Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (14 May 2024) - Russia launches new invasion from the north into Kharkiv, soon to launch second corridor into Sumy. Situation is dire

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 06 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 6, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin argued that Russian forces will be “even less capable of offensive operations than they are now” by spring 2024 given the current nature of Russian offensive operations along the fro

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on November 6. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 7 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin argued that Russian forces will be "even less capable of offensive operations than they are now" by spring 2024 given the current nature of Russian offensive operations along the frontline.[1] Girkin's wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, published a hand-written letter from Girkin dated October 26, in which he summarized the frontline situation in Ukraine for the month of October. Girkin claimed that the situation for Russian forces is "gradually deteriorating" and that Russian forces are showcasing "growing weakness (compared to [Ukraine's] capabilities," despite Russia's "generally successful repulsion" of the Ukrainian offensive over the summer and fall of 2023. Girkin argued that Russian forces were not only unable to start broad offensive operations at the beginning of the fall season but were also unable to complete even limited offensive operations to achieve operationally significant goals – namely around Kupyansk, Lyman, and Avdiivka. Girkin claimed that Russian forces failed to advance in the Kupyansk direction and are now impaled in battles on "the distant approaches to the city," while also failing to change the situation in the Lyman direction. Girkin added that tactical advances around Avdiivka led to significant losses in Russian manpower and equipment and did not lead to the further development of the Russian offensive. Girkin observed that the Avdiivka offensive demonstrated Russian forces' inability "to achieve superiority on a very narrow sector of the front" despite Russia's careful preparations, good coordination of strike forces and means for the initial stage of the offensive, and the abundance of ammunition "unheard of since the assault on Bakhmut."

Girkin suggested that Russian efforts to repel Ukrainian localized attacks across the frontline and simultaneous fall-winter offensive operations will likely degrade Russian offensive and defensive potential by spring 2024. Girkin noted that Russian forces would need to spend the rest of the fall-winter campaign on the defensive to try to eliminate emerging operational crises – such as the Ukrainian presence in the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Girkin argued that Russian forces will continue to be "incapable of any broad offensive actions" even if Ukrainian forces are unable to "knock out" Russian frontline units, fail to achieve a breakthrough over the fall-winter season, and are exhausted. Girkin, however, added that such a "positional scenario" is not guaranteed and that he fears that Ukrainian forces may be successful in breaking Russian forces that have already been exhausted by months of combat. Girkin's suggestion that ongoing Russian offensive operations are harming the prospects for future Russian operations is notable because Russian forces still must repel Ukrainian offensive operations while attempting to initiate their own offensives. The timing of current Russian offensives around Avdiivka was also somewhat odd and suboptimal because the rainy and muddy weather has predictably hindered Russian operations.[2] ISW continues to assess that fall and winter weather conditions are unlikely to preclude Russian or Ukrainian offensives.[3]

Girkin implied that additional Western military aid to Ukraine and the lack of mobilization in Russia could allow Ukraine to end positional warfare and conduct successful offensive operations in 2024. Girkin stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing to use Western-provided materiel to target the Russian rear and even destroy the Berdyansk airfield in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast against the backdrop of Russian offensives in Avdiivka. Girkin implied that Ukrainian forces would continue to devastate the Russian rear over the winter as Russian forces continued to push for limited offensive operations. Girkin stated that once Ukraine receives Western-provided F-16 fighter jets, Ukrainian forces could have localized advantages for a short period of time on any section of the frontline. Girkin added that Ukraine could be "seriously strengthened in military-technical terms" with Western military equipment. Girkin also claimed that Ukraine currently has superiority in manpower over Russian forces due to a lack of mobilization in Russia and that the Kremlin is unlikely to call up mobilization before spring 2024 due to upcoming presidential elections. Girkin noted that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is unlikely to recruit "hundreds of thousands" of new contract servicemen because Russia has exhausted the recruitment potential for new contract servicemen and volunteers. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi's long essay, "Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It," similarly argues that Western-provided military equipment and air superiority among other things will allow Ukraine to overcome positional warfare.[4]

Russian milbloggers appear to be grappling with how Russian forces can overcome wider operational challenges in Ukraine, likely in response to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi's recent essay on the subject of "positional warfare." Select milbloggers argued that specific changes in battlefield tactics will allow Russian forces to achieve their desired operational objectives in the current difficult operational environment.[5] Another milblogger argued that Russia should not celebrate Zaluzhnyi's discussion of Ukrainian difficulties with positional warfare and that Russian forces need to prepare for a long, challenging war.[6] The milblogger argued that Russia is currently no closer to victory in Ukraine and expressed concerns that Russian forces will likely face a renewed Ukrainian counteroffensive in the winter.[7] The milblogger's discussion of a large Ukrainian counteroffensive effort in the winter suggests that he expects that Russian forces will not completely seize the initiative in the coming months and therefore will not be able to launch a larger offensive effort that would preclude Ukrainian forces from committing resources to counteroffensive operations. The wider Russian information space has offered a relatively muted response to Zaluzhnyi's essay, and Russian ultranationalists appear to be applying Zaluzhnyi's discussions about the challenges of the operational environment in Ukraine to Russia's offensive campaign and not coming to very optimistic conclusions.[8]

Select Russian milbloggers specifically argued that the use of small infantry assault groups will allow both Russian and Ukrainian forces to better achieve operational objectives along the front. Russian milbloggers argued on November 3 and 6 that concentrated attacks with large forces attempting to break through a stable defense to full depth is increasingly ineffective and suggested that small infantry groups with comprehensive support may be more effective at achieving significant operational effects in the current operational environment.[9] One of the milbloggers argued that the initial phases of the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive and the ongoing Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka are similar in that both operations made some initial advances at the cost of irretrievable manpower and equipment losses.[10] The milblogger argued that throughout the war in Ukraine, heavy losses during such large, mechanized assaults have prompted Russian and Ukrainian forces to increasingly rely on smaller ad-hoc infantry groups in subsequent operations.[11] The Ukrainian command changed tactics to rely more on infantry assaults following early setbacks in the counteroffensive in June 2023, and Ukrainian forces proceeded to make significant advances in the following months.[12] It remains to be seen if Russian forces will show the same adaptability near Avdiivka, especially since repeated offensive failures suggest that the Russian General Staff has failed to internalize and disseminate lessons learned from previous costly large, mechanized assaults.[13] The milblogger argued that it would be more advantageous to prepare specialized small infantry assault groups with sufficient technological capabilities, specifically in reconnaissance and communication, ahead of offensive operations instead of switching to small infantry assault tactics only after larger, mechanized assaults prove too costly to continue.[14]

Russian sources suggested that some Ukrainian forces may already be fielding the small infantry assault groups that these sources are advocating for. A Russian milblogger noted that Ukrainian forces already appear to be employing this adaptation in ongoing ground operations on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, where the milblogger claimed that small Ukrainian assault groups operating at the operational-tactical level have been able to divert considerable Russian combat resources and attention from elsewhere along the front.[15] The milblogger argued that lower-level Russian commanders have previously made some progress in preparing such small infantry groups south of Bakhmut but that the Russian command's insistence on manpower-intensive frontal assaults quickly rendered these groups combat ineffective.[16] The milblogger's observations suggest that Ukrainian forces may be once again successfully adapting to aspects of the battlefield in Ukraine while Russian forces struggle to do so. Select elements of the Russian military have shown the propensity for successful adaptation, particularly in defensive operations during the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast, but the Russian command will likely continue to struggle with instituting any successful change in tactics and capabilities writ-large throughout the theater.[17]

The war in Ukraine is likely exacerbating an emerging identity crisis within Russian society resulting from tensions between Russian identity and Russian nationalism. Russian "Vostok" Battalion Commander and Russian Orthodox ideologue Alexander Khodakovsky wrote two long Telegram posts on November 6 about what it means to be "Russian," acknowledging a schism in Russian national identity that has largely resulted from the ideological arguments advanced to justify and mobilize support for Russia's war in Ukraine.[18] Khodakovsky shared an anecdote of an unidentified Chechen general who, he claimed, conducted a "genetic study" to identify "the ethnic composition " of his Russian friends and found out that "Russian genes" were not dominant.[19] Khodakovsky used this anecdote to offer commentary on what it means to be "Russian," and concluded that it is not "ethnogenetic," but rather a matter of morals and ideologies, observing that Russian nationalism is "hysteria" resulting from a lack of consolidated Russian identity.[20] Khodakovsky thereby appears to offer the suggestion that when one fixates on a genetic definition of what it means to be Russian, the destructive and toxic ideologies of nationalism appear and erase broader and more socio-cultural and linguistic definitions of identity. Khodakovsky warned that a population that lacks a coherent identity can easily destroy itself from within.[21]

Khodakovsky's musings offer insight into some socio-cultural implications of Russia's pursuit of ideological goals in its war in Ukraine. In several ways, the war has narrowed the conception of what it means to be Russian among Russian ideologues, particularly as concepts of identity are increasingly defined by hyper-nationalist and pro-war information space voices who amplify the Kremlin's ideological line on the war and redirect it at domestic audiences.[22] Whereas Russian identity was largely defined before the war linguistically and culturally as enshrined in the Russian concepts of "compatriots abroad" and "Russkyi Mir," the war has focused Russian identity more narrowly on Russian ethnonationalism that echoes the Kremlin's ideological justifications for the war.[23] Russia's deliberate campaign to "Russify" Ukraine through the invasion has generated clear social impacts within Russia itself, particularly aimed at ethnic minority and migrant communities, which have paradoxically been forced by the Russian government to bear the brunt of force generation efforts for the war.[24] Russian nationalist commentators have increasingly fixated on demographic transitions facing Russia particularly relating to the balance between "Russians" and "minorities" within the Russian population, further reinforcing concepts of what it means for Russia to be a fundamentally "Russian" state.[25] Khodakovsky responded to this apparent schism in Russian society by underlining some of the inherent dangers of defining what it means to be Russian as a matter of genetics and notably drew criticism from some more virulently nationalist commentators for being "Russophobic" in his conclusions.[26] Both Khodakovsky's observations and the immediate response to his conclusions underline a fundamental dilemma facing Russia as it continues its war in Ukraine—the dilemma of how to reconcile the hyper-nationalist ideologies on which the Kremlin increasingly relies to justify the war and demand greater sacrifices from its people with Moscow's desire to continue to increase the burden of mobilization on disenfranchised minority communities, while also maintaining a sense of Russian identity that society can coalesce behind as the war continues.

Russian forces conducted missile and drone strikes against rear areas in southern Ukraine on the evening of November 5 and on the night of November 5 to 6 as well as the largest series of glide bomb strikes to date against targets in Kherson Oblast on November 5. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched a Kh-59 cruise missile at Dnipro City and a Kh-31P anti-radar missile at Odesa City on November 5.[27] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command stated that Ukrainian air defenses shot down the Kh-59 missile and that the Kh-31P missile struck an infrastructure facility in Odesa City.[28] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces also conducted missile and drone strikes on the night of November 5 to 6 with a Kh-31 anti-radar missile and a Kh-59 cruise missile launched from occupied Kherson Oblast, a P-800 Onyx anti-ship missile and an Iskander-M ballistic missile launched from occupied Crimea, and 22 Shahed-131/136 drones launched from Cape Chauda, occupied Crimea.[29] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed the Kh-59 missile and 15 drones.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the Russian strikes targeted port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and civilian infrastructure in Kherson City and damaged residential buildings, port infrastructure, transportation infrastructure, and other civil infrastructure.[31] Ukrainian Odesa Oblast Military Administration Head Oleh Kiper reported that a Russian strike partially damaged the Odesa National Art Museum.[32] Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Ihor Klymenko stated that Russian forces launched 87 glide bombs on populated areas in Kherson Oblast on November 5 - the largest number of glide bombs that Russian forces have launched to date since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[33]

The Russian military appears to have increased its stock of high-precision missiles due to reported increases in Russian missile production more rapidly than previous forecasts had suggested. Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitskyi stated on November 6 that Russian forces have a total of 870 high-precision operational-strategic and strategic missiles in reserve. Skibitskyi previously stated on August 28 that Russian forces had a total of 585 long-range missiles in reserve, indicating that Russian forces have increased their missile reserves by 285 missiles since August.[34] Skibitskyi added on November 6 that Russian forces produced a total of 115 long-range high-precision missiles in October: 30 Iskander-M cruise missiles, 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles, 20 Kalibr cruise missiles, 40 Kh-101 cruise missiles, 9 Kh-32 cruise missiles, and 4 Kinzhal ballistic missiles.[35] Skibitiskyi stated on August 28 that Russian defense enterprises were struggling to produce several dozens of specific types of missiles a month due to foreign component shortages, and the increase of 285 missiles in Russian reserves since late August — with 115 of that total being produced in October alone — indicates that Russia has increased its domestic production of missiles faster than had been forecasted.[36]

Skibitskyi also commented on Russian domestic drone production on November 6, stating that the GUR has not observed the movement of Shahed drones from Iran to Russia as Iran has fulfilled its first Shahed supply contracts with Russia.[37] Skibitskyi stated that Iran may still send small batches of Shaheds to Russia, however.[38] Skibitskyi also stated that Russia has begun to increase the domestic assembly of Shahed drones with components from Iran including at the factory in Alabuga, Tatarstan Republic.[39] Skibitskyi added that predicted Russian missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the upcoming winter will likely not be as "primitive" as the strike series during the winter of 2022-2023.[40] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has recently commented on Ukraine's urgent need for air defense systems.[41]

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[42] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Krasnohorivka (6km northwest of Avdiivka) between November 3 and November 5, thereby forcing Russian troops to withdraw from part of the railway track in the area.[43] The Russian "Russkiy Legion" (BARS-13) irregular armed formation claimed that Ukrainian forces were successfully pressuring Russian forces near Stepove and the "Tsarska Okhota" restaurant south of Avdiivka.[44]

Key Takeaways:

• Imprisoned ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin argued that Russian forces will be "even less capable of offensive operations than they are now" by spring 2024 given the current nature of Russian offensive operations along the frontline.
• Russian milbloggers appear to be grappling with how Russian forces can overcome wider operational challenges in Ukraine, likely in response to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi's recent essay on the subject of "positional warfare," and not coming to optimistic conclusions.
• Select Russian milbloggers specifically argued that the use of small infantry assaults groups will allow both Russian and Ukrainian forces to better achieve operational objectives along the front. Russian sources suggested that some Ukrainian forces may already be fielding the small infantry assault groups that these sources are advocating for.
• The war in Ukraine is likely exacerbating an emerging identity crisis within Russian society resulting from tensions between Russian identity and Russian nationalism.
• Russian forces conducted missile and drones strikes against rear areas in southern Ukraine on the evening of November 5 and on the night of November 5 to 6 as well as the largest series of glide bomb strikes to date against targets in Kherson Oblast on November 5.
• The Russian military appears to have increased its stock of high-precision missiles due to reported increases in Russian missile production more rapidly than previous forecasts had suggested.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas on November 6.
• Russian occupation officials are expanding military recruitment and registration offices in occupied territories, likely in support of coercive mobilization efforts.
• Russian officials continue to weaponize youth engagement programs to consolidate social control of occupied areas of Ukraine.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Reports from Russian soldiers on the left bank of the Dnipro that Ukraine has expanded their bridgehead and has begun moving armoured vehicles over (confirmed by photo yesterday). Over 300 marines believed to have crossed already.

 

Obviously not enough to seriously threaten Russia's hold on the Kherson region...but how the hell is Russia not able to stop this? Apparently they've been trying at the local level, but Russia is providing almost no air or artillery support to Kherson at this point (obviously trying to hold/advance in Zaporizhzhia and the east).

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

1 minute ago, CitizenVectron said:

Reports from Russian soldiers on the left bank of the Dnipro that Ukraine has expanded their bridgehead and has begun moving armoured vehicles over (confirmed by photo yesterday). Over 300 marines believed to have crossed already.

 

Obviously not enough to seriously threaten Russia's hold on the Kherson region...but how the hell is Russia not able to stop this? Apparently they've been trying at the local level, but Russia is providing almost no air or artillery support to Kherson at this point (obviously trying to hold/advance in Zaporizhzhia and the east).

 

It really could be as simple as wanting as many UAF to cross to the bridgehead for a "critical mass" before absolutely hammering them with artillery for maximum casualties.

[CitizenVectron]

25 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

It really could be as simple as wanting as many UAF to cross to the bridgehead for a "critical mass" before absolutely hammering them with artillery for maximum casualties.

 

Entirely possible!

 

What's interesting about this crossing is that the UK and Ukraine practiced armoured amphibious crossings in 2020...at this location.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

3 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Entirely possible!

 

What's interesting about this crossing is that the UK and Ukraine practiced armoured amphibious crossings in 2020...at this location.

 

I honestly think that whatever the hell the UAF is attempting to do on the left bank is simply damned foolish.

 

At best, it's merely an annoyance/irritant for the Russians and at worst, it could potentially result in the loss of many UAF soldiers that can ill-afford to be squandered.

