that Russian Shahed drones also struck port infrastructure in Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[29]

 

The Russian military appears to be recruiting personnel at scale through ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts, although the quality and allocation of these new servicemembers remains unclear. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev stated on September 3 that 280,000 people signed contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) since the start of 2023.[30] Medvedev noted that this figure includes individuals formerly in the Russian military reserve or who previously fought as volunteers. Russian State Duma Deputy Andrey Gurulev stated on September 3 that Russian officials intend to sign a total of 420,000 contracts before the end of 2023.[31] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on June 10 that all volunteer formations were required to sign military contracts with the Russian MoD by July 1, so Medvedev and Gurulev’s figures likely include many volunteers that have already been fighting in Ukraine; however, ISW cannot independently confirm how many of these claimed 280,000 personnel are entirely new to the war in Ukraine.[32] Regardless, the Russian military is continuing to successfully recruit for the war in Ukraine at scale. The level of training and combat experience of these contract personnel likely varies, as the Russian military advertises contracts ranging from a few months to two years.[33] These contract soldiers are likely less skilled and experienced than the Russian military’s pre-war number of “kontraktniki,” professional long-service soldiers. Contract soldiers received greater training and occupied key positions (such as technicians and vehicle crews) in Russian units, with relatively elite units such as Airborne (VDV) formations having a higher proportion of kontraktniki.[34] Many units suffered heavy losses among kontraktniki at the beginning of the war and have unlikely been able to reconstitute with the same quality of personnel.[35] State Duma Deputy Viktor Sobolev stated that the Russian General Staff determined the 420,000 figure as necessary for the creation of new formations and units, likely referencing Defense Minister Shoigu’s intent to form many new Russian army formations.[36] However, the Russian military faces the competing priorities of establishing long term new formations and rushing personnel to the front in Ukraine. As ISW previously reported, new formations earmarked for reserves have reportedly already deployed to the frontline ahead of schedule.[37]

 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced on September 3 that he dismissed current Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov and intends to replace him with Rustem Umerov.[38] Umerov is currently the chairman of Ukraine’s State Property Fund.[39] Zelensky stated that he believed the Ministry of Defense “needs new approaches and other formats of interaction with both military and society at large” and that he hopes the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada will confirm Umerov this week.[40]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian military officers offered notably frank and direct commentary about the prospects of further Ukrainian advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast and indicated that the series of prepared Russian defensive positions immediately ahead and further south of the Ukrainian advance may be less challenging to Ukrainian forces.
• Ukrainian military officials particularly noted that advancing Ukrainian forces can operate more freely in areas with sparser Russian minefields.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 3.
• Several Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes targeting Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast on September 3.
• The Russian military appears to be recruiting personnel at scale through ongoing crypto-mobilization efforts, although the quality and allocation of these new servicemembers remain unclear.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk, in the western Donetsk–eastern Zaporizhia border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 3.
• Russian law enforcement is patrolling and guarding polling stations in occupied Ukraine to prevent citizens from expressing opposition to the elections and recording the voting process.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New brigade bears heavy brunt of Russia’s onslaught in Kharkiv Oblast

KYIVINDEPENDENT.COM

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Editor’s Note: Soldiers in this story are stationed on the front and are identified only by their first name due to the nature of the information they are sharing. KHARKIV OBLAST – Fighting throughout Ukraine is grueling, even for hardened veterans. For inexperienced troops recently plucked from civilian life, it's

 

Quote

 

Fighting throughout Ukraine is grueling, even for hardened veterans. For inexperienced troops recently plucked from civilian life, it's something else altogether.

 

Ihor, a former lawyer, recalls that day at the start of August when the Russians attacked the cratered ruins of Novoselivka in Kharkiv Oblast, which his 1st company was defending.

 

The attack was well-prepared. The Russian troops scouted out the position with their seemingly limitless drones. When they struck, their mortars zeroed in on what cover remained. A shell dropped into the living room of the house Ihor and a fellow soldier were occupying. They survived because they happened to be in the hall.

 

Enemy artillery established fire control over the only roads leading to the village, cutting off medevac and reinforcements.

 

This left Ihor's unit, with their three weeks of NATO basic training and two months' deployment in Kharkiv Oblast, one-on-one with professional Russian troops with superior firepower.

 

The casualties were only recovered by nightfall. An undisclosed number didn't make it, including some of Ihor's friends from the unit.

