Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (14 May 2024) - Russia launches new invasion from the north into Kharkiv, soon to launch second corridor into Sumy. Situation is dire

[PaladinSolo]

The sad part is Russia probably has no fucking idea where these mines are themselves, so even if they hold all of this territory in the end its completely unuseable.

[CitizenVectron]

Kerch bridge has been hit by storm shadows, at least one span has been destroyed and is in the water.

[CitizenVectron]

Looks like naval drone, possibly 

[CitizenVectron]

Not quite in the water, but still disabled:

 

 

The other span on the far side is also damaged and has been closed as well.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 16 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 16, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort. The recent dismissal of 58th Combined Arms Army Commander (CAA) Colonel General Ivan

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort. The recent dismissal of 58th Combined Arms Army Commander (CAA) Colonel General Ivan Popov and the reported dismissal of 106th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division Commander Major General Vladimir Seliverstov prompted further discussions of other alleged recent dismissals and arrests.[1] Russian sources amplified an alleged audio message from personnel of the 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division on July 15 in which the personnel claimed that the Russian military command dismissed 7th VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev in early July.[2] Russian sources also claimed that Russian authorities arrested 90th Tank Division (Eastern Military District) Commander Major General Ramil Ibatullin as well as two unspecified deputies on an unspecified date.[3] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger suggested that the Russian military command is also planning to dismiss the 31st VDV Brigade Commander, who is reportedly Colonel Sergei Karasev.[4]  Russian sources speculated that the Russian MoD may be preparing to arrest VDV Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky.[5] ISW has not observed confirmation of Seliverstov’s and Kornev’s dismissals nor of Ibatullin’s arrest, although these claims follow a pattern similar to that of previous claims of command changes that have proven true.[6]
 

These formations and units are conducting defensive and offensive operations in key sectors of the front in Ukraine. The 58th CAA has conducted a relatively successful defense against Ukrainian counteroffensives in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and the 106th Division is committed to defending against Ukrainian assaults on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks.[7] ISW has observed elements of the 7th VDV Division deployed to east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge as well as to unspecified areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] Russian milbloggers have claimed that the 31st VDV Brigade is also defending in the Bakhmut direction and that elements of the 90th Tank Division are involved in ongoing limited assaults west of Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast.[9]

 

The reported dismissal and arrest of commanders leading combat effective units and formations appears to be associated with cases of insubordination. Popov flagrantly attempted to bypass Russian Chief of the General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov and directly bring his complaints about the frontline in western Zaporizhia to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[10] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Seliverstov’s dismissal was a result of similar insubordination, and Russian sources claimed that Seliverstov had a reputation for speaking up on behalf of his soldiers.[11] Kornev may have voiced criticism of a host of potential issues on behalf of the 7th VDV Division, including the likely failure to be notified beforehand about the Russian destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station (KHPP) on June 6, reported attritional fighting that failed to eliminate a Ukrainian presence near the Antonivsky Bridge, or conditions in western Zaporizhia Oblast similar to those that Popov complained about.[12] Ibatullin’s arrest may be associated with the 90th Tank Division’s resumption of assaults in Luhansk Oblast, where it conducted widespread offensive operations that failed to achieve territorial gains during the Russian 2023 winter offensive campaign.[13] It is unclear why Ibatullin would have been arrested, if, indeed, he was, when the other commanders were reportedly simply removed from their commands.

 

Insubordination among commanders appears to be spreading to some of their soldiers. Russian milbloggers shared an audio excerpt on July 16 in which the alleged elements of the 7th VDV Division threatened that they would withdraw from their positions in occupied Kherson Oblast if the Russian MoD arrests Teplinsky or threatens his life.[14] The elements of the 7th VDV Division also claimed that they would defend Teplinsky against the Russian MoD and asserted that the high command is targeting Russia’s most combat effective commanders. This audio appeal, if legitimate, is a threat of mass desertion in the face of the enemy on behalf of Teplinsky. Desertion in the face of the enemy is a capital offense in many militaries. The VDV servicemen are blackmailing the Russian MoD to ensure that Teplinsky continues to command troops in Ukraine, despite Teplinsky’s previous affiliation with Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin who had led an armed rebellion on June 24 to overthrow Shoigu and Gerasimov.[15]

 

Teplinsky himself set the precedent for the acts of insubordination that are currently plaguing the Russian MoD. The Russian MoD had previously attempted to launch wide-scale personnel changes within the Russian Armed Forces in January-February 2023 to replace some commanders who had been insubordinate to Shoigu and Gerasimov throughout the invasion. The Russian MoD announced on January 11 that Gerasimov assumed the position of overall theater commander in Ukraine, which upset a group of commanders and Russian irregular formations such as Wagner that supported Gerasimov’s predecessor, Army General Sergei Surovikin.[16] Teplinsky was one of these commanders, and he reportedly resigned on January 12 following an altercation with Gerasimov over Gerasimov’s use of elite VDV forces in human wave attacks.[17] Teplinsky later recorded a video on February 23 in which he confirmed his resignation and implied that Russian commanders in charge of the Russian winter offensive paid for captured villages with soldiers’ lives.[18] Teplinsky’s resignation was not in itself insubordinate--resigning is one of the legal actions an officer can take when he decides that he cannot in good conscience execute a lawful order. Releasing a video criticizing the theater commander, however, was insubordinate and would likely be viewed as conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline, which is a violation of military law in many militaries. Teplinsky’s video likely publicly blamed Gerasimov for Russian casualties during the winter offensive in an effort to undermine his command and set informational conditions to signal the need for Gerasimov’s replacement to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[19] Teplinsky later mobilized support within the VDV veteran community and directly appealed to Putin on March 15 regarding the Russian MoD’s poor treatment of Wagner forces and poor conduct of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.[20] Putin rewarded Teplinsky’s insubordination by reappointing him as the VDV commander on April 1 instead of punishing him for his public actions undermining the theater commander.

 

Popov’s leaked audio recording demonstrated a striking resemblance to Teplinsky’s appeals as it portrayed Popov’s insubordination as an attempt to improve conditions for 58th CAA’s servicemen. Popov did not claim responsibility for leaking the audio recording, however, he likely intended to evoke similar support for himself as the voice of opposition to the Russian MoD among servicemen and veterans of the 58th CAA. Both Teplinsky and Popov demanded radical changes in the Russian conduct of the war – that, however necessary they might be, are impossible for Gerasimov or Shoigu to execute given Putin’s unrealistic demands for the war effort, constraints on Russian mobilization, and the Russian MoD’s persistent incompetence. Putin reportedly signed a decree deploying Popov to Syria on July 14 on Gerasimov’s recommendation.[21] ISW assessed on April 30 that the Kremlin demoted several commanders by transferring their responsibilities from combat in Ukraine to Syria or Nagorno-Karabakh and that these apparent demotions leave open the possibility that these commanders could return to Putin’s favor.[22]

 

The Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine. Putin consistently bypassed or ignored the established chain of command in hopes of securing rapid successes on the battlefield throughout the war, degrading Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s authority – especially when military failures on the frontlines also eroded their reputations. Putin had cultivated an environment in which military personnel, officials, and even Russian war correspondents bypassed Shoigu and Gerasimov to present Putin their understandings of the current state of the war and recommendations for what to do.[23] It is unusual but not unique for a commander in chief to solicit views on the war from outside experts. It is more problematic, although still not unique, for a commander in chief to solicit the views of subordinates opposed to senior leadership directly. But allowing a quasi-military commander such as Prigozhin to conduct his own campaign parallel but not subordinate to the one being executed by the formal chain of command is extraordinarily unusual and badly corrosive of the authority of the formal military leadership.

 

Putin also established the Russian MoD as the scapegoat for all Russian military failures, which saddled Shoigu and Gerasimov with a reputation for incompetence and failure that they are unlikely to repair.[24] ISW previously assessed that Putin regularly grants and withdraws his support for different commanders in hopes generating rapid improvements in Russia’s military fortunes but without always doing so formally.[25] Shoigu and Gerasimov likely expected that Putin would restore their full authority over the Russian military’s decision-making processes given their loyalty to him after Wagner’s armed rebellion on June 24. Putin, however, has clearly not done so.  He has instead followed his normal pattern of seeking to divert backlash away from himself and rotating commanders instead of outright dismissing them.[26] Intensifying insubordination and widespread outrage in response to the ongoing officer purge may force the Kremlin to reconsider its partial backing for Shoigu and Gerasimov in the wake of Wagner’s rebellion.

 

The intensifying dynamic of insubordination among Russian commanders in Ukraine may prompt other commanders to oppose the Russian military leadership more overtly. ISW has previously assessed that Teplinsky and Popov have established precedents for Russian military officers to challenge the authority of senior commanders and for to use their responsibility for key sectors of the front to cajole the Kremlin into supporting them.[27] Insubordinate commanders appear to be more actively emulating this approach to achieving their desired aims and are likely aware of the constraints the MoD faces in punishing them. These commanders present themselves as defenders of their soldiers, tapping into longstanding grievances about the war effort that the Kremlin routinely attempts to avoid exacerbating but has been unable or unwilling to address.[28] The Kremlin’s relatively soft reaction to insubordination likely incentivizes strong-willed commanders to engage in these patterns of insubordination, knowing that they offer substantial rewards with relatively low risks. These commanders appear to be deftly drawing a line between themselves and Prigozhin by centering their soldiers in their complaints and avoiding the appearance of promoting their personal ambitions, which had made Prigozhin appear a threat to the Kremlin (they are also, obviously, avoiding leading armed forces in a march on Moscow).[29] As the Kremlin fails to adequately punish commanders who challenge Gerasimov’s and Shoigu’s authority it becomes more logical for commanders who wish to protect their soldiers (or to appear to be doing so) to engage in this kind of behavior. Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s attempts to remove and punish these commanders will likely cause some commanders to intensify their insubordination and draw public attention to their conflicts with the senior Russian military leadership in hopes of making the Kremlin more hesitant about supporting Shoigu’s and Gerasimov’s efforts. It may cause the fainter of heart to become more pliable yes-men and, thus, likely less effective on the battlefield.

 

Russian commanders are likely setting information conditions to prevent the Russian MoD from punishing them for their insubordination by promoting narratives among Russian servicemembers along the front and thereby risking widespread demoralization. Teplinsky and Popov may have leveraged Russian military and ultranationalist communities to bring awareness to the Russian MoD’s intentions to dismiss military commanders and thus spark backlash within these communities.[30] This effort has the potential to drive the Kremlin to undo or halt the Russian MoD’s command changes.[31] Teplinsky’s earlier involvement of veteran communities allowed him to reestablish control of the VDV and occupied southern Ukraine, and it is likely that these commanders are aware of their ability to garner support on Russian social media platforms under the guise of attempting to save their troops from the Russian MoD.[32] ISW assesses that some of these commanders, like many Russian officials, likely have personal connections to Russian Telegram channels and social media networks that they use to spread their desired narratives and objectives.[33] Russian servicemembers routinely engage with milblogger content to follow the war in Ukraine, and insubordinate commanders likely rely on servicemembers consuming this content to garner support for their opposition to the Russian senior military leadership.

