Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[Nokra]

2 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

US lawmaker in Kyiv: Momentum shifting toward ATACMS, F-16s for Ukraine

WWW.REUTERS.COM

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A senior U.S. lawmaker said during a visit to the Ukrainian capital on Tuesday that momentum in Washington was shifting toward sending the long-range missiles and fighter jets coveted by Kyiv as it battles Russia's invasion.

 

 

 

 

This gave me a great laugh, thanks.

[Air_Delivery]

ATACMS would absoutely change everything more than tanks or F-16s espeically if given in quantity. Russia has no answerr for them.

[Greatoneshere]

8 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Zelenskyy has been firm recently on his "offer" to defend Transnistria if Russia makes an overt move. Many are reading this as Ukraine's intent to move into that region of Moldova in order to take care of the Russian threat near Odessa, and return that region to Moldova. Who knows if that could happen.

 

It would certainly be nice if there was some way to end the Transnistria issue so at least this would move the needle on that.

[TUFKAK]

Putin raises tension on Ukraine, suspends START nuclear pact | AP News

APNEWS.COM

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Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended Moscow’s participation in the last remaining nuclear arms control pact with the United States, announcing the move Tuesday in a...

 

[Jason]

2 minutes ago, TUFKAK said:

Putin raises tension on Ukraine, suspends START nuclear pact | AP News

APNEWS.COM

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Russian President Vladimir Putin suspended Moscow’s participation in the last remaining nuclear arms control pact with the United States, announcing the move Tuesday in a...

 

 

[Demut]

What a nothingburger. About as significant as Pootin saying last year that he ordered his nuclear response forces to be "on super-duper, for-cereal high alert". So, what's he gonna do now that he feels no longer bound by this treaty? Increase the number of launchers and nukes on stand-by? On paper this already allowed the R*ssians to have enough missiles and warheads deployed to raze the West multiple times over. What's more, given the corruption in the rest of their military I doubt they are even able to field as much as the treaty already allowed them to in the first place.

 

Man, mainstream journalism has become such fucking garbage.

[Jason]

Of course he's a Putin apologist. 

[Demut]

3 minutes ago, Jason said:

Of course he's a Putin apologist. 

You alright in the head there, Jason? I'm getting worried.

[TUFKAK]

5 hours ago, Jason said:

Of course he's a Putin apologist. 

Remember back on ign when he said the Russians would never be a threat to Europe again?

 

I’ve no idea why you guys engage with him.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

In his defense, he's not incorrect that this amounts to nothing.

 

The only people really making a big deal out of this are the World War III fear-mongering, pro-Kremlin, "useful idiots".  No one in the American NatSec establishment well and truly gives a damn.

[Demut]

9 minutes ago, TUFKAK said:

Remember back on ign when he said the Russians would never be a threat to Europe again?

 

I’ve no idea why you guys engage with him.

I've never been on IGN and, to the best of my knowledge, never said or even thought such a thing. What the fuck is wrong with you people? Has there been another user called Demut in my absence that you're all confusing me with or something? I don't even know who you are, your name means nothing to me. Were you actually posting on D1P/BC back in the day under a different username or are you some newcomer?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 21 February 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 21, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 21 address to the Russian Federal Assembly did not articulate specific goals or intentions for the war in Ukraine, instead reinforcing several long-standing rhetorical lines in an effort to buy Putin more space

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 21 address to the Russian Federal Assembly did not articulate specific goals or intentions for the war in Ukraine, instead reinforcing several long-standing rhetorical lines in an effort to buy Putin more space and time for a protracted war. Putin claimed that Russia began the “special military operation” in Ukraine a year ago in order to protect people in Russia’s “historical lands,” ensure Russian domestic security, remedy the threat posed by the Ukrainian “neo-Nazi” regime that he claims has been in place since 2014, and protect the people of Donbas.[1] Putin virulently accused the collective West of arming Ukraine and deploying bases and biolabs close to Russian borders, thereby unleashing the war on Russia.[2] Putin falsely analogized the Ukrainian Armed Forces with various Nazi divisions and thanked the Russian Armed Forces for their efforts in fighting the Nazi threat.[3] The emphasis of a significant portion of the speech was on the supposed resilience of the Russian economic, social, and cultural spheres, and Putin made several recommendations for the development of occupied territories of Ukraine.[4] Putin's speech notably re-engaged with several long-standing Russian information operations regarding the justifications of the war and did not present an inflection in Russia’s rhetorical positioning on the war. Putin could have used this event to articulate new objectives and means for achieving them, such as announcing another formal wave of partial mobilization, redefining the “special military operation” as an official war, or taking additional steps to mobilize the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) in a more concrete way. Instead, Putin said very little of actual substance, likely in order to set continued information conditions for a protracted war in Ukraine by not articulating specific temporal goals and framing the war as existential to the Russian domestic population.