 

"I lost brothers in arms there," he said. "I haven't been back since, and I don't want to go back. What I went through there is just chaos."

 

Ihor's company is part of the 32nd Separate Mechanized Brigade, one of the new brigades that Ukraine began staffing at the start of the year. It's also one of the few brigades that are set to hold the northeastern front, while the majority of troops and equipment is stationed on the southern front where Ukraine's slowly pushing forward.

 

While it’s doing its duty defending Russia’s push in Kharkiv Oblast, lack of experience and the limits of training and equipment made for a harrowing first two months in the field.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 04 September 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, September 4, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

---

Ukrainian light infantry has advanced to positions beyond anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles that comprise the current Russian defensive layer ahead of the Ukrainian advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces likely i

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on September 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the September 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian light infantry has advanced to positions beyond anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles that comprise the current Russian defensive layer ahead of the Ukrainian advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces likely intend to hold those positions. ISW is not prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have breached this Russian defensive layer in the absence of observed Ukrainian heavy equipment in these areas. Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced to tree-line positions that are east of the Russian anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth obstacles that are a part of a tri-layered defense immediately west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[1] Geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian light infantry has also advanced further into a series of prepared Russian defensive positions along the road that runs northwest into Verbove.[2] Other geolocated footage published on September 4 indicates that Ukrainian forces have advanced up to Russian defensive positions between Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Novoprokopivka (13km south of Orikhiv).[3] Ukrainian forces are widening the breach they have already made in one Russian defensive layer and are reportedly maneuvering more equipment and personnel into tactical rear areas of this layer.[4] Ukrainian forces appear to be making gains in the immediate vicinity of the not-yet-breached Russian defensive layer that runs northwest of Verbove to north of Solodka Balka (20km south of Orikhiv) with infantry assaults and heavy artillery fire on Russian positions further into and south of this layer.[5] The deployment of Ukrainian heavy equipment and more substantial forces to these areas than ISW has so far observed would indicate both a breach of this Russian defensive layer and an effort to widen that breach.

 

 

Quote

Russian forces reportedly attempted to expand minefields in southern Ukraine following the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in June. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) reported that the Russian command determined at the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive that Ukrainian forces might be able to easily breach the Russian doctrinal minefield depth of 120 meters leading Russian forces to aim to increase the depth of their minefields up to 500 meters.[6] RUSI stated that Russian forces lacked enough mines to mine these larger areas as densely as Russian doctrine dictates, causing Russian forces to deviate from doctrine, including by using improvised explosive devices and a wider and differential distance between mines.[7] RUSI stated that Russian forces tried to compensate for decreased minefield density by increasing the effectiveness of anti-tank mines by placing two on top of each other.[8] Ukrainian operations across several sectors of the front have likely further compounded these constraints on the Russian effort to expand minefields by forcing Russian forces to disperse their mining efforts along wide sectors of the frontline. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Oleksandr Shtupun stated on September 3 that minefields near the next series of Russian defensive positions in western Zaporizhia are less dense than the initial defensive layer that Ukrainian forces advanced through.[9] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian forces may encounter denser minefields at certain sections of subsequent series of Russian defensive positions, however.[10]

 

Limitations on Russian artillery capabilities and Ukrainian advantages in counter-battery fire are forcing the Russians to deviate from their own doctrine, RUSI reported. RUSI stated that Russian forces have been attempting to adapt their fire doctrine since before Ukrainian counteroffensive operations began.[11] RUSI noted that Russian forces are attempting to prioritize strike accuracy over volume because they lack enough ammunition to sustain doctrinally designated artillery fire, have difficulties transporting a large volume of ammunition to frontline areas, and are seeing diminishing effectiveness of mass strikes as they lose counterbattery radars and their guns suffer from barrel wear.[12] RUSI stated that Russian forces are attempting to increase the production of Krasnopol laser-guided shells and the use of Lancet drones (loitering munitions) in order to increase accuracy and reduce the number of munitions used in attacks.[13] RUSI also observed that Russian forces have often prepared their fighting positions for remote demolition with improvised explosives instead of striking their own positions with artillery after Russian forces have withdrawn, as Russian doctrine dictates.[14] These adaptations suggest that reduced Russian artillery capabilities may be further weakening the Russian defense in certain sectors as artillery fire is a critical component of the Russian elastic defense. A shift towards more precise fire doctrine may allow Russian forces to strengthen these capabilities, but constraints on Russian training capacity will likely prevent Russian forces from implementing this shift at scale in the near term. Russian sources have continually claimed since the start of the counteroffensive that the Russians lack sufficient counterbattery capabilities on various sectors of the front.[15] Estonian Defense Forces Intelligence Center Commander Colonel Margo Grosberg reported on September 1 that Ukrainian artillery capabilities are “equal or even better” than those of Russian forces and have been able to push Russian artillery units back from the frontline, preventing them from supporting Russian forces.[16]