 

The Russian veteran and ultranationalist communities appear to be readily defending the commanders’ insubordination by amplifying defeatist discussions that may have direct effects on Russian servicemembers’ morale. The 7th VDV Division’s threat to withdraw in response to the latest speculations about dismissals and arrests of commanders suggests that Russian servicemembers are actively engaging with this content.[34] Russian milbloggers also often amplify videos and letters from servicemen further confirming the interactions between milbloggers and the Russian forces on the frontlines.[35] ”Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky (who is currently fighting in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast) argued that Russia will lose the war in Ukraine if Russian authorities arrest Teplinsky.[36] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger rhetorically asked who would lead Russian forces to victory if there are only commanders who do not stand up for their soldiers and fear upsetting the General Staff with their ”panicked” reports about the situation on the frontlines.[37] Another Russian source, that promotes narratives sympathetic to the insubordinate commanders, claimed that the situation is reminiscent of the demoralization of the Soviet military at the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.[38] One milblogger noted that the degree of speculation and claims about the dismissals and arrests is indicative of widespread concern among the Russian military about this issue.[39] These narratives threaten to cause a widespread loss of confidence in the Russian command and an overall sense of defeatism if Gerasimov and Shoigu continue to remove and/or punish the commanders whom many view as ”heroes born of the Special Military Operation.”[40]

 

The apparent crisis in the Russian chain of command and the corresponding morale effects it may produce will likely degrade Russian capabilities to conduct tactical offensive operations that are critical to the Russian elastic defense in southern Ukraine. Russian defensive operations in southern Ukraine follow a pattern in which one echelon of Russian forces slows and degrades attacking Ukrainian forces until a second echelon counterattacks from prepared defensive positions to roll back the Ukrainian advances.[41] Tactical counterattacks from prepared (and therefore likely relatively safe and defensible) positions require a degree of motivation and morale that the chain of command crisis may undermine to the point of failure. Elements of the 58th CAA and the 7th VDV Division are engaged in the defense of areas of western Zaporizhia Oblast and are likely already experiencing pronounced morale issues in the wake of the controversies surrounding their dismissed commanders. Ukrainian assaults also appear to be occurring along seams of the Russian defense between different formations and units in some areas, and insubordination and command and control issues may lead to a lack of cohesion between these defending units.[42] ISW has not observed direct indicators of these developments at this time.

 

The apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine. It is unlikely that the Kremlin will allow the conflict between these commanders and the Russian senior military command to escalate to a point where personnel follow through on threats like the one the 7th VDV division made, although the continued hollowing out of support for the Russian military leadership among field commanders will produce morale issues throughout the theater. Further controversies about insubordination and command changes will likely increasingly reach a wider domestic audience as the Russian ultranationalist milblogger community continues to closely follow and amplify these developments. The Kremlin’s failure to appeal to these commanders and their personnel while also failing to fully back Shoigu and Gerasimov may increasingly undermine the Kremlin’s desired goal to be viewed as an effective manager of the war in Ukraine.

 

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made limited gains. Geolocated footage published on July 15 shows that Ukrainian forces made limited gains northwest of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.[43] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen reported that Ukrainian forces advanced 1km in an unspecified area in the Berdyansk direction (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area).[44] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations in the Melitopol direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast area).[45] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces continue to advance in the Bakhmut area and are defending new positions on the flanks of Bakhmut against Russian ground attacks.[46] Some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces liberated Zaliznyanske (13km north of Bakhmut), parts of heights near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut), and a fortified area west of Andriivka (10km south of Bakhmut).[47] Russian President Vladimir Putin denied Ukrainian successes in the counteroffensive and claimed that Ukrainian forces have not been able to break through Russian defenses on July 16.[48] Putin notably told a journalist that he would answer a question about further goals of the war if the journalist turned off the camera.[49] Ukrainian forces have, however, advanced in southern Ukraine where Russian forces have prepared the most extensive fortifications. ISW calculated based on its own control of terrain data that since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4 to July 9 Ukrainian forces liberated approximately 253 square kilometers of territory.[50] (Ukrainian official accounts of the area liberated differ from ISW’s, almost certainly because Ukraine calculated its initial control of terrain differently. ISW is presenting its own figure of liberated land to make an apples-to-apples comparison of Russian and Ukrainian gains.)[51]

 

Ukrainian officials indicated that extensive Russian minefields and shortages of Western mine clearing equipment have slowed the pace of Ukrainian advances in the counteroffensive. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi acknowledged in an interview with CNN published on July 14 that the tempo of counteroffensive operations is slower than expected citing “complex and dense minefields” in areas through which Ukrainian forces intend to move.[52] The Washington Post reported on July 15 that Russian forces heavily mined areas between five and 16 kilometers behind the frontline in Zaporizhia Oblast, which has slowed Ukrainian advances and forced Ukrainian forces to conduct ground attacks with infantry rather than Western kit.[53] An unnamed Ukrainian officer told the Washington Post that Russian forces have prioritized destroying more advanced mine-clearing systems over Leopard tanks.[54] An unnamed senior Ukrainian official told the Washington Post that Ukraine received less than 15 percent of the quantity of mine clearing and engineering material it requested ahead of the counteroffensive with some equipment arriving only last week.[55]

 

The Kremlin is likely attempting to increase its control over Russian social media outlets to set conditions for the 2024 Russian presidential elections. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko is brokering a deal to purchase the Russian division of media giant Yandex on behalf of investors heavily affiliated with billionaire Yuri Kovalchuk, a close Kiriyenko ally and reported personal banker to Russian President Vladimir Putin.[56] Meduza reported that these investors will likely transfer their shares of Yandex to another entity, such as Kovalchuk or one of his holdings, after a period of time. Meduza noted that Yandex corporate advisor Alexey Kudrin and Putin personally approved an earlier deal to sell Yandex to investors with less direct connections to the federal government, but the deal fell through after an investor withdrew under fear of Western sanctions should he proceed with the purchase.[57] Meduza reported that Kudrin hoped that the new Yandex buyers would have less explicit federal government ties, but that Kiriyenko’s influence likely swayed Putin to this new deal.[58] A Russian insider source claimed that Telegram channels affiliated with Kiriyenko accused RT editor in chief and Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan of spreading fake information to try to take control over Telegram.[59] The source also claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service’s (FSB) recent detention of the Russian Deputy Minister of Digital Development, Maxim Parshin, and of Russian insider sources is part of a broader Russian federal effort to take more direct control over Russian social media.[60]

 

Kiriyenko’s role in this consolidation is notable given his increasing reach in the Russian federal government and prior connections to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin. ISW reported recently on claims from former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin accusing Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk of directly acting as Prigozhin’s patrons.[61] The degree of Kiriyenko’s and Kovalchuk’s support for Prigozhin in recent months, and especially following Prigozhin’s June 24 rebellion, is currently unclear, however. Some Russian sources continue to postulate that Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk are firm Prigozhin supporters.[62] Other sources have claimed that Kiriyenko and Kovalchuk have distanced themselves from Prigozhin in recent months due to Prigozhin’s escalation of his conflict with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and St. Petersburg Mayor Alexander Beglov prior to the rebellion.[63] Kovalchuk, Kiriyenko, and Prigozhin all reportedly contributed to the effort to elect Beglov to his office in 2019, but the Prigozhin-Beglov relationship deteriorated.[64] Some sources assert that Kovalchuk – and likely Kiriyenko as a result – firmly backed Beglov in his feud with Prigozhin.[65] Kiriyenko has consistently postured himself as a firm Putin loyalist, and his increasing role in the Russian information space reflects both Putin’s trust in him as a result of his labors thus far and Kiriyenko’s desire to further advance his influence with Putin.[66]
 

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian MoD has begun to remove commanders from some of the Russian military’s most combat effective units and formations and appears to be accelerating this effort.
• Insubordination among commanders appears to be spreading to some of their soldiers.
• Teplinsky himself set the precedent for the acts of insubordination that are currently plaguing the Russian MoD.
• The Kremlin’s chronic disregard for the Russian chain of command is likely hindering Shoigu and Gerasimov in their attempts to suppress insubordination and establish full control over the Russian military in Ukraine.
• The intensifying dynamic of insubordination among Russian commanders in Ukraine may prompt other commanders to oppose the Russian military leadership more overtly.
• Russian commanders are likely setting information conditions to prevent the Russian MoD from punishing them for their insubordination by promoting narratives among Russian servicemembers along the front and thereby risking widespread demoralization.
• The Russian veteran and ultranationalist communities appear to be readily defending the commanders’ insubordination by amplifying defeatist discussions that may have direct effects on Russian servicemembers’ morale.
• The apparent crisis in the Russian chain of command and the corresponding morale effects it may produce will likely degrade Russian capabilities to conduct tactical offensive operations that are critical to the Russian elastic defense in southern Ukraine.
• The apparent Russian chain of command crisis threatens to demoralize the wider Russian war effort in Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made limited gains.
• Kiriyenko’s role in this consolidation is notable given his increasing reach in the Russian federal government and prior connections to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove line and did not make confirmed advances.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Kreminna and made tactical advances.
• Ukrainian forces continue to target Russian rear areas in occupied Luhansk Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and reportedly advanced.
• Russian and Ukrainian sources confirmed that some Chechen forces have deployed to the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and did not advance.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia border area and made limited gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and did not make confirmed advances in the area.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to operate on east (left) bank Kherson Oblast near the Antonivsky Bridge and did not claim any Russian or Ukrainian advances in the area.
• Russian officials accused Ukrainian forces of attempting an aerial and maritime drone strike against unspecified targets in the Black Sea near Sevastopol, Crimea overnight on July 15 to 16.
• Russian “Lancet” drone (loitering munition) producer Zalo Aero Group announced the production of a new generation of drones with automatic targeting systems and the intention to expand production abroad.
• A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue persecuting religious minorities in occupied Ukraine as part of a broader cultural genocide aimed at eradicating the Ukrainian national and cultural identity.
• Wagner Group forces will reportedly integrate into the Russian-Belarusian Union State Regional Grouping of Troops (RGV).