 

Putin's announcement of Russia’s suspension of participation in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) captured more attention than the relatively boilerplate content of the rest of the speech. Towards the end of his speech, Putin claimed that the collective West has used START to try to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia and that Russia is therefore suspending its participation in START, although Putin did emphasize that suspension is not a full withdrawal.[5] Putin called on the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian nuclear energy agency Rosatom to ensure readiness for testing nuclear weapons.[6] Putin may have made this announcement in order to re-introduce nuclear rhetoric into the information space, thereby distracting from the overall lack of substance in the rest of his speech. ISW has previously reported on the Russian use of nuclear rhetoric as an information operation to discourage Ukraine and the West and compensate for Russian battlefield failures.[7] ISW continues to assess that Russia will not employ a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or against NATO, however.

 

US President Joe Biden gave a speech in Warsaw, Poland on February 21 to reaffirm US and NATO support for Ukraine after his trip to Kyiv. Biden emphasized the unity among NATO countries and stated “our support for Ukraine will not waver, NATO will not be divided, and we will not tire.”[8] Biden also directly addressed Putin’s February 21 speech stating, “the West was not plotting to attack Russia” and “[Putin] could end this war with a word.”[9]

 

Many Russian milbloggers condemned Putin’s failure to use his speech to forward new war aims, outline new measures to support the war, or hold Russian authorities accountable for their many military failures. Some milbloggers with prior Kremlin affiliation as well as occupation officials attended the speech in person and expressed positive or neutral support for Putin’s framing of the war as a conflict against the West, suspension of Russia’s participation in START, and support of the Donbas separatist republics.[10] Other milbloggers criticized Putin’s address as boilerplate and without meaningful action. Russian milblogger Igor Girkin notably claimed that Putin did not say anything meaningful for 40 minutes; omitted Russia’s military defeats, military failures, and economic downturn; and failed to hold Russian officials accountable.[11] Girkin also expressed frustration at Putin’s failure to use the address to formally recognize the war, announce next objectives, or counter Western sanctions. Another milblogger claimed that the suspension of Russia’s participation in START is politically symbolic but complained that the suspension will not improve Russia’s situation on the battlefield, instead calling on Russia to hinder Western military aid deliveries to Ukraine.[12] A third milblogger compared Putin to a corpse and echoed many of Girkin’s complaints about accountability and action.[13] Other milbloggers similarly noted the need for decisive action and called for Russia to foster the growth of and promote military leaders with a demonstrated history of taking decisive action on the battlefield.[14] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he did not watch Putin’s speech live because he was too busy working to supply Wagner forces with the ammunition necessary to continue effective combat operations in Ukraine.[15]

 

International journalists reportedly obtained the Kremlin’s classified 2021 strategy document on restoring Russian suzerainty over Belarus through the Union State by 2030. The Kyiv Independent, Yahoo News, and several of their international media partners published an investigative report on February 20 about a classified 17-page Russian strategy document on how the Kremlin seeks to absorb the Belarusian state using the Kremlin-dominated Union State structure by 2030.[16] The journalists did not publish the strategy document to avoid compromising sources they said. While ISW is unable to confirm the existence or contents of this document, the reporters’ findings about the strategy document and its various lines of effort for Belarus’ phased military, political, economic, and cultural integration with Russia through the Union State are consistent with ISW’s long-term research and assessments about the Kremlin’s campaigns and strategic objective to subsume Belarus via the Union State.[17]

 

NATO must seriously plan for the likely future reality of a Russian-controlled Belarus. As ISW previously assessed, Putin will very likely secure significant gains in restoring Russian suzerainty over Belarus regardless of the outcome of his invasion of Ukraine.[18] Russia’s likely permanent gains in Belarus present the West with a decision about how to deal with the potential future security landscape on NATO’s eastern flank. If the West allows Putin to maintain his current gains in Ukraine—particularly Crimea and eastern Kherson Oblast—then the Kremlin will be able to use both occupied Belarusian and Ukrainian territory to further threaten Ukraine and NATO’s eastern flank. The West could alternatively set conditions for a future in which a territorially-whole Ukraine becomes a robust military partner in defending NATO’s eastern flank against Russia and Russian-occupied Belarus. This preferable long-term future is predicated on immediate and sustained decisive Western action to empower Ukraine to expel Russian forces from its territory. It is extraordinaly unlikely that the West will be able to defeat or respond effectively to the Russian campaign to absorb Belarus without first defeating the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

 

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Central Foreign Affairs Commission Office Director Wang Yi met in Moscow on February 21 to discuss deepening Sino–Russian cooperation.[19] Patrushev stated that developing a strategic partnership with China is an unconditional foreign policy priority for Russia.[20] Patrushev claimed that Western states are acting against both China and Russia and claimed that both states stand for a fair world order. Wang stated that Sino–Russian relations remain strong and can “will withstand the test of the changing international situation.”[21] Wang will meet with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on February 22.[22] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned on February 18 that China is strongly considering providing lethal support to Russia.[23]