 

Russian forces conducted a drone strike on Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts on the night of September 3-4. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 32 Shahed 136/131 drones from Cape Chauda, Crimea, and Primorske-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai on the night of September 4 and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 23 of the drones.[17] Ukrainian Southern Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian drones struck civilian infrastructure in Odesa Oblast, and Russian sources claimed that drones struck port infrastructure in Reni and Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[18] Head of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Council Mykola Lukashuk reported that a drone strike destroyed 1,500 tons of grain in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[19] Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Oleg Nikolenko stated that a Russian drone fell on Romanian territory, which the Romanian Ministry of Defense subsequently denied.[20]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative until all of Russia’s extensive terms are met at a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Putin reiterated claims that the West ignored its obligations to allow Russia to export grain and fertilizer at a meeting with Erdogan in Sochi, Russia on September 4.[21] Putin claimed that Russia will supply 25,000 to 50,000 tons of grain for free to unspecified African countries in “the coming days.”[22] Putin and Erdogan claimed that Turkey is willing to help process and transport one million tons of grain intended for these countries.[23] Putin and Erdogan also announced Qatar’s interest in providing financial support so that these countries can receive free grain.[24]

 

Head of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Erik Mose stated on September 4 that the commission has not yet concluded that Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine. Mose stated that the commission must determine the intent of the perpetrators and identify the “need” to physically or biologically exterminate a certain group to meet the legal qualifications under the Genocide Convention.[25] Mose stated that the commission has found evidence for a large number of war crimes, specifically evidence of torture and strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure that the commission could consider as crimes against humanity.[26] Mose also stated that the commission previously determined that certain statements in Russian mass media could be considered as incitement to commit genocide.[27] Mose noted that the commission’s investigation into genocide in Ukraine will continue.[28] Article II of the 1948 Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention) states that “genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measure intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”[29] Article III states that “the following acts shall be punishable: genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; complicity in genocide.”[30]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian light infantry has advanced to positions beyond anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth anti-tank obstacles that comprise the current Russian defensive layer ahead of the Ukrainian advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and Ukrainian forces likely intend to hold those positions. ISW is not prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have breached this Russian defensive layer in the absence of observed Ukrainian heavy equipment in these areas.
• Russian forces reportedly attempted to expand minefields in southern Ukraine following the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in June.
• Limitations on Russian artillery capabilities and Ukrainian advantages in counter-battery fire are forcing the Russians to deviate from their own doctrine, RUSI reported.
• Russian forces conducted a drone strike on Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa oblasts on the night of September 3-4.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated Russia’s unwillingness to rejoin the Black Sea Grain Initiative until all of Russia’s extensive terms are met at a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
• Head of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine Erik Mose stated on September 4 that the commission has not yet concluded that Russia is committing genocide in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on September 4.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations and advanced near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on September 4.
• Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced on September 4 that the Russian military will not be holding “Zapad-2023” joint strategic exercises scheduled for September.
• Russian occupation officials continued the fifth day of early voting for Russian regional elections in occupied territories on September 4.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Cuba uncovers human trafficking of Cubans to fight for Russia in Ukraine | Reuters

WWW.REUTERS.COM

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Cuba has uncovered a human trafficking ring that coerced its citizens to fight for Russia in the war in Ukraine, its foreign ministry said, adding that Cuban authorities were working to "neutralize and dismantle" the network.

 

Quote

 

Cuba has uncovered a human trafficking ring that coerced its citizens to fight for Russia in the war in Ukraine, its foreign ministry said, adding that Cuban authorities were working to "neutralize and dismantle" the network.

 

The statement from Cuba's foreign ministry late on Monday gave few details, but noted the trafficking ring was operating both within the Caribbean island nation, thousands of miles from Moscow, and in Russia.

 

"The Ministry of the Interior... is working on the neutralization and dismantling of a human trafficking network that operates from Russia to incorporate Cuban citizens living there, and even some from Cuba, into the military forces participating in war operations in Ukraine," the Cuban government statement said.