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 17 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 17, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have continuing ramifications on Russian logistics in southern Ukraine. Russian authorities accused Ukrainian special services of conducting an unmanned surface vehicle strike against the Kerch

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on July 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have continuing ramifications on Russian logistics in southern Ukraine. Russian authorities accused Ukrainian special services of conducting an unmanned surface vehicle strike against the Kerch Strait Bridge between Russia and occupied Crimea on the morning of July 17.[1] Footage of the aftermath shows that one Kerch Strait Bridge road span had collapsed and another span suffered damage but remains intact.[2] The Russian Ministry of Transport claimed that the strikes did not damage the rail bridge or supports of the road bridge, and rail traffic across the Kerch Strait Bridge resumed several hours after the strike.[3] Russian occupation authorities rerouted heavy civilian traffic from occupied Crimea to Russia through occupied southern Ukraine, and Russian sources reported extensive traffic jams in Crimea’s Dzhankoy Raion and occupied Kherson Oblast towards Melitopol.[4] Russian tourists fleeing occupied Crimea likely exacerbated traffic and likely impeded Russian logistics from Crimea to rear areas in Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts. Occupation authorities asked civilians to consider alternate evacuation routes to mitigate the immediate traffic issues.[5] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Andrii Yusov declined to comment on Ukrainian involvement in the incident.[6] The Kerch Strait Bridge and military areas in occupied Crimea are legitimate military targets for Ukrainian forces in their defense against the full-scale Russian invasion and occupation of Ukraine, as ISW and Ukrainian officials have previously reported.[7]

 

The Russian government’s continued failure to put Russian society on a war-time footing will have significant impacts on Russian logistics as traffic from Russian tourism to occupied Crimea jams Russian logistics to southern Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south. The Kerch Strait Bridge is along one of two ground lines of communication (GLOCs) supporting Russia’s southern force grouping, with the other route passing through occupied Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts. This sole remaining logistics route is now a single point of failure for the supply of the large numbers of mechanized Russian forces in southern Ukraine needed to resist Ukrainian counteroffensives. Russian and occupation officials have nevertheless continued to promote occupied Crimea as a tourist destination, however, urging Russian civilians to drive through and to a warzone rather than advising them to avoid it as a responsible government would.[8] Russian occupation authorities recently struggled to mitigate traffic issues just from increased Russian tourism across the Kerch Strait Bridge, as ISW has previously reported.[9] Russian President Vladimir Putin even ordered the use of Russian military assets to ferry tourists across the Kerch Strait.[10] Some Russian milbloggers also suggested that the attack against the Kerch Strait Bridge should not reduce continued tourist flows.[11]

 

Russian logistics to southern Ukraine will likely suffer in the short and medium-term, likely exacerbating recent and significant complaints about inadequate Russian supplies in southern Ukraine. Former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District) Commander Major General Ivan Popov’s recent complaints about the Russian military command’s mistreatment of Russian forces defending against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine sparked great ire in the Russian information space.[12] Many of Popov’s complaints indicated that the 58th Combined Arms Army, and likely other Russian formations deployed in Zaporizhia Oblast, suffer from supply shortages that will further worsen if tourist and other civilian traffic slow down logistics routes supporting Russian forces in southern Ukraine.[13] Further issues with support for this grouping, and further resulting complaints that emerge in the Russian information space, are likely to draw further outrage from the Russian ultranationalist community and undermine confidence in the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[14]

 

Russian and occupation authorities appear to be consumed with mitigating the consequences of the attack rather than leveraging the incident to levy heavy informational attacks with rhetorical inflections. Russian President Vladimir Putin held a meeting instructing Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to lead a headquarters and develop solutions to mitigate traffic issues across the bridge.[15] Khusnullin and other occupation authorities decided to lift curfews and passport checks along major highways to Russia in occupied territories, which are under Russian martial law, in order to mitigate some of these traffic issues.[16] Putin’s and other senior Russian officials’ statements were largely straightforward; the officials accused Ukraine of conducting a “terrorist attack” and promised retaliation, which is consistent with prior official reactions to claimed Ukrainian provocations.[17] The Russian Foreign Ministry accused Ukraine of conducting the strike in conjunction with American and British intelligence, forwarding a consistent Russian narrative aimed at falsely portraying Russia as at war with the West rather than Ukraine.[18] Some Russian officials connected the Kerch Strait Bridge attack to the Black Sea Grain Initiative, which expired today.[19] Senior Russian officials, including Putin, had signaled before the bridge was attacked that Russia was unwilling to renew the grain deal without significant additional concessions, however.[20] Russia was very unlikely to have engaged in negotiations around the continuation of the grain deal or any other negotiations with Ukraine in good faith, as ISW has previously assessed.[21]

 

The Russian milblogger response to the Kerch Strait Bridge attack largely criticized Russian authorities for failing to secure the bridge. Some milbloggers, including former Russian officer and critical pro-war nationalist Igor Girkin, offered the critique that Russian authorities have focused too heavily on road security and not enough on maritime security, thereby allowing the most recent attack on the bridge to occur.[22] Girkin complained that the Russian border officials have devoted too much time to checking civilian cars entering the bridge and not enough time investing in infrastructure that could protect against attacks launched by sea.[23] Another prominent milblogger and Kremlin-appointed member of the Russian Human Rights Council blamed Russian authorities for focusing too much on security on the land bridge and neglecting to take into account any maritime threats.[24] One milblogger emphasized that the strike was caused by poor internal Russian decision making and posed a threat to the stability of Russian domestic peace.[25] Many Russian sources erroneously claimed that the strike will not impact Russian logistics in occupied Ukraine and called the attack a “terrorist act” to minimize the fact that the Kerch Strait Bridge is a legitimate military target in the rear of an active war zone.[26] Some Russian sources additionally advocated for retributive and retaliatory actions against Ukraine in the wake of the attack, but this brand of milblogger response closely resembles outcry following previous such events.

 

The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence in Belarus. Independent Belarusian monitoring group “The Hajun Project” reported on July 17 that another Wagner vehicle convoy traveled towards the Tsel village tent camp near Asipovichy, Mogilev Oblast, Belarus, and that two other Wagner columns had traveled along this same route between July 11 and July 17.[27] Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels relatedly posted footage on July 17 of a Wagner column moving between Voronezh and Oryel oblasts before arriving at the training ground near Asipovichy.[28] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported that over 700 Wagner fighters have recently settled in the Tsel-Asipovichy area and that Belarusian authorities have formed three Belarusian special-purpose units to train under Wagner leadership in these training areas.[29] Several Wagner-affiliated milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner’s training ground in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, will cease operations by July 30 and that Wagner will deploy elsewhere and they posted footage of Wagner fighters ceremoniously lowering Russian and Wagner flags at Molkino.[30] Wagner fighters will likely continue to redeploy to Belarus from training areas in Molkino and staging grounds elsewhere in Russia over the coming month.

 

Russia continues efforts to reorganize its domestic security apparatus in the wake of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion. Russian State Duma Deputy Alexander Khinshtein stated on July 17 that the “Grom” special units of the Russian Federal Drug Control Service (of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs) were officially transferred to the control of the Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard).[31] Khinshtein emphasized that the decision was made to capitalize on Rosgvadia’s key role in protecting Russia’s internal security.[32] ISW previously reported on July 4 that the decision to transfer “Grom” to Rosgvardia emphasizes the Kremlin’s desire to consolidate an effective anti-rebellion force under Rosgvardia command.[33] The Russian Duma additionally announced on July 17 that it is considering a bill to allow Rosgvardia to field heavy weapons by amending the federal law “On the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation,” which will allow the Rosgvardia to be armed with transport aircraft, combat, transport, and multi-purpose helicopters, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, communications complexes, boats, engineering equipment, and other military and paramilitary kit.[34] The transfer of “Grom” units to Rosgvardia, as well as the decision to provide Rosgvardia with heavy combat equipment, supports ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin is continuing efforts to consolidate its internal security apparatus around Rosgvardia’s structures. However, several actors within the Russian internal security sphere have voiced their concern and dissatisfaction over the “Grom” transfer, and the reorganization of domestic security organs may cause more tension within Russia.[35]

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front over the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 17. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces have launched active offensive operations and advanced in the Kupyansk area (between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and northwestern Luhansk Oblast) in the past several days.[36] Russian forces likely are engaging in offensive operations in this area of the front in an effort to exploit Ukrainian operational focus on other sectors of the front and draw Ukrainian reserves away from critical areas of the theater, namely the Bakhmut and western Donetsk, and western Zaporizhia Oblast areas, where Ukrainian forces are pursuing counteroffensive operations. The poor quality and composition of Russian troops currently deployed on this line, however, will likely hinder Russia’s ability to achieve more than tactically significant gains or make an operationally significant breakthrough. Ukrainian and Russian sources have both reported the deployment of convict-formed “Storm-Z” assault units to the Kupyansk direction, and ISW has previously assessed that “Storm-Z” units have low operational effectiveness due to poor morale and discipline.[37] Ukrainian forces also continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut, south of Velyka Novosilka, and near Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast throughout July 17.[38]

 

Key Takeaways:

• The July 17 attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge will likely have significant and sustained impacts on Russian logistics as traffic from tourism to occupied Crimea jams Russian logistics to southern Ukraine in the midst of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south.
• Russian and occupation authorities appear to be consumed with mitigating the consequences of the attack rather than leveraging the incident to levy heavy informational attacks with rhetorical inflections.
• The Russian milblogger response to the Kerch Strait Bridge attack largely criticized Russian authorities for failing to secure the bridge.
• The Wagner Group continues to prepare to establish a permanent presence in Belarus.
• Russia continues efforts to reorganize its domestic security apparatus in the wake of the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front over the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 17.
• Russian forces conducted active offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line and have likely made marginal tactical gains in this direction.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks southwest and south of Kreminna, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area and advanced near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia administrative border.
• Russian forces conducted limited counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued unsuccessful ground attacks in the Orikhiv area in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that Russian authorities have removed at least eight Russian military commanders without reappointing them to new positions since the start of the war, which is largely consistent with ISW’s previous assessments.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to artificially increase the number of Russian citizens in occupied Ukraine ahead of the September regional elections.

 

[CitizenVectron]

For the Cold Warriors:
 

Ukrainian Bradley IFV obliterates two Russian T-72 tanks in single battle

ENGLISH.NV.UA

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Ukrainian troops, using an American infantry fighting vehicle M2 Bradley, effectively neutralized two Russian T-72 tanks during an intense battle on July 18.

 

Quote

According to the deputy minister, the Bradley initially outmaneuvered the Russian infantry from both flanks. After successfully eliminating the occupants with the automatic cannon, the Russians declared a "real hunt" for the Ukrainian Bradley and urgently brought a pair of T-72 tanks into the fight.

"Both Russian tanks were promptly taken out of action. The Bradley is equipped with the powerful TOW anti-tank missile, which the crew skillfully employed," added Maliar.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russia has pulled out of the double-bilateral-deal protecting grain transport ships out of Ukraine. The deals were between Ukraine-Turkiye and Turkiye-Russia. The day after the deal was ripped up (last night), Russia launched a large wave of cruise missiles and drones at the port of Odessa, hitting grain and oil storage. Fortunately most were intercepted.

 

Turkiye has provided hints that they may offer their naval vessels to escort grain ships out of Ukraine and across the Black Sea.

