Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[PaladinSolo]

 

[Uaarkson]

52 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

 

The fact that the dude firing it is missing an arm makes this even better.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 07 July 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 7 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Igor Konashenkov announced on July 7 that Russian forces in Ukraine are pausing to rest and regain their combat capabilities, confirming ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have initiated an operational pause. 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian Defense Ministry Spokesperson Igor Konashenkov announced on July 7 that Russian forces in Ukraine are pausing to rest and regain their combat capabilities, confirming ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have initiated an operational pause.[1] Konashenkov did not specify the intended length of Russian forces’ operational pause. As ISW previously assessed, Russian forces have not ceased active hostilities during this operational pause and are unlikely to do so.[2] Russian forces still conducted limited ground offensives and air, artillery, and missile strikes across all axes on July 7.[3] Russian forces will likely continue to confine themselves to small-scale offensive actions as they rebuild forces and set conditions for a more significant offensive in the coming weeks or months.

 

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense announced that Russian forces are conducting an operational pause to rest and reconstitute.
• Russian forces continued efforts to advance toward Slovyansk from the southeast of Izyum and may be setting conditions to advance from the southeast of Barvinkove—either toward Slovyansk or toward Kramatorsk.
• Russian forces made marginal gains to the southeast of Siversk and continued offensive operations west of the Lysychansk area.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations to the south and east of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted a limited and unsuccessful attack north of Kharkiv City.
• Ukrainian partisans are likely continuing to target Russian-controlled railways around Melitopol.
• Russian oblasts are continuing to create their own ad hoc volunteer units to compensate for personnel losses in Ukraine.

 

 

 

 

[mclumber1]

It has to be demoralizing for a Russian soldier on the ground in Ukraine.  Your buddies are dying left and right, your shells and bullets are being expended at an unsustainable rate, with little to no territorial gains made on a day to day basis.  It's a modern meat grinder. 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Four more HIMARS for Ukraine:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Crazy to see these in action:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Interesting thread. This guy is too-often referenced as more of an expert than he is, but it's a thread worth reading:

 

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

It's so tough to predict how well Ukraine's counter-offensive in the south will go once it actually begins, but I expect it to go better than Russia's in the east:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Germany pleads with Canada to release Russian turbine critical for gas flows

NATIONALPOST.COM

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Canada's Ukrainian community is urging Trudeau to refuse to compromise the country's sanctions against Russia

 

 

No good options

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 08 July 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 8 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are not conducting an operational pause as of July 8 and are continuing to shell settlements and deploy additional tank units to Donbas. Haidai’s statement likely reflects c

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Luhansk Oblast Administration Head Serhiy Haidai stated that Russian forces are not conducting an operational pause as of July 8 and are continuing to shell settlements and deploy additional tank units to Donbas.[1] Haidai’s statement likely reflects confusion about the meaning of the expression “operational pause” and how such a “pause” actually manifests on the ground in a war. US military doctrine considers the role of operational pauses in warfighting and campaigning in some detail.[2] It notes that “Normally, operational pauses are planned to regenerate combat power or augment sustainment and forces for the next phase.” It observes that “The primary drawback to operational pauses is the risk of forfeiting strategic or operational initiative.” It therefore recommends that “If pauses are necessary, the [commander] can alternate pauses among components to ensure continuous pressure on the enemy or adversary through offensive actions by some components while other components pause.” Soviet military theory regarded operational pauses in a similar fashion—sometimes necessary, but always dangerous.

 

The Russian military command, which announced an operational pause on July 7, has apparently recognized the need for a pause given the state of Russian forces at this point in the campaign. The Russian troops that have completed the seizure of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk are clearly in need of regenerating combat power and building up supporting capabilities, including supply, before launching another large-scale offensive operation. Numerous reports from various sources show that they are engaged in both activities. They have naturally and necessarily ceased efforts to conduct large-scale offensive operations in this sector while they reorganized, reinforce, and resupply their tired troops—in other words, they are in an operational pause in this sector.