 

Russia's defence ministry did not immediately respond to a Reuters request for comment.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Ukrainian intercepts show Russian soldiers’ anger at losses, disarray

WWW.REUTERS.COM

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Excerpts from 17 phone calls placed in early July by Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine - and intercepted by Ukrainian intelligence services - show them complaining about poor equipment and heavy losses.

 

Quote

 

Ukraine’s counteroffensive was in its second month when Andrey, a Russian soldier, called his wife to say his unit was taking heavy casualties. They were so badly equipped, he said, it felt like the Soviet forces in World War Two.

 

“They are fucking us up,” Andrey said by telephone on July 12, comparing the onslaught to the worst moments of Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union. “No fucking ammunition, nothing ... Shall we use our fingers as bayonets?”

 

The conversation was one excerpt from 17 phone calls placed by Russian soldiers fighting in the south and east of Ukraine that were intercepted in the first two weeks of July by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the country’s main intelligence agency.

 

The expletive-laden intercepts, shared with Reuters by a Ukrainian intelligence source, provide a rare - albeit partial - glimpse into the conditions of some Russian soldiers as Kyiv prosecuted a major counteroffensive, which started in early June, two military analysts told Reuters.

 

 

[Spork3245]

So… North Korea wants to sell Russia weapons for the war… is it going to be a few slingshots and a bag of sharp stones?

[TUFKAK]

2 minutes ago, Spork3245 said:

So… North Korea wants to sell Russia weapons for the war… is it going to be a few slingshots and a bag of sharp stones?

Sure let em 

 

we are still the arsenal of democracy and humbling these goons is great 

[CayceG]

11 minutes ago, Spork3245 said:

So… North Korea wants to sell Russia weapons for the war… is it going to be a few slingshots and a bag of sharp stones?

 

North Korea, arguably, has the largest stocks of artillery on the planet. And it's all stuff that fits the Russian guns. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

5 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

North Korea, arguably, has the largest stocks of artillery on the planet. And it's all stuff that fits the Russian guns. 

 

And artillery is exactly what the Russians want.

[ThreePi]

6 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

North Korea, arguably, has the largest stocks of artillery on the planet. And it's all stuff that fits the Russian guns. 

 

Hopefully it's all shitty, unmaintained shells that are either dudes or explode in the barrel.

[CayceG]

16 minutes ago, ThreePi said:

 

Hopefully it's all shitty, unmaintained shells that are either dudes or explode in the barrel.

 

I wouldn't count on that. I think Russia is going to the exact right place for more shells. 

 

 

[Spork3245]

35 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

North Korea, arguably, has the largest stocks of artillery on the planet. And it's all stuff that fits the Russian guns. 

Did they get them from China? I find it hard to believe that anything made in North Korea will be largely reliable 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

13 minutes ago, Spork3245 said:

Did they get them from China? I find it hard to believe that anything made in North Korea will be largely reliable 

 

It really doesn't need to be "largely" reliable to be quite effective - it merely needs to be reliable "enough" to seriously blunt the forward momentum of UAF operations, especially if those operations are proceeding cautiously or in narrow corridors due to the presence of significant minefields.

[CayceG]

14 minutes ago, Spork3245 said:

Did they get them from China? I find it hard to believe that anything made in North Korea will be largely reliable 

 

There is a misconception in the west and US specifically that North Korea doesn't produce quality weapons. Artillery is their bread and butter. We see a lot of flashy news about new missiles and rockets, but artillery is the basics for their army and their defensive strategy. They have the production capability to competently make artillery that works and can be used by Russia in their war on Ukraine. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

8 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

There is a misconception in the west and US specifically that North Korea doesn't produce quality weapons. Artillery is their bread and butter. We see a lot of flashy news about new missiles and rockets, but artillery is the basics for their army and their defensive strategy. They have the production capability to competently make artillery that works and can be used by Russia in their war on Ukraine. 

 

There's a reason why military planners consistently project that Seoul would be absolutely devastated in the opening hours (even minutes) of another conflict on the peninsula.

[CitizenVectron]

Russia appears to be placing tires on top of their strategic aircraft in an effort to protect them from Ukrainian drone strikes.

 

 

[CayceG]

This isn't as goofy as it looks. 

 

This messes up the infra-red and radar signature that guided weapons would use for terminal guidance. So the missiles might not register them as targets. 