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine storm shadow'd a big ammunition depot in Crimea, and explosions have been going on for hours:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 18 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 18, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine. Footage and imagery published on July 17 and 18 show extensive traffic jams and accidents reportedly on the E58

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on July 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine. Footage and imagery published on July 17 and 18 show extensive traffic jams and accidents reportedly on the E58 Mariupol-Melitopol-Kherson City highway – Russia’s current main logistics line connecting Russia to southern Ukraine – at various points between Mariupol and Berdyansk, and in Kherson Oblast.[1] Russian occupation authorities claimed to have reduced traffic at Crimea-Kherson Oblast checkpoints near Chonhar and Armiansk following significant traffic jams in the morning.[2] Russian occupation authorities also advertised alternate routes and rest stops along them for tourists to drive from occupied Crimea through occupied Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts – rear areas in a war zone – to return to Russia.[3] Russian authorities also announced additional measures to mitigate resulting traffic jams and logistics issues, including a temporary road bridge next to the Kerch Strait Bridge, the reconstruction of a 60-kilometer stretch of road between Crimea and Kherson Oblast through Armiansk, and lowering security measures at the Kerch Strait Bridge checkpoints.[4] Russian authorities reopened one span of the Kerch Strait Bridge to one-way road traffic towards Russia on July 18, and plan to reopen the same span to two-lane traffic on September 15 and the whole bridge to road traffic in November.[5] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on July 18 that the Russian government is still developing measures to increase the security of the Kerch Strait Bridge, and Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the claimed Russian security failure to adequately protect the bridge.[6]

 

Russian forces conducted a strike campaign ostensibly against Ukrainian military objects in southern Ukraine in explicit retaliation for the Kerch Strait Bridge attack. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian retaliatory strikes hit port infrastructure in Odesa City and to have destroyed Ukrainian fuel storage facilities holding a combined 70 thousand tons of fuel near Odesa and Mykolaiv cities.[7] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all six Russian Kaliber missiles and 31 of 36 Shahed 131/136 drones targeting these areas, but that falling missile fragments damaged port infrastructure and a residential area in Odesa.[8] Russian milbloggers heavily criticized the Russian MoD for only targeting Ukrainian military assets in retaliation for Ukrainian military ”provocations” rather than targeting these assets as part of the war effort.[9] These complaints are consistent with prior milblogger criticisms to the same effect following other major military events, including the October 2022 Kerch Strait Bridge attack.[10] The Russian MoD also accused Ukrainian forces of targeting occupied Crimea with 28 drones overnight on July 17 to 18 and claimed that Russian air defenses and electronic warfare systems downed all 28 drones.[11]

 

The dismissal of former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and the issues he cited continue to have effects on Russian military operations in southern Ukraine and the discourse around these operations. A prominent, Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger accused Ukrainian forces of attempting to exhaust Russian forces defending in southern Ukraine and noted that the Russian military command has not solved the force rotation issues Popov outlined before his dismissal.[12] Another prominent milblogger supported Popov, noting that the issues Popov outlined seem more important issues for the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to address than transferring Popov to Syria or other information mitigation measures.[13] Some Russian milbloggers amplified reports of several Russian assault groups with forces of up to a platoon simultaneously surrendering to Ukrainian forces in the Zaporizhia direction.[14] Persistent issues with Russian logistics and operations in southern Ukraine may have contributed to these forces’ inability or unwillingness to fight and reported resulting surrender.

 

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the frontline against the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations and claimed tactical gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 18. Russian and Ukrainian sources noted that Russian forces have recently increased offensive operations in the Kupyansk area (between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and northwestern Luhansk Oblast).[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces advanced up to 2km along the front and up to 1.5km in depth in an unspecified area in the Kupyansk direction.[16] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar and Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported that Russian forces continue to transfer reinforcements to the Bakhmut direction and are concentrating their main forces in the Kupyansk direction due to Ukrainian advances in the Bakhmut area, supporting ISW‘s assessment that Russian forces aim to draw Ukrainian reserves to the Kupyansk area and away from critical areas of the theater where Ukrainian forces are conducting counteroffensive operations.[17] ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will not likely make tactically significant advances or an operationally significant breakthrough between northeastern Kharkiv Oblast and Luhansk Oblast in part due to the poor quality of Russian forces deployed in this area. Russian and Ukrainian sources noted that elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army (Western Military District) and convict-formed “Storm-Z” units are operating in the Kupyansk area.[18] ISW has previously assessed that the elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army are heavily degraded and that “Storm-Z” units suffer from poor morale and discipline.[19]

 

Russia continues legislative manipulations to repress domestic dissent through introducing fear of criminal liability. Russian State Duma Deputy Vasily Piskarev stated on July 18 that he and several other deputies submitted a bill for consideration to the Duma on “liability for propaganda and justification of the ideology of extremism” that will introduce a 300 thousand ruble (roughly $3,297) fine and up to five years in prison for violation of the amendment.[20] ISW has previously reported on similar laws and amendments that are meant to set high penalties and criminal liability for anything that Russian authorities assert is “extremist” or “terroristic” behavior in order to encourage self-censorship and facilitate crackdowns against any dissenting parties.[21] Some facets of the Russian information space expressed concern that Russian authorities could use the law to crack down against any expressed viewpoints that contradict those of the Russian state, including support for Russian opposition parties or figures.[22] 

 

The Telegraph concluded that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian authorities are actively involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children. The Telegraph quoted the head of the Belarusian opposition group National Anti-Crisis Management, Pavel Latushka, who alleged that Lukashenko is personally responsible for the forced displacement of Ukrainian children to Belarus and that he gave direct instructions on how to carry out and finance the displacement.[23] The Telegraph found that Belarusian authorities actively worked with Russian authorities to transport some Ukrainian children to Belarus and others to far eastern regions of Russia. The Telegraph reported that Belarusian and Russian authorities collaborated to forcibly transport at least 2,150 Ukrainian children to Belarus since September 2022 and that the number of Ukrainian children in Belarus will likely reach 3,000 by fall of 2023.[24] The European Parliament Foreign Affairs Council had previously called for an arrest warrant against Lukashenko in early June for actions relating to Ukrainian children and for facilitating other crimes committed in Ukraine.[25] ISW has long assessed that Belarus is involved in the deportation of Ukrainian children to Belarus and the Russian Federation.[26]

 

Key Takeaways:

• The July 17 Kerch Strait Bridge attack is likely having immediate ramifications on Russian military logistics in southern Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted a strike campaign ostensibly against Ukrainian military objects in southern Ukraine in explicit retaliation for the Kerch Strait Bridge attack.
• The dismissal of former Russian 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) Commander Major General Ivan Popov and the issues he cited continue to have effects on Russian military operations in southern Ukraine and the discourse around these operations.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive actions on at least three sectors of the frontline against the backdrop of increased Russian offensive operations and claimed tactical gains along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border on July 18.
• Russia continues legislative manipulations to repress domestic dissent through introducing fear of criminal liability.
• The Telegraph concluded that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko and Belarusian authorities are actively involved in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, southwest of Kreminna, and in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas and made limited territorial gains in all sectors.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations around Bakhmut and advanced north of Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly made limited advances.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area and recently made limited advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Some Russian sources suggested that recent measures supporting the development of the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) allow it to posture as an alternative Russian military formation.
• Russia continues to formalize methods of social programming targeted at youth in occupied areas of Ukraine.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Quote

 

Russia says all ships travelling to Ukrainian ports on Black Sea to be considered carriers of military equipment from Thursday

Russia’s defence ministry has said it will consider all ships travelling to Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea as potential carriers of military equipment from Thursday.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Russia's Prigozhin: no more fighting in Ukraine but prepare for Africa - video

WWW.REUTERS.COM

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Russia's mutinous mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin was shown in a video on Wednesday welcoming his fighters to Belarus, telling them they would take no further part in the Ukraine war for now but ordering them to gather their strength for Africa.

 

Quote

 

Russian mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin was shown in a video welcoming his Wagner fighters to Belarus and telling them they would for now take no further part in the Ukraine war, Reuters reports.

 

In the video, the authenticity of which the Guardian or Reuters could not immediately verify, a man whose voice and Russian sounded like Prigozhin’s is heard welcoming his men. The video was reposted by his press service on Telegram.

 

“Welcome lads … Welcome to Belarusian soil,” Prigozhin said.

 

The video was shot after night had fallen and it was only possible to discern what looked like Prigozhin’s profile. “We fought honourably,” said Prigozhin.

 

“You have done a great deal for Russia. What is going on at the front is a disgrace that we do not need to get involved in.”

 

Prigozhin then tells his men to behave well towards the locals and orders them to train the Belarusian army and collect their strength for a “new journey to Africa.”

 

“And perhaps we will return to the SMO (special military operation in Ukraine) at some point when we are sure that we will not be forced to shame ourselves,” Prigozhin said.

 

A man who sounded like Dmitry Utkin (an actual goddamned Nazi), who helped found Wagner, then spoke to the men. “This is not the end. This is just the beginning of the biggest work in the world that will be carried out very soon,” Utkin said, before switching to English. “And welcome to hell!”

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russian is launching dozens of missiles at Odesa right now. 60,000 tonnes of grain were destroyed yesterday at the port. It appears that anti-ship missiles have also been launched towards the coastal city.

[mclumber1]

All we need is one errant missile to hit a Romanian ship.  Come on Russia...

[silentbob]

. . . . and WWIII starts in

[TUFKAK]

It was good knowing you all.

[marioandsonic]

Wait, what happened now?!

[CayceG]

WW3 isn't starting over blowing up storage at a port. Get a grip you guys. 

[Jason]

1 minute ago, CayceG said:

WW3 isn't starting over blowing up storage at a port. Get a grip you guys. 

 

I've already got a solid stroking grip. 

[silentbob]

3 hours ago, CayceG said:

WW3 isn't starting over blowing up storage at a port. Get a grip you guys. 

It’s more on the fact that if your aren’t a Russian ship in the water, they’re free to kill you. They don’t care what country you’re from because you might be working with Ukraine forces. 

[PaladinSolo]

5 hours ago, silentbob said:

It’s more on the fact that if your aren’t a Russian ship in the water, they’re free to kill you. They don’t care what country you’re from because you might be working with Ukraine forces. 

I feel this is more likely to be an empty threat, like they're not going to sink a Turkish ship, that would be truly insane.  If the US operated in the black sea we would absolutely continue to operate as normal.

[CayceG]

8 hours ago, silentbob said:

It’s more on the fact that if your aren’t a Russian ship in the water, they’re free to kill you. They don’t care what country you’re from because you might be working with Ukraine forces. 

 

Right. But also. 

 

 

 

2 hours ago, PaladinSolo said:

I feel this is more likely to be an empty threat, like they're not going to sink a Turkish ship, that would be truly insane.  If the US operated in the black sea we would absolutely continue to operate as normal.

 

I'm not saying it's an empty threat entirely, but as of today, they haven't done shit to these ships. 

[PaladinSolo]

43 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

Right. But also. 

 

 

 

 

I'm not saying it's an empty threat entirely, but as of today, they haven't done shit to these ships. 

 I mean its a pretty empty threat, like i could see them boarding an doing search and seizures or something claiming they found weapons or something but not actually firing on a civilian cargo ship for no reason, that would be pretty good justification for further international intervention, while further isolating themselves, especially when they know damn well the weapons are just crossing Ukraine's western land border.

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine has just declared all vessels traveling to Russian-controlled ports in the Black Sea as enemy vessels, and says they could be fired upon if they continue to Russian ports.