 

The UAF just experienced an incredibly dumb personnel loss through the Russian missile strike on a promotion ceremony that was held ludicrously close to the Zaporizhzhia frontline:

 

Ukraine Opens Criminal Probe After Strike on Brigade

WWW.VOANEWS.COM

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At least 20 soldiers were reported to have been killed in the attack, which local media said took place on Friday as a brigade gathered to receive awards in Ukraine's southern Zaporizhzhia region.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 07 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 7, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred a limited number of armored vehicles to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are continuing larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank with a light infantry grouping of roughly

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred a limited number of armored vehicles to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are continuing larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank with a light infantry grouping of roughly battalion size. Russian milbloggers amplified a picture on November 6 purporting to show a Ukrainian tracked amphibious transport (PTS) vehicle carrying an infantry fighting vehicle onto the east bank near Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[1] Other milbloggers claimed on November 7 that a Ukrainian amphibious infantry fighting vehicle crossed the Dnipro River on its own near Krynky and amplified separate footage on November 7 purporting to show a destroyed Western amphibious armored personnel carrier in an unspecified location on the east bank.[2] Select Russian milbloggers claimed that either one or two Ukrainian PTS vehicles crossed the Dnipro near Krynky, while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred several unspecified armored vehicles to the area.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that more than 300 Ukrainian personnel (about a battalion's worth) are operating on the east bank in the Krynky area and continue to claim that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in central Krynky and nearby areas.[4] One milblogger claimed that several hundred Ukrainian personnel are operating throughout east bank Kherson Oblast.[5] Russian milbloggers claimed that combat engagements continued near Krynky, as well as near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), but did not claim that Ukrainian attempts to advance on November 6 and 7 were particularly larger than in previous days.[6]

Ukrainian forces likely conducted initial company-sized assaults across the Dnipro River onto the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17 and 18.[7] The reported battalion-size Ukrainian force grouping on the east bank suggests that heavy Russian interdiction efforts along the Dnipro River have not prevented Ukrainian forces from transferring additional personnel and materiel to positions on the east bank. ISW will not speculate on the prospects of ongoing Ukrainian activity on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 7. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed on November 6 that Ukrainian forces crossed the railway near Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[9] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces are entrenched in forest areas near Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) and that a lack of Russian control of the airspace in the area is complicating Russian artillery fire on these positions.[10]

A prominent pro-war Russian milblogger who is typically optimistic about Russian capabilities expressed a relatively pessimistic assessment of the war and emphasized the need for the Kremlin to fully mobilize the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to a wartime footing to win. The milblogger claimed on November 7 that Ukraine is committed to an "exhausting war" against Russia and that Russian needs "enormous combat potential" and an "accurate calculation" of its capabilities to beat Ukraine.[11] Another Russian milblogger expressed surprise that a milblogger who was previously so positive in his assessments of the Russian offensive campaign in Ukraine would openly admit to the need for a wider mobilization of the Russian economy in the face of a long war.[12] The Kremlin has largely appeared unwilling to conduct wider economic mobilization, and the milblogger's call to change this line is noteworthy.[13] Yet another Russian milblogger claimed that Russia is "paying terribly" for the Kremlin's unwillingness to fully commit to the war.[14] The milbloggers' suggestion to further mobilize the Russian economy appears to be part of recent discussions in the Russian information space about operational changes that could help Russian forces overcome challenges in Ukraine, likely in response to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi's recent essay on the subject of "positional warfare."[15] Zaluzhnyi's essay appears to have prompted even the most positive Russian milbloggers to make more straight and honest assessments about the Russian war effort.

Russian authorities detained Republic of Dagestan's deputy Minister of Internal Affairs on the pretext of corruption charges, likely in an effort to demonstrate that the federal government is taking action in Dagestan without drawing further attention to the interethnic and interreligious tensions and the propensity for destabilization in the region. Russian state media outlet TASS stated on November 7 that Russian security forces detained Dagestani Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Rufat Ismailov and are currently conducting searches of his home and office.[16] Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti further reported that a source within the Russian security forces stated that Ismailov is preliminarily suspected of bribery.[17] A Russian insider source claimed that Ismailov is believed to have received a 100-million-ruble (about $1,085,770) bribe from an insurance company.[18] The insider source and a Russian milblogger claimed that Russian authorities transferred Ismailov to Moscow, and the milblogger claimed that this indicates that there are risks of high-level officials at the federal subject level "escaping responsibility."[19] Russian opposition media outlet SOTA reported that Russian authorities, including the Federal Security Service (FSB), are also investigating the deputy head of the investigative department of the Dagestani Ministry of Internal Affairs, Dalgat Abdulgapurov.[20] Russian authorities previously removed multiple ineffective air defense officials in charge of the defense of Moscow on the pretext of corruption charges after increasing drone strikes on rear Russian cities, showing that there is a recent pattern of Russian authorities using corruption charges to circumvent publicly disciplining Russian officials for not performing their duties well and thereby admitting to their ineptitude.[21] Although ISW has no reason to doubt the charges against Ismailov his detention suggests that Russian authorities are attempting to create a semblance of federal government control over the situation in Dagestan while avoiding highlighting the recent antisemitic riots. ISW similarly assessed that the Russian leadership likely avoided meting out more severe punishments for more serious charges for participants of the antisemitic riots out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.[22]

The Ukrainian strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4 significantly damaged a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval vessel. Russian and Ukrainian sources posted photos on November 7 showing significant damage to the Askold Project 22800 Karakurt-class Kalibr missile carrier corvette that will likely render it inoperable for the foreseeable future.[23] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have conducted an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces transferred a limited number of armored vehicles to the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are continuing larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank with a light infantry grouping of roughly battalion size.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 7.
• A prominent pro-war Russian milblogger who is typically optimistic about Russian capabilities expressed a relatively pessimistic assessment of the war and emphasized the need for the Kremlin to fully mobilize the Russian economy and defense industrial base (DIB) to a wartime footing to win.
• Russian authorities detained Republic of Dagestan's deputy Minister of Internal Affairs on the pretext of corruption charges, likely in an effort to demonstrate that the federal government is taking action in Dagestan without drawing further attention to the interethnic and interreligious tensions and the propensity for destabilization in the region.
• The Ukrainian strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4 significantly damaged a Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) naval vessel.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas.
• A Russian battalion comprised of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) will likely deploy to Ukraine in the near future in an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.
• Kremlin-appointed Commissioner on Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova advertised several benefit schemes targeting children in occupied Ukraine as part of the "A Country for Children" strategic program.

 

[Derek]

Last night, someone at work, told me this war was over and Russia is going to win. He said Zelensky was begging for more money and that we aren't giving them anymore. I asked him who was reporting that and he said some youtuber named Tim Pool? I don't know who that is, but he sounded very confident!

[CayceG]

1 hour ago, Derek said:

Last night, someone at work, told me this war was over and Russia is going to win. He said Zelensky was begging for more money and that we aren't giving them anymore. I asked him who was reporting that and he said some youtuber named Tim Pool? I don't know who that is, but he sounded very confident!

 

Oh jesus christ. 

 

 

Feel free to ignore everything this coworker of yours tells you. And if he brings up anything from Tim Pool again, tell him you'll not ever speak with him again. Tim Pool is a fascist. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 08 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 8, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults near Robotyne, Novoprokopivka (just south of Robotyne), and Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated during a video address to the Reuters NEXT conference in New York on November 8 that Ukrainian forces have a battlefield plan for 2024 that he cannot disclose.[3] Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces have several paths for future advances in southern Ukraine, eastern Ukraine, and Kherson Oblast. There are also plans to advance to specific occupied cities.[4] Ukrainian forces continue counteroffensive operations without interruption in several sectors of the front, and Ukrainian officials continue to indicate that these operations will continue into this winter.[5]

Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality. A Russian milblogger claimed that the Russian General Staff uses battlefield maps that differ from tactical reality in response to another milblogger who questioned why Russian forces were not striking alleged large Ukrainian force concentrations close to the frontline.[6] The Russian milblogger claimed that Russian personnel on the front have access to the "real" map and that Russian commanders order Russian forces to conduct routine assaults to make gains that align the "real" map with the Russian General Staff's map.[7] A separate milblogger claimed that there had been previous individual cases of Russian battalion and regiment-level assault operations aimed at achieving compliance with inaccurate maps of the frontline but that this is the first time that he has heard of a wider operational imperative to make advances that comply with a reported General Staff map.[8] A milblogger claimed that Russian commanders are incentivized to make the tactical gains depicted in the General Staff's maps because the General Staff increasingly requires positive reports from frontline commanders.[9] Russian milbloggers have routinely criticized Russian commanders throughout the chain of command for delivering false and overly positive reports to their superiors and have identified the Russian General Staff as fostering this widespread institutional dishonesty.[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.[11] Putin promoted Kuzmenko to the rank of colonel general following Kuzmenko's meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu during Shoigu's visit to the Eastern Grouping of Forces command post in the south Donetsk direction (Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area) on October 25.[12] Shoigu's visit confirmed Kuzmenko's position as the Eastern Grouping of Forces commander and likely the Eastern Military District (EMD) commander. This promotion is likely routine and intended to give Kuzmenko a rank appropriate to his position. Putin also promoted three Russian officers to the rank of lieutenant general, 11 officers to the rank of major general, and 29 internal affairs officers to the rank of major general and lieutenant general.[13]

Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia's alleged stability and criticisms of the West.[14] Russian opposition media outlet Meduza reported on November 8 that two sources close to the Russian Presidential Administration stated that the presidential campaign aims to paint Putin as a leader who made Russia an "island of calm."[15] Meduza sources claimed that Putin's ratings increase after speeches in which he criticizes the West and that Russian state propaganda will encourage this by increasingly publishing stories about "difficulties" in Western countries and the United States' alleged inability to support Ukraine and Israel simultaneously. A Meduza source also reportedly stated that the campaign would only discuss the war in Ukraine if there were a "very serious [Russian] success" on the front instead of continued "positional warfare." Putin is reportedly preparing to announce his campaign this month, and Russian sources have consistently indicated that the campaign will not prominently promote the war in Ukraine.[16] Putin previously downplayed the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka, referring to it as "active defense," which would be consistent with these reports.[17] The Kremlin-backed United Russia Party also reportedly realized that using the war in Ukraine in their election campaigns in the run up to the September 2023 State Duma elections was ineffective and counterproductive.[18] Concerns within the Kremlin and United Russia over domestic support for the war are not indications that United Russia or Putin's dominance of Russian politics faces a legitimate threat in the upcoming presidential election, however. This campaign framing, if it occurs, would double down on Putin's refusal to mobilize Russian society to a wartime footing and may increase the informational cost necessary to support a long-term war effort in Ukraine.

Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine. Russian and occupation officials reported on November 8 that a car bomb killed LNR People's Council member and the LNR Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) Head Colonel Mikhail Filiponenko in occupied Luhansk City.[19] Filiponenko previously headed the LNR People's Militia and the LNR's Joint Center for Control and Coordination (JCCC).[20] Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that GUR agents and Ukrainian partisans conducted the attack.[21] GUR stated that Filiponenko organized torture camps for Ukrainian civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) and that Filiponenko personally participated in the torture.[22] These accusations would be an apparent violation of the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8.
• Select Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian commanders may be making operational and tactical decisions using maps of the battlefield in Ukraine that differ from tactical reality.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin promoted 44 Russian military and internal affairs officers, including Eastern Grouping of Forces Commander Andrei Kuzmenko, to general officer rank on November 8.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly avoid centering his 2024 presidential campaign on the war in Ukraine and will rather focus on Russia's alleged stability and criticisms of the West.
• Ukrainian partisans and military intelligence assassinated a prominent Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) official accused of conducting war crimes in occupied Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 8 and advanced in some areas.
• Russia is reportedly attempting to reacquire components for military equipment from states to which it previously sold the equipment, including Egypt, Pakistan, Brazil, and Belarus.
• Russian occupation administrations continue to create new administrative bodies meant to further integrate occupied territories into Russian governance systems.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New video from Kings & Generals:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 09 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 9, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine. Russian milbloggers claimed on November 9 that Ukrainian forces established control over new positions in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River) and conducted assaults towards Russian positions south and southwest of the settlement.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed that there are reports that Ukrainian forces advanced to forest areas south of Krynky.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces also attacked near Poyma (12km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River), Pishchanivka (13km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River), and Pidstepne (17km east of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River) and are trying to establish positions between Pidstepne and Kozachi Laheri (23km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[3] Ukrainian military observer Konstyantyn Mashovets stated that Ukrainian forces have established continuous control of positions from the Antonivsky railway bridge north of Poyma to the Antonivsky roadway bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson and 4km from the Dnipro River) as of November 9 and have cut the Oleshky-Nova Kakhovka (53km northeast of Kherson City) road in at least two areas.[4]

Elements of the Russian 18th Combined Arms Army's (CAA) 22nd Army Corps (formerly of the Black Sea Fleet) and 70th Motorized Rifle Division as well as the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla) appear to be the main Russian forces responding to Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast.[5] The Russian military reportedly formed the 18th CAA from other units previously operating in the Kherson direction, and it is unlikely that new units of the 18th CAA are comprised of fresh forces or staffed to doctrinal end strength.[6] Elements of the 177th Naval Infantry Regiment previously defended positions in western Zaporizhia Oblast for almost the entirety of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and have likely suffered significant casualties.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on November 5 that unspecified elements of the 7th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division are operating in the Kherson direction, although the bulk of the 7th VDV Division appears to be committed to defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[8] Mashovets claimed on November 2 and 9 that elements of the 7th VDV Division's 171st Air Assault Battalion (97th VDV Regiment) are operating near Pishchanivka and Poyma, but it is unclear if these reported elements have been present in the Kherson direction since the start of the counteroffensive or recently redeployed to the area.[9] Elements of the 49th CAA (Southern Military District) have reportedly been operating in the Kherson direction since the Ukrainian liberation of Kherson City in November 2022, but some Russian and Ukrainian sources claim that the Russian command has since redeployed elements of at least one its brigades to the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area.[10] Mashovets claimed that elements of the 49th CAA still comprise the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces in the Kherson direction, and elements of the 49th CAA's 205th Motorized Rifle Brigade appeared to be operating on the left bank as of late August 2023.[11]

The Russian command will likely face significant challenges in redeploying units from other sectors of the front should relatively combat ineffective Russian formations and currently uncommitted Russian forces in the Kherson direction prove insufficient to respond to the Ukrainian operations on the east bank of the Dnipro. Redeployments of considerable elements of the 7th VDV Division or other VDV formations and units in western Zaporizhia Oblast would likely disrupt Russian defensive operations there. Russian forces reportedly continue to accumulate forces for sustaining the Russian offensive effort near Avdiivka and localized offensive operations in Kharkiv and Luhansk oblasts.[12] Any potential Russian redeployment to the Kherson direction will likely degrade the Russian ability to sustain these other operations and efforts.

 

 

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Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted nearly 30 attacks northwest and southwest of Bakhmut between November 8 and November 9, which is notably a higher number of attacks than the Ukrainian General Staff typically reports for the Bakhmut area.[13] Russian milbloggers widely claimed that Russian forces entered Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and pushed Ukrainian troops back from the railway that runs northeast and east of the settlement.[14] Geolocated footage published on November 9 indicates that Russian forces have advanced towards Klishchiivka and hold positions just east of the settlement and west of the railway line.[15] Some Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also drove Ukrainian forces out of positions in and around Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut), but ISW has not observed visual evidence to substantiate these claims.[16] Several Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Bakhmut in the Berkhivka-Bohdanivka direction (directly northwest of Bakhmut to 5km northwest of Bakhmut) south of the Berkhivka Reservoir towards the Vilyanova plant nursery.[17] Geolocated footage from around November 7 shows that Russian forces have advanced south of the Berkhivka Reservoir, about 3km northwest of Bakhmut.[18]

These localized offensive operations northwest and southwest of Bakhmut are likely opportunistic tactical ground attacks intended to take advantage of the reported reallocation of Ukrainian resources away from Bakhmut. Several milbloggers noted that the pace of Ukrainian artillery fire and ground activity in the Bakhmut direction has decreased in recent days, with some Russian sources remarking that this is partially because Ukrainian forces have redeployed to other areas of the front.[19] Russian forces are likely taking advantage of a decrease in Ukrainian activity on this sector of the front to launch localized and successful attacks. Russian forces are unlikely to be able to translate offensive efforts near Bakhmut into wider and more meaningful offensive operations, as the Russian force grouping around Bakhmut is weak and disorganized because Russian forces have been committing more manpower and materiel to deliberate and larger-scale offensive operations near Avdiivka and on the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border.