[CitizenVectron]

An interesting take from the front lines on NATO training for Ukrainian troops that received it. tl;dr: is that there was some useful stuff, but overall western training completely disregarded the realities of the current war, especially artillery warfare and drone warfare (in training, they weren't even allowed to consider the use of drones in most situations). Basically, NATO doctrine needs to catch up with the times; if you can't have absolute aerial superiority (which the west banks on), then you need to know how to also counter artillery and drones. The below is from a Ukrainian former combat vet with contacts in the Ukrainian army, and taking other info into consideration (interviews from Ukrainian papers, etc). Obviously some grains of salt:

 

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My thoughts regarding the issues reported by the 
@KyivIndependent
 article about the evaluation of NATO training and the 32nd Mechanized Brigade.

Please consider this text as a supplementary piece interjected with opinions - my own and those I spoke to in the field.

I got in touch with not only the 32nd but also the 92nd Mechanized Brigade. The 92nd fought alongside the 32nd and can provide unique insight, as they are experienced and saw firsthand the schism between theory and practice.

 

Our new infantry brigade did a heroic job in the given circumstances: limited time, resources, and ammunition. My conversations with everyone outside of the 32nd were marked with gratitude, as nobody appreciates people willing to do the job of infantry more than infantry.

Don't doom over this text. My effort is to give another small input into making Western training more effective.

Let me also point out that when dealing with losses, emotions run high, and there is an opening for toxicity to seep in. The disconnect between expectations set by the training and the reality of the Ukrainian battlefield can be explained better with a lack of communication at the higher level than with "Western arrogance". It can still get you angry, but you would be a fool to escape into a simple narrative that relies on a lack of intelligence or empathy. You can not expect Western militaries to be perfectly in tune with the requirements of the Ukrainian battlefield at the institutional level when our own institutions run into similar problems with less distance to the front. If you think Ukrainian training is perfect, I have an illegal bridge to sell you.

You can watch the videos of Western instructors saying farewell to Ukrainian recruits anytime. Twitter replies made by armchair generals do not represent them. I think they very much care.

Background:

 

The 32nd Mechanized Brigade was formed at the beginning of 2023 and partially equipped with Western equipment with the core of its mechanized infantry utilizing the American M113 armored personnel carrier.
Its infantry battalions underwent training in the spring of 2023 in a NATO country. After the return to Ukraine, the brigade received equipment and ammunition and was fully staffed. During the summer, the 32nd brigade was deployed alongside the 92nd brigade, which had been fighting for the past nine months in the Svatove axis in the northeast of Ukraine.

The deployment quickly became problematic and resulted in heavy casualties, eventually forcing the command to reconsider.

 

The training:

I’ve spoken to one of the sergeants in the brigade with the call sign “Nestor” about the training they received abroad.

Overall, the training included basic infantry, reconnaissance, and assault tactics.

Nestor said the most interesting and useful part was the reconnaissance training. “We learned how to get close to the enemy and build secure observation posts. It was essential.” They also learned how to adjust artillery and navigation. “Navigation was useful; spotting was interesting, but it was not particularly useful on the battlefield so far.”

 

However, his overall verdict of the training was mixed: “It was like the instructors were in a vacuum. We received training in infantry tactics, while this war is a war of artillery and drones.”.

 

On one occasion, Nestor’s commander asked if trainers would at least consider the presence of drones on the battlefield. The answer was a damning “No.”.
“You didn’t take your drones with you, and the only drone we have available is DJI Phantom 4, but we can’t even use it for bureaucratic reasons.” he recalls them saying. So they continued the training as is.

 

Western-provided training fell short of considering current realities on the battlefield. The brigade’s first deployment in Ukraine was to hold the defense in the Svatove direction. However, Nestor commented: “Our battalion received zero defensive combat training. It was all assault oriented.”

On a positive note, the sergeant says that our infantry learned to move and storm buildings and trenches. “If you consider this basic infantry training, it was good.” The infantry companies spend seven days practicing assault combined arms operations, storming different objectives. One day, it was a small town. Another day, it was an enemy trench. “We went through swamps, mud, and cold nights. Once, our instructor said that living through it on the battlefield would be easier if we experienced these conditions now. He was right.”

 

But the companies received too little training on surviving the battlefield: “There was no camouflage training. The infantry didn’t learn how to conceal positions, build bunkers, and no defensive combat training.”