 

Obviously Ukraine doesn't have any naval fleet at this point, but they do have Neptune anti-ship missiles as well as drones. I doubt Ukraine will target civilian Russian-aligned cargo ships, but maybe the threat will work. Tonnes of vessels are still going to Russian-controlled Ukrainian ports and taking stolen grain to China and the Middle-East.

 

Edit - this is likely why the announcement was made, as insurance will have a larger effect on corporate behaviour than anything else:

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 19 July 2023:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 19, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces launched an extensive missile and drone attack against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 19 likely to further emphasize Russia’s objections to the renewal of the Black Sea grain deal and hinder Ukraine’s ability to e

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2:30pm ET on July 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian forces launched an extensive missile and drone attack against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 19 likely to further emphasize Russia’s objections to the renewal of the Black Sea grain deal and hinder Ukraine’s ability to export grain. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted strikes using 16 Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, eight Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, six Onyx cruise missiles, one Kh-59 guided air missile, and 32 Iranian-made Shahed drones.[1] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces predominantly targeted civilian and military infrastructure in Odesa Oblast with Kh-22 and Onyx missiles and that Ukrainian forces shot down 37 air targets including 13 Kalibrs, one Kh-59 missile, and 23 Shaheds.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Russian forces deliberately targeted the infrastructure necessary for executing the Black Sea grain deal in Odesa, Zhytomyr, and other oblasts.[3] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck grain and oil terminals and damaged tanks and loading equipment.[4]  Ukrainian Minister of Agrarian Policy and Food Mykola Solskyi reported that Russian strikes destroyed 60,000 tons of grain in the Chornomorsk port in Odesa Oblast on the night of July 19.[5] The Southern Operational Command added that Russian strikes also targeted coastal areas in Mykolaiv Oblast and some infrastructure in Kherson City.[6] Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Captain of the First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that the Russian July 19 strikes “happened virtually simultaneously,” and that Russian forces likely attempted to overwhelm the Ukrainian air defense systems.[7] Ukrainian Air Forces Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that this attack was the most intense missile and drone attack on Odesa Oblast since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.[8]

 

Russian sources, apart from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Russian strikes on south Ukraine aimed to dismantle the port infrastructure necessary for the Black Sea grain deal. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian military infrastructure and ammunition depots in Odesa Oblast and the Kanatove Air Base in Kirovohrad Oblast.[9] Kremlin-affiliated mibloggers and former proxy officials claimed that Russian strikes damaged port infrastructure, grain storage, and industrial facilities in Odesa Oblast.[10] Some Russian ultranationalists called on the Russian MoD to authorize additional strikes to destroy Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure to ensure that no grain deals can ever be renewed.[11] One milblogger who has been routinely skeptical of the Kremlin’s war effort claimed that the Russian strike campaign is more “retaliatory” than “operationally sound” and blamed the Russian General Staff for wasting Russian efforts (and likely the dwindling stock of Russian precision weapons) on striking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure rather than military infrastructure.[12]

 

The South African Presidential Office announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the BRICS summit in-person in Johannesburg in August 2023.[13] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov will represent Russia at the summit, and President Putin will participate by video call.[14]

 

An explosion at a Russian training ground in occupied Kirovskyi Raion (Islam Terek Raion), southeastern Crimea, disrupted the Russian use of the Tavrida highway that connects eastern Crimea to Sevastopol on July 19. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian ammunition depots detonated following an explosion at the Starokrymskyi Training Ground in Kirovskyi Raion.[15] Geolocated footage showed explosions at the reported Russian ammunition depot south of Aivazovske (25km northwest of Feodosia).[16] Crimean Occupation Head Sergei Aksyonov stated that the explosions caused a landfill to catch on fire and announced that the Russian occupation officials will block movement on the Tavrida highway until the consequences of the fire are managed.[17] Aksyonov also announced the evacuation of 2,000 residents.[18] Aksyonov stated that the cause of the explosion is unknown as of the time of this publication, and Russian occupation officials notably did not accuse Ukrainian forces of striking Russian military infrastructure.[19] A Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Andriy Yusov denied claims that GUR Chief Major General Kyrylo Budanov confirmed Ukraine’s involvement in the explosion.[20] Russian milbloggers, however, accused Ukrainian forces of striking a Russian ammunition depot but did not provide a consistent suggestion of the means Ukraine might have used to conduct this strike.[21] Some ultranationalist milbloggers claimed that the explosion sparked criticism of Russian military officials within the Kremlin as these officials continued to lie about the situation in Crimea.[22]

 

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 19 and made gains in these areas. Geolocated footage published on July 19 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut). The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut City and forced Russian forces to retreat from positions northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut).[23] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[24] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Major Valerii Shershen stated that Ukrainian forces advanced more than a kilometer in an unspecified area of the Melitopol direction.[25] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces lack rotations and reinforcements on the Zaporizhia front and south of Bakhmut, which is preventing Russian forces from recapturing lost positions.[26] The milblogger forecasted that continued delays in resolving these rotation and reinforcement issues south of Bakhmut threaten serious consequences for the Russian grouping in the area.[27]

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin and reportedly Wagner Commander Dmitry Utkin greeted Wagner fighters at the new Wagner base near Asipovichy, Belarus, on July 18. Footage posted on July 19 and likely captured on July 18 shows Prigozhin addressing Wagner fighters at the field camp near Asipovichy, Belarus.[28] Prigozhin welcomed the fighters to Belarus in a ceremony whose symbolism demonstrates that Prigozhin still controls the Wagner Group.[29] Prigozhin handed the Wagner flag that had previously flown at the Wagner Group’s main military base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to the local Wagner commander – a man with a first name of Sergey and callsign “Pioneer” – who will command Wagner forces in Belarus.[30] “Pioneer” has reportedly been awarded five Orders of Courage and participated in combat in Syria, Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali, and other countries.[31] Prigozhin stated that unspecified current events in Ukraine are a “shame in which [Wagner] does not need to participate” but acknowledged that Wagner may return to Ukraine when Wagner can be sure that Wagner fighters will not be forced to “shame” themselves.[32] Prigozhin also ceremonially presented ribbons of Russian and Belarusian flags so that “no one will think that [Wagner] fights without a flag and without a Motherland as some have said.”[33] Prigozhin stated that Wagner personnel will remain in Belarus “for some time” and that they will make “make the Belarusian army the second army in the world” - an insult directed against the Russian Ministry of Defense. Prigozhin also stated that Wagner will embark on a new journey in Africa after regrouping in Belarus. An unidentified man – reportedly Dmitry Utkin (callsign “Wagner”) – also thanked the Wagner fighters for their work and for making Wagner a world-famous name. Utkin said that “this is only the beginning of the biggest job that will be carried out soon.” ISW is unable to confirm the identity of the man who was presented as Utkin. If the man is indeed Utkin, this ceremony would mark Utkin’s first public appearance since 2016.[34] Russian milbloggers reported that several thousand Wagner fighters attended this ceremony, though ISW cannot verify attendance numbers at this time.[35]

 

Russian sources claimed that Wagner will continue to operate abroad in African countries, although Prigozhin’s involvement in these activities remains unclear. A Russian source published on July 19 an apparent audio clip from Prigozhin, in which Prigozhin stated that he has sold part of Wagner’s “African assets” to an unspecified buyer to pay off existing liabilities – but that this will not curtail any Wagner programs in African countries.[36] Wagner-affiliated milbloggers amplified statements from Wagner Commander Alexander Ivanov on July 19, in which Ivanov claimed that Wagner is continuing to rotate Wagner instructors in the Central African Republic (CAR).[37] Ivanov reportedly stated that Wagner’s employees in CAR are not military personnel and did not sign military contracts with the Russian MoD.[38] Ivanov stated that Prigozhin intends to expand Wagner‘s presence in Africa despite unspecified change in the structure of Wagner’s business in the region and quoted Prigozhin as saying that ”concrete negotiations” are occurring on the matter.[39]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to display his knowledge of Russian history at odd moments, this time appearing to warn against the possibility of revolution in Russia. Putin stated on July 19 that Russia already exceeded its “limit on revolutions in the last century” in response to the mention of the Mayevka tourism event that took place in May.[40] Mayevka was an illegal meeting of revolutionary-minded workers held outside of Moscow during the Tsarist period, but the word can also be associated with the arrival of spring.[41] Putin additionally stated that he hoped that the tourism Mayevka event would not “lead to a revolution.” Putin had previously made a seemingly unrelated and unprompted allusion to Russian history at a public engagement in October 2022 when he spoke about the causes of the 18th Century Pugachev Rebellion, observing that it began because the center appeared weak and because someone decided that he was tsar – an observation that has since appeared to have been apropos.[42]

 

Russian authorities opened a case against an affiliate of the ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club for discrediting Russian forces, prompting the Angry Patriots Club to make explicit demands of Russian officials. Russian media reported on July 18 that Russian authorities initiated a criminal case against former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov under the article for discrediting the Russian Armed Forces.[43] Angry Patriots Club member Viktor Alksnis claimed on July 18 that he talked with Kvachkov and confirmed the initiation of the case.[44] The Angry Patriots Club formally denounced the criminal case and demanded that Russian authorities end their “persecution” of Kvachkov.[45] Kvachkov recently spoke at the Angry Patriots Club’s June 25 event in Moscow aimed at espousing longstanding criticisms against Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian military leadership.[46] Kvachkov may have drawn the attention of Russian authorities at the event, although it is likely that authorities were aware of his activities given that Kvachkov recently left prison in 2019 after serving a six-year sentence for creating a terrorist group and plotting to overthrow the government.[47] Kvachkov called for violence “against representatives of state power” in a video message in 2017 and admitted to promoting anti-government propaganda among the military.[48] The Federal Security Service (FSB) previously reportedly attempted to censor notable Angry Patriots Club member Igor Girkin.[49]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched an extensive missile and drone attack against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 19 likely to further emphasize Russia’s objections to the renewal of the Black Sea grain deal and hinder Ukraine’s ability to export grain.
• The South African Presidential Office announced that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not attend the BRICS summit in-person in Johannesburg in August 2023.
• An explosion at a Russian training ground in occupied Kirovskyi Raion (Islam Terek Raion), southeastern Crimea, disrupted the Russian use of the Tavrida highway that connects eastern Crimea to Sevastopol on July 19.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 19 and made gains in these areas.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin and reportedly Wagner Commander Dmitry Utkin greeted Wagner fighters at the new Wagner base near Asipovichy, Belarus, on July 18.
• Russian sources claimed that Wagner will continue to operate abroad in African countries, although Prigozhin’s involvement in these activities remains unclear.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to display his knowledge of Russian history at odd moments, this time appearing to warn against the possibility of revolution in Russia.
• Russian authorities opened a case against an affiliate of the ultranationalist Angry Patriots Club for discrediting Russian forces, prompting the Angry Patriots Club to make explicit demands of Russian officials.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk area, near Kreminna, in the Bakhmut area, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front and made gains near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, and in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area.  They made marginal gains along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front and reportedly made limited advances in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblast area.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia area and western Zaporizhia Oblast and made reportedly made gains in both sectors of the front.
• The Russian State Duma adopted on July 19 a law on the first reading and “in general” that allows the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to have heavy military equipment.
• The Ukrainian Crimean-based “Atesh” partisan group conducted another successful attack on a Russian military convoy in occupied Kherson Oblast on July 14.