 

The Financial Times (FT) reported that international companies belonging to Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin continue to garner hundreds of millions of dollars in profits despite long-standing Western sanctions.[24] FT reported that the Prigozhin-controlled company Evro Polis, which received energy concessions from Syria in exchange for recapturing ISIS-controlled oilfields, had net profits of $90 million in 2020 despite US sanctions on the company in 2018, providing a 180 percent return on investment for shareholders that was repatriated to Russia. FT reported that smaller Prigozhin-controlled companies like M Invest, which runs gold mines in Sudan, and Mercury LLC, a Syrian oil company that likely transferred operations to a new business name to evade sanctions, continue to rake in millions in profit. FT’s report further demonstrates the extent to which Western sanctions have failed to stop Russian or Russian-backed actors that help Russia fight against Ukraine.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s February 21 address to the Russian Federal Assembly did not articulate specific goals or intentions for the war in Ukraine, instead reinforcing several long-standing rhetorical lines in an effort to buy Putin more space and time for a protracted war.
• Putin's announcement of Russia’s suspension of participation in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) captured more attention than the relatively boilerplate content of the rest of the speech.
• US President Joe Biden gave a speech in Warsaw, Poland on February 21 to reaffirm US and NATO support for Ukraine after his trip to Kyiv.
• Many Russian milbloggers condemned Putin’s failure to use his speech to forward new war aims, outline new measures to support the war, or hold Russian authorities accountable for their many military failures.
• International journalists reportedly obtained the Kremlin’s classified 2021 strategy document on restoring Russian suzerainty over Belarus through the Union State by 2030.
• Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Central Foreign Affairs Commission Office Director Wang Yi met in Moscow on February 21 on deepening Sino–Russan cooperation.
• The Financial Times (FT) reported that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s international companies continue to garner hundreds of millions of dollars in profits despite long-standing Western sanctions.
• Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks northwest of Svatove and near Kreminna. Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a limited counterattack near Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued making incremental tactical gains in and around Bakhmut and continued ground attacks near Avdiivka.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continue to reinforce and build fortifications in rear areas in southern Ukraine.
• The Kremlin may be directing patronage programs between Russian regions and occupied Ukrainian territory to promote socio-economic recovery and infrastructure development.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin further expanded unrealistic promises of benefits for Russian soldiers in his address to the Russian Federal Assembly.

 

[Demut]

That huge blob of "Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare" has been there for a couple of months now, right? Did they just forget to remove that or is this actually still happening?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

1 minute ago, Demut said:

That huge blob of "Reported Ukrainian Partisan Warfare" has been there for a couple of months now, right? Did they just forget to remove that or is this actually still happening?

 

They occasionally do mention "partisan activity" in the summary bullet points.

[Demut]

Hm. Must just be small-scale stuff then or I'm following the wrong people. The last news about that which I can remember is some local official who collaborated with the R*ssians getting killed via car bomb. And I think this was in pre-liberated Kherson even. Since then I heard zilch.

[CitizenVectron]

[CitizenVectron]

More worryingly:

 

WSJ News Exclusive | U.S. Considers Release of Intelligence on China’s Potential Arms Transfer to Russia

WWW.WSJ.COM

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Western nations have intelligence that Beijing might end its self-imposed restraint on weapons supplies to Moscow

 

[Demut]

Man, Alaskans better watch out, one day R*ssia might feel compelled to liberate all the people with R*ssian ancestry there from globohomo oppression as well. I mean I probably shouldn't be surprised anymore by them trampling international law but it's still baffling how brazenly they assert that they have the right to invade anywhere under the pretext of "muh ethnic R*ssians being oppressed". They should've learned to take a note from the United States' playbook and be at least a little more subtle about their actual intentions.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 22 February 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 22, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian President Vladimir Putin revived his imperialistic narrative that Russia is fighting for Russia's "historic frontiers" on February 22, a narrative that he had similarly voiced in his speech before the re-invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin revived his imperialistic narrative that Russia is fighting for Russia's "historic frontiers" on February 22, a narrative that he had similarly voiced in his speech before the re-invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Putin gave a four-minute speech at the rally for the Defenders of the Fatherland Day in Moscow, stating that there is currently "a battle going on for [Russia's] historical frontiers, for [Russian] people."[1] Putin had similarly called territories adjacent to Russia "[Russian] historical land" when announcing Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[2] Putin did not offer other notable remarks on the progress of the war or discuss concrete frontline objectives. The concept of Russia's "historical frontiers" could be used to justify aggression against almost any of Russia's neighbors, as well as Moldova and the Central Asian states that do not share a border with Russia, since all of them contain territory that belonged at one point to either the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire or both.