 

In the end, Nestor adds that one of the things that they needed was EOD awareness and training. “You must understand the battlefield is littered with booby traps, mines, and explosive ordinance. We knew it before the deployment. Everyone in Ukraine knows it. We asked trainers if we could get any training on the topic.” But for some reason, the trainers refused to even discuss it. It was a taboo. “We regret the lack of EOD training specifically. It could have saved lives.”

 

The deployment:

After the training in Germany by a NATO country was complete, and after a short period in Ukraine, they were sent to reinforce Svatove direction.

Problems appeared immediately. Nestor’s battalion was deployed shoulder to shoulder with one of the battalions of the 92nd brigade. The 92nd brigade soldier with the call sign “Zero” explains, “It appears that they were trained on another planet. What was obvious to us was a terra incognito for them.” He continues with a story of one of their first encounters with 32nd infantry: “We were driving 15km from the front line, and I noticed a military Ural (truck), with a full platoon clustered around near one of the small local grocery stores. They acted like they didn’t know it was a war zone. We had to stop and tell them that ZALA (russian) drone was reported around. The platoon commander did not know the enemy had such capabilities.”.

 

A grave mistake in NATO training was that a company commander stayed in the trenches with the company. While it sounds heroic and may work when facing a poorly equipped enemy, russia is well-equipped and has hundreds of drones. This costly mistake was corrected after they lost a couple of positions. “The company commander has to have the eyes in the sky. He has to have his own drone stream and communicate with platoon or group commanders.” - It was a costly lesson for Nazar’s unit; “It cost us lives.”

 

I asked why a company commander couldn’t stay in the trench. My friend from the 92nd Brigade explained that when the company commander is in the trench, he becomes another link in the chain of command: “Please understand controlling 100 soldiers in combat is a hard task. The higher-level commander watches a drone stream and makes decisions. He gives an order to the company commander over the radio. The company commander has to understand exactly what is going on to make decisions and pass orders to the platoons. For that, you need to observe the battlefield from the top. Try sitting under tank shelling and yelling over the radio while being yelled over the radio yourself. It is much more efficient when the company commander has his own command and control room with drone streams coming in. He can make calm and weighed decisions looking at the battlefield instead of listening to what is happening, and it is no longer a game of telephone.”

“In the current battlefield, even the group or a platoon commander has to have a tablet with our special map application to be effective, and you can not rely on a stupid enemy anymore. They evolved.” summarizes Nestor, “We knew none of that, and no one could share the experience and knowledge with us. Now we are smarter, but the price was terrible.”

 

Another capability that was undertrained might surprise: driving. It might sound absurd to some, but those familiar with the battlefield know how hazardous and costly even a simple drive toward or away from the front can be. Our drivers must be more experienced in driving at night; driving during the day is too dangerous. Training for night driving operations is critical to avoid casualties and the loss of valuable equipment. It is also emblematic: It may not seem a top priority for NATO training personnel with a shortened schedule. However, its importance must be communicated just like any other discrepancy mentioned here and elsewhere.

 

Conclusion:

The disconnect of the NATO training leads to a brigade being unprepared on the battlefield. Specifically, the lack of UAV, defensive, mine awareness, and EOD training has led to unnecessary casualties on the battlefield.

To avoid a similar situation in the future, Ukraine needs to treat NATO training as basic infantry training instead of a complete cycle of brigade/battalion-level preparation. We need to perform post-training exercises and adapt the units to the newest technologies and tactics on the battlefield.

Ultimately, the brigade has gained enough experience to be effective, but the cost could have been much smaller.

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

24 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

I’ve spoken to one of the sergeants in the brigade with the call sign “Nestor” about the training they received abroad.

@Jason

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

33 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

An interesting take from the front lines on NATO training for Ukrainian troops that received it. tl;dr: is that there was some useful stuff, but overall western training completely disregarded the realities of the current war, especially artillery warfare and drone warfare (in training, they weren't even allowed to consider the use of drones in most situations). Basically, NATO doctrine needs to catch up with the times; if you can't have absolute aerial superiority (which the west banks on), then you need to know how to also counter artillery and drones. The below is from a Ukrainian former combat vet with contacts in the Ukrainian army, and taking other info into consideration (interviews from Ukrainian papers, etc). Obviously some grains of salt:

 

 

 

This is an absolutely fantastic critical analysis and should definitely be discussed and analyzed within NATO staff levels.

[PaladinSolo]

The problem seems more that they don't have enough time to train them in those areas than NATO doesn't know how to train them, Ukraine needs soldiers now so they're giving them basic and sending them back.