 

[TUFKAK]

Belarus Red Cross says it helped deport Ukrainian children to Belarus | CNN

EDITION.CNN.COM

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The head of the Belarusian Red Cross has sparked an international outcry with his announcement that the organization is involved in the relocation of Ukrainian children from Russian-occupied areas to Belarus, a stark admission that potentially could make the group complicit in what Ukraine says is a war crime.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 20 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 20, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces launched a third night of missile and drone strikes against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 20 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported t

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian forces launched a third night of missile and drone strikes against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 20 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched seven Onyx cruise missiles, four Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, three Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles, and 19 Iranian-made Shahed drones.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 18 targets, including two Kalibrs, three Iskanders, and 13 Shaheds.[2] Spokesperson of the Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces targeted port infrastructure in Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts and noted that the strikes mainly affected warehouses and logistics facilities.[3] Humenyuk noted that Russian “blackmail and sabotage” of Ukrainian ports started shortly after Russian began its rhetoric about its conditions for the expansion of the grain deal.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian manufacturing and storage facilities in Odesa City and Chornomorske in Odesa Oblast, and fuel infrastructure facilities and ammo depots in Mykolaiv City.[5] Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces destroyed the Odesa Seaport Administration building in the center of Odesa City and noted that residential buildings were damaged by the blast wave.[6] Ukrainian sources reported that Russian missile strikes also damaged a Chinese consulate building in Odesa City.[7]

 

Ukrainian military officials outlined the challenge of defending against Onyx missiles and Russia’s shortage of Kh-22 missiles. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Onyx missiles fly at a speed of more than 3,000 kilometers per hour at a high altitude and then quickly change altitude to 10–15 meters above the surface when striking a target, making it difficult to detect and destroy.[8] Ihnat noted on July 19 that Russian forces are using Onyx cruise missiles that are designed to destroy targets located directly on the coastline along the sea.[9] Ihnat also stated on July 20 that Russia does not have the same ability to manufacture Kh-22 missiles that it does to produce other types of high-precision long-range missiles.[10] Ihnat noted that Russia had approximately 250 Kh-22 missiles at the beginning of the war in February of 2022 and has already used approximately 150 missiles against Ukraine.[11]

 

The Russian military announced that it may consider civilian ships in the Black Sea en route to Ukrainian ports legitimate military targets. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on July 19 that as of midnight Moscow time on July 20 Russian forces will consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports as potential carriers of military cargo and will consider the flag countries of such vessels as “involved in the Ukrainian conflict on the side of the Kyiv regime.”[12] The Russian MoD declared a number of sea areas in the northern and southern parts of the Black Sea “temporarily dangerous for navigation” and claimed that it issued relevant warnings to sailors in the Black Sea about the withdrawal of safety guarantees.[13] The Russian MoD specified that these naval measures are connected to the termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative and the curtailment of the maritime humanitarian corridor in the Black Sea.[14] The announcement prompted the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense (MoD) to announce on July 20 that as of midnight Kyiv time Ukrainian forces may treat all ships in the Black Sea heading to ports in Russia and occupied Ukrainian territories as military cargo vessels.[15] The Ukrainian MoD similarly stated that Ukrainian officials released relevant navigation information to seafarers.[16] US National Security Council Spokesperson Adam Hodge stated on July 20 that US intelligence indicates that Russian forces have laid additional sea mines in the approaches to Ukrainian ports.[17] Hodge added that the White House believes that Russia is engaging in a coordinated effort to justify possible attacks against civilian ships in the Black Sea and blame Ukrainian forces for the attacks.[18]

 

The Russian military’s intensifying strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and threats of maritime escalation are likely a part of a Kremlin effort to leverage Russia’s exit from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and exact extensive concessions from the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated on July 19 that Russia is ready to return to the grain deal immediately if all previously agreed-upon conditions for Russia’s participation in the initiative are fulfilled and the parties restore the deal’s “original humanitarian essence.”[19] Putin accused Western countries of exploiting the grain deal so that European enterprises could profit at the expense of Russian businesses.[20] Putin claimed that elements of the grain deal led to a 30 to 40 percent discount on Russian grain on global markets, which caused Russian farmers to lose $1.2 billion and Russian fertilizer producers to suffer $1.6 billion in losses.[21] Putin stated that returning to the deal in its current form is pointless and called for the lifting of sanctions on Russian grain and fertilizer deliveries and the removal of obstacles for Russian banks servicing food supplies to the global market, including their connection to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) banking system.[22] Putin also called for the resumption of deliveries of components and spare parts for Russian agricultural machinery and fertilizer production, the resolution of issues with Russia ship chartering and insurance of Russian food exports, the renewal of operations for the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline, and the removal of blocks on Russian agricultural assets.[23]

 

The Kremlin likely views the Black Sea Grain Initiative as one of its few remaining avenues of leverage against the West and has withdrawn from the deal to secure these concessions. The Kremlin now appears to be attempting to create a sense of urgency around its return to the Black Sea Grain Initiative by conducting intensifying strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and threatening to strike civilian ships in the Black Sea. Ukraine harvests most of it grain between July and August, and Russia’s strikes on Ukrainian port and agricultural infrastructure can further complicate Ukraine’s ability to free up space for newly harvested grains.[24] Prolonged disruptions to grain logistics in Ukraine will likely have increasingly cascading effects on grain supplies, adding to the sense of urgency that the Kremlin hopes to create.

 

The Kremlin routinely engages in escalatory rhetoric surrounding the West’s support for Ukraine in an effort to shape Western behavior, although Russia appears notably to be conducting these shaping efforts concerning the grain deal with kinetic operations instead of rhetoric. It is unclear to what extent Russian forces intend to strike civilian ships in the Black Sea, although the Kremlin likely believes the announcement will have a chilling effect on maritime activity in the Black Sea and create conditions reminiscent of the complete blockade of Ukrainian ports at the start of the full-scale invasion.[25] This attempt to achieve economic concessions from the West may undermine the Kremlin's international outreach efforts by threatening the food supplies of several countries that are the intended targets of the Kremlin’s outreach.[26] Russian strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and naval posturing also continue to illustrate that the Kremlin is willing to use naval and precision strike assets to prioritize immediate economic concerns instead of operations in Ukraine that pursue the Kremlin‘s overall campaign objectives.

 

The Kremlin may be destroying Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure before renegotiating the Black Sea grain deal to set conditions for the export of stolen Ukrainian grain from Russian-occupied territories that could disproportionately benefit the Russian economy. Ukrainian Minister for Agrarian Policy Mykola Solskyi stated that it would take Ukraine no less than one year to restore the Chornomorsk port in Odesa Oblast, which was used for export of grain.[27] The destruction of Ukrainian port infrastructure in government-controlled Odesa and Mykolaiv oblasts may restrict Ukraine’s ability to export grain by sea even if the grain deal is renegotiated, while allowing Russia to offer grain from occupied Ukraine or Russia to fulfil the deal in the meantime.

 

Russia is also likely attempting to intensify divisions between Ukrainian and Central European governments as Ukraine and the West search for a way to re-route the grain exports. Senior European officials stated that the European Union (EU) is seeking to transport more Ukrainian grain via road and rail to help make up for Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea grain deal.[28] Five Central European countries — Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria — called on the EU to extend the ban on grain imports from Ukraine until at least the end of the year on July 19.[29] Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki also announced on July 19 that Poland will retain its ban on Ukrainian grain exports on September 15 even if the EU does not agree to the extension.[30] Polish Agriculture Minister Robert Telus stated on July 18 that Poland is willing to facilitate Ukrainian grain transit through Poland but said that the EU will need to help to establish necessary infrastructure.[31] Telus added that Poland had only begun its harvest and noted that it cannot facilitate the extra transit immediately. Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal condemned Poland’s decision to extend the ban as an “unfriendly and populist move that will severely impact global food security and Ukraine's economy.”[32] Exports through Poland and other EU countries bordering Ukraine had previously sparked resistance from local farmers after the EU lifted tariffs and quotas on food exports from Ukraine in June 2022 as Russia blocked Ukraine from transporting grain and other goods by sea.[33] Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary announced in April 2023 bans on grain and other food exports from Ukraine to protect their agricultural sectors.[34] The European Commission later announced restrictions on the imports of Ukrainian wheat, maize, rapeseed, and sunflower seeds in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Bulgaria until June 5 as a result of farmers’ concerns in Central European countries.[35] The Kremlin may be attempting to disrupt Ukraine’s future prospects for maritime exports in an effort to sour Ukrainian relations with its Western neighbors.[36]

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced on July 20. A Ukrainian commander operating in the Bakhmut area reported on July 19 that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.8km likely on the southern flank of Bakhmut, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced on Bakhmut’s northern flank on July 20.[37] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces cannot rapidly advance near Bakhmut due to heavy Russian force concentrations in the area.[38] The Russian military command concentrated a high density of forces in the Bakhmut area to defend against Ukrainian attacks in the area, likely an intended effect of those attacks, though Syrskyi and other Ukrainian officials have repeatedly restated their intent to retake Bakhmut.[39] Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces continued advancing in the Berdyansk (Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions and are continuing to advance by roughly 100 meters per day south and southeast of Orikhiv.[40] Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Mykhailo Podolyak reiterated that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will be slow and difficult but will prevent Russian forces from retaking the battlefield initiative.[41] The Washington Post reported that Ukrainian forces have begun using Western-provided cluster munitions in southeastern Ukraine and assessed that Ukrainian forces will likely use them near Bakhmut soon.[42] The Washington Post, citing an anonymous Ukrainian military official, reported that Ukrainian forces are using the cluster munitions to “break up [Russian] trenches slowing down Ukrainian forces.”

 

The United States and European Union (EU) reiterated their long-term security commitments to Ukraine via security assistance packages and proposals on July 19 and 20. The Pentagon announced on July 19 a new $1.3 billion security package for Ukraine that includes four National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), 152mm artillery rounds, mine-clearing equipment, and other munitions and vehicles.[43] The US package also includes electronic warfare, communications, and other security equipment. EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell proposed a plan to EU ministers on July 20 to provide Ukraine with security assistance worth up to 20 billion euros ($22.4 billion), including weapons, ammunition, and other military aid, over the next four years.[44]

 

Wagner Group personnel are training Belarusian special forces on modern tactics at the Brest Training Ground in Brest, Belarus. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense and Wagner-linked sources reported on July 20 that Wagner forces began training unspecified Belarusian special forces elements at the Brest Training Ground in Brest, Belarus, and that the training will last until July 24.[45] The Wagner trainers are teaching Belarusian forces modern combined arms techniques and tactics, including using drones for tactical reconnaissance, tactical maneuvers, movement under fire, camouflage, and command and control.[46] Wagner-linked sources praised the Belarusian military and Belarusian trainees for their adeptness, agility, and flexibility in training while complaining that the Russian Ministry of Defense did not appreciate the Wagner Group due to Russian command staff’s "rigidity of thinking and bureaucratic barriers.”[47] A Wagner-linked source specifically praised Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s “old school” style and how Lukashenko managed to preserve the Soviet military’s “best traditions.”[48]

 

The Wagner Group may open another base in Belarus in Gomel Oblast near Belarus’ international border with Ukraine. The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on July 20 that construction for another Wagner Group base in Belarus began near Naroulia Raion and that Wagner personnel surveyed land near Dyatlik, Naroulia Raion, Gomel Oblast, approximately 2km from Belarus’ border with Ukraine on July 19.[49] ISW has not observed visual confirmation of construction in this area as of this publication.