 

Recognizing the danger of allowing the Ukrainians to seize the initiative and go over to an offensive of their own, however, Russian forces continue to conduct more-limited offensive operations in this sector and elsewhere along the front line. Those operations involve smaller Russian forces than had been involved in the attacks on Severodonetsk and Lysychansk pursuing more limited and localized objectives with less determination and willingness to take casualties compared with their behavior during the fights for the two cities. When the Russian military command has determined that it has adequately prepared for a renewed major offensive operation, it will likely resume larger-scale ground offensives with more troops and a greater determination than it is currently showing. The transition out of the operational pause may be gradual and difficult to discern at once, just as the transition into it appeared gradual. Skillful campaign design aims to achieve precisely such an effect in order to persuade the enemy that no pause is contemplated or underway, or that it will be too short to be of benefit to the enemy, and thereby convince the enemy that it does not have the opportunity to seize the initiative and go over to a counter-offensive of its own. Russian campaign design, inadequate as it has generally been, is nevertheless good enough to manifest this basic principle of operational art.

 

Russian milbloggers are continuing to show rhetorical opposition to the Kremlin by faulting the Russian Defense Ministry for making Russian logistics vulnerable to the Ukrainian strikes via US-provided HIMARS rocket systems. Russian milbloggers are notably criticizing the Russian military command instead of expressing patriotic hatred toward Western suppliers of HIMARS as one would have expected of the ultra-nationalist, pro-war Telegram channels. Former Russian military commander Igor Girkin, an outspoken Russian nationalist who commanded militants during the Donbas war in 2014, stated that personnel of the Russian Defense Ministry’s logistics department should be tried for failing to disperse and camouflage ammunition depots.[3] Russian milbloggers Starshe Eddy and Russian officer Aleksey Suronkin echoed similar concerns over the effectiveness of HIMARS, calling on Russian forces to adapt to new threats and strike back against Ukrainian forces.[4] The continued trend of patriotic and pro-war Russian milbloggers blaming the Kremlin by default for setbacks and problems in the war may begin to create in effect a loyal opposition that could ultimately erode confidence in the milbloggers’ significant audience in Russia’s ability to win.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued to conduct limited offensive operations north of Slovyansk.
• Russian forces continued attempting to advance toward Siversk from Lysychansk but did not make any confirmed territorial gains.
• Russian forces launched assaults on Dementiivka to disrupt Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along the T2117 highway.
• Russian forces continued to launch assaults on settlements along the Kherson-Mykolaiv and Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border to regain lost positions.
• Russian Federation Council approved a bill committing the Kremlin to paying veteran benefits to civilians involved in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities continued to set conditions for the annexation of Donbas and southern Ukraine.

 

 

 

[elbobo]

13 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

definitely not a sign of a serious a manpower issue 

[PaladinSolo]

The US has some scary shit, this drone is autonomously switching targets.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[Air_Delivery]

1 hour ago, PaladinSolo said:

 

That seems like a huge waste.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 09 July 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 9 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian-backed occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast stated that Kharkiv Oblast is an “inalienable part of Russian land,” indicating that the Kremlin likely intends to annex part or all of Kharkiv Oblast. The Russian occupation government in Kharkiv Ob

 

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian-backed occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast stated that Kharkiv Oblast is an “inalienable part of Russian land,” indicating that the Kremlin likely intends to annex part or all of Kharkiv Oblast.[1] The Russian occupation government in Kharkiv Oblast unveiled a new flag for the occupation regime in Kharkiv Oblast containing the Russian imperial double-headed eagle and symbols from the 18th century Kharkiv coat of arms.[2] The Russian occupation government stated that the imagery in the flag is a “symbol of the historical roots of Kharkiv Oblast as an inalienable part of Russian land,” indicating that the Kremlin seeks to annex portions of Kharkiv Oblast to Russia and likely seeks to capture all of Kharkiv Oblast if it can.[3] The Kharkiv Oblast occupation government’s speed in establishing a civilian administration on July 6 and introducing martial law in occupied Kharkiv Oblast on July 8 further indicates that the Kremlin is aggressively pursuing the legitimization and consolidation of the Kharkiv Oblast occupation administration’s power to support this broader territorial aim.[4] The Kharkiv Oblast occupation government’s explicit use of Imperial Russian imagery and rhetoric pointing clearly at annexation, rather than using imagery and rhetoric supporting the establishment of a “people’s republic,” reinforces ISW’s prior assessment that the Kremlin has broader territorial aims than capturing Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts or even holding southern Ukraine.[5]

