Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (14 May 2024) - Russia launches new invasion from the north into Kharkiv, soon to launch second corridor into Sumy. Situation is dire

CitizenVectron · October 27, 2023

Hungary, Slovakia criticise more aid to Ukraine as EU fights over budget | Reuters

WWW.REUTERS.COM

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on Thursday opposed the European Union giving Ukraine 50 billion euros in aid, and his Slovak counterpart cited corruption in expressing reservations over extending new financial support to Kyiv.

Hungary can be bribed (like Turkey), but Slovakia just elected a pro-Russian government (hence why the previous government, right before leaving office, donated a bunch of surplus stuff to Ukraine). Not sure how the EU gets out of this one.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · October 27, 2023

ISW analysis for 26 October 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 26, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term. Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered 5,000 personnel killed and wounded and 400 armored vehicles losses near Avdiivka and Marinka (southwest of Donetsk City) since October 10.[1] Satellite imagery has confirmed that the Russian military has lost at least 109 military vehicles, primarily armored fighting vehicles and tanks, near Avdiivika between October 10 and 20.[2] A Ukrainian reserve officer stated that Russian forces appear to be using fewer armored vehicles near Avdiivka, although Russian forces may be regrouping for renewed large mechanized assaults as they did between the initial mechanized assaults on October 10 and a second series of large mechanized assaults on October 19 and 20.[3] The Russian command has funneled additional forces to the Avdiivka front to offset heavy manpower losses and maintain the Russian military's ability to sustain its ongoing offensive effort.[4]

The Russian command will likely struggle to offset Russian equipment losses, particularly in armored vehicles, however. Widespread Russian equipment losses and shortages in the first year of the full-scale invasion heavily restricted Russia's ability to conduct effective mechanized maneuver warfare during the Russian military's winter-spring 2023 offensive, contributing to further losses in disorderly mechanized assaults near Vuhledar, Donetsk Oblast in January and February 2023.[5] Heavy losses around Vuhledar likely prevented the Russian command from committing to sustained mechanized assaults elsewhere in Ukraine later in the winter-spring 2023 offensive.[6] Recent Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka appear to be much larger than earlier equipment losses around Vuhledar. It remains unclear if the prospect of further heavy equipment losses will deter the Russian command from launching another series of large, mechanized assaults near Avdiivka. Russia has gradually mobilized elements of its defense industrial base (DIB) to address equipment shortages but has not done so at a scale remotely sufficient to offset the cumulative Russian equipment losses in Ukraine.[7] Recent Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely lead to even more pronounced Russian equipment shortages and setbacks for any progress that the Russian military has made in addressing degraded mechanized maneuver warfare capabilities.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 25 shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced north of Pidstepne (15km east of Kherson City).[8] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9]

Ukrainian officials denied reports that Ukraine suspended a corridor for civilian vessels in the Black Sea on October 26. Reuters reported that British security firm Ambrey, Ukrainian consulting firm Barva Invest, and specialized Ukrainian news outlet Ukrainian Ports stated that Ukraine had temporarily suspended traffic through the corridor on October 26.[10] Barva Invest stated that the Ukrainian Sea Ports Administration announced the suspension on the evening of October 25 and that a de facto suspension had already been in place for two days.[11] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that many factors, including threats from Russian forces and weather, affect the Ukrainian military's decisions to allow individual civilian vessels to pass through the corridor.[12] The Ukrainian Ministry of Reconstruction and the Ukrainian Minister for Communities, Territories, and Infrastructure Development, Oleksandr Kubrakov, later clarified that reports about the suspension are false and that civilian vessels are using all available routes established by the Ukrainian Navy.[13] Russia has continually pursued efforts to disrupt Ukrainian grain exports and curtail maritime traffic to Ukrainian ports and will likely continue escalatory posturing in the Black Sea meant to undermine confidence in the Ukrainian corridor.[14]

An amendment to the Russian citizenship law allowing for the revocation of naturalized Russian citizenship came into force on October 26, providing the Russian government with a new mechanism to coerce migrants into Russian military service. The amendment most notably allows Russian authorities to revoke Russian citizenship from naturalized citizens who are convicted of discrediting the Russian military and of committing "certain crimes encroaching on public and personal safety" regardless of when the crime was committed, the date of sentencing, or for how long the convicted has held Russian citizenship.[15] Russian authorities have recently increased raids against migrants accused of committing crimes to deliver summonses and impress migrants into signing military contracts.[16] Russian authorities will likely use this new amendment to further recruit naturalized migrants under threat of revoking their Russian citizenship or after having done so.[17] It is unclear what procedure Russian authorities will follow once they deprive someone of their citizenship, and Russian authorities may intend to use deportation procedures to increase the number of migrants in detention centers, where Russian officials regularly try to recruit.[18] Russian authorities will also likely exploit denaturalized migrants whose labor options will become limited upon conviction of a crime and loss of their Russian citizenship and therefore more vulnerable to military recruitment efforts. The new amendment to the citizenship law also streamlines the process for allocating Russian citizenship to certain individuals, including children with at least one Russian parent, migrants currently residing in Russia, and participants in the Russian state resettlement program, by removing certain entrance requirements.[19]

The EU is reportedly behind on its artillery ammunition round provision to Ukraine. Unspecified sources told Bloomberg in an article published on October 25 that the EU has currently delivered only 30 percent of the promised one million shells that are expected by March 2024.[20] Bloomberg also reported that some unspecified counties have asked to extend the provision deadline.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) and the UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) recently announced new military aid packages to Ukraine. The UK MoD announced on October 11 a new package of military material support for Ukraine valued at over 100 million pounds (about $121 million).[21] The US DoD announced on October 26 a new security assistance package valued at up to $150 million in materiel.[22]