 

Putin's speech also followed his February 21 decree revoking his May 2012 edict on Russia's position on Moldovan territorial integrity.[3] Putin revoked his 2012 orders to the Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) to firmly uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter—which require the development of friendly relations between states on the basis of equality, respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity—and Russia's commitment to actively seek ways to resolve the Transnistria issue on the basis of respect for Moldovan territorial integrity. The revocation of the 2012 decree does not indicate that Putin intends to attack Moldova—an undertaking for which he lacks the military capability—although it does point toward an escalation in his ongoing efforts to undermine the Moldovan state.

 

The new decree also canceled the provision of "consistent implementation" of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) with the United States. Putin stated that he signed the decree "in order to ensure the national interest of the Russian Federation in connection with the profound changes taking place in international relations."

 

Ukrainian intelligence officials continue to assess that Russia lacks the combat power and resources needed to sustain its new offensive operations in Ukraine. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky told the AP that Russian forces intensified their offensive operations in at least four or five directions in Luhansk, Donetsk, and Zaporizhia oblasts at the beginning of February but have yet to achieve any significant successes despite continuing to exhaust their personnel and resources.[4] Skibitsky added that Russian forces are concentrating their efforts on capturing Kupyansk, Lyman, Bakhmut, Marinka, Avdiivka, and Vuhledar.

 

GUR Chief Kyrylo Budanov stated in an interview with Forbes that the Russian offensive is so ineffective as to be almost unnoticeable and noted that Russian forces have been rationing shells and ammunition to sustain assaults on the Bakhmut, Lyman, and Vuhledar directions while conserving shells in other areas.[5] Budanov's statement coincides with ISW's assessment that Russian forces are prioritizing the Bakhmut and Lyman directions and have yet to launch a significant push to advance in areas west of Donetsk City.[6] Budanov added that Russian artillery stocks decreased to 30 percent of the total number of shells.  He claimed that Russia has imported a test batch of artillery shells from Iran and is currently attempting to procure another batch of 20,000 shells. Budanov previously estimated that Russian forces fired about 20,000 shells per day in late December 2022, down from 60,000 shells per day during the early stages of the war.[7] Budanov also observed that Russian tactics around Bakhmut and Vuhledar have largely shifted from artillery and mechanized attacks to infantry assaults due to the lack of shells and armored vehicles. Budanov noted that Russia had committed more than 90 percent of its 316,000 mobilized personnel to the frontlines, which further confirms Western and ISW's assessments that Russian forces do not have significant untapped combat-ready reserves.[8] Budanov noted that the Kremlin's stated objective of producing 800 tanks per year is unrealistic and stated that Russia can only produce 40 cruise missiles per month, which they use up in a single round of missile strikes. Russia has already lost at least 1,500 tanks and possibly as many as 2,000, as ISW has previously reported.[9]

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin directly accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of mistreating Wagner forces, igniting intense backlash in the information space and supporting ISW's prior assessments of a growing Wagner-MoD fissure.[10] Prigozhin accused the MoD of lying about supplying all unconventional units with requested artillery ammunition, claiming instead that Wagner forces receive only 20 percent of the artillery ammunition promised to them.[11] Prigozhin claimed that the MoD's statement is "spitting at the Wagner private military company (PMC)" and an attempt to hide the MoD's "crimes against fighters" who achieve battlefield successes near Bakhmut.[12] Prigozhin published a dossier contrasting Wagner forces' artillery ammunition usage with what the MoD distributes to Wagner forces, an image showing Wagner fighters dead supposedly from the lack of artillery support during assaults, and an interview response claiming that the support of certain regional heads, including Crimean Occupation Governor Sergey Aksyonov, has helped raise awareness of Wagner forces' ammunition shortages.[13] Prigozhin called on the MoD to fulfill its promises rather than "deceiving" the Russian public.[14] Many prominent Russian milbloggers jumped to defend Prigozhin, spreading Prigozhin's claims and accusing the MoD of failing to support the supposedly most effective Russian forces in Ukraine.[15] One milblogger noted that the Russian MoD is now treating Wagner forces in the same way that the MoD treats its conventional forces in Ukraine, a clear step down from Prigozhin's prior posturing as the true victor near Bakhmut.[16] Prigozhin's complaints also confirm that his earlier boasts of Wagner's independence from the Russian MoD were lies.[17] Another Kremlin-affiliated milblogger criticized the rivalry between the Wagner Group and the MoD as counterproductive.[18]

 