 

Approximately 400 Wagner convict fighters are reportedly awaiting their criminal pardon paperwork to clear in Anapa, occupied Crimea. Independent Russian investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on July 19 that about 400 Wagner convict fighters are waiting in hotels in Anapa until the Russian government approves their pardons.[50] The report states that the Wagner Group suspended its effort to recruit Russian convicts (codenamed “Project K”) and that Wagner seeks to release these convicts no later than July 29.[51] The report states that the former convicts will have the option to extend their contracts with Wagner to serve in Belarus or Africa.[52]

 

The Wagner Group reportedly suffered an 80 percent casualty rate and a 28 percent killed-in-action rate in Ukraine. A Wagner-linked source reportedly quoted a senior Wagner commander with the callsign “Marx,” who stated that 78,000 Wagner fighters fought in Ukraine (49,000 of whom were convicts), and that Wagner had suffered 22,000 killed-in-action and 40,000 wounded-in-action as of Wagner’s capture of Bakhmut on May 20.[53] These figures — if accurate — indicate that the Wagner Group was likely combat ineffective after fighting in Bakhmut and that the force suffered a 79.5 percent overall casualty rate and a 28.2 percent death rate. Marx reportedly stated that 25,000 Wagner fighters are currently alive and that 10,000 of them are in Belarus and the remaining 15,000 are resting, presumably in Russia.[54]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched a third night of missile and drone strikes against port and grain infrastructure in southern Ukraine on July 20 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 17.
• The Russian military announced that it may consider civilian ships in the Black Sea en route to Ukrainian ports legitimate military targets.
• The Russian military’s intensifying strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and threats of maritime escalation are likely a part of a Kremlin effort to leverage Russia’s exit from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and exact extensive concessions from the West.
• The Kremlin likely views the Black Sea Grain Initiative as one of its few remaining avenues of leverage against the West and has withdrawn from the deal to secure these concessions.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced on July 20.
• The United States and European Union (EU) reiterated their long-term security commitments to Ukraine via security assistance packages and proposals on July 19 and 20.
• Wagner Group personnel are training Belarusian special forces on modern tactics at the Brest Training Ground in Brest, Belarus.
• The Wagner Group may open another base in Belarus in Gomel Oblast near Belarus’ international border with Ukraine.
• The Wagner Group reportedly suffered an 80 percent casualty rate and a 28 percent killed-in-action rate in Ukraine.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line and advanced on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line as of July 20.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited offensive operations east of Kupyansk, near Kreminna, near Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City line and made gains near Bakhmut on July 20.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Vuhledar, on the administrative border between western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts, and south of Orikhiv and made limited territorial gains in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts and western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 20.
• Russian forces continued to unsuccessfully counterattack Ukrainian positions on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on July 20.
• The Russian State Duma approved amendments increasing penalties for draft dodging and for officials and legal entities that fail to assist Russian force generation efforts on July 20.
• Russian authorities continue persecution of non-Russian Orthodox churches in occupied Ukraine.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Quote

New WOTR podcast w/ Michael Kofman & Rob Lee reflecting on their trip to Ukraine. Early June attacks were not probing, says Lee. "It was the real counter offensive...an attempt to conduct a rapid breakthrough [&] exploit that as quickly as possible"

 

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Lee:  "during this phase, Ukraine used a lot of its new modern equipment...new NATO trained brigades played a key role in the beginning. And ultimately...the first phase of this operation was not a success...That's the conclusion we've reached after talking to a number of people"

 

The podcast can be found below:

 

Ukraine Struggles to Scale Offensive Combat Operations - War on the Rocks

WARONTHEROCKS.COM

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On this special sneak peak of the Russia Contingency, Mike sat down with Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, to discuss the

 

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On this special sneak peak of the Russia Contingency, Mike sat down with Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, to discuss the findings from their recent research trip to Ukraine. The conversation covered Russian defensive lines, the role that mines have played in stymying Ukraine’s counteroffensive, and the broader challenges the Ukrainian military has with scaling offensive operations. To listen to part two of this episode, as well as a series of conversations about the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the Russian military, sign up today to become a member of War on The Rocks.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Igor Girkin -- a relatively popular hardline Russian ultranationalist who frequently criticizes Putin -- has been arrested under the "extremism" article of Russia's criminal code.

 

Russia arrests pro-war Putin critic Igor Girkin, according to reports | Russia | The Guardian

WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM

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FSB agents come to Girkin’s home and escort him away ‘in an unknown direction’

 

Quote

 

Russia has arrested Igor Girkin, a former battlefield commander of its proxy forces in east Ukraine who was convicted by a Dutch court over the shooting down of MH17, on extremism charges probably fuelled by his criticism of the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

 

FSB agents came to his home and escorted him away “in an unknown direction”, said his wife, Miroslava, according to Girkin’s Telegram account.

 

“My friends told me that my husband has been charged under article 282 of the criminal code of the Russian Federation (extremism),” she said.

 

Girkin, who also goes by the nom de guerre Strelkov, was a leading military commander of the pro-Russian forces who occupied east Ukrainian cities beginning in 2014. His armed intervention backed by Russia marked the beginning of the conflict in Ukraine.

 

Girkin appeared in a Moscow courtroom on Friday where he was formally charged with extremism. Earlier this week he had called for Putin’s downfall, saying Russia “could not survive another six years” of his rule.

 

He has also been found guilty in absentia by a Dutch court of the murder of 298 people onboard flight MH17, the plane shot down by a Russian surface-to-air missile while flying over east Ukraine in July 2014.

 

Girkin was given a life sentence by the Dutch court for his role in sending a Buk surface-to-air missile system controlled by Russia to a field near the village of Pervomaisky from where it fired on the passenger jet. Russia has been accused of harbouring Girkin.

 

In Russia, Girkin has become a popular Telegram blogger and commentator on the war. Like other pro-war nationalists, he has been critical of the Russian military’s bungling of the invasion, calling top generals ineffective and criticising Vladimir Putin and other top officials.

 

 

More about this son-of-a-bitch:

 

Igor Girkin - Wikipedia

EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG

 

[CitizenVectron]

[Air_Delivery]

9 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

The state of the US giving ATACMS

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

7 hours ago, Air_Delivery said:

The state of the US giving ATACMS

This is an infuriating gif

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Is Ukraine's counteroffensive failing? Defense experts say the risks facing Kyiv are growing

WWW.CNBC.COM

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The window of opportunity for Kyiv's counteroffensive is small with Kyiv having only a few months to make major gains.

 

Quote

 

Ukraine’s counteroffensive has been more sluggish than many expected and military analysts warn that the window of opportunity for breaking through Russian defenses — and making territorial gains — could close soon.

 

Kyiv’s counteroffensive was launched in June after months of preparation, but its progress has disappointed some onlookers who hoped for a faster regaining of Russian-occupied territory in the south and east of the country.

 

While Ukraine planned its counteroffensive over the winter — and waited for more military hardware from its international allies — Russian forces were heavily fortifying their positions along a 900-kilometer (559-mile) front line stretching from the Kharkiv-Luhansk border in the northeast of Ukraine, toward Kherson in the southwest.

 

Military analysts note that Ukraine now faces successive lines of Russian defenses that are, in some cases, 30 kilometers deep and consisting of minefields, anti-tank obstacles, and extensive networks of trenches and bunkers that are covered by Russian drones, artillery and helicopters.

 

 

Quote

 

Small window of opportunity

 

One of the biggest problems for Ukraine is that the time frame for breaking through Russia’s defenses is limited, with only a few summer months left in which to make serious gains.

 

For Michael Clarke, a defense analyst and former director-general of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank, there’s a risk that the first phase of the counteroffensive, designed to probe Russia’s defenses, takes too long.

 

“It was always intended to be a two-stage offensive, with a sort of probing first stage to try to identify weaknesses in the Russian frontline, followed by a second stage where they put their big forces into it. And we’re still on the first stage which has lasted longer than they expected,” Clarke told CNBC Wednesday.

 

“If this first phase lasts too long, they leave themselves insufficient time before the weather changes, before the second phase starts,” he said. Although he believed it to be an unlikely scenario, Clarke noted that time pressures could prompt Ukraine to deploy military units destined for use in the second phase of the counteroffensive sooner than planned — something he said Russia is hoping for.

 

“The danger then is that they will not be able to use the bulk of their forces in sufficient mass to make a difference ... to create a real punch when they decide to really start,” he added.

 

“I’m not pessimistic about this offensive but the risks that it may not work are increasing as the days tick on.”

 

 

Quote

 

Konrad Muzyka, a military intelligence specialist and president of Rochan Consulting, said “the weather has always been the factor” for Kyiv.

 

“I think that the Ukrainians expected the counteroffensive to gather sufficient momentum to allow them to continue to push south at a much faster rate. Unfortunately, it didn’t happen,” he told CNBC on Wednesday.

 

“I think it’s fair to say that Ukrainians have up to three months now before they will run out of artillery munitions and they will run out of barrels for their guns, and three months until the terrain will again become very muddy.”