Armenia continues to distance itself from Russia amid deteriorating Armenian-Russian relations. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan stated in an interview with the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) published on October 25 that there are no "advantages" to the continued presence of Russian military bases in Armenia.[23] Pashinyan also stated that Armenia is in the process of diversifying its security partnerships.[24] Pashinyan previously stated on October 11 that Russian peacekeepers should return to Russia instead of the Russian bases in Armenia if they leave Nagorno-Karabakh.[25]

A senior Hamas delegation traveled to Moscow and met with Russian and Iranian officials on October 26.[26] (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project (CTP)'s October 26 Iran Update) Hamas' International Relation Office head and political bureau member Musa Abu Marzouk led a delegation, which also included the Health Minister of the Gaza Strip, Basem Naim.[27] The delegation held a joint meeting with Russian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister and Special Representative for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov and Iranian Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Ali Bagheri Kani. Hamas leaders issued statements around the visit praising Russia's stance toward the Israel-Hamas war. Russia has framed itself as a possible mediator between Israel and Hamas and submitted a UN resolution calling for a humanitarian ceasefire on October 16. The UN resolution failed to mention Hamas by name.[28] The Israeli Foreign Affairs Ministry condemned Russia's invitation to Hamas on October 26.[29]CTP-ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is already exploiting and will likely continue to exploit the Israel-Hamas war to advance several information operations intended to reduce US and Western support for and attention to Ukraine.[30] A senior Hamas delegation most recently visited Moscow in March 2023 amid strained tensions between Russia and Israel over the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Key Takeaways:

Heavy Russian equipment losses around Avdiivka will likely undermine Russian offensive capabilities over the long term.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

Ukrainian officials denied reports that Ukraine suspended a corridor for civilian vessels in the Black Sea on October 26.

An amendment to the Russian citizenship law allowing for the revocation of naturalized Russian citizenship came into force on October 26, providing the Russian government with a new mechanism to coerce migrants into Russian military service.

A senior Hamas delegation traveled to Moscow and met with Russian and Iranian officials on October 26.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.

Several Russian opposition outlets reported that Russian defense industrial base (DIB) companies continue to use Western components supplied through intermediaries to manufacture missiles to use against Ukraine.

Russian occupation authorities continue efforts to forcibly indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian culture and identity through the expansion of military-patriotic educational programs.

CitizenVectron · October 27, 2023

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · October 28, 2023

ISW analysis for 27 October 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 27, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced further

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Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on October 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for accessing this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Geolocated footage published on October 27 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced further south under the Antonivsky road bridge north of Oleshky (7km south of Kherson City and 4km from the Dnipro River).[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[2]

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Iskander-M ballistic missile from Voronezh Oblast and six Shahed-131/136 drones from the near Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and that Ukrainian forces destroyed five Shaheds over Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.[3] Ukrainian Air Force Command Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on October 27 that Russian forces launched over 500 Shaheds targeting critical infrastructure and military facilities in Ukraine in September 2023.[4] Ihnat also stated that the composite materials for the fuselage of modernized Shaheds make them harder to detect and that weather conditions do not affect Russian Shahed operations.[5]

Germany and Denmark announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on October 27. The Danish Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced a package of military materiel support for Ukraine valued at 3.7 billion kroner (about $520 million) that includes T-72 tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, artillery ammunition, and drones.[6] The German government announced a military aid package valued at around 5.4 billion euros (about $5.7 billion) that includes MARS II anti-aircraft missiles and an additional IRIS-T SLM air defense system.[7]

Unspecified actors attempted to assassinate Russian-backed former separatist Ukrainian politician Oleg Tsaryov on October 27. Tsaryov’s Telegram channel reported that unspecified actors shot Tsaryov twice at his home in occupied Yalta, Crimea.[8] The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) opened an investigation into the assassination attempt against Tsaryov.[9] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Tsaryov is in intensive care.[10] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Kremlin did not have information on the assassination attempt against Tsaryov.[11]

Russian authorities reportedly arrested Russian citizens who allegedly used Telegram channels, including some that identify themselves as insider sources, to extort money from Russian officials. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on October 27 that the Tverskoy Court of Moscow arrested Anton Safonov and detained Stanislav Daineko, both of whom work in public relations, for extorting more than 2 million rubles (about $21,200) from Rostec Director for Special Assignments Vasily Brovko in exchange for not publishing potentially compromising information on the “Nebrekhnya” Telegram channel.[12] The ”Provisional Government” Telegram channel, which stated that it has previously published allegations about Brovko’s involvement in corruption schemes, claimed that Brovko has close ties to the well-connected Rostec Director, Sergei Chemezov.[13] Another Russian insider source claimed on October 26 and 27 that Brovko initiated searches of the administrators of the ”Nebrekhnya“ and ”Provisional Government” channels, but the ”Provisional Government” Telegram channel denied claims on October 27 that authorities searched and detained its own administrators.[14] A Russian insider source claimed that the case concerns events from April to August 2022 that involved more than 20 Telegram channels, including some insider sources and the ”Nebrekhnya” and ”Provisional Government” channels.[15] Russian authorities have previously detained reported administrators of popular Telegram insider source channels that possibly used secret information to extort Russian officials.[16]

Russian authorities have likely coerced Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) into joining a “