US State Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated that the US government is concerned about the potential strengthening of Russia-China relations.[19] Price stated that the United States is concerned because "these two countries share a vision... in which big countries could bully small countries [and] borders could be redrawn by force."[20] Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee Central Foreign Affairs Commission Office Director Wang Yi in Moscow on February 22.[21] Kremlin newswire TASS reported that Yi said "no matter how the international situation changes, China remains committed to... maintaining positive trends in the development of its relations with Russia."[22]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian President Vladimir Putin revived his imperialistic narrative that Russia is fighting for Russia's "historic frontiers" on February 22, a narrative that he had similarly voiced in his speech before the re-invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022.
• Putin's speech also followed his February 21 decree revoking his May 2012 edict on Russia's position toward Moldovan territorial integrity.
• Ukrainian intelligence officials continue to assess that Russia lacks the combat power and resources necessary to sustain its new offensive operations in Ukraine.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin directly accused the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) of mistreating Wagner forces, igniting intense backlash in the information space and supporting ISW's prior assessments of a growing Wagner-MoD fissure.
• US State Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated that the US government is concerned about the potential strengthening of Russia-China relations.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to increase the tempo of their offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Lyman line.
• Some Russian sources refuted other Russian claims about the intensification of offensive operations in western Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks throughout the Donetsk Oblast front line and secured marginal territorial gains around Bakhmut.
• Russian and occupation authorities continue to publicly indicate that Russian forces are focusing on defensive operations in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast and Crimea.
• US intelligence officials stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may mobilize significantly more Russian personnel.

 

[Demut]

Huh, they added a couple more tiny-ass circles. Also, one teleported and another grew larger. What does it all mean ?

 

On a more serious note, after almost exactly a year of following this war I still don't get why Ookin is continuing these half-measures. Is it plain ol' stupidity and ignorance? Or are the ideas about him pulling out all the stops leading to either a collapse, revolt/coup, NATO escalation or all three sound and this is, somehow, the one dumb thing that his advisors managed to keep him from doing so far? Puzzling to be sure.

 

Disclaimer: I reckon that it's not like he's got good options left and I suspect he's fucked either way so maybe it's just decision paralysis. Keep doing what hasn't worked yet, perhaps tomorrow'll be the day things suddenly turn around on their own!

[Jason]

Attention Ukrainian workers : DeepSpaceNine

OLD.REDDIT.COM

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Posted in r/DeepSpaceNine by u/haeyhae11 • 88 points and 18 comments

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New video from Kings & Generals:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 23 February 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for false flag operations on the Chernihiv Oblast international border and in Moldova ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian Northern Operational Command r

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for false flag operations on the Chernihiv Oblast international border and in Moldova ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Ukrainian Northern Operational Command reported on February 23 that Russian forces are preparing possible false flag operations in the international border areas of Chernihiv Oblast.[1] The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian intelligence has already observed Russian convoys with unmarked military equipment and personnel dressed in uniforms resembling those worn by the Ukrainian military move to areas near the Chernihiv Oblast border. The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command stated that the purpose of these false flag operations would be to accuse Ukrainian forces of violating the territorial integrity of an unspecified country, very likely referring to Belarus. The Kremlin may be preparing false flag attacks to coerce Belarus into the war following Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's February 16 statement that Belarus would only enter the war if attacked by Ukraine.[2] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense also notably claimed on February 21 that Belarusian forces observed a buildup of Ukrainian forces at its borders.[3] ISW continues to assess that Belarusian or Russian attack on northern Ukrainian regions is highly unlikely, but Russia seeks to force Lukashenko’s hand or blame Ukraine for expanding the war to undermine support for Kyiv. Such a false flag operation could also aim to fix Ukrainian forces at the northern border in an effort to weaken Ukrainian defenses in eastern Ukraine and preparations for counter-offensive operations.

 

The Kremlin also appears to be setting information conditions to stage a false flag operation in occupied Transnistria, Moldova. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on February 23 that Ukrainian forces are planning to conduct an armed provocation against Transnistria in the near future.[4] The MoD claimed that Ukrainian forces would dress as Russian military personnel and stage an alleged Russian offensive from positions in Transnistria.[5] The Moldovan government denied the Russian MoD’s allegations.[6] The MoD likely sought to foster this false narrative to twist Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky‘s warning to Moldovan President Maia Sandu that the Kremlin was preparing provocations in Moldova and his offer to help Moldova if Russian forces in Transnistria threaten the territorial integrity of Ukraine.[7] The MoD’s dissemination of this false narrative does not indicate that Putin intends to attack Moldova—an undertaking for which he lacks military capability—although it points toward an escalation in his ongoing efforts to undermine the Moldovan state. 