 

 

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Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8. Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian Kh-31P missile struck a civilian ship flying the flag of Liberia in a port near Odesa City, Odesa Oblast, injuring several people and killing the ship's pilot.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed on November 8 and 9 in an attempt to justify the strike that the ship was carrying military cargo.[21] Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian exports and curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in the Ukrainian corridor.[22]

Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.[23] The Kremlin canceled Putin's annual press conference in December 2022, which ISW assessed was likely in order to preempt the informational risks of Putin addressing difficult questions about the war and international situation live.[24] Similarly, in early June of 2023, Putin postponed the "Direct Line" until November or December 2023.[25] The vagueness with which Peskov announced the two live events suggests that the Kremlin may desire to have the flexibility to cancel them if they deem the informational risks of holding them to be too great. The Kremlin may hope for a wider operational victory in Ukraine to frame both the "Direct Line" and the press conference in a positive light and is likely trying to leave itself room to mitigate if Russian forces cannot secure meaningful battlefield success in Ukraine in the coming month.

Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan. Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized during a meeting with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the 19th Russian-Kazakh Regional Cooperation Forum in Ankara that Russia currently transports gas to Uzbekistan through Kazakhstan and seeks to further develop this transport.[26] Russia began exporting natural gas to Uzbekistan for the first time in October 2023, and Uzbekistan notably still exports its own domestically produced natural gas, including to Russia as recently as 2021, despite suffering domestic shortages in recent years.[27] Uzbekistan's continued export of gas while importing Russian gas for the first time suggests that Uzbekistan may not be the final destination for all its Russian gas imports. Uzbekistan is capable of providing Iran with direct access to other Central Asian as well as Russian and Chinese markets, as ISW-CTP previously reported.[28] Senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi, discussed reviving Iranian-Uzbek economic relations and signed agreements to increase bilateral trade with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in Tehran on June 18, 2023.[29] Iran has also increased its economic diplomacy efforts, including on gas supplies, with other countries in Central Asia. Raisi discussed increasing the volume of gas swaps with Turkmenistan during a meeting with Turkmenistan People's Council Chairman Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in Tehran on May 30.[30] Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji separately announced on May 30 that Iran and Turkmenistan will soon sign an agreement for Iran to import 10 million cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan each day, which will allow Iran to use some of the gas it imports from Turkmenistan to supply electricity and heat to its northern provinces.[31] Iran has consistently struggled with natural gas shortages in winter and summer 2023, and Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to secure further military cooperation with Iran.[32]

Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children. A Russian insider source claimed that Moscow authorities are investigating and charging members of the inner circle of an unspecified nephew of Kadyrov for various crimes including kidnapping, extortion, and organizing a criminal community in both Moscow and Chechnya.[33] The insider source claimed that two high-ranking Chechen security officials lead this inner circle, and that its other members include Chechen police officers and bureaucratic officials.[34] The source claimed that Russian authorities allowed this circle to commit these crimes for "quite a long time" but that "apparently, something is starting to change."[35] It is possible that Russian authorities are targeting Chechen organized crime activities. This insider source's specific reference to Kadyrov, however, suggests either that some Russian authorities may seek to target Kadyrov's affiliates through criminal charges or that some actors may seek to target Kadyrov informationally by using this insider source to discredit him and his family. Kadyrov has notably awarded his children, many of whom are underage, with prominent Chechen governmental positions and awards in recent weeks following the Kremlin's refusal to become involved when his 15-year-old son Adam was filmed beating a detained man in September 2023, sparking domestic outrage.[36]

Key Takeaways:

• The Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat effective reinforcements to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in eastern Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.
• Russian forces have likely launched opportunistic localized offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction and intensified ground attacks near Bakhmut in recent days.
• Russian forces struck a civilian ship near Odesa City on November 8.
• Kremlin Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will occur in tandem on an unspecified date by the end of the year, potentially to set conditions to cancel the events as the Kremlin sees fit.
• Russia may seek to provide gas to Iran through Kazakhstan.
• Unspecified actors appear to be targeting Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov as he continues to heap honors on his children.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Avdiivka direction, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Kupyansk.
• Russian authorities appear to be increasingly reliant on private security companies to protect domestic energy infrastructure from Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian far rear areas.
• Occupation authorities reportedly continued efforts to militarize Ukrainian youth.

 

[Signifyin(g)Monkey]

On 11/8/2023 at 1:03 PM, CayceG said:

 

Oh jesus christ. 

 

 

Feel free to ignore everything this coworker of yours tells you. And if he brings up anything from Tim Pool again, tell him you'll not ever speak with him again. Tim Pool is a fascist. 

 

He’s also one of the clearest illustrations of the ‘audience capture’ phenomenon you can find outside of Glenn Greenwald.

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine has used two naval drones to destroy an additional two Russian vessels, these ones off the coast of Crimea. They were landing vessels equipped with AA TOR systems, so this will widen the air defense holes around Crimea.

[CayceG]

I find it adorable that the Russians are so bad at naval air defense that they've--since day one--been putting land based SAMs on their ships to widen their net. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 10 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 10, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10. The GUR published satellite imagery and reported that the U

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:00pm ET on November 10. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 11 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10. The GUR published satellite imagery and reported that the Ukrainian surface attack drone strike on Uzka Bay near Chornomorsk, occupied Crimea sunk one Project 1176 Akula-class small landing ship and one Project 11770 Serna-class small landing ship.[1] The GUR reported that the Serna-class ship was carrying a crew and was loaded with armored vehicles, including BTR-82 armored personnel carriers, and that Russian forces previously used Serna-class ships to provide cover for Russian BSF ships during raids when Russian forces lacked naval air-defense equipment.[2] A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted the strike on Uzka Bay with four unmanned boats and that it was one of three series of Ukrainian strikes on occupied Crimea on November 10.[3] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also attempted to conduct a drone strike on an oil depot in Feodosia and a Neptune cruise missile strike on BSF and Federal Security Service (FSB) bases in Chornomorsk.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down a Neptune missile over the Black Sea off the coast of Crimea and intercepted two drones over Crimea.[5] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[6]

Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. A prominent Russian milblogger reiterated common complaints about inadequate Russian counterbattery fire, electronic warfare, air defense, and assault operations along the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[7] The milblogger especially complained about improper usage of the Russian 10th Spetsnaz Brigade (Main Military Intelligence Directorate [GRU]) to conduct frontal assaults like standard infantry against Ukrainian positions on the east bank even though these frontal assaults are ineffective in this area. The milblogger expressed concerns about possible future Ukrainian operations in the Kherson direction, but other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are currently unable to achieve a breakthrough in this direction.[8]

Russian milbloggers are likely hyperfocusing on east bank Kherson Oblast due to the significant Russian information space neuralgia about Russian military issues in the area. Some Russian milbloggers appear to be less concerned about the possible near-term threat of Ukrainian operations on the east bank and are more upset about the poor Russian conduct of the war and mistreatment of military personnel.[9] A Russian milblogger complained that Russian forces struggle with the "ossification" of poor habits and conduct within the Russian military. These habits include poor communications, lack of proper preparations before or support during assault missions, conducting rotations in columns, Russian commanders selling frontline aid, and uninterest in learning from military mistakes and acknowledging poor battlefield realities.[10] The milblogger specifically emphasized the importance of Russian military professionalism and becoming the best army in the world. Other Russian milbloggers reiterated standard complaints about Russian military capabilities in Kherson Oblast but claimed that Russian forces still inflict high casualties on Ukrainian forces operating on the east bank.[11] Another prominent milblogger claimed that the situation near Krynky, Kherson Oblast is a "tactical problem" for Russian forces but not a strategic threat.[12]

Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated on November 10 that Russian forces attacked Ukraine with 500 Shahed-131/-136 drones in September 2023 and several hundred drones in October 2023 but are currently launching drone strikes with fewer Shaheds almost every night.[13] Russian milbloggers noted on November 9 that Russian forces conducted large-scale Shahed strikes against Ukraine almost every night from the end of summer until mid-October 2023.[14] The milbloggers claimed that Russia's Shahed strikes have been notably smaller and less frequent in the past month due to Russian forces planning to synchronize a new wave of intense combined strikes with the beginning of future large-scale ground operations. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 10 that Russian forces launched six Shaheds, a Kh-31 missile, and a Kh-59 missile at targets in Ukraine on the night of November 9 to 10.[15] Ukrainian air defenses downed five of the six Shaheds and the Kh-59 missile. Ihnat reported that the Kh-31 missile did not strike its target.[16]

Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024. Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and other unnamed commanders briefed Putin on the progress of the invasion and presented new models of Russian military equipment.[17] Russian state outlets published footage of Shoigu and Gerasimov showing Putin the Desertcross 1000-3 all-terrain vehicle.[18] Russian opposition outlet Meduza observed that an information stand displaying data about the Desertcross 1000-3 in the video claimed that the all-terrain vehicle is intended for patrol, reconnaissance, raid, search, and rescue operations, alongside transporting materiel in difficult road conditions.[19] The information stand also claimed that Russian forces are already using 537 Desertcross 1000-3 vehicles in combat and that Russia plans to purchase an additional 1,590 Desertcross vehicles in December 2023 and in the first quarter of 2024. Meduza noted that US-registered brand Aodes (which is headquartered in China) manufactures the Desertcross vehicles and advertises them as vehicles for hunters, farmers, and forestry workers.

Russian milbloggers have been consistently complaining about the lack of military equipment and vehicles in the Kherson direction, and it is possible that Putin is trying to appeal to Russian personnel fighting in this direction by providing them with hunting and farming vehicles rather than dedicated military vehicles.[20] A prominent Russian milblogger, for example, celebrated the news that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) would provide Russian servicemen with light frontline vehicles.[21] Putin's November 10 visit marks his fifth visit to the SMD headquarters since December 2022 after he last visited the headquarters on October 19.[22]

Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign. Russian news outlet RBK stated on November 10 that sources familiar with the matter indicated that the "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference will likely occur in tandem on December 14.[23] Russian opposition media outlet Verstka stated that sources within the Federation Council indicated that the upper chamber will announce the beginning of the campaign period for the 2024 Russian presidential elections on December 13, as required by Russian law.[24] Verstka stated that presidential candidates have 25 days to complete the nomination procedures after the Federation Council's announcement.[25] Although it is unclear when Putin will announce his presidential campaign, he will likely use the "Direct Line" forum and press conference to promote his candidacy and platform, which a Russian opposition source has indicated will widely avoid highlighting the war in Ukraine.[26] The Kremlin likely decided to hold the two events at once in order to more tightly control and regulate the questions asked. Putin has consistently run as an independent candidate despite his affiliation with the United Russia party, and Russian law dictates that independent candidates must gather at least 300,000 signatures in order to submit their candidacy.[27] Russian opposition media outlets stated on November 10 that the United Russia party is preparing to collect signatures to demonstrate its support for Putin's candidacy and asked employees of the Kursk Oblast Multifunctional Service Center, a state and municipal service provider, to fill out a survey with their personal information and up to three suggestions about how to improve IT services in Russia.[28] The employees reportedly received a letter with the survey stating that they could write one suggestion three times but to fill out the form by hand.[29]

Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.[30] Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported that Russian authorities forcibly deported Yermokhin from Mariupol after Russian forces took occupied the city in May 2022 and placed him with a foster family in Moscow Oblast.[31] Yermokhin's lawyer published a video on his behalf on November 9 pleading for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's help after Yermokhin received a summons for military service on November 8, weeks ahead of his 18th birthday.[32] Russian Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova claimed that Yermokhin testified in writing in August 2023 that he did not plan to return to Ukraine, but Yermokhin's lawyer stated that Russian authorities forced the teenager to write the statement.[33] Meduza reported that Yermokhin previously attempted to escape Russia in March 2023, but that Russian border guards detained him.[34] Lubinets stated that Ukrainian authorities will reunite Yermokhin with his sister in Ukraine in the coming days.[35]

The United Kingdom–led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Operation Interflex, which initially included the United Kingdom but has added Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Lithuania, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Romania, and Sweden as partners since its launch in summer 2022, achieved its goal of 30,000 Ukrainian military personnel trained ahead of time on November 10.[36] The Ukrainian General Staff and UK government stated that the UK has trained over 52,000 Ukrainian soldiers since 2014.[37] The UK government stated that Operation Interflex is the largest military training program on UK territory since the Second World War.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Ukrainian surface attack drones sank two Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) small landing ships in occupied Crimea on November 10.
• Russian milbloggers continue to overreact to the Russian failure to push Ukrainian forces from positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces are launching significantly smaller and less frequent drone strikes against Ukraine in the past month than in previous months ahead of an anticipated large-scale winter strike campaign.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin again visited the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on November 10, possibly in an effort to portray himself as an involved wartime leader ahead of the upcoming presidential elections in March 2024.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin will reportedly hold his annual live "Direct Line" forum and annual press conference in tandem on December 14, and the event will likely serve to promote his presidential campaign.
• Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets announced on November 10 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a 17-year-old Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, will return to Ukraine.
• The United Kingdom-led Operation Interflex has achieved its goal of training 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers between June 2022 and December 2023.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations on November 10 along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• Russian forces continue to struggle with low morale and poor discipline.
• Ukrainian Telegram channel Mariupol Resistance and Ukrainian Mariupol City Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported on November 10 that Ukrainian partisans detonated a police car in occupied Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

This is one potential headache that Kyiv absolutely does NOT need right about now:

 

Ukrainian military officer coordinated Nord Stream pipeline attack that shocked and mystified the West - The Washington Post

WWW.WASHINGTONPOST.COM

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Roman Chervinsky, a colonel in Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces, was integral to the brazen sabotage operation of the Russia-Germany pipeline, say people familiar with planning.

 

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A senior Ukrainian military officer with deep ties to the country's intelligence services played a central role in the bombing of the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline last year, according to officials in Ukraine and elsewhere in Europe, as well as other people knowledgeable about the details of the covert operation.

 

The officer's role provides the most direct evidence to date tying Ukraine's military and security leadership to a controversial act of sabotage that has spawned multiple criminal investigations and that U.S. and Western officials have called a dangerous attack on Europe's energy infrastructure.

 

Roman Chervinsky, a decorated 48-year-old colonel who served in Ukraine's Special Operations Forces, was the "coordinator" of the Nord Stream operation, people familiar with his role said, managing logistics and support for a six-person team that rented a sailboat under false identities and used deep-sea diving equipment to place explosive charges on the gas pipelines. On Sept. 26, 2022, three explosions caused massive leaks on the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines, which run from Russia to Germany under the Baltic Sea. The attack left only one of the four gas links in the network intact as winter approached.

 

 

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Chervinsky did not act alone and he did not plan the operation, according to the people familiar with his role, which has not been previously reported. The officer took orders from more senior Ukrainian officials, who ultimately reported to Gen. Valery Zaluzhny, Ukraine's highest-ranking military officer, said people familiar with how the operation was carried out. They spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive details about the bombing, which has strained diplomatic relations with Ukraine and drawn objections from U.S. officials.

 

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Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Chervinsky had been serving in a unit of Ukraine's Special Operations Forces and was focused on resistance activity in areas of the country occupied by Russia, people familiar with his assignments said. He reported to Maj. Gen. Viktor Hanushchak, a seasoned and respected officer, who communicated directly with Zaluzhny.

 

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In 2020, Chervinsky oversaw a complex plan to lure fighters for Russia's Wagner mercenary group into Belarus, with the goal of capturing them and bringing them to Ukraine to face charges. In his statement to The Post and Der Spiegel, Chervinsky said he also "planned and implemented" operations to kill pro-Russian separatist leaders in Ukraine and to "abduct a witness" that could corroborate Russia's shooting down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over the eastern Donbas region in 2014, which killed all 298 passengers and crew on board. Last year, a Dutch court convicted two Russians and a Ukrainian of murder in the downing, which was caused by a Russian Buk surface-to-air missile.

 

Chervinsky is being held in a Kyiv jail on charges that he abused his power stemming from a plot to lure a Russian pilot to defect to Ukraine in July 2022. Authorities allege that Chervinsky, who was arrested in April, acted without permission and that the operation gave away the coordinates of a Ukrainian airfield, prompting a Russian rocket attack that killed a soldier and injured 17 others.

 

 

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But the Nord Stream operation was designed to keep Zelensky out of the loop, people familiar with the operation said.

 

"All of those involved in planning and execution reported directly to [chief of defense] Zaluzhnyy, so Zelensky wouldn't have known about it," according to intelligence reporting obtained by the CIA that was allegedly shared by Jack Teixeira, a member of the Massachusetts Air National Guard, on the Discord chat platform. Officials in multiple countries have said privately they were confident that Zelensky didn't personally approve the Nord Stream attack.

 

Other secret Ukrainian operations targeting Russian forces, including the operation involving the Russian airplane, also were designed to bypass the Ukrainian president, people familiar with their planning said.

 

Chervinsky has blamed Yermak and several other Zelensky advisers for botching the plan in 2020 to ensnare Wagner fighters after they traveled to Belarus. That sting operation failed, Chervinsky said in a 2021 press interview, because of a leak from Zelensky's inner circle.

 

"It is not just one 'mole' [in Zelensky's administration], it is a bunch of people," Chervinsky said, naming Yermak as well as two other Zelensky advisers. He accused administration officials of being "afraid of challenging Russia."