 

The Kremlin has likely used a leaked letter from mothers demanding the ban of journalist activity on the frontlines to promote self-censorship among pro-Russian milbloggers and war correspondents. Russian opposition outlet Meduza released a letter from mothers of an Astrakhan-based platoon that blamed Kremlin-sponsored Izvestia war correspondent Valentin Trushnin for reporting the details of Russian positions in a way that led to the deaths of their sons.[6] Meduza removed the letter from its website on July 8. First Deputy of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Information Minister and milblogger Daniil Bezsonov reported noticing suggestions from unspecified “faceless experts” to censor his posts regarding Russian war efforts.[7] Bezsonov noted that Russian war correspondents received necessary accreditations from the Kremlin and follow protocol when reporting from the frontline to refrain from exposing Russian positions. Bezsonov also argued that Russian war correspondents took the initiative to keep Russians updated on the situation on the front line from the first days of the war, while Russian “big bosses” failed to launch an information campaign to counter claimed Ukrainian information warfare. Several Russian milbloggers shared Bezsonov’s remarks, with proxy serviceman Maksim Fomin stating that Russian Defense Ministry briefings are not sufficient to replace combat footage.[8]

 

The Kremlin faces challenges directly censoring pro-Russian milbloggers and war correspondents but will likely continue to look for opportunities to promote self-censorship. Moscow has not demonstrated the ability to compel Telegram to delete or control the content of channels, and so would likely have to threaten individual milbloggers with legal or extra-legal action to stop them from publishing on that platform. Russia could prevent war correspondents publishing in regular media outlets from writing stories or deprive them of access to the front lines. But both the milbloggers and the war correspondents are explicitly pro-war and patriotic, often ultra-nationalist, with large followings likely concentrated among Russian President Vladimir Putin’s key supporters. Threatening or suppressing them directly could backfire if Putin’s motivation in doing so is to stop them from undermining support for the war or questioning authority. Actions such as the use of this leaked and possibly faked letter to stoke self-censorship or induce pressure from the readers of these blogs and articles toward self-censorship may be an effort to achieve the Kremlin’s desired effects without the risk of having them backfire.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued to launch unsuccessful assaults northwest of Slovyansk and conducted offensive operations east of Siversk from the Lysychansk area.
• Russian forces continued localized attacks northwest of Kharkiv City, likely in an effort to defend Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in the area.
• Russian forces continue to face personnel and equipment shortages, relying on old armored personnel carriers and launching new recruitment campaigns.
• Russian forces continued to set conditions for the annexation of Donbas, Kharkiv Oblast, and southern Ukraine.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine has apparently used HIMARS to destroy an S-400 battery...which was specifically designed to counter American MLRS strikes, lol.

[CitizenVectron]

 

This makes 23 successful strikes against Chornobayivka (airbase nears Kherson). The Russians keep putting stuff there, and Ukraine keeps hitting it. It's...not even funny anymore.

[CayceG]

Man, if the Russians are using S-300s to strike at land targets, they really must be hard up for long range weapons. 

[PaladinSolo]

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

So here's what I see:

 

Russian millbloggers are massively criticizing Russian leadership, but not because they want Russia to stop. It's the opposite—they want Putin to declare full national mobilization and completely invade Ukraine with the might of the entire nation. But...the reason it's not happening isn't because of any restraint, it's because Russia can't, and for a few reasons:

• Russia has the theoretical manpower, but not the equipment: they could get a million men on the field in a matter of months, but they simply don't have the gear to actually equip them, outside of WWII-era rifles and helmets. The generals know this, which is why they haven't ordered mobilization. If they order it...then it will be revealed how hollow the military is
• They would need to draw on men from the ethnic Russian areas (western/north-western Russia): so far almost all of the manpower in Ukraine has come from the very poor, very non-Russian areas of the federation. If ethnic Russians start dying in the tens of thousands, then you'll see more resistance to the war from the only group that has any real power to oppose Putin: mothers of soldiers
• Logistics: Russia has proven that they simply lack all ability to organize any military action outside of local areas. Whether this is because they have no experienced strategic leaders (likely) or because of political infighting (also likely), their only real "strength" at the moment is just firing 20,000 shells a day in local areas and then forcing their conscripts to move forward a km (and then repeat the next day). This is working because they outnumber Ukraine in those local areas 10:1 (in both men and shells). But that strategy can't be employed across the entire frontline because Russia lacks the manpower, equipment, and logistics to do so everywhere

So while Russia can theoretically continue their current strategy for months or years...I don't see how it gets them Ukraine. They have clearly run out of high-accuracy long-range ordinance (while Ukraine continues to build their stocks from the US/UK), and are relying entirely on brute-force Soviet tactics. Maybe they will learn...but I don't see how, as regular-level troops have no ability in the Russians structure to move into officer positions and use what they've learned. The 23 strikes on the Russian airbase in Kherson show this: regular troops would know that you can't keep putting ammo and tanks and helicopters in the same place over and over when it's in range of even regular Ukrainian artillery. But they do it anyway, because the officers are idiots and don't care. They've been given an order to do something, so they force that order all the way down, damn the consequences.

 

Assuming there is no coup/soft coup against Putin, then I think this war will continue for years. Ukraine might be able by the fall to push Russia back in some areas (most likely area is the south), but Russia won't stop. Even if Ukraine pushes them back in the north (away from Kharkiv, for example), Russia will just line up their endless Soviet artillery batteries and fire over the border over and over and over. Orders have been given, and in Russia you have to follow orders, even if they mean nothing and will do nothing. This is Putin's war, and the only thing that will stop it is the death of Putin, or an overthrow of Putin. And since the war won't end easily, the smart thing for the US/UK (and others) to do is to keep supplying Ukraine with the weapons to resist. Obviously if Ukraine had an additional 100 HIMARS with 300km-range ammo then this would be over by September, but I also think (cynically) that the US doesn't want this over too fast, that they want Russia to bleed in order to deplete them of the equipment that would be needed in any other conventional war. This war is reducing the future Russian threat every day, bit by bit.

[CitizenVectron]

More HIMARS strikes:

 

 

Whoops:

 

 

Current estimates of Russian losses:

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

I spoiler'd the tweet since apparently those on iOS can't see entire pages when a sensitive tweet is embedded? It's a video of a minefield. Four Russian tanks have been destroyed in a line, but there is a small gap where one more tank can go...and a Russian tank drives into the gap, with the expected results.
 

Spoiler

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Without an NCO Corp, the Russian army has proven itself useless without direct leadership from high-ranking officers on the front-lines. So...it makes sense that Ukraine is targeting them:

 

 

[Signifyin(g)Monkey]

7 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

So here's what I see:

 

Russian millbloggers are massively criticizing Russian leadership, but not because they want Russia to stop. It's the opposite—they want Putin to declare full national mobilization and completely invade Ukraine with the might of the entire nation. But...the reason it's not happening isn't because of any restraint, it's because Russia can't, and for a few reasons:

• Russia has the theoretical manpower, but not the equipment: they could get a million men on the field in a matter of months, but they simply don't have the gear to actually equip them, outside of WWII-era rifles and helmets. The generals know this, which is why they haven't ordered mobilization. If they order it...then it will be revealed how hollow the military is
• They would need to draw on men from the ethnic Russian areas (western/north-western Russia): so far almost all of the manpower in Ukraine has come from the very poor, very non-Russian areas of the federation. If ethnic Russians start dying in the tens of thousands, then you'll see more resistance to the war from the only group that has any real power to oppose Putin: mothers of soldiers
• Logistics: Russia has proven that they simply lack all ability to organize any military action outside of local areas. Whether this is because they have no experienced strategic leaders (likely) or because of political infighting (also likely), their only real "strength" at the moment is just firing 20,000 shells a day in local areas and then forcing their conscripts to move forward a km (and then repeat the next day). This is working because they outnumber Ukraine in those local areas 10:1 (in both men and shells). But that strategy can't be employed across the entire frontline because Russia lacks the manpower, equipment, and logistics to do so everywhere

So while Russia can theoretically continue their current strategy for months or years...I don't see how it gets them Ukraine. They have clearly run out of high-accuracy long-range ordinance (while Ukraine continues to build their stocks from the US/UK), and are relying entirely on brute-force Soviet tactics. Maybe they will learn...but I don't see how, as regular-level troops have no ability in the Russians structure to move into officer positions and use what they've learned. The 23 strikes on the Russian airbase in Kherson show this: regular troops would know that you can't keep putting ammo and tanks and helicopters in the same place over and over when it's in range of even regular Ukrainian artillery. But they do it anyway, because the officers are idiots and don't care. They've been given an order to do something, so they force that order all the way down, damn the consequences.

 

Assuming there is no coup/soft coup against Putin, then I think this war will continue for years. Ukraine might be able by the fall to push Russia back in some areas (most likely area is the south), but Russia won't stop. Even if Ukraine pushes them back in the north (away from Kharkiv, for example), Russia will just line up their endless Soviet artillery batteries and fire over the border over and over and over. Orders have been given, and in Russia you have to follow orders, even if they mean nothing and will do nothing. This is Putin's war, and the only thing that will stop it is the death of Putin, or an overthrow of Putin. And since the war won't end easily, the smart thing for the US/UK (and others) to do is to keep supplying Ukraine with the weapons to resist. Obviously if Ukraine had an additional 100 HIMARS with 300km-range ammo then this would be over by September, but I also think (cynically) that the US doesn't want this over too fast, that they want Russia to bleed in order to deplete them of the equipment that would be needed in any other conventional war. This war is reducing the future Russian threat every day, bit by bit.

I don’t know—the Unherd has a decent article laying out an argument why Ukraine needs greater support from the West to win the war of attrition.  They can hold out for awhile longer, but not forever, unless they receive  more direct help from their stronger Western allies.  Not because the Russians are more competent, (clearly they’re not) but just because they have an asymmetric advantage in terms of resources that will let them ‘wait this out’.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 10 July 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 10 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces are in the midst of a theater-wide operational pause in Ukraine. This operational pause has been largely characterized by Russian troops regrouping to rest, refit, and reconstitute; heavy artillery fire in critical areas to set conditions

 

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian forces are in the midst of a theater-wide operational pause in Ukraine. This operational pause has been largely characterized by Russian troops regrouping to rest, refit, and reconstitute; heavy artillery fire in critical areas to set conditions for future ground advances; and limited probing attacks to identify Ukrainian weakness and structure appropriate tactical responses. As ISW has previously noted, an operational pause does not mean a complete cessation of hostilities, rather that ongoing hostilities are more preparative in nature.[1]

 

Russian milblogger Rybar provided more evidence of tensions between the Russian military command and Russian war correspondents.[2] Russian war correspondents include journalists operating at the frontlines and Russian milbloggers commentating on information available in the open-source (and likely also drawn from friends in the military). Rybar noted that Russian military commanders responsible for wartime information operations are attempting to silence Russian milbloggers and war correspondents to conceal the Russian military’s blunders during the invasion of Ukraine. Rybar noted that Russian military commanders remain shaped by negative experiences during the Chechnya wars when war correspondents exposed problems at the frontline to the Kremlin and embarrassed Russian officers.