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to deliver boilerplate rhetoric in public addresses that offered him opportunities he did not take to shape the Russian information space ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin marked Defenders of the Fatherland Day on February 23 with a video address in which he reiterated tired Kremlin talking points arguing that the Russian military is fighting neo-Nazism in Ukraine and protecting “our people in our historical lands.”[8] Putin delivered vague remarks that the Russian military is improving the training of its units and continuing to supply advanced equipment to its forces.[9] Putin also asserted that Russian industry is quickly increasing the production of a broad range of conventional weapons and preparing for the mass production of advanced models of military equipment, although ISW assesses that Russia continues to gradually prepare its defense industrial base (DIB) for a protracted war instead of engaging in wider rapid economic mobilization.[10] Putin’s speech did not offer specific goals or objectives for the war on Ukraine but instead continued generic rhetorical lines of effort aiming to prepare the Russian public for a protracted war in Ukraine. Putin’s refusal to use the public address to issue specific goals or policies ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine suggests that Putin remains uncertain of his ability to shape the Russian information space through a dramatic speech that represents a significant inflection in his rhetoric.[11]

 

Putin likely attempted to downplay recent surges of criticism regarding the integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR/LNR) into the Russian Armed Forces. Putin attended a wreath-laying ceremony to mark Defenders of the Fatherland Day, during which a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Lieutenant Colonel Roman Cheremukhin asked him questions concerning the status of DNR and LNR militias and their inability to access state benefits for combat veterans.[12] Putin responded that the Russian government will include DNR and LNR militia personnel who served from 2014 onward to the list of those eligible for combat veteran benefits, in what was likely an orchestrated performance similar to past exchanges between Putin and servicemembers.[13] Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Andrey Turchak’s announcement that DNR and LNR personnel who fought in Ukraine since 2014 would receive the status of combat participant further suggests that the incident was staged.[14] The Kremlin is likely attempting to gain favor with the newly-integrated DNR and LNR militias – who have expressed concern over the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) imposing military command changes within their units – by offering them the prospect of having state benefits.

 

Putin seems more concerned with appealing to ultranationalist pro-war ideologues and tired rhetorical gestures than with presenting any new approach to achieving the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine. Putin’s only specific remark in his public address concerned the operation of the Borei-A nuclear-powered submarine and how it would allow the Russian Navy’s strategic nuclear forces to operate at 100 percent capacity.[15] Putin’s remarks concerning the Russian Navy‘s strategic nuclear forces were likely meant to support ongoing Russian information operations aimed at discouraging Western support to Ukraine by fueling hyperbolic concerns about nuclear escalation, as well as to display Russian military might to a domestic audience by highlighting capabilities that are not involved with Russian military failures in Ukraine.[16] Putin also engaged in a likely staged interaction with a representative from the Russian Orthodox Church in which he stated that he would do everything to address the concerns of the Orthodox clergy serving with Russian forces in Ukraine.[17] Putin’s appeals to nuclear armaments, DNR and LNR proxy forces, and Orthodoxy indicate that he is continuing to rely on rhetoric that he knows appeals to the Russian ultranationalist pro-war community.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin likely continues to suffer from confirmation bias in his belief that Russia’s will to fight will outlast the West’s will to support Ukraine. The Financial Times (FT) cited unnamed officials close to the Kremlin stating that Putin assesses that “Russia is more committed to the war than the West is to Ukraine and [is] resilient enough to see out the economic pain.”[18] Unnamed Kremlin sources also told FT that Putin’s demands for loyalty over competence among elites is forcing them to refrain from being honest with him about the progress of the war, and noted that Putin gets information of “poor” quality as a result. Sources also revealed that most of Putin’s presidential administration and economic cabinet expressed that they do not support this war but use lies as a survival tactic, with only a small number of officials resigning since the start of the invasion. One longtime insider also observed that Putin is of “sound mind” and is “reasonable,” which supports ISW’s February 5 assessment that he is a highly calculated actor who places considerable emphasis on eliminating risks.[19] Insiders also revealed that Putin also withheld his plans to launch a full-scale invasion in February 2022 and his plans to occupy Crimea in 2014 from his closest advisors, with his circle of advisors recently tightening even more. The insider information indicates that Putin is prepared for Russia to suffer through a costly and exhausting protracted war under the conviction that the war will tire out Western support. Putin is also likely misinformed about the effectiveness of the Western equipment on the frontlines and its ability to impede his plans for a protracted war of attrition. The combination of Putin’s beliefs about Russian staying power and expectations of the collapse of Western will with the shrinking circle of advisors and the apparent unwillingness of insiders to contradict him likely create a strong confirmation bias in Putin’s observations of Western statements and outreach.  Putin is likely to prioritize any indications of waning Western support or hesitancy over statements or indications of Western toughness or determination if this hypothesis is correct.  Western leaders would do well to consider the likelihood that confirmation bias of this sort is shaping Putin’s perceptions in their own public and private statements and actions.