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 21 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:00pm ET on July 21. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 22 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served. The Russian Investigative Committee arrested Girkin on July 21, and Girkin will be held until September 18 on extremism changes.[1] Girkin’s wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, reported that representatives from the Russian Investigative Committee detained Girkin at his home in Moscow, and noted later that the Moscow’s Meshansky Court arrested Girkin and that he will be held until September 18 on extremism charges.[2] Girkin unsuccessfully attempted to argue in the court that he is not a high flight risk due to his sentence at the Hague Tribunal, but the court cited Girkin’s notoriety and “connections in law enforcement” as the reasons for his immediate incarceration.[3] Girkin’s lawyer, Alexander Molokhov, argued that Russian law enforcement is prosecuting Girkin for his May 25, 2023 Telegram posts, which reportedly discussed the lack of payments to servicemen of the 105thand 107th airborne (VDV) regiments.[4] Court documents, however, indicate that Russian authorities opened a case against Girkin on July 18 - the day on which Girkin published several harsh critiques of Russian President Vladimir Putin.[5] Girkin had been consistently criticizing Putin prior to July 18, however, but his past criticisms had not triggered an arrest.[6] Members of the Girkin-led “Angry Patriots Club” gathered for a small protest outside of the court demanding Girkin’s release.[7] Some sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest followed his conflict with a fellow Angry Patriots Club member about the Wagner Group.[8] Other sources speculated that Wagner complaints about Girkin may have triggered his arrest.[9] One source claimed that the arrest is related to Russian authorities targeting Russian “patriots” deemed disloyal to Putin.[10]

 

Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24. A Russian source affiliated with the Russian security services leaked a document – approved after the Wagner rebellion – in which the Russian Presidential Administration purportedly ordered the Russian authorities to “take repressive measures against those who are insane, including Strelkov-Girkin.”[11] The document additionally targeted several high-profile propagandists including Margarita Simonyan, prominent milbloggers, Russian State Duma deputies with extensive online presence, and Prigozhin. Russian insider sources have previously claimed that Kremlin factions have begun a struggle for control over the Russian information space and that First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Presidential Administration Sergey Kiriyenko has been attempting to undermine Simonyan.[12] The Russian Investigative Committee – the government organization that reportedly arrested Girkin – is a structure subordinated to Putin. ISW previously reported that Kiriyenko has been notably expanding his control over Russian social media outlets and increasing his reach in the Russian federal government since Prigozhin’s rebellion.[13]

 

Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin. ISW has consistently assessed that Girkin likely has the backing of an unknown silovik – possibly within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) – who promoted their interests by using Girkin as a conduit to reveal select information to Russia’s online ultranationalist community.[14] Russian authorities arrested on July 14 former FSB officer Colonel Mikhail Polyakov, who reportedly ran several popular insider Telegram channels that speculated on internal Kremlin and Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) dynamics between different factions.[15] Russian authorities also initiated a criminal case against Girkin’s affiliate, former Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Colonel Vladimir Kvachkov, on charges of discrediting the Russian Armed Forces on July 18 – the same day on which Girkin’s criminal charge was opened.[16] Girkin himself was an FSB officer and had been consistently using passports under fictitious names that he received from the FSB.[17] Girkin recently accused the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS) of deliberately censoring him by interfering with his presentations at a St. Petersburg bookstore on July 9.[18] The court publicized Girkin’s court proceedings, and the Russian media had been consistently televising Polyakov’s arrest and raids of Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s property – and it is possible that select Russian officials are trying to undermine the reputation of a security structure or of an affiliated silovik who protected Girkin.[19] One milblogger observed that the media attention around Polyakov’s arrest suggests that some unnamed figure is attempting to ruin the FSB’s reputation.[20]

 

Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power. Girkin claimed on July 12 that Prigozhin’s rebellion shifted the balance of power within the Kremlin in favor of the group that reportedly includes Kiriyenko.[21] Girkin claimed that members of the “Ozero Cooperative” – an association unifying the dachas of Putin and several members of his inner circle in Leningrad Oblast – want to oust Putin in favor of one of its own members, such as Prigozhin or Kiriyenko. Girkin warned that the “Ozero Cooperative” members will target the Ministry of Defense, Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, the FSB, and other structures outside the control of the presidential administration. While Girkin’s specific affiliations remain unknown, the recent crackdowns on ultranationalist figures in connection with the Russian security services are likely a public manifestation of a significant change within the Kremlin’s power politics.

 

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces shot down two of three Kaliber missiles, three of four Iskander missiles, and 13 of 19 Shahed UAVs launched at areas in southern Ukraine and that Russian forces also launched one Kh-22, one S-300 surface-to-air, and six Onyx missiles.[22] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that seven of the missiles damaged an unspecified infrastructure facility in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi Raion just southwest of Odesa City.[23] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also reported that Russian forces began targeting agricultural infrastructure including destroying 100 tons of peas and 20 tons of barely in strikes on a granary after three consecutive nights of targeting port infrastructure.[24] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk and Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reiterated that Russian forces are targeting Ukraine with specific missiles and tactics to complicate Ukraine’s ability to detect and intercept the missiles.[25]

 

The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin stated on July 21 that the Russian MoD’s July 19 announcement that the Russian military will consider all ships en route to Ukrainian ports as potential military cargo vessels meant that Russian forces will inspect the ships.[26] The Russian MoD’s announcement, however, still indicates that Russian forces intend to treat civilian ships as legitimate military targets, and even Vershinin’s interpretation of the announcement states that Russian forces will board and possibly seize foreign civilian vessels.

 

Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West. Vershinin also argued that the July 22, 2022 memorandum underpinning the Black Sea Grain Initiative remains valid because neither Russia nor the United Nations (UN) gave notification about the termination of the memorandum that the UN, Turkey, Russia, and Ukraine signed.[27] Vershinin justified Russia’s exit from the grain deal by accusing Ukrainian forces of using grain corridors to conduct “terrorist attacks” against Russia, which is consistent with prior Russian official and milblogger narratives to justify Russia’s exit from the deal during periods of its renewal.[28]

 

The Russian MFA is likely trying to assert that Russia is still a de jure participant in the agreement despite its exit from the grain deal in an effort to leave open a channel for Russia to renegotiate the grain deal on conditions more favorable to Russia rather than negotiating an entirely new one. Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Vasyl Bondar reported on July 21 that the Joint Coordination Center in Istanbul, which monitors the grain corridors in the Black Sea, has stopped operating and that all Russian personnel at the center have left.[29] The Joint Coordination Center’s halted operations indicate that Russia is engaging in efforts to further remove itself from the grain deal, although in ways that it could easily reverse.

 

Putin delivered an array of demands for Russia’s return to the agreement on July 19, notably including the lifting of sanctions on Russian grain and fertilizer deliveries and the reconnection of Russian banks servicing food supplies to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) banking system.[30] The Russian military’s intensifying strikes against Ukrainian port and grain infrastructure and threats of maritime escalation in the Black Sea likely aim to pressure the West to acquiesce to these demands among other things.[31] The Kremlin routinely engages in escalatory rhetoric aimed at prompting Western concessions and often will have some officials promote that rhetoric while having other officials feign willingness to engage in negotiations.[32]

 

Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.[33] Putin’s rhetoric heavily drew upon historical parallels meant to evoke fear and distrust between European countries and the United States as well as between Ukraine and Poland. Putin’s rhetoric is consistent with prior rhetoric from Russian senior officials meant to sow distrust between Ukraine and its allies, undermine ongoing Western security assistance to Ukraine, and encourage Western states to push Ukraine prematurely into negotiations with Russia.

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas. Geolocated footage published on July 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces made gains northeast of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut) and closer to Pryyutne (12km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations north and south of Bakhmut, where heavy fighting continues in the Orikhovo-Vasylivka-Paraskoviivka (up to 8km north of Bakhmut) and the Klischiivka-Andriivka (7km to 10km southwest of Bakhmut) directions.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces achieved success in the Novodarivka-Pryyutne (13km to 16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) direction in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area as well as the Novodanylivka-Verbove (up to 16km southeast of Orikhiv) and Novodanylvika-Robotyne (up to 12km south of Orikhiv) directions in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[36] US National Security Spokesperson John Kirby stated on July 20 that Ukrainian forces have started to use US-provided cluster munitions and are using them effectively against Russian defensive formations.[37] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director William Burns stated on July 21 during a speech at the Aspen Institute that Russian defenses in Ukraine have a number of structural flaws, including low morale and disorder among Russia’s political and military leadership.[38]

 

Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger released an interview with an alleged unnamed Wagner platoon commander on July 21. The platoon commander claimed that none of the Wagner personnel he knows signed contracts with the Russian MoD except for fighters whom Wagner fired for drunkenness and looting and a Wagner commander with the surname Troshev (callsign “Seda”).[39] Putin notably claimed that he offered Wagner fighters the option to serve under a Wagner commander with the callsign “Seda” at the June 29 meeting with Prigozhin and Wagner commanders.[40] The platoon commander claimed that the goal of the Wagner armed rebellion on July 24 was to protest the “lawlessness” of the Russian military command who attempted to disband Wagner by forcing all volunteers to sign MoD contracts by July 1. The platoon commander expressed his dedication to Wagner by stating that he would not care if the MoD killed him, but he would not “disgrace [his] name or the name of Wagner PMC.”[41] He also claimed that Wagner would not have existed without Prigozhin, that all Wagner fighters took an oath to Prigozhin and to an unnamed Wagner commander (likely Wagner Group co-founder and commander Dmitry Utkin), and therefore, that they would remain with them.[42] ISW has consistently observed Wagner-affiliated sources voicing their support for Prigozhin despite Kremlin efforts to destroy Prigozhin’s reputation.[43] ISW has notably not observed Wagner-affiliated sources refusing to support Prigozhin or attempting to separate Wagner from Prigozhin.

 

French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21. Bonn told a CNN journalist at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21 that China is supplying “massively [sic] military capabilities to Russia.”[44] CNN later quoted unspecified French officials as clarifying Bonne’s intent to speak of non-lethal aid, however.[45]

 

A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.[46] The milblogger amplified footage of alleged personnel of the 7th VDV division denying Kornev’s dismissal as well as speculations that Russian authorities may intend to arrest VDV commander Mikhail Teplinsky.[47] ISW cannot confirm Kornev’s dismissal.

 

Key Takeaways:

• The arrest of former Russian officer and ardent ultranationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) on July 21 may be the public manifestation of a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions, possibly to the detriment of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
• Russian insider sources claimed that Girkin’s arrest is part of the Russian Presidential Administration’s efforts to crack down on select high-profile Russian ultranationalists following Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s armed rebellion on June 24.
• Girkin’s arrest follows other criminal charges against ultranationalists with past ties to Russian security services and indicates that unknown Russian officials may be targeting prominent ultranationalists who routinely reveal insider information about the Kremlin.
• Wagner’s rebellion likely shifted the balance of power in the Kremlin, potentially depriving some patrons – including Girkin’s patron – of Putin’s favor and, therefore, of some of their power.
• Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against southern Ukraine for a fourth night on July 21 following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.
• The Kremlin appears to be attempting to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense's July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets.
• Russia is maneuvering to retain the option of modifying the current agreement rather than negotiating an entirely new one as it seeks to extract extensive concessions from the West.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued efforts to sow intra-NATO and Ukrainian-NATO divisions likely aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s Black Sea Grain Initiative effort and undermining long-term Western support for Ukraine.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 21 and made gains in some areas.
• Pro-Wagner Group sources continue to express loyalty to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin as the future of the Wagner Group and Prigozhin’s role in the organization remains unclear.
• French Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Emmanuel Bonne was likely referring to dual-use technology and non-lethal aid when speaking about Chinese supplied equipment to Russia on July 21.
• A Russian milblogger affiliated with the Russian Airborne Forces claimed that recent speculations about the dismissal of 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division Commander Major General Alexander Kornev are false.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Kreminna, Bakhmut areas, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and reportedly advanced in the Kupyansk and Kreminna areas.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna and Avdiivka Donetsk City lines, and advanced in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast, the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area, and south of Orikhiv, and reportedly advanced south of Orikhiv.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made gains in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast area.
• Russian officials announced that they will amend a Russian State Duma bill originally aimed at incrementally raising the conscription age so that there is an immediate increase of the upper age limit for the spring 2024 conscription cycle.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
• A Wagner-linked source reported that Wagner temporarily relocated its headquarters from Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Belarus and that Wagner’s work to transfer combat experience to the Belarusian military is in full swing.