 

Rybar stated that the Russian Defense Ministry and possibly actors within the presidential administration are actively attempting to silence unofficial coverage of the Russian war in Ukraine. Rybar expressed support for a Telegram article by Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Deputy Information Minister (and milblogger) Daniil Bezsonov that criticized the Kremlin's apparent effort to promote self-censorship among war correspondents.[3] Rybar noted that Adviser to the Russian Defense Minister Andrey Ilnitsky called for such self-censorship on May 26 and had encouraged Russian war correspondents to report on the war only from an ideological standpoint without getting into operational details.[4] Rybar speculated that the presidential administration or other Russian officials ordered Ilnitsky to promote censorship among war correspondents who publish frontline updates in real-time.[5]

 

Rybar noted that the relationship between the Russian military command and war correspondents particularly soured after Russian President Vladimir Putin met with war correspondents during the St. Petersburg Economic Forum on June 17. Rybar claimed that two prominent war correspondents told Putin about the “mess” at the frontlines during the closed-door meeting, effectively bypassing the Russian Defense Ministry in presenting their negative views directly to the commander in chief. The event Rybar is describing likely occurred: Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced on June 12 that Putin would hold a largely closed-door meeting with Russian war correspondents, and Russian propagandist Margarita Simonyan confirmed that Putin had a “candid” and long conversation with frontline journalists after the event.[6] Rybar noted that Russian Defense Ministry began to identify war correspondents as a “threat” after this engagement whereas previously it had perceived them as a “poorly controlled problem.”

 

Putin likely held the June 17 meeting to defuse milblogger discontent, which had become evident and dramatic after the disastrous failed river crossing attempt at Bilohorivka in mid-May. If that was his aim, he failed to win them over, as the milbloggers have remained staunchly critical of the way the Russian high command is waging the war ever since. But Putin may also have obtained a more unvarnished view of what is occurring on the frontlines than he was getting from the chain of command.

 

The Russian information space would change significantly if the Ministry of Defense cracked down on the milbloggers and stopped them from operational reporting. ISW uses milbloggers and Russian war correspondents as sources of Russian claims on a daily basis, so the elimination of regular milblogger operational reporting would affect ISW’s approach to coverage. We will continue to observe and report on milblogger and war correspondent behavior and will flag significant changes in the Russian information space as we observe them.

 

Russian milbloggers are increasingly criticizing Russian strategy and military leadership by seizing upon recent successful Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear areas.[7] Russian milblogger Voennyi Osvedomitel’ underlined the threat posed by Western-provided high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS) and stated that HIMARS will complicate Russian logistics in a Telegram post on July 9.[8] Voennyi Osvedomitel’ cautioned that Russian air defense may be increasingly insufficient against Ukrainian strikes and called on Russian forces to improve coordination between intelligence and aviation in order to identify and target Western-provided weapons systems. Another milblogger with a small following, Nam Pishut iz Yaniny, complained that Russian military leadership is proving unable to defend against Western weapons being used against Russian positions.[9] Igor Girkin, a Russian nationalist who previously commanded militants during operations in Donbas in 2014, discussed recent Ukrainian strikes against Russian rear areas and criticized Russian troops for not targeting Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) along which HIMARS and other Western weapons are delivered.[10] Girkin suggested that the ongoing operational pause is exposing easily-exploitable Russian vulnerabilities and called for Russian troops to start fighting in full force again. Girkin and other milbloggers are likely to continue voicing their discontent with Russian military leadership as Ukrainian capabilities are strengthened by Western weaponry and equipment.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces are conducting a theater-wide operational pause in Ukraine and engaging in operations to set conditions for future offensives.
• Russian forces conducted limited probing operations northwest of Slovyansk.
• Russian forces are likely intensifying artillery and missile strikes west of Bakhmut in order to isolate the city from critical ground lines of communication (GLOCs).
• Russian forces conducted a limited and unsuccessful ground attack north of Donetsk City.
• Russian military leadership continues to form ad hoc volunteer units and private military company combat organizations partly comprised of older men and criminals to support operations in Ukraine.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Geez, completely gone:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Interesting look from a Russian streamer on the situation in southern Russia (specifically Rostov-on-Don), and how sanctions are affecting basic commerce and shopping. It also provides a window into his own mental health and how the war is affecting middle-class Russians.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Another Russian general killed, this time by a HIMARS strike in Kherson:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Video evidence of Ukraine using 155mm SMArt munitions, which they were rumoured to have. They are fired from German PzH 2000 mobile artillery, and once fired use ballutes (balloon parachutes) to slow themselves and autonomously track and hit targets on approach using IR and radar.