 

A Russian source attempted to preempt Western discussions about releasing classified information regarding China’s considerations to provide lethal aid to Russia. A prominent Russian milblogger responded to Chinese Foreign Minister Yi Wang’s denial that China intends to supply weapons to Russia and stated that China provides Russia the opportunity to purchase various types of ammunition, industrial drones, field medicine, and protective gear on a commercial basis.[20] The Russian milblogger claimed that Chinese-made equipment is abundantly available in Russia and is present throughout the front in Ukraine.[21] The milblogger is likely referring to commercially available dual-use technology from China, which ISW has observed various Russian volunteer groups purchase and send to the Russian military as part of crowdfunding efforts. ISW has not observed any evidence of Russian forces using lethal aid from China in Ukraine. US officials are reportedly considering releasing intelligence that they believe shows that China is weighing whether to supply weapons to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.[22] NATO Secretary Jens Stoltenberg stated on February 23 that NATO has seen signs that Chinese officials may be planning to send lethal aid to Russia.[23]

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) fulfilled Wagner Group’s complete artillery ammunition request on February 23 following immense support for Prigozhin in the Russian information space.[24] Prigozhin thanked many unspecified figures for helping to solve Wagner’s ammunition shortage problems, including unspecified individuals in positions of power who “exerted pressure and made decisions” in favor of Wagner, and claimed these individuals helped save hundreds of Wagner personnel from dying in combat operations. Prigozhin likely aimed to further undermine the Russian MoD by thanking individuals rather than the MoD itself for providing Wagner with all its requested ammunition. Prigozhin’s February 23 resolution did not generate significant discussion within the information space, unlike Prigozhin’s escalation on February 22.[25] Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of Ukrainian General Staff, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov stated on February 23 that the Russian military command is trying to oust Prigozhin from the information space after his continuous resistance to subordinate to the Russian MoD.[26] Prigozhin’s claims about Wagner receiving ammunition, if true, may suggest that the Kremlin fears Prigozhin’s influence over the information space and might have attempted to appease him before he exposed more inner workings of the Kremlin and the Russian MoD. The provision of ammunition to Wagner would also indicate that the Russian MoD continues to suffer significant resistance when attempting to subordinate and integrate irregular forces into its structure despite their reliance on the Russian MoD. It is also possible, however, that Prigozhin was pressured by the Kremlin or the MoD to make this statement defusing the informational crisis he had created.

 

Key Takeaways

• The Kremlin appears to be setting conditions for false flag operations in Chernihiv Oblast and Moldova ahead of the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to deliver boilerplate rhetoric in public events that present him opportunities to shape the Russian information space ahead of the year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
• Putin likely attempted to downplay recent surges of criticism regarding the integration of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR/LNR) into the Russian Armed Forces.
• Putin seems more concerned with appealing to ultranationalist pro-war ideologues with meaningless gestures than with presenting any new approach to achieving the Kremlin’s objectives in Ukraine.
• Putin likely continues to suffer from confirmation bias in his belief that Russia’s will to fight will outlast the West’s will to support Ukraine.
• A Russian source attempted to preempt Western discussions of releasing classified information regarding China’s considerations to provide lethal aid to Russia.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) fulfilled Wagner Group’s complete artillery ammunition request on February 23 following immense support for Prigozhin in the Russian information space.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks near Svatove and Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian authorities announced that they completed the repair of the Kerch Strait Bridge road spans ahead of schedule.
• Russian officials continue to offer incremental and insufficient benefits to support Russian military personnel and defense manufacturers.
• Russian occupation officials continue efforts to militarize Ukrainian children through the installation of military-patriotic educational programs in occupied areas. 

 

 

[Chris-]

5 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

I saw some analysis that said the Wagner units which captured Soledar are incredibly vulnerable right now, so that is something to keep an eye on. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Jomini of the West's "SITREP" for 08 February 2023 - 19 February 2023:

 

Jomini of the West (@JominiW): "1/ Ukraine TVD, 8-19 FEB 23. The past 2 weeks of February saw the Russian Winter Offensive intensify as major pushes continued in Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Vuhledar. Russian made few gains, Ukrainian defenses continue to hold. #UkraineRussiaWar #RussianArmy #UkraineFrontLines"|nitter

NITTER.NL

---

1/ Ukraine TVD, 8-19 FEB 23. The past 2 weeks of February saw the Russian Winter Offensive intensify as major pushes continued in Kreminna, Bakhmut, and Vuhledar. Russian made few gains, Ukrainian defenses continue to hold. #UkraineRussiaWar #RussianArmy #UkraineFrontLines

 

[CitizenVectron]

2 minutes ago, Chris- said:

I saw some analysis that said the Wagner units which captured Soledar are incredibly vulnerable right now, so that is something to keep an eye on. 