 

 

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In June 2022, the Dutch military intelligence agency, the MIVD, obtained information that Ukraine might be planning to attack Nord Stream. Officials at the CIA relayed to Zaluzhny through an intermediary that the United States opposed such an operation, according to people familiar with those conversations.

U.S. officials believed the attack had been called off. But it turned out only to have been postponed to three months later, using a different point of departure than originally planned. Key elements of the plan, including the number of people on the bombing team, as well as the use of a rented boat, diving equipment and fake identities remained the same.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 11 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 11, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 11 that Russian forces launched

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:00pm ET on November 11. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 12 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 11 that Russian forces launched 31 Shahed 131/136 drones, two Kh-59 missiles, one Kh-31 missile, one P-800 Onyx anti-ship missile, and an S-300 missile against various targets in Ukraine, and specifically targeted Kyiv Oblast with either an Iskander-M or an S-400 missile.[1] Ukrainian air defenses downed 19 Shaheds (primarily targeting front line areas), one Kh-59 missile, and used a Patriot air defense system to destroy the ballistic missile targeting Kyiv Oblast.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces were targeting an air defense system at the Boryspil Airport near Kyiv City.[3] The Kyiv City Administration stated that it has been 52 days since Russian forces last launched a missile strike against Kyiv Oblast.[4]

Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) was reportedly involved in at least one of three strikes on Russian territory on November 10-11. Ukrainian outlet Suspilne Crimea reported that sources in the GUR stated that the GUR orchestrated an explosion of railway tracks in Ryazan Oblast that caused 19 railroad cars of a freight train to derail on the morning of November 11.[5] The GUR source stated that the explosion will complicate Russian military logistics for the near future. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that the train was carrying mineral fertilizer.[6] Moscow Railways stated that the situation did not affect passenger and commuter trains and that Russian Railways created a headquarters to coordinate any disruptions caused by the derailment.[7] Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti stated that the derailment was due to an "intervention of unauthorized persons."[8] The Main Directorate of the Ministry of Emergency Situations for Tambov Oblast also stated that a fire covering 300 square meters broke out in a gunpowder factory near Kotovsk on the night of November 11.[9] Eyewitnesses reportedly heard explosions before the fire ignited.[10] BBC Russia stated that this is the second such incident at this gunpowder factory after a fire there killed five people in June 2023.[11] GUR spokesperson Andriy Yusov stated on November 11 that he cannot officially confirm or deny information about events in Russia, such as the explosion at the gunpowder plant near Tambov or the train derailment but that such strikes will continue.[12] Geolocated footage published on November 10 also shows smoke coming from a building in Kolomna, Moscow Oblast.[13] Russian sources claimed that locals heard explosions near the Machine-Building Design Bureau, a Rostec state corporation in Kolomna that specializes in missile systems.[14] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces downed one or more drones over the Machine-Building Design Bureau, and a Russian insider source claimed that a drone crashed into the building.[15] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian drones over Smolensk and Moscow oblasts on the night of November 10, and a prominent Russian milblogger similarly claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted several air targets over Smolensk Oblast and Kolomna, Moscow Oblast in the night.[16] Ukrainian officials have not commented on the Kolomna strike as of the time of this publication. Ukrainian Minister of Energy Herman Halushchenko notably stated in an interview published on November 11 that Ukraine would answer Russian strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the winter with reciprocal strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, including oil and gas infrastructure.[17]

Continued Russian milblogger discussion of widespread Russian infantry-led frontal assaults highlights the challenges Russia will face in using massed infantry assaults to offset the problems contributing to the current positional warfare identified by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi. One milblogger emphasized on November 11 that the Russian practice of conducting tactical assaults intended to storm Ukrainian fortified positions in forest areas of Donbas will not translate into a wider operational breakthrough anywhere on the front.[18] The milblogger noted that there is no way to train enough Russian personnel for the intensive frontal assaults required for significant advances in Ukraine.[19] Another milblogger claimed that the Russian military is about to experience a "real renaissance of infantry combat" because there are fewer tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and armored personnel carriers (APCs) close to the frontline.[20] A critical milblogger responded to the "infantry renaissance" comment and remarked that the comment is a negative reflection of Russian equipment losses and poor frontline coordination that has created a reliance on assault tactics.[21] A Russian Spetsnaz-affiliated Telegram channel additionally complained that the reliance on infantry-led frontal assaults is heavily attriting all Spetsnaz elements that have deployed to Ukraine because the Russian command has reportedly been using Spetsnaz forces for frontal assaults since the beginning of the war.[22] Spetsnaz forces are not meant to conduct such infantry-led assaults like standard Russian motorized rifle infantry, and some Russian sources are clearly frustrated with the ramifications of the misapplication of such Spetsnaz elements.

ISW has previously observed that Russian forces are increasingly relying on such infantry-led frontal assaults, likely to compensate for a lack of adequately trained personnel and due to widespread equipment losses.[23] The Russian General Staff appears to be relying heavily on frontal assaults as the predominant tactic in Ukraine as an important part of the Russian solution to the problems of "military parity" laid out by Zaluzhnyi's essay on the issue of "positional warfare."[24]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to be increasingly sidelining his eldest son, 18-year-old Akhmat Kadyrov, in favor of his younger son Adam Kadyrov. Ramzan Kadyrov quietly indicated on November 9 that he appointed Akhmat Deputy First Minister of the Chechen Republic for Physical Culture, Sports, and Youth Policy.[25] This appointment follows Akhmat's 18th birthday on November 8, when Ramzan Kadyrov praised Akhmat for success in his "chosen business" as head of the Chechen "Movement of the First" youth movement.[26] Ramzan Kadyrov's quiet acknowledgment of Akhmat's new position stands in contrast to the recent praise and appointments of his other children, including his appointment of his younger son, Adam, to the Chechen security service position that Ramzan Kadyrov held prior to succeeding his own father.[27] The reason for Ramzan Kadyrov's apparent snubbing of his eldest son is unclear. Akhmat Kadyrov notably met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in early March 2023 while rumors about Ramzan Kadyrov's declining health circulated, fueling speculation that Ramzan Kadyrov, Akhmat, and Putin may have been preparing for Akhmat to succeed his father.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces launched a large-scale missile and drone strike series against Ukraine on the night of November 10 to 11, targeting Kyiv Oblast for the first time in 52 days.
• Ukraine's Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) was reportedly involved in at least one of three strikes on Russian territory on November 10-11.
• Continued Russian milblogger discussion of widespread Russian infantry-led frontal assaults highlights the challenges Russia will face in using massed infantry assaults to offset the problems contributing to the current positional warfare identified by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appears to be increasingly sidelining his eldest son, 18-year-old Akhmat Kadyrov, in favor of his younger son Adam Kadyrov.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
• Russian authorities have reportedly launched another large-scale crypto-mobilization wave.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to fill out the workforce and artificially alter the demographics of occupied Ukraine.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New video from Perun:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 12 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 12, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukraine appears to be intensifying attacks against Russian military, logistics, and other high-profile assets in rear areas in occupied Ukraine and Russia. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 12 that Ukrainian

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on November 12. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 13 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukraine appears to be intensifying attacks against Russian military, logistics, and other high-profile assets in rear areas in occupied Ukraine and Russia. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on November 12 that Ukrainian partisans attacked a Russian military headquarters in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 11, killing at least three Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Rosgvardia officers.[1] The GUR's November 12 announcement follows a Ukrainian partisan attack against a former Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) People's Militia head on November 8; strikes against a Russian military base in occupied Skadovsk, Kherson Oblast and Black Sea Fleet assets in Crimea on November 9; and three rear-area strikes and partisan attacks in Russia on November 11.[2] Ukrainian forces have conducted a strike campaign specifically targeting occupied Crimea since summer 2023.[3]

The Russian government is attempting to downplay the extent of its efforts to strengthen control over the Russian information space. The Russian Ministry of Digital Development claimed on November 12 that it will only block specific virtual private network (VPN) services that an "expert commission" identifies as threats, likely aiming to prevent Russians from bypassing Russian censorship efforts and anonymizing themselves online.[4] The Ministry of Digital Development had responded to an inquiry from the "Novyi Lyudi" faction expressing concern over the Russian government's efforts to restrict access to information on the internet and fears that the Russian government will simply identify all VPN services as threats and block them.[5] The Russian government recently announced a ban on services that provide virtual and temporary mobile numbers starting on September 1, 2024, and Russians can use these mobile numbers in conjunction with VPN services to form anonymous online personas to evade Russian censorship efforts.[6] The Russian government is very unlikely to allow any VPNs to operate within Russia that would allow Russians to bypass censorship efforts and remain anonymous from the Russian government.

Russia continues to posture itself as a prominent security guarantor for authoritarian countries in Africa. Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin stated during a television interview with the "Voyennaya Priemka" program on November 12 that Russia will sign military cooperation agreements with six additional African countries in the near future.[7] Fomin stated that Russia currently has military agreements with 30 of the 54 African countries and added that Russia is "very active" on the African continent. Fomin did not specify which African countries Russia will sign agreements with, although Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov have met with delegations from Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali, and Libya in recent months.[8] French-language outlet Jeune Afrique reported on November 11 that a group of Russian servicemen arrived in Burkina Faso to protect President Ibrahim Traore from future coup attempts, which Russian sources credited as an outcome of Shoigu's November 7 meeting with Burkinabe Minister of Defense and Veteran Affairs Brigadier General Kassoum Coulibaly.[9] The Kremlin appears to be using military agreements with Sahelian juntas to insert itself into the power vacuums created by the withdrawal of Western actors from the region, such as the UN's withdrawal from Mali.[10]

Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine on November 12. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched two Kh-59 cruise missiles and an Iskander ballistic missile at targets in southern Ukraine.[11] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted a Kh-59 cruise missile over Mykolaiv Oblast and that the second Kh-59 missile and the Iskander missile struck unpopulated areas.[12]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukraine appears to be intensifying attacks against Russian military, logistics, and other high-profile assets in rear areas in occupied Ukraine and Russia.
• The Russian government is attempting to downplay the extent of its efforts to strengthen control over the Russian information space.
• Russia continues to posture itself as a prominent security guarantor for authoritarian countries in Africa.
• Russian forces conducted a limited series of missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine on November 12.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces made a marginal gain on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 12 amid ongoing ground operations.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Sounds like the US has brokered a deal with Jordan to give 60 Gepard AA tanks to Ukraine. These will be good against drone strikes. Crazy that we're reverting back to shell/flak weapons, as they work better against drones.

[mclumber1]

I think it would be interesting to see the development of anti-drone laser systems.  Most of the FPV drones being used in the war are visible on radar and infrared I would imagine.  A device that constantly scans the sky above a formation of troops should be able to target non-friendly drones with a sufficiently powerful laser to either destroy it outright or blind its sensors to the point where it would be unable to complete its mission.  This device probably wouldn't be useful against ballistic missiles or lancet drones, however. 

[SuperSpreader]

EMP Cannon 

[CitizenVectron]

Russian state media TASS accidentally released a press release announcing the withdrawal of Russian troops away from the Dnipro, but it was quickly retracted. So...who knows what that is about. Ukraine has continued to move soldiers across, potentially as many as 500+ in their foothold near Krynky, as well as establishing a small beachhead a little further north. I don't expect Ukraine has big ambitions for this area, other than trying to divert Russian forces.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 13 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 13, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 13. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 14 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank. Kremlin press wire TASS and Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti published reports claiming that the command of the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces (currently active in east bank Kherson Oblast) decided to transfer troops to unspecified "more advantageous positions" east of the Dnipro River and that the Russian military command would transfer elements from the "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces to other directions for offensive operations following the regrouping.[1] TASS and RIA Novosti withdrew the reports within minutes and TASS later issued an apology wherein it claimed that it had "erroneously" released its report.[2] Russian state-affiliated outlet RBK reported that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) called the reports of a regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast "false" and a "provocation."[3] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov responded to a question about the situation in Kherson Oblast by stating that only the Russian military can and should comment on the situation.[4]

The Russian MoD has not acknowledged persisting Ukrainian positions on the east bank or ongoing larger-than-usual Ukrainian ground operations in recent weeks. Russian milbloggers have increasingly reported on Ukrainian activity on the left bank, however, sharply contrasting with the continued lack of acknowledgement from Russian state media and Russian officials.[5] The Russian command has previously struggled to establish a coordinated informational approach to developments in Ukraine, particularly when the Russian command failed to set informational conditions for defeats during the Kharkiv 2022 counteroffensive.[6] Previous failures to set coordinated informational approaches have led to chaotic fractures and pronounced discontent in the Russian information space, and the Russian command risks repeating these incidents with the situation on the east bank, which has drawn notable concern from Russian ultranationalists.[7] The reports' references to Russian "offensives" elsewhere on the front suggests that the uncoordinated informational approach may be more widespread than the east bank, since the Russian command has not explicitly recognized any current Russian operations in Ukraine as an offensive effort.[8]

The now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military. Russian media outlet RBK reported that the original TASS and RIA Novosti reports stated that the commander of the joint Russian group of forces in Ukraine (unnamed in the article, but in reference to Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov) heard and agreed with arguments from the "Dnepr" group command (also unnamed in the article, but known to be Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky) and ordered the "Dnepr" group to redeploy and free up forces for offensive operations in other unspecified directions.[9] The suggestion that two high-ranking military commanders would have a discussion on reallocating Russian forces away from a certain sector of the front to another is not outlandish or improbable. RBK's report further suggests that the Russian military command has assessed that the situation in Kherson Oblast is not overtly threatening to Russian forces. Despite near-constant anxiety about the Kherson direction on the part of milbloggers, the Russian military command itself seems to be preoccupied with other sectors of the front, namely the Avdiivka direction, where Russian forces are pursuing renewed offensive operations.[10] Gerasimov and Teplinsky may have weighed the costs of maintaining frontline units in Kherson Oblast with the benefits of redeploying these units to other areas of the front and decided that the current Russian grouping in rear areas of Kherson is sufficient to defend against Ukrainian operations on the east bank. Ukrainian military observer Konstantyn Mashovets remarked on November 12 that the Russian command in the Kherson direction has refused to commit to the front lines additional forces of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) and 7th Air Assault (VDV) Division beyond the elements of single regiments and battalions, opting instead to maintain the remainder of these formations in near rear areas and secondary echelons of defense.[11] Mashovets noted that the Russian presence in frontline areas of Kherson Oblast is "limited."[12] The suggestion that Russian forces have a stronger rear-area presence in Kherson Oblast largely tracks with purported discussions between Gerasimov and Teplinsky to free up these frontline elements and commit them to other areas of the front.

Alternatively, the Russian military command may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated on November 13 that Ukrainian officials have not observed any Russian forces withdrawing from positions on the east bank and that the TASS and RIA Novosti reports are a part of a Russian information operation to distract Ukrainian forces.[13] Ukrainian forces are very unlikely to make any operational-level decisions based on limited media reports of a Russian regrouping, however, and if the reports are a part of an information operation, they will likely fail to deceive the Ukrainian command.

It is unlikely that an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported "regrouping" of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets. Several Russian sources suggested that an unspecified actor posing as the Russian MoD from a fake account could have provided the information to Russian state news outlet RIA Novosti.[14] It is very unlikely that an outside actor posing as the Russian MoD could deceive Russian state media outlets as Russian state media is closely connected to Russian government bodies including the Russian MoD.

Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro. The published reports use relatively neutral language and notably do not announce a "retreat" or "withdrawal," instead discussing a "transfer" and "regrouping."[15] The Russian media frenzy that followed, including the immediate retraction of the statements, a direct response from the Kremlin, and emphatic milblogger refutations, reflects the fact that any mention of the Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast generates near-immediate information space neuralgia.[16] It also appears that the Russian information space has not yet determined how to discuss the operational situation on the east bank of the Dnipro, and that any inflection in the situation there can generate an informational shock. The Russian MoD falsely framed the Russian retreat from Kharkiv Oblast in early September of 2022 as a "regrouping," and that word and general concept apparently remains highly neuralgic for the Russian information space.

Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations. Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo noted on November 13 that rain and mud in Donbas impede the speed of ground maneuver advances.[17] Ukrainian 14th Mechanized Brigade Spokesperson Nadiya Zamryha stated on November 12 that fog and rain complicate both Russian and Ukrainian aerial reconnaissance efforts and lead to reduced numbers of attacks.[18] Zamryha added that the falling leaves complicate efforts to hide equipment and personnel. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian aviation has been less active in southern Ukraine due to weather conditions and that Russian forces are attempting to launch as many glide bombs as possible with each sortie.[19] A Ukrainian reserve officer assessed that mud will make many roads near Avdiivka impassable, complicating logistics for both sides.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that recent heavy rains led to reduced shelling and that strong winds and rain interfere with Russian drone operations and complicate offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[21] Russian sources also circulated footage purporting to show mud and rain filled Ukrainian trenches.[22] ISW continues to assess that fall weather conditions will decrease the tempo of Russian and Ukrainian operations but not halt them entirely, and that fighting will continue on both sides throughout the winter months as it did in the winter of 2022-2023 and in the years between 2014-2022.[23]

Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter. Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk responded on November 13 to the forecasted large-scale Russian strike series against Ukrainian critical infrastructure in the upcoming winter and stated that Ukraine is preparing air defense capabilities and needs additional air defense systems and long-range missiles, such as ATACMS, to hit Russian rear areas.[24] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on November 12 that Ukrainian forces' current main task is to disrupt Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs) and that these disruptions, coupled with the onset of inclement weather, will "freeze" Russian offensive operations.[25] Fityo also stated on November 13 that Ukrainian disruptions of Russian GLOCs will create issues for the supply of food, water, ammunition, and winter materials to Russian forces.[26] Ukrainian forces have been conducting an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily Black Sea Fleet assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine, and Ukraine may intend to intensify and widen this interdiction campaign in the coming months.[27]

A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets. A Russian milblogger claimed that all types of Russian units work together to identify, record, direct, and confirm Russian strikes on Ukrainian targets.[28] The milblogger complained that the Russian information space barely covers these events, which creates a "false impression of [Russian forces'] inaction." The milblogger claimed that the Russian information space instead devotes more coverage to Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory and that Russian milbloggers have to search for information about the alleged Russian strikes on their own. The milblogger urged other milbloggers and "ordinary pro-Russian residents of Ukraine" to offer "brighter" coverage of Russian strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure and military targets in order to "create the spirit of victory in the media space." The milblogger offered an example of the alleged insufficient coverage, claiming that Russian forces struck five unspecified Ukrainian railway junctions on an unspecified date in response to the Ukrainian operation that derailed a Russian freight train in Ryazan Oblast on November 11. The milblogger did not report on these five alleged Russian strikes previously but did report on the Ukrainian operation in Ryazan Oblast.[29] The wider Russian information space has also not reported on these alleged five retaliatory strikes, and the Russian milblogger did not specify where they got this information.[30]

Russian forces have used many of their long-range weapons to target Ukrainian critical and civilian infrastructure and have recently increased glide bomb strikes against populated areas of the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast.[31] One critical Russian milblogger, whom Russian authorities later arrested, complained in July 2023 that the Russian strike campaign was more "retaliatory" than "operationally sound" and blamed the Russian General Staff for wasting Russian efforts on striking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure rather than military infrastructure.[32] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 12 that Ukraine will focus on responding to the large-scale Russian series of strikes on Ukrainian critical infrastructure that are likely to occur in the winter, and Ukrainian officials have signaled their intent to strike military and energy targets within Russia and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.[33]

US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor. Brink also stated that Ukraine has used the corridor to export 3.7 million tons of food and other goods, presumably since the first civilian vessel successfully departed from a Ukrainian port through the corridor on August 15.[34] Russian forces have continually conducted strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and mined water areas to disrupt and discourage civilian maritime traffic through the corridor.[35]

Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa. A Russian insider source claimed on November 13 that the Russian MoD, led by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and members of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), has been attempting to recruit former Wagner personnel at the former Wagner base in Molkino, Krasnodar Krai, to Russian MoD operations in Africa since September 2023.[36] The insider source claimed that the Russian MoD is offering former Wagner personnel 110,000-ruble (about $1,200) salaries, "promising" positions and ranks, and the formation of a separate unit capable of operating in Libya, Syria, Mali, and Burkina Faso.[37] The insider source also claimed that the reported leader of Redut private military company (PMC), Konstantin Mirzoyants, denied the MoD's offers on November 8 and claimed that the Russian MoD would not form a separate unit and that all personnel would go to Burkina Faso, which caused over 120 former Wagner personnel to reject contracts with the Russian MoD and leave Molkino.[38] ISW cannot confirm any of the insider source's claims.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian state media released and later retracted reports about the "regrouping" of Russian forces on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further east of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian command and/or Russian state media apparatus has failed to establish a coordinated information line for the Russian response to ongoing Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank.
• There are three hypotheses of varying likelihood for the release of the now-retracted reports of a Russian regrouping on the east bank of Kherson Oblast: They may be indicative of actual discussions taking place in the high echelons of Russian military command that may have prematurely entered the information space before being officially released by the Russian military; the Russian military command alternatively may have instructed state media to release and then retract these reports as part of an information operation that aims to have Ukrainian forces underestimate available Russian manpower on the east bank of Kherson Oblast; or an outside source posing as the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided information about the reported "regrouping" of Russian forces on the left bank of Kherson Oblast to Russian state media outlets.
• Regardless of the causes and circumstances of the TASS and RIA Novosti reports, the reaction to them suggests that events in Kherson Oblast continue to be highly neuralgic in the pro-war information space and emphasizes that the Russian media space still has not coalesced around a singular rhetorical line about what is happening on the east bank of the Dnipro.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources noted that weather conditions are impacting the battlespace but not halting operations.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukraine will likely conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in the upcoming winter.
• A Russian milblogger called on actors in the Russian information space to more widely amplify Russian strikes on Ukrainian military assets as opposed to Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas, indirectly highlighting a unique dynamic wherein the majority of reported Russian strikes seem to affect Ukrainian civilian objects, whereas the majority of reported Ukrainian strikes affect Russian military assets.
• US Ambassador to Ukraine Bridget Brink stated that the 100th civilian ship departed the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels on November 13, amid continued Russian efforts to deter usage of the corridor.
• Former Wagner Group personnel are reportedly rejecting Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) recruitment attempts aimed at subsuming Wagner operations in Africa.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas of the frontline.
• Ukrainian officials continued to discuss Russian forced mobilization of Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas of Ukraine.
• Russian occupation officials continued to deport Ukrainian children to Russia under vacation schemes.

 

[Jason]

This is such a Greek story. 

 

Forbidden Russian oil flows into Pentagon supply chain

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/11/14/russian-oil-sanctions-us-greece-turkey

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 14 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 14, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces are likely trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine by conducting several simultaneous offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, although it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to fully regain the initiative as

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 14. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 15 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces are likely trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine by conducting several simultaneous offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, although it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to fully regain the initiative as Ukrainian forces maintain pressure on critical areas of the front. Several Ukrainian officials noted that the situation along the frontline is complex but that Ukrainian forces maintain control of the battlespace.[1] Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi stated on November 13 during a conversation with US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Charles Brown that the Avdiivka, Kupyansk, and Marinka directions are the most intense but noted that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive actions in unspecified sectors of the front.[2] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi emphasized that Russian forces are pursuing simultaneous offensive actions in several directions and trying particularly to regain the initiative north and south of Bakhmut.[3] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces are reporting an increase of Russian assaults in the Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Donetsk directions.[4]

Ukrainian officials' statements about the current tempo of Russian operations along the frontline are consistent with ISW's assessment about ongoing Russian offensive operations, particularly in the Kupyansk, Bakhmut, and Avdiivka directions.[5] Russian forces will likely struggle to fully regain the initiative across the theater, however, and Ukrainian forces are continuing their own offensive operations and making tactical-level gains along the front, particularly in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[6] The Russian military command will likely have to decide whether to keep certain Russian elements on certain sectors of the front to defend against ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations or to redeploy them to support offensive operations elsewhere that will likely culminate without reinforcements. These choices will likely hinder Russia's ability to fully regain the initiative in the coming weeks.

Ukrainian President's Office Head Andriy Yermak stated on November 13 that Ukrainian forces have established a "foothold" on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[7] In a speech at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC, Yermak emphasized that despite the challenging battlefield situation, Ukrainian forces have "gained a foothold on the left bank of the Dnipro" and continue counteroffensive operations in unspecified sectors of the front.[8] ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces have been conducting larger-than-usual ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast since mid-October 2023 and that Ukrainian forces appear to be able to maintain and supply their current positions on the Russian-controlled side of Kherson Oblast.[9] Geolocated footage published on November 13 shows that Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson Oblast and 2km from the Dnipro River).[10]

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to the Russian federal election law on November 14 that increase the Kremlin's control over the conduct of elections and reduce election transparency ahead of the 2024 presidential elections.[11] The amendments allow the Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) to control the specifics and conduct of elections in areas under martial law, which notably includes occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, and stipulates that voting in these areas will only occur following coordination among the regional occupation administrations, the CEC, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Federal Security Service (FSB). The amendments also restrict media access to polling places and election commission meetings exclusively to Russian-accredited journalists and media organizations. Russian-accredited journalists who seek access to polling areas in the jurisdiction of Russian military units require the approval of the unit's commander to visit the areas. The amendments also necessitate that any actor legally designated as a "foreign agent" who speaks during a campaign event must announce that designation at the start of the speech and further prohibits presidential campaigning on blocked online platforms, such as opposition outlets Meduza and Vazhnye Istorii. These amendments allow the Russian federal government to increasingly control election campaigning and coverage of polling in Russian media to set conditions for additional Kremlin controls over Russian elections to help re-elect Putin in 2024. The Russian government may also postpone or cancel presidential elections in occupied Ukraine depending on the frontline situation and their ability to convincingly portray Putin as the winning candidate in these areas.

Russian forces conducted another wave of missile, air, and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear areas on the night of November 13–14. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 14 that overnight Russian forces launched nine Shahed-131/-136 drones from the direction of Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; an Iskander-M ballistic missile from the direction of Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea; and Kh-35 cruise missiles from the direction of occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[12] Ukrainian forces reportedly shot down seven of the nine Shaheds.[13] Ukraine's Southern Operational Command clarified that a ballistic missile, presumably the Iskander-M, struck an open area near Chornobaiivka, Kherson Oblast, and Russian forces launched Kh-59s at Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts.[14] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat noted that Russian forces are using ballistic missiles more frequently because they are more challenging for Ukrainian air defenses to intercept.[15] Russian sources claimed that Russian strikes hit military assets and critical infrastructure in Cherkasy, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, and Kirovohrad oblasts, as well as the Shebelinsky gas processing plant in Kharkiv Oblast, although ISW has not observed visual evidence for all of these strikes.[16]

Ukraine's Western partners announced new efforts to continue providing Ukraine with military and financial aid. Germany announced a new aid package to Ukraine on November 13 that includes 10 Leopard tanks, 14 Bandvagn 206 tracked all-terrain vehicles, and 1,020 155-mm shells, and Reuters reported on November 12 that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's governing coalition has agreed in principle to double Germany's military aid to Ukraine next year to €8 billion.[17] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on November 13 that Ukrainian pilots began training at the F-16 training center in Romania.[18] NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasized on November 14 that sustained NATO support for Ukraine is important as the current situation on the battlefield is difficult.[19] EU Foreign Affairs Representative Josep Borrell stated on November 13 that Ukraine is the EU's top priority and that the EU's commitment will not waver.[20] Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs Dmytro Kuleba highlighted the importance of speeding up the EU's plan to supply Ukraine with one million shells by March 2024 during a meeting with the EU Council of Foreign Ministers on November 13, but Politico reported on November 14 that German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius expressed doubt that the EU would be able to meet this target.[21] Politico also reported that Borrell stated that the European defense industry is exporting about 40 percent of its current production to third countries and urged European countries to shift exports to Ukraine as "priority one."[22] Borrell stated that the EU's ability to supply Ukraine with one million shells "will depend on how quickly orders come to the industry and how quickly the industry reacts."[23] Stoltenberg also reiterated on November 14 that NATO has put in place framework contracts worth €2.4 billion, including €1 billion worth of firm orders, and stated that NATO countries are increasing production in order to reach the target of one million shells by March 2024.[24] Politico reported that Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur also announced that Estonia offered five European companies a procurement offer for €280 million worth of 155-mm artillery ammunition.[25]

The Russian government is likely attempting to force Google to cease operations in Russia. The Moscow Magistrate's Court fined Google 15 million rubles (roughly $165,745) on November 14 for the repeated failure to localize the personal data of Russian citizens in Russia.[26] Russian state censor Roskomnadzor requires foreign internet-based services to localize databases of Russian users as of July 1, 2021, and Russian courts previously fined Google 15 million rubles in June 2022 for failing to adhere to this law.[27] The Russian government has previously fined Russian internet giant Yandex for also failing to adhere to Russian laws regarding disclosing users' personal data to the government, likely forcing Yandex to split its Russian entity from its international entity to adhere to Russian laws and allowing the Russian government to exercise increased control and surveillance over Russians' usage of Yandex.[28] The Russian government previously banned certain Western social media sites and demanded that Google remove "false information" about the Russian war in Ukraine in early 2022.[29] The Russian government likely aims to force Russians to utilize search engines and other internet services of Russian companies that the government can control better than international entities like Google.

Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Russian–Armenian relations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan informed Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko on November 14 that he would not participate in the Russian-led Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO) meeting in Minsk on November 23.[30] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov responded to Pashinyan's announcement, stating that the Kremlin understands that heads of state have their own events in their work schedules but that this is regrettable as meetings like the CSTO meeting are a "very good occasion for exchanging opinions" and coordinating ideas.[31] Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan told journalists on November 9 that Armenia is currently not discussing the legal process of leaving the CSTO.[32]

Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy suggested a measure that would restrict work opportunities for migrants from countries that have not designated Russian as a state language, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service. Tolstoy proposed restricting migrants from working in service sector jobs if they are not citizens from a country that designates Russian as a state language at a Federation Council meeting on state policy in the field of preservation, protection, and development of Russian language on November 14.[33] Tolstoy claimed that post-Soviet countries are teaching English and "trying to supplant Russian with their national language."[34] If Tolstoy's measure is officially proposed and passed, it would allow Russian authorities to limit work opportunities for migrants from Central Asia and the south Caucasus, potentially making it easier for Russian authorities to coerce migrants into serving in the Russian military due to a lack of other labor alternatives. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan designate Russian a state language while the titular languages are their state languages.[35] Tajik law designates Russian as a language of "interethnic communication."[36] The Russian language does not have a legally designated status in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, or Armenia.[37] Russian authorities may also be attempting to pass laws restricting migrant work in Russia in an effort to placate Russian ultranationalists who are often critical of migrants working in Russia ahead of the Russian presidential elections in 2024.

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces are likely trying to regain the theater-level initiative in Ukraine by conducting several simultaneous offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, although it remains unclear if Russian forces will be able to fully regain the initiative as Ukrainian forces maintain pressure on critical areas of the front.
• Ukrainian President's Office Head Andriy Yermak stated on November 13 that Ukrainian forces have established a "foothold" on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin approved amendments to the Russian federal election law on November 14 that increase the Kremlin's control over the conduct of elections and reduce election transparency ahead of the 2024 presidential elections.
• Russian forces conducted another wave of missile, air, and drone strikes against Ukrainian rear areas on the night of November 13–14.
• Ukraine's western partners announced new efforts to continue providing Ukraine with military and financial aid.
• The Russian government is likely attempting to force Google to cease operations in Russia.
• Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations.
• Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy suggested a measure that would restrict work opportunities for migrants from countries that have not designated Russian as a state language, likely as part of an ongoing effort to coerce migrants into Russian military service.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 14 and advanced in some areas.
• The Russian government discussed amendments that would more strictly penalize those who evade mobilization as well as volunteer servicemen who "improperly" perform their duties.
• Russian occupation officials are beginning to announce that occupied areas of Ukraine will not hold significant public Christmas and New Years' celebrations due to security concerns.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 15 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 15, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia. The ban, if enacted and effectively enforced, could deal a significant blow to Russia’s defense industrial b

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 15. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 16 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia. The ban, if enacted and effectively enforced, could deal a significant blow to Russia's defense industrial base (DIB) given precision machine tools' importance in industrial manufacturing. Bloomberg reported on November 15 that the EU's 12th sanctions package proposes a ban on the export of precision machine tools and machinery parts that Russia uses to make weapons and ammunition, such as welding machines, lithium batteries, thermostats, motors, and drone motors.[1] Bloomberg reported that Russia has been importing precision machines and precision machine tools from Europe to sustain its ammunition production and other DIB production efforts. Bne Intellinews reported in June 2021 that Russia's near total reliance on European- and US-produced precision machine tools makes Russia particularly vulnerable to such sanctions and noted that at the time Russia imported almost all of the precision machines it required.[2]

Russia has been increasingly attempting to develop import substitution solutions for sourcing Western-made precision machine tools in 2023, likely in preparation for Western sanctions targeting this vulnerability. The Russian government approved in May 2023 the "Concept of Technological Development until 2030," which encourages domestic production of high-tech products such as precision machine tools and mandates that domestic enterprises produce at least 75 percent of Russia's high-tech products by 2030.[3] Russian state-owned defense conglomerate Rostec reported in August 2023 that Russia's STAN group, the country's largest domestic precision machine manufacturer, which Rostec purchased in 2019, is a major element of Russia's import substitution program.[4] Rostec subsidiary RT-Capital's head, Semyon Yakubov, told Kommersant on October 26 that Rostec hopes to use the STAN Group to meet Russia's "great need" for modern precision machines in the absence of Western imports.[5] Yakubov stated that Western sanctions and the war in Ukraine have sharply increased Russia's military and civilian demand for domestically produced machine tools. Yabukov noted that STAN was unable to meet even a third of the total volume of Russia's orders for precision machines in 2023, worth around six billion rubles (approximately $67.1 million). Yabukov stated that Russia's demand for precision machines is "much greater" than its current production abilities.

Denmark will reportedly start inspecting and potentially blocking Russian oil tankers in an effort to enforce a price cap on Russian oil and the European Union's (EU) insurance regulations. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 15 that the EU proposed measures that would allow Denmark to inspect and block Russian oil tankers traveling through the Danish straits. These measures are part of an EU effort to enforce a G7 cap demanding that Western insurers only provide coverage to Russian shipments where oil is sold for less than $60 per barrel.[6] An unnamed senior European government official told FT that "almost none" of the Russian maritime oil shipments in October 2023 were below the $60 barrel price cap.[7] FT also reported that the EU is concerned that Russian tankers are violating EU regulations by frequently traveling with falsified financial statements or non-Western insurance.[8]

The Ukrainian government reached a deal with international insurers that will provide affordable coverage to vessels carrying grain and other critical food supplies through the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels, amid continued Russian efforts to deny navigation through the corridor. The Financial Times (FT) reported on November 15 that the Ukrainian government reached a deal with insurance broker giant Marsh McLennan to provide up to $50 million in hull and liability insurance from Lloyd's of London firms for each vessel carrying agricultural goods.[9] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated that this agreement would allow Ukraine to "provide vital food supplies to the world at the same time as supporting the Ukrainian economy and keeping the Black Sea open for international trade."[10] Russian forces have continually conducted strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure and mined areas in the Black Sea to deny freedom of navigation in the corridor.[11]

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with Russian election commission representatives on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference. Putin stated that the Russian government will "continue to do everything necessary to prevent any illegal intrusion into electoral processes."[12] Putin notably did not specifically reference the March 2024 presidential elections, nor did he announce his announce his presidential campaign.

Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations. The Levada Center – an independent Russian polling organization – reported on October 31 that 55 percent of respondents to a recent poll believe that Russia should begin peace negotiations while 38 percent favor continuing to conduct the war.[13] The Levada Center observed that while these numbers slightly increased between September and October by four percent, they have largely remained consistent since July 2023.[14] The Levada Center added that support for Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine remained high with 76 percent of respondents stating that they support Russian military operations in Ukraine. The Levada Center reported that 62 percent of surveyed Russians believe that the full-scale invasion is progressing well, while 21 percent of respondents believe that the war is going reasonably or very poorly for Russia.[15] The Levada Center reported on November 14 that two-thirds of respondents believe that Russia is headed in the right direction and of those who believe the opposite, 45 percent cited the war in Ukraine.[16] Opposition-leaning Russian research organization Russian Field reported similar numbers supporting negotiations on November 15, noting that 48 percent of respondents said that Russia should engage in peace negotiations and that 74 percent would support Russian President Vladimir Putin if he signed a peace agreement "tomorrow."[17] Russian Field stated that 36 percent of respondents believe that the war is going well for Russia whereas 25 percent believe that the war is going poorly for Russia and that respondents who trust Telegram channels are twice as likely to believe that the war is going poorly for Russia as those who rely on Russian television.[18]

Yandex NV - the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex - reportedly aims to sell all its Russian assets by the end of 2023, allowing the Russian government to further increase its hold over the Russian information space. Reuters and Bloomberg reported on November 14, citing sources familiar with the matter, that Yandex NV likely aims to sell all its Russian assets, not just a controlling stake, by the end of 2023.[19] One of Reuters' sources claimed that Yandex NV seeks a complete break from Russia while another source stated that a complete exit is likely but undecided. Reuters and Bloomberg reported that Yandex NV will host a board meeting on the deal in late November and hopes to finalize a deal by December 2023.[20] The Kremlin has been attempting to crypto-nationalize Yandex through coercive measures since at least the summer of 2023 and reportedly approved a prior deal to sell Russian Yandex holdings to an affiliate of Russian Presidential Administration First Deputy Head Sergey Kiriyenko.[21] The Yandex crypto-nationalization effort likely supports the Kremlin's preparations for the 2024 Russian presidential elections.

Key Takeaways:

• The European Union (EU) appears poised to ban the export of precision machine tools and key weapons manufacturing equipment components to Russia.
• Denmark will reportedly start inspecting and potentially blocking Russian oil tankers in an effort to enforce a price cap on Russian oil and the European Union's (EU) insurance regulations.
• The Ukrainian government reached a deal with international insurers that will provide affordable coverage to vessels carrying grain and other critical food supplies through the Black Sea corridor for civilian vessels, amid continued Russian efforts to deny navigation through the corridor.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin stated during a meeting with Russian election commission representatives on November 15 that the Russian government will suppress any foreign or domestic election interference.
• Recent Russian opinion polls indicate that roughly half of Russians maintain support for the war in Ukraine and for Russia to engage in peace negotiations.
• Yandex NV - the Dutch holding company of Russian internet technology company Yandex - reportedly aims to sell all its Russian assets by the end of 2023, allowing the Russian government to further increase its hold over the Russian information space.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.
• A Russian insider source claimed that Kremlin-created Defenders of the Fatherland Foundation, which presented a limited number of former Wagner fighters with the certificates of their combat veteran status, is coercing former Wagner fighters into signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Russian and occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian students in occupied Ukraine.

 

[Air_Delivery]

Russians report rainbows to security forces because they remind them of LGBT propaganda

NEWS.YAHOO.COM

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The Russian Duma has asked the media monitoring agency Roskomnadzor to officially declare that there is no link between rainbows and the LGBT community. Source: Russian news agency TASS Details: Vladislav Davankov, Deputy Speaker of the State Duma (the lower chamber of the Russian parliament), noted that there has been an increase in cases of citizens complaining to law enforcement agencies about LGBT...

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 16 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 16, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

---

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-131/136 drones of which Ukrainian forces destroyed 16. The

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 16. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 17 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 18 Shahed-131/136 drones of which Ukrainian forces destroyed 16.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched S-300 missiles targeting Kharkiv Oblast and that Ukrainian forces destroyed a Kh-59 cruise missile over Poltava Oblast on the evening of November 15.[2] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on November 16 that Russian forces changed the timing of the November 16 drone attack from their normal strike pattern by conducting the drone strikes until around 9:30am local time, as opposed to conducting the attacks at their usual time from around 10:00pm to 3:00-4:00am.[3] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that the Russian military has concentrated over 800 missiles, including Kalibr and Onyx missiles, in occupied Crimea and intends to use all of them against Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter 2023.[4]

Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev announced on November 16 that Russian authorities are strengthening Russian air defense over Russia's Central Federal Okrug, likely in response to Ukraine's recently implied intent to conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in rear areas during the winter. Patrushev also announced that Russian authorities have organized patrols to protect critical infrastructure facilities to prevent attacks and that the Russian government is funding the creation of "territorial defense lines" for oblasts bordering Ukraine.[5] Patrushev added that Russian authorities are updating a list of all critical infrastructure facilities – including fuel and energy facilities and important transportation objects – that require protection from unspecified threats.[6] The Central Federal Okrug consists of 18 federal subjects including Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod oblasts, which border Ukraine.[7] Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Iryna Vereshchuk stated on November 13 that Ukraine needs additional air defense systems and long-range missiles to strike Russian rear areas.[8] Ukrainian Ground Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated on November 12 that Ukrainian forces' current main task is to disrupt Russian ground lines of communications (GLOCs).[9]

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize actors in the Russian information space for distorting the reality of the Russian war effort, highlighting an emerging cyclical dynamic in the Russian information space in which the majority of Russian sources coalesce around a particular predominant narrative and, in turn, a subset of different sources coalesces to criticize the majority's prevailing opinion. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 16 that Russian state media may have falsely convinced the Russian people that "everything is fine" in Russia's war in Ukraine.[10] The milblogger claimed that he does not understand why Russian state media devotes so much time to promoting narratives about the "imminent collapse of Ukraine" and portrays the Russian war effort so positively that Russian viewers think that signing a military service contract is unnecessary. Another Russian milblogger who previously served throughout the front in Ukraine and correctly assessed Russia's foundational problems in Kharkiv Oblast in spring 2022 criticized several unnamed Russian milbloggers for their recent overly positive reporting about Russian counterattacks on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[11] The milblogger claimed that the other milbloggers preemptively claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on the east bank and criticized them for setting unrealistic expectations for Russian forces. The milblogger noted that such overoptimistic claims are forcing Russian servicemen to "catch up" to these Russian politicians' and commanders' unrealistic expectations of Russian battlefield successes. The milblogger's complaint suggests that the situation in Kherson Oblast remains very ambiguous and is dynamic. The milblogger's complaint mirrors recent reports that the Russian General Staff uses battlefield maps that differ from tactical reality and that local Russian commanders order Russian forces to conduct routine assaults to make gains that align with the Russian General Staff's inaccurate maps.[12] Disjointed Kremlin efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space and report overly optimistic news are likely creating these cycles of coalescence and backlash among Russian sources. The Russian information space may grow increasingly volatile as the rift between the Kremlin optimists and their critics expands.

Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded a prominent Russian milblogger who was previously critical of Russia's military performance during its full-scale invasion with a prestigious state honor, continuing the Kremlin's long-standing effort to coopt milbloggers and make them loyal to the Kremlin. Putin awarded founder of Rybar Telegram channel, Mikhail Zvinchuk, the Russian Order of Merit of the Fatherland Second Class for his efforts supporting the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on November 16.[13] Other Russian milbloggers congratulated Zvinchuk and praised him for launching the first awarded Telegram channel in Russia.[14] Putin had previously engaged Zvinchuk by recruiting him to join the Kremlin working group on mobilization problems on December 20, 2022, which ISW assessed was Putin's first concerted attempt to regain control over the segment of Russia's domestic audience that turned to the Telegram information space for war coverage independent of Russian state media.[15]

Zvinchuk's Rybar project amassed an audience of over 1.2 million followers by covering Russian military operations in Ukraine and is frequently cited by Russian and Western media alike (including ISW). Russian investigative outlet The Bell reported that Rybar was originally a personal blog from its creation in 2018 until Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin reportedly began sponsoring the channel from 2019 to 2021.[16] The Bell observed that Rybar frequently published posts that may have advanced Prigozhin's business interests in Syria during their partnership. Rybar frequently published contradictory posts since the start of the Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Rybar's posts and tone used to loudly criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) only to then defend disgraced Russian Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin against attacks on his command from Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov and Prigozhin.[17] The Bell also found that Rybar amplified numerous videos that supported the Russian MoD's information operation efforts to present partial mobilization in Russia in a more favorable light. Rybar claims to sustain its four million ruble ($44,800) monthly production cost via donations, although the channel also profits from showing advertisements for companies associated with First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Sergei Kiriyenko and Russian state media.[18]

ISW had observed a significant shift in the style and focus of Rybar's war coverage since the Ukrainian counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts in fall 2022 during which Russian state propagandists were unable to explain away Russia's military failures and a deeply unpopular mobilization of 300,000 reservists.[19] Zvinchuk began appearing on Russian state television and the Russian state media began heavily relying on Zvinchuk's content at this time. Rybar's coverage since fall 2020 has significantly reduced its criticism of the Russian MoD. This observed content and tonal shift is significant and is likely the result of Putin's efforts to coopt prominent Russian milbloggers to reestablish Kremlin dominance over the Russian language online information space, carry out information operations against Western audiences, and prevent other influential Russian officials from buying milbloggers' loyalties. Zvinchuk's award also likely serves as an effort to incentivize other milbloggers to offer their loyalty to the regime in exchange for accolades and Kremlin recognition.

Ukraine stated that the continued Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has resulted in equipment and maintenance failures that threaten the plant's security. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom reported on November 16 that Russian ZNPP authorities transferred reactor no. 5 to a hot shutdown state from a cold shutdown state in violation of Ukraine's nuclear regulatory orders, resulting in a leak of a boric acid solution that entered all the reactor's steam generators.[20] Energoatom reported that Russian ZNPP authorities' "incompetence" in bringing reactors from cold shutdowns to hot shutdowns has resulted in a radioactive coolant leak from the first to second circuit of reactor no. 4 and a similar situation involving reactor no. 6.[21] Energoatom also reported that unspecified "incompetent" Russian actions resulted in reactor no. 6 experiencing a temporary blackout on November 14, forcing the reactor to rely on emergency diesel generators.[22] Energoatom stated that equipment at the ZNPP is constantly degrading and that the frequency of such dangerous instances are increasing.[23]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has not yet commented on these incidents but expressed concern on November 13 over the extent and effectiveness of maintenance on ZNPP safety systems and its own ability to monitor ZNPP operations.[24] The IAEA reported that these maintenance issues became apparent in July and August 2023 when the steam generator of reactor no. 4 experienced a leak that contaminated the reactor's safety systems that had to be recleaned. The IAEA reported that ZNPP operators have not granted its contingent at the ZNPP access to all six reactor turbine halls to assess their safety and that operators restricted IAEA access during recent walkthroughs of the halls in October and on November 10. The IAEA reported that the ZNPP planned maintenance of transformers of reactors no. 4, 5, and 6 after recently completing maintenance of transformers of reactors no. 1, 2, and 3 and noted that reactors no. 4 and 5 are in hot shutdown mode in violation of the Ukrainian regulatory agency's orders.

The Ukrainian and IAEA reports indicate that Russia's presence and exclusive control over the ZNPP is increasing, suggesting that similar failures may escalate under continued Russian occupation. The IAEA announced on November 13 that its staff visited a Russian training center for the ZNPP on November 7 and that Russian nuclear regulatory agency Rostekhnadzor is establishing a permanent presence at the ZNPP.[25] This announcement indicates the normalization of the Russian occupation of the ZNPP despite Russian forces' documented reckless conduct near the plant.[26] In addition to the recent equipment and mechanical failures, Russian forces deployed military equipment on and inside ZNPP facilities in summer-fall 2022 to protect these assets from Ukrainian strikes, while setting conditions to blame Ukrainian forces for any incidents at the ZNPP.[27] The ZNPP has completely lost access to external power sources seven times during its service history – all seven incidents occurring while under Russian occupation.[28]

Cyprus has reportedly been complicit in helping Russian elites, sanctioned for supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, launder money. The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) reported on November 14 that Russians who have been under Western sanctions since 2014 owned or controlled almost 800 companies and trusts secretly registered in various countries and territories including Cyprus, Lichtenstein, the British Virgin Islands, and Hong Kong.[29] The ICIJ also stated that Cypriot professional services firms have worked on behalf of 25 Russians sanctioned after Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine and on behalf of an additional 71 Russians sanctioned after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[30] The ICIJ found that the Cypriot branch of an international professional service firm helped a Russian billionaire transfer a $1.4 billion in investments out of his name to evade European Union (EU) sanctions.[31] The ICIJ cited figures from the Center for the Study of Democracy in Sofia, Bulgaria, reporting that Russian businessmen have "invested" over $200 million in Cyprus as of 2020, comprising half of all Russian investments in Europe, and that about 300 Russian-owned companies constituted 80 percent of Cyprus' wealth at one point in time.[32]

Gazprom Media Holdings, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, announced on November 16 that it acquired the majority share of a large Russian blogger agency, likely in an effort to expand its already extensive control over the Russian media space. Gazprom Media Holdings announced that it bought 51 percent of shares in Insight People, reportedly the largest blogging agency in Russia.[33] Gazprom Media Holdings already owns Russian video streaming platform RuTube, Russian social media network VKontakte, and several prominent Russian TV channels and radio stations.[34] Gazprom Media is headed by Alexander Zharov who previously served as the head of Russian state censor Roskomnadzor from 2012 to 2020.[35] Long-time Gazprom Head Alexei Miller notably has associates throughout various power structures, and Gazprom Media's recent media acquisitions indicates a possible rise in Miller's influence. Miller is a long-time associate of Russian President Vladimir Putin and likely has ties to former Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head and Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, as Patrushev's sons previously held senior positions at Gazprom.[36]

Russian authorities discovered former Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army Commander Lieutenant General Vladimir Sviridov dead in his home in Stavropol Krai on November 15. Russian sources reported that authorities found Sviridov dead with a woman, likely his wife, and suggested that the couple likely died around November 9. Russian sources reported that Russian authorities have not yet determined Sviridov's and the woman's cause of death but have ruled out carbon monoxide poisoning and "violent" deaths.[37] Sviridov reportedly resigned from his position as commander of the 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army in 2009.[38]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 15 to 16.
• Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev announced on November 16 that Russian authorities are strengthening Russian air defense over Russia's Central Federal Okrug, likely in response to Ukraine's recently implied intent to conduct an interdiction campaign against Russian supply routes in rear areas during the winter.
• Russian milbloggers continued to criticize actors in the Russian information space for distorting the reality of the Russian war effort, highlighting an emerging cyclical dynamic in the Russian information space in which the majority of Russian sources coalesce around a particular predominant narrative and, in turn, a subset of different sources coalesces to criticize the majority's prevailing opinion.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin awarded a prominent Russian milblogger who was previously critical of Russia's military performance during its full-scale invasion with a prestigious state honor, continuing the Kremlin's long-standing effort to coopt milbloggers and make them loyal to the Kremlin.
• Ukraine stated that the continued Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has resulted in equipment and maintenance failures that threaten the plant's security.
• The Ukrainian and IAEA reports indicate that Russia's presence and exclusive control over the ZNPP is increasing, suggesting that similar failures may escalate under continued Russian occupation.
• Cyprus has reportedly been complicit in helping Russian elites, sanctioned for supporting the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, launder money.
• Gazprom Media Holdings, a subsidiary of Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom, announced on November 16 that it acquired the majority share of a large Russian blogger agency, likely in an effort to expand its already extensive control over the Russian media space.
• Russian authorities discovered former Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army Commander Lieutenant General Vladimir Sviridov dead in his home in Stavropol Krai on November 15.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, near Robotyne, and northeast of Vasylivka and advanced near Avdiivka.
• The Russian Ministry of Education issued a draft order establishing a course called "Fundamentals of Security and Defense of the Motherland" for Russian middle and high school students starting in September 2024.
• The Russian government and Russian occupation authorities continue to forcibly deport children in occupied Ukraine to Russia under the rubric of educational programs.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 17 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 17, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces have established bridgeheads on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are conducting ground operations aimed at pushing Russian forces out of artillery range of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 17. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 18 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces have established bridgeheads on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are conducting ground operations aimed at pushing Russian forces out of artillery range of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River. The Ukrainian Marine Corps Command and the Ukrainian General Staff stated on November 17 that Ukrainian marines have secured several "bridgeheads" on the east bank following successful actions and are conducting actions to expand these positions.[1] US military doctrine defines a bridgehead as "an area on the enemy's side of the water obstacle that is large enough to accommodate the majority of the crossing force, has adequate terrain to permit defense of the crossing sites, provides security to crossing forces from enemy direct fire, and provides a base for continuing the attack."[2] The doctrinal definition of a bridgehead does not stipulate a certain size for the crossing force, the extent of the secured positions, or the ability to transfer and operate heavy military equipment from those positions. The necessary size of a bridgehead depends on the operations it is meant to support, and the official Ukrainian acknowledgment of these positions as bridgeheads indicates that the Ukrainian command assesses that these positions are sufficient for continuing ground operations on the east bank.

The Ukrainian General Staff stated that one of the main operational objectives for Ukrainian ground operations on the east bank is to prevent Russian shelling of Ukrainian civilians on the west bank of Kherson Oblast, particularly near Kherson City. The 152mm tube artillery systems that Russian forces widely operate in Ukraine have an approximate range of 25km, although Russian forces are unlikely to deploy these systems to immediate frontline areas due to the threat of Ukrainian counterbattery fire. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces on the east bank are conducting diversionary actions, raids, and reconnaissance and are particularly surveilling Russian positions for intelligence on Russian logistics and ammunition concentrations.[3]

 

 

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Russian forces appear to be applying lessons learned from attempts to man Russian multilayered defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive to current Russian defensive operations in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces have a "fairly serious" line of fortifications in Kherson Oblast.[4] A Ukrainian soldier operating on the left (east) bank of Kherson Oblast characterized Russian defensive positions as "elaborate dugouts that [Russian forces] constructed over months" in an interview with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published on November 15.[5] The WSJ also reported that Russian forces heavily mined the area around Krynky (30km northeast of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River), where Ukrainian forces currently maintain positions.[6] Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets noted that Russian forces are not deploying their forces in a "pillar formation" at the immediate frontline on the east bank, likely in an effort to protect concentrations of Russian forces from Ukrainian artillery fire and drone strikes.[7] Mashovets claimed on November 12 that the Russian command in the Kherson direction has refused to commit additional forces of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (of the newly formed 18th Combined Arms Army) and 7th Air Assault (VDV) Division beyond elements of single regiments and battalions to the frontline, opting instead to maintain the remainder of these formations in near rear areas and secondary echelons of defense.[8]

This tactical deployment of forces in Kherson is reminiscent of changes that Russian forces made to Russian tactical defensive deployments in western Zaporizhia Oblast. ISW observed Russian forces concentrating personnel along the defensive layer closest to Ukrainian offensive operations at the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[9] ISW observed a shift in Russian defensive operations as Ukrainian forces began penetrating Russian defensive layers in mid-September, wherein Russian forces shifted personnel away from manning immediate frontline defensive positions in order to man defensive layers further from the frontline from which more combat effective forces would counterattack.[10] Russian forces have not constructed extensive visible defensive fortifications similar to those that Russian forces established in western Zaporizhia Oblast prior to the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and appear to have opted for more discrete fortifications set further from the frontline. The discrete fortifications located away from the frontline in Kherson Oblast will likely only be fully effective if they remain concealed, however. Fall and winter weather conditions may reveal some concealed positions as foliage and natural ground cover die.

Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces have suffered roughly a brigade's worth of casualties since Ukrainian forces started ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17, reportedly forcing Russian forces to transfer combat power from elsewhere in Ukraine to Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces have killed 1,216 Russian personnel and wounded 2,217 since starting "measures" on the east bank.[11] These manpower losses are roughly equivalent to a brigade's worth of personnel, although these losses are likely spread out across the Russian formations and units operating in the Kherson direction. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces have destroyed 24 Russian tanks, 48 armored combat vehicles, 89 artillery systems, 29 ammunition warehouses, and 14 aircraft since starting "measures" on the east bank.[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces have transferred unspecified units from other unspecified sectors of the front to Kherson Oblast due to these losses.[13] ISW previously assessed that the Russian military command will likely struggle to redeploy combat-effective reinforcements at scale to respond to ongoing Ukrainian operations in Kherson Oblast while conducting defensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast and sustaining other offensive efforts in eastern Ukraine.[14] The scale of Russian reinforcements required, however, depends heavily on how much effort Ukrainian forces put into the Kherson direction and how much progress they make.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 17 that Russian forces launched 10 Shahed-131/136 drones primarily targeting Khmelnytskyi Oblast and several S-300 missiles in the Donetsk direction.[15] Ukrainian military sources reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed nine Shahed drones over Mykolaiv, Odesa, Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi oblasts.[16] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck targets in Khmelnytskyi, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kharkiv oblasts.[17]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Israel-Hamas war has negatively affected Ukraine's shell supplies. Zelensky stated during an interview with Bloomberg on November 16 that Israel has sought large quantities of the global supply of 155mm artillery shells and that this has slowed deliveries of artillery shells to Ukraine at a critical moment.[18]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov attempted to dismiss criticisms of the Russian government and the war in Ukraine as inevitable yet unfounded and urged Russian citizens to self-censor. Putin stated at the International Cultural Forum in St. Petersburg on November 17 that people who are critical of the war have the right to their own point of view.[19] Putin added that "the head is not only a tool for speaking but is also for thinking before you say something."[20] Putin commented that many educated, knowledgeable, and talented adults do not follow or understand what is happening, presumably in Ukraine, but acknowledged that "the mood in society and the opinion of a country's people...is an objective factor that no one can escape."[21] Peskov similarly stated in a video interview published on November 17 that there should be a level of censorship during wartime that would be unacceptable during peacetime.[22] Peskov stated that the line between criticizing the Russian military and discrediting the Russian forces is very thin and advised those who want to "indiscriminately" speculate about and criticize the Russian military to "think ten times" before doing so.[23]

Peskov also stated that he believes Putin will announce his presidential campaign and that he "does not doubt" that Putin will win the 2024 presidential elections.[24] Peskov also responded to a question about Russian leadership after Putin and the characteristics that Putin's eventual successor should have, stating that Putin's successor should be someone exactly like Putin.[25]

Russian authorities detained several Federal Security Service (FSB) employees on November 16 for accepting a five-billion-ruble ($55.6 million) bribe in connection with the dismissal of a corruption case. Russian outlet RBC reported that the FSB employees were involved in the dismissed investigation into the Merlion Group of Companies, a Russian IT company and technology distributor that the FSB previously investigated for corruption.[26] Russian authorities also arrested former head of the Russian Investigative Committee for the North-Western District of Moscow Sergei Romodanovsky, current head of the Russian Investigative Committee's Khoroshevsky Investigative Department Rustam Yusupov, and former investigator Andrei Zhiryutin in connection to the case's dismissal on November 10.[27] RBC reported that Russian authorities suspect that additional FSB employees, Romodanovsky, Yusupov, and Zhiryutin accepted a five-billion-ruble bribe to dismiss the case against the Merlion Group. A Russian insider source claimed on November 17 that Russian authorities are also investigating former Director of Russia's Federal Migration Service Konstantin Romodanovsky (father of Sergei Romodanovsky), who has connections to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and suggested that Russian authorities may intend to blame Konstantin Romodanovsky for Russia's migration issues to appease Putin's ultranationalist base.[28]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian forces have established bridgeheads on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and are conducting ground operations aimed at pushing Russian forces out of artillery range of the west (right) bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian forces appear to be applying lessons learned from attempts to man Russian multilayered defenses in western Zaporizhia Oblast during the Ukrainian counteroffensive to current Russian defensive operations in Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces have suffered roughly a brigade's worth of casualties since Ukrainian forces started ground operations on the east bank of Kherson Oblast on October 17, reportedly forcing Russian forces to transfer combat power from elsewhere in Ukraine to Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted a series of drone and missile strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 16 to 17.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Israel-Hamas war has negatively affected Ukraine's shell supplies.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov attempted to dismiss criticisms of the Russian government and the war in Ukraine as inevitable yet unfounded and urged Russian citizens to self-censor.
• Russian authorities detained several Federal Security Service (FSB) employees on November 16 for accepting a five-billion-ruble ($55.6 million) bribe in connection with the dismissal of a corruption case.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in several sectors of the front.
• The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on November 17 that the Russian military is likely using updated surveillance aircraft due to concerns over Ukraine deploying Western-provided combat aircraft.
• Yale School of Public Health's Humanitarian Research Lab (Yale HRL) reported on November 16 that Russian and Belarusian authorities have forcibly deported at least 2,442 Ukrainian children between the ages of six and 17 to Belarus via Russia since February 24, 2022.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 18 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 18, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 17 to 18. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 18 that Ukrainian air defenses downed 29 of 38 Russian-launched Shahed-131/136 drones over multiple

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:45pm ET on November 18. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 19 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 17 to 18. Ukrainian military sources reported on November 18 that Ukrainian air defenses downed 29 of 38 Russian-launched Shahed-131/136 drones over multiple unspecified oblasts.[1] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian Shaheds struck an energy infrastructure facility and administrative building in Odesa Oblast.[2] The Ukrainian Northern Operational Command reported that Russian Shaheds also damaged infrastructure facilities in Chernihiv Oblast.[3] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces struck an oil depot in Altestove, Odesa Oblast, the Starokostyantyniv airfield in Khmelnytskyi Oblast, and Kyiv City, Kyiv Oblast.[4]

A Kyrgyzstan government official called on the Russian government to help Kyrgyz migrants in Russia against the backdrop of recent proposals from Russian government officials to decrease migrant work opportunities in Russia. Deputy Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan Edil Baisalov met with Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Social Policy, Labor, Health, and Pension Provision Tatyana Golikova on November 17 and reiterated the importance of Russia providing families of Kyrgyz citizens working in Russia with compulsory health insurance in accordance with Eurasian Economic Union standards.[5] Baisalov stated that this would help create favorable conditions for Kyrgyz citizens in Russia. Prominent voices in the Russian ultranationalist information space responded to Baisalov's statements by complaining that the Russian government's migrant policy is too lenient and that Russian government officials either are not aware of the problem or do not want to fix it.[6]

Russian federal subjects and government officials have been increasingly introducing and proposing bills restricting migrants' rights in the fall of 2023. Deputy Chairperson of the Russian State Duma Pyotr Tolstoy proposed a measure on November 14 that would restrict work opportunities for migrants from countries that have not designated Russian as a state language.[7] Russian political party A Just Russia-For Truth introduced three bills to the Duma on November 15 that would abolish work certificates for foreign workers, require Russian organizations to obtain permission from the Russian government to hire foreign workers, and require foreign workers to acquire a separate Russian work permit.[8] A Just Russia head Sergei Mironov stated that these measures will create order and ensure that the government "clearly understand who is on the territory of the Russian Federation and why they are there."[9] Several Russian federal subjects have banned migrants from driving minibuses and taxis, offering catering services, and selling alcohol and tobacco in Russia.[10]

Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly continue to charge participants of the October 29 antisemitic riots with minor administrative crimes, while select Russian ultranationalists call for increased government control in order to curb the alleged spread of Islamic extremism in Dagestan. Russian authorities have reportedly charged 412 people for violating various articles of the Russian Administrative Code, including 394 people charged with violating procedures on holding assemblies and 18 people charged with organizing a mass gathering in public places.[11] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed on November 17 that a radical Salafi preacher spoke about the unrest in Dagestan and alleged that there are over 100,000 supporters of Salafism in Dagestan – an allegation that the milblogger rejected.[12] The milblogger also claimed that radical ideologues have become more active on the internet following the riots in Dagestan and that extremists are attempting to take advantage of the confusion caused by the spontaneity of the unrest.[13] Another Russian milblogger added that the Russian government needs to establish strict control over Dagestan in order to curb future unrest.[14] ISW previously assessed that the Russian leadership is likely avoiding more serious punishments for antisemitism in the North Caucasus out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.[15] Russian authorities also recently detained a Dagestani government official on corruption charges, likely in an effort to placate those calling for an increased federal government response to the unrest.[16]

The Russian government continues efforts to restrict citizens' access to the internet and to strengthen its control over the Russian information space. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree on November 17 allowing the Russian Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media (Roskomnadzor) to block sites that publish information about methods to bypass sites blocked by the Russian government.[17] The Russian State Duma previously adopted a bill on October 17 that stipulates that presidential election campaign materials cannot be shown on sites restricted by Roskomnadzor, and the November 17 decree is likely in part related to controlling the Russian information space before the 2024 presidential elections.[18]

The European Commission will reportedly include sanctions on the sale of petroleum tankers to Russia in an upcoming sanctions package in an effort to curb Russian schemes to skirt the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products. Reuters reported on November 17 that the European Union's upcoming sanctions package against Russia will ban the sale to Russia of tankers for crude oil and other petroleum products and will stipulate contractual clauses in the sale of tankers to third countries prohibiting the re-sale of tankers to Russia and the transfer of Russian crude oil and petroleum products that violate the G7's price cap.[19] The Financial Times reported on November 14 that Western officials stated that Russia is likely currently selling almost all of its crude oil at or above the G7's $60 per barrel price cap.[20] The Financial Times added that Russian export data for crude oil suggests that Russia sold crude oil at an average of roughly $80 a barrel in October.[21] Only 37 of the 134 vessels that reportedly ship Russian oil held insurance from Western countries, and Russia has reportedly increasingly relied on aging oil tankers with obscure ownership to build a "shadow fleet" to sell crude oil and petroleum products above the G7 price cap.[22] European economic think tank Bruegel reported on October 11 that by July 2023 over 60 percent of tankers carrying Russian crude oil were covered by insurance from an unknown country of origin, whereas less than 20 percent of the tankers carrying Russian crude oil had been covered by unknown insurance at the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[23]

Key Takeaways:

• Russian forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of November 17 to 18.
• A Kyrgyzstan government official called on the Russian government to help Kyrgyz migrants in Russia against the backdrop of recent proposals from Russian government officials to decrease migrant work opportunities in Russia.
• Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly continue to charge participants of the October 29 antisemitic riots with minor administrative crimes, while select Russian ultranationalists call for increased government control in order to curb the alleged spread of Islamic extremism in Dagestan.
• The Russian government continues efforts to restrict citizens' access to the internet and to strengthen its control over the Russian information space.
• The European Commission will reportedly include sanctions on the sale of petroleum tankers to Russia in an upcoming sanctions package in an effort to curb Russian schemes to skirt the G7 price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka and Donetsk City.
• Russia has reportedly frozen prisoner of war (POW) exchanges with Ukraine since the summer of 2023.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 19 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 19, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian and Russian forces are continuing combat operations in eastern and southern Ukraine, although the rainy weather will likely continue to slow the pace of combat operations until winter conditions fully set in. A Russian milblogger claimed that

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:00 pm ET on November 19. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian and Russian forces are continuing combat operations in eastern and southern Ukraine, although the rainy weather will likely continue to slow the pace of combat operations until winter conditions fully set in. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces continue to defend against a strong group of Russian forces attacking near Avdiivka and that Ukrainian forces maintain the initiative in southern Ukraine.[1] The milblogger added that it is premature to declare any Russian victories to avoid creating any false impressions about the situation on the battlefield. Another Russian milblogger observed that poor weather is impeding the use of armored vehicles in western Zaporizhia Oblast but that Ukrainian forces are still attacking Russian positions with infantry units.[2] The United Kingdon (UK) Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessed on November 18 that neither side has achieved any substantial progress in the Kupyansk and Avdiivka directions, or in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast — where the most intense battles are ongoing.[3] The UK MoD added that there are fewer immediate prospects of major changes on the frontlines as colder winter weather begins to set in. Ukrainian military officials anticipate that Russia will launch a third wave of assaults on Avdiivka.[4] Freezing weather conditions during the winter will likely prompt the resumption of more active combat operations, and ongoing rainy weather is unlikely to halt Ukrainian or Russian attacks.

Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes primarily targeting Kyiv, Poltava, and Cherkasy oblasts on the night of November 18 to 19. The Ukrainian Air Force reported on November 19 that Ukrainian air defenses destroyed 15 of the 20 Russian Shahed-131/-136 drones.[5] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated the strike series did not result in any casualties or critical damages and that this was an "excellent result."[6] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian ammunition depots in Kirovohrad City, Kirovohrad Oblast and Olshanytsya, Kyiv Oblast and a fuel storage facility at the Kanatove airfield, Kirovohrad Oblast.[7]

Ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin formally announced his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential elections despite his imprisonment. Girkin acknowledged that his August 30 post claiming that he is better than Russian President Vladimir Putin aimed to attract attention before formally announcing his intent to run for president as an independent candidate.[8] Girkin claimed that the current Russian government fears his nomination because it would disrupt the Kremlin's plans to have sham candidates run against Putin, as Putin is the "only winner [of the presidential election] already known in advance." Girkin acknowledged that running in the Russian presidential election is "like sitting down at a table to play with cheaters" but that bringing like-minded "patriots" together through the election is a defeat for the Russian officials living on the delusional "planet of the pink ponies." Girkin appealed to the Russian Strelkov (Girkin) Movement (RDS), which has supported Girkin's defense against his criminal case for allegedly discrediting the Russian military, to help canvas to receive the necessary number of signatures to run as an independent candidate.

Girkin's presidential announcement indicates a possible rift between the RDS and his wife, Miroslava Reginskaya. Reginskaya has been the first to transcribe Girkin's prior letters from prison to post on Telegram but did not claim to post Girkin's presidential campaign announcement on November 19 and has not yet acknowledged Girkin's presidential announcement on her own Telegram channel.[9] Reginskaya has been a staunch advocate for Girkin's release since the first day of his imprisonment in July 2023 and appears to maintain ties with Russian veterans who support Girkin's release, so her silence regarding Girkin's most recent announcement is notable.[10] Reginskaya and the RDS contradicted each other on November 8 when the RDS called for character witnesses to speak for Girkin at his trial, but Reginskaya stated that witness recruitment on "other channels and by other persons is not coordinated with the general defense and can be dangerous for Igor [Girkin]."[11] The RDS announced on November 15 that it had found several such witnesses for Girkin, despite Reginskaya's November 8 statement.[12]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be censoring irregular Russian armed formations as part of its ongoing efforts to formalize Russia's irregular forces and establish greater control over the Russian information space. The Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) "Vostok" Battalion claimed on November 19 that the DNR's Internal Affairs Ministry issued a censorship order, prohibiting the battalion from "showing its life and work."[13] The "Vostok" Battalion is currently serving in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and provides near-daily updates on the situation in their sector of the front.[14] The DNR Internal Ministry may be administering the censorship order as part of the Russian MoD's ongoing efforts to formalize the DNR/Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) People's Militias into the Russian armed forces, which has previously trigger backlash within the Russian information space.[15] ISW has extensively reported on the Kremlin's ongoing censorship efforts targeting Russian milbloggers and state media.[16]

Ukrainian officials announced on November 19 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a teenage Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, returned to Ukraine.[17] Ukrainian Presidential Administration Chief of Staff Andriy Yermak stated that Yermokhin's return occurred within the framework of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's "Bring Kids Back UA" program.[18] Yermak and Ukrainian Ombudsman Dmitry Lubinets stated that Qatar and UNICEF mediated the return, and Lubinets noted that this was the first time UNICEF was involved in efforts to return Ukrainian children back from Russia.[19] Russia dictated that Yermokhin travel to a third country to meet a relative once he turned 18 years old, and Yermokhin turned 18 on November 19 and met his sister in Belarus before returning to Ukraine.[20] Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued attempts to dispute Russia's practice of illegally deporting Ukrainian children to Russia and claimed on November 19 that the Russian military found Yermokhin "neglected" in Mariupol in 2022 and took him to "safety" with a Russian foster family.[21]

A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed anger on November 19 about Armenia's decisions to distance itself from Russia against the backdrop of recent deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used a Tochka-U missile to strike Belgorod Oblast on November 19, and a prominent Russian milblogger used the opportunity to allege that Armenia, possibly with assistance from the US, agreed to give Tochka-U launchers and missiles to Ukraine.[22] The milblogger offered no evidence in support of this allegation, and ISW has not observed anything to substantiate it. The milblogger speculated about the number of weapons Armenia could possibly transfer to Ukraine but did not offer any specifics or the sourcing of his information. The milblogger also claimed that the Armenian government has begun to prepare to withdraw from the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). ISW has not observed any confirmation of the milblogger's claim that Armenia is planning to leave the CSTO, and Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vahan Kostanyan told journalists on November 9 that Armenia is not discussing the legal process of leaving the CSTO.[23] Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated on November 18 that Armenia and Azerbaijan were able to agree on the basic principles for a peace treaty but that the two countries are speaking "different diplomatic languages" and that there is an atmosphere of mistrust.[24]

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian and Russian forces are continuing combat operations in eastern and southern Ukraine, although the rainy weather will likely continue to slow the pace of combat operations until winter conditions fully set in.
• Russian forces conducted another series of drone strikes primarily targeting Kyiv, Poltava, and Cherkasy oblasts on the night of November 18 to 19.
• Ardent nationalist and former Russian officer Igor Girkin formally announced his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential elections despite his imprisonment.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may be censoring irregular Russian armed formations as part of its ongoing efforts to formalize Russia's irregular forces and establish greater control over the Russian information space.
• Ukrainian officials announced on November 19 that Bohdan Yermokhin, a teenage Ukrainian whom Russian authorities forcibly deported from occupied Mariupol to Russia and attempted to conscript, returned to Ukraine.
• A prominent Kremlin-affiliated milblogger expressed anger on November 19 about Armenia's decisions to distance itself from Russia against the backdrop of recent deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in some areas on November 19.
• Regional Russian officials continue to fear the emergence of localized protests in response to the Russian military's refusal to return some mobilized personnel from the frontlines.
• Occupation authorities continue efforts to indoctrinate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine into Russian national and cultural identities.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 20 November 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 20, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russia appears to be employing a known hybrid warfare tactic to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish border. Finnish authorities closed four border checkpoints on Finland’s southeastern border with Russia on November 18 after the Finnish B

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 20. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 21 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russia appears to be employing a known hybrid warfare tactic to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish border. Finnish authorities closed four border checkpoints on Finland's southeastern border with Russia on November 18 after the Finnish Border Guard reported that an influx of about 300 asylum seekers, mostly from Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and Syria, had arrived at the Finnish border from Russia since September 2023.[1] Finnish Border Guards recorded 89 migrant crossings during a two-day period between November 7 and 14 — a sharp increase from the 91 crossings recorded from mid-July to November 12.[2] Four checkpoints currently remain open on Finland's northeastern border with Russia with only two open for asylum applicants.[3] Reuters reported on November 19 that dozens of migrants arrived at the closed Finnish Nuijamaa and Vaalimaa crossings on November 18 and gathered around a campfire in sub-zero temperatures.[4] Finnish outlet Iltalehti reported on November 20 that Finnish authorities are considering closing the entire border with Russia on the night of November 21.[5] Finnish Prime Minister Petteri Orpo stated on November 14 that Russian border guards are escorting or transporting migrants to the Finnish border, and the Finnish government stated on November 16 that there are indications that "foreign authorities or other actors" have played a role in helping people illegally cross the border.[6] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported on November 19 that Jouko Kinnunen, head of the Finnish Vartius checkpoint that currently remains open, stated that Russian border guards pushed migrants to the Finnish side of the barrier and then closed the Russian border barriers behind them.[7] It is unlikely that these migrants would continue to remain at the Finnish border in sub-zero temperatures of their own volition after Finnish border authorities denied their entrance into Finland, suggesting that Russia is likely involved in the situation in some way.

The Kremlin has denied Finland's accusations about Russia's involvement in creating an artificial influx of migrants. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitri Peskov responded on November 17 to the announcement of the closure of the four checkpoints, stating that Finland had chosen a path of confrontation, which Peskov labeled as a "big mistake."[8] Peskov also stated on November 20 that Finland's possible decision to close the entire border "causes nothing but deep regret" and claimed that Finland's "Russophobic" position has harmed Finnish-Russian relations of the past.[9]

Russia's apparent hybrid warfare tactic on the Russian-Finnish border is similar to Russia's and Belarus' creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 and is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin enabled, or possibly directly controlled, Belarus' artificial creation of a migrant crisis on its border with Poland in 2021, when Belarusian security personnel aided thousands of Middle Eastern migrants in crossing the Belarusian border to Poland.[10] The Kremlin exploited the manufactured crisis in 2021 to falsely accuse NATO of aggression against Belarus.[11] Peskov responded to Finland's accession into NATO on April 4, threatening that Russia would take any "countermeasures [deemed necessary] to ensure [Russia's] own security."[12] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs similarly stated on April 4 that Russia will be "forced to take retaliatory measures" and that Finland's accession to NATO "cannot but have a negative impact on Russian-Finnish bilateral relations."[13] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin may be attempting to set information space conditions to destabilize the NATO states on Russian borders and distract from the war in Ukraine.[14] ISW has also consistently assessed that one of Putin's goals in launching the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was to break up NATO – a goal he continues to pursue.[15]

Russian milbloggers expressed continued anger at deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations as Armenia appears to distance itself further from Russia while entering further agreements with Western governments. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Secretary General Imangali Tasmagambetov claimed in Minsk on November 20 that Armenia asked to remove provisions on assistance to Armenia from the agenda of the upcoming CSTO Summit's agenda.[16] Russian media also reported that Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Paruyr Hovhannisyan and the European Union (EU) Ambassador to Armenia Vassilis Maragos signed an agreement that increases "legal certainty" surrounding the EU Mission to Armenia (EUMA)'s "rights and obligations" within Armenia, and creates easier conditions for EUMA observers to operate in the country.[17] Russian milbloggers latched onto Tasmagambetov's claim and the Armenia-EU agreement, reamplifying a thus-far unsubstantiated claim from November 19 that Armenia is preparing to leave the CSTO and provide missiles and missile launchers to Ukraine.[18] The milbloggers accused Armenia of "betrayal" for growing closer to the West and distancing itself from Russia and expressed bitterness at Armenia's alleged provision of weapons to Ukraine while doing nothing "besides throwing mud" at Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh.[19] ISW has observed no indications to substantiate the milblogger claim of Armenia providing missiles and missile launchers to Ukraine.[20]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly started public recruitment for the Russian "Africa Corps" aimed at subsuming Wagner Group operations in Africa after alleged failed MoD attempts to directly recruit former Wagner personnel. A Russian milblogger posted an advertisement for contract service in the Russian "Africa Corps" on November 20.[21] The milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD decided to form the Russian "Africa Corps" in Libya after Russian Deputy Defense Minister Colonel General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov met with Libyan National Army Commander Marshal Khalifa Haftar, likely referencing their August 22 meeting.[22] The milblogger claimed that the formation of the Russian "Africa Corps" in Libya is part of wider Russian-Libyan agreements established at the Moscow International Security Conference and Army-2023 Forum.[23] The milblogger claimed that the starting salary for "Africa Corps" personnel is 280,000 rubles (about $3,160), significantly higher than the salaries that the Russian MoD reportedly offered former Wagner fighters and that the Wagner Group offered recruits for its operations in Africa in 2023.[24] ISW previously observed a Russian insider source's claim that the Russian MoD unsuccessfully attempted to recruit former Wagner Group personnel to Russian MoD operations in Africa.[25] The need to publicly advertise recruitment into the Russian "Africa Corps" supports the insider source's claim that the MoD's attempt to directly recruit former Wagner personnel for operations in Africa were largely unsuccessful.

The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) predictably backed Girkin's November 19 formal announcement of his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential election. The RDS stated on November 20 that its first congress as an official political movement began in Moscow on November 18 and reiterated that its current main priority is to secure Girkin's release from prison and the dismissal of all charges against him. The RDS also emphasized that the RDS Congress fully supports Girkin's nomination and is creating an organizing committee to support Girkin's campaign.[26] The RDS reiterated its main political tenets that it first announced on June 26, which center around supporting the Russian military and veterans and pursuing military and governmental reforms.[27] Girkin's wife, Miroslava Reginskaya, has not yet acknowledged Girkin's presidential campaign or the RDS' support of the campaign as of this publication.[28]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to distinguish himself in the Russian information space, infringing on the generally accepted boundaries between Russian federal subject (region) heads and Russian President Vladimir Putin. During a video conference on the renewal of the Russian public transport fleet in the Russian regions, Kadyrov publicly invited Putin, who was also on the call, to visit Chechnya.[29] Kadyrov told Putin that Chechen elders had "scolded" Kadyrov because Putin has not visited Chechnya in a long time.[30] Putin did not directly respond to the invitation and instead thanked Kadyrov and the Chechen people for their hard work in restoring the republic. Kadyrov's public invitation to Putin, who has notably not visited Chechnya since 2011, places Putin in a difficult position, as he either ignores the invitation and risks snubbing Kadyrov, or he accepts the invitation and risks looking as though he is amendable to Kadyrov's pressure.[31] This implicit veiled challenge to Putin in a public forum is unusual and represents a clear attempt at informational posturing on the part of Kadyrov, who has recently tried to balance an apparent desire to curry favor with Putin while also appealing to his own Chechen constituency.[32]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package to Ukraine during US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's visit to Kyiv on November 20. Austin met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umerov and reiterated long-term US support for Ukraine.[33] The new DoD package contains military equipment valued at up to $100 million, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles; one HIMARS system and additional ammunition; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and artillery and small arms rounds.[34]

Key Takeaways:

• Russia appears to be employing a known hybrid warfare tactic to artificially create a migrant crisis on the Finnish border.
• Russia's apparent hybrid warfare tactic on the Russian-Finnish border is similar to Russia's and Belarus' creation of a migrant crisis on the Polish border in 2021 and is likely similarly aimed at destabilizing NATO.
• Russian milbloggers expressed continued anger at deteriorating Russian-Armenian relations as Armenia appears to distance itself further from Russia while entering further agreements with Western governments.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reportedly started public recruitment for the Russian "Africa Corps" aimed at subsuming Wagner Group operations in Africa after alleged failed MoD attempts to directly recruit former Wagner personnel.
• The Russian Strelkov (Igor Girkin) Movement (RDS) predictably backed Girkin's November 19 formal announcement of his intent to run in the 2024 Russian presidential election.
• Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov continues efforts to distinguish himself in the Russian information space, infringing on the generally accepted boundaries between Russian federal subject (region) heads and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced a new security assistance package to Ukraine during US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin's visit to Kyiv on November 20.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and marginally advanced in some areas.
• A Russian federal subject (region) and occupation officials are reportedly planning to work together to provide drones to Russian forces.
• A Ukrainian official reported that Ukraine successfully returned 45 Ukrainian children whom Russian authorities forcibly deported to Russia in the past six months.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Ukrainian Sniper Sets New World Record with 4 km Fatal Shot on Russian Soldier

WWW.KYIVPOST.COM

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The precision shot beats the previous record set by a Canadian sniper in Iraq in 2017.

 

Damn.

 

The gun used, named Volodar Obriyu (Lord of the Horizon):

 

 

[Remarkableriots]

White House declassifies intel suggesting Wagner Group is preparing to provide air defense capability to Hezbollah or Iran | CNN Politics

WWW.CNN.COM

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The White House released recently declassified intelligence on Tuesday confirming that the Russian mercenary organization Wagner group has been preparing to provide an air defense...

 

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The White House released recently declassified intelligence on Tuesday confirming that the Russian mercenary organization Wagner group has been preparing to provide an air defense capability “to either Hezbollah or Iran,” according to National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby.

 

Wagner was preparing to provide the capability at the direction of the Russian government, Kirby said.

 

The newly downgraded intelligence did not specify where the missile system would be coming from. But CNN previously reported that the Wagner Group had been tasked with carrying out the delivery of a surface-to-air SA-22 missile system from Syria to the Iran-backed militant group Hezbollah in Lebanon.

 

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad agreed to provide Hezbollah with the Russian-made missile defense system, known as a Pantsir, two people familiar with the intelligence told CNN last month.