 

Wagner is toast. Before, they had a separate supply of artillery shells and ammo that allowed them to get around the limitations within Russian forces. But that's been cut off, and now they are only allowed to use what the Russian military gives them. So instead of 30,000 shells a day, they are only able to get some smaller amount. They are basically being absorbed into the military and shut out. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

UK intelligence that Russia no longer hopes to seize the Donetsk and Luhansk regions by military means, but is simply trying to exhaust the Ukrainian army and economy. Russia believes it's possible due to an advantage in manpower and equipment.

 

From my perspective, this is absolutely the "correct" strategy for the Kremlin to pursue as Moscow certainly has the capacity to outlast Western patience and attention spans.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Sweden just announced they are donating 10 2A5 Leopard II battle tanks to Ukraine, along with more Hawk air defense systems, and IRIS-T components to help with their existing IRIS-T air defense stock.

[CitizenVectron]

[Uaarkson]

3 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

UK intelligence that Russia no longer hopes to seize the Donetsk and Luhansk regions by military means, but is simply trying to exhaust the Ukrainian army and economy. Russia believes it's possible due to an advantage in manpower and equipment.

 

From my perspective, this is absolutely the "correct" strategy for the Kremlin to pursue as Moscow certainly has the capacity to outlast Western patience and attention spans.

 

If they want to make this more painful for Ukraine than it already is, then we need to figure out how to make this more painful for Russia than it already is. I don’t know if there’s any more we could be doing, but an onslaught of NATO gear wouldn’t hurt.

[Demut]

Weeell, the West could stop pussy-footing around with sanctions for example. If anyone here wants a comprehensive explanation of why (presumably) this hasn't been done yet and what it would consist of, look up the corresponding analysis by Kamil 'The Tartar Queef' Galeev (@kamilkazani) on Twitter. Quite eyeopening to both how dependent R*ssia actually is, economically and militarily, on the one hand and on the other hand how half-hearted the West is about supporting Ukraine this war.

 

4 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

Moscow certainly has the capacity to outlast Western patience and attention spans.

(x)

 

Okay, maybe the capacity, as in, it's theoretically possible. But their house of cards is already creaking. Wait, no, I think I'm mixing up metaphores here. Anyway, you get the point. They don't have all the time in the world, the West, at least in principle, has. This was never a fight R*ssia could hope to win in the first place if Western support decided to match (let alone outdo) their efforts.

 

4 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

Given that the spring thaw isn't far away, that strikes me as unlikely but we'll see. R*ssian commentators like ol' Jerkin' Gherkin himself have pointed out how there's basically no time left to start a "serious" offensive for them because the remaining time before the thaw and all the issues that the mud is gonna bring with it would make it pointless to try and cover large distances during an offensive with armored/motorized units. That's why in his estimation the minuscule advances they've made so far are basically all they're gonna get this season.

[CitizenVectron]

Canada sending an additional four 2A4 Leopard II tanks, and Germany sending an additional four 2A5.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

2 hours ago, Demut said:

 They don't have all the time in the world, the West, at least in principle, has. 

 

The Kremlin has the luxury of really not needing to pay attention to the overall public sentiment of the Russian populace.  This is not a luxury that Western political leaders enjoy as they have to keep an eye on the next election cycle.

 

In the "long game", the advantage belongs to Moscow.

[Demut]

I'm not sure that's true. After all, even dictatorships can push the limit only so far. In R*ssia in particular there exists a kind of unspoken agreement between the populace and the Kremlin, namely that the average Muscovite and St. Petersbergian don't stick their nose into politics and in return the Powers That Be leave them alone. It's been named as one of the reasons why Pootin has still refused to call for a general mobilization despite hawks even inside R*ssia calling for him to do so (including state propagandists) and why the partial mobilization has largely been restricted to R*ssia's periphery and its ethnic minorities. Sure, it's not precisely elections that he has to worry about but he cannot ignore popular sentiment altogether either. In some sense that might even be a weakness. In democracies the opposition can grumble along and tell themselves "We'll show them what's what come next election!" which acts as a pressure valve and buys the party in power a few years. In R*ssia the people don't have any such illusions given the lack of a real, non-controlled political opposition.

 

Putting that part aside, R*ssia is feeling the squeeze of sanctions. Yes, the West, more specifically Europe, suffered, too, as a result of cutting many ties with R*ssia but at the end of the day the latter needs the former far more than vice-versa. And as I said earlier, the sanctions haven't even remotely been tightened as much as they could be tightened. What's more, Ukraine on the other hand is gaining in strength with each new delivery of NATO weaponry and newly raised regiment. Numerical superiority in manpower only takes one so far in modern warfare and that's the only unchanging advantage that R*ssia holds and can potentially utilize. Human waves of poorly trained mobiks and drug-addled convicts with rusty AKs don't do particularly well against minefields, heavy machine gun fire and zeroed in artillery strikes. We've all seen enough of that kind of footage, I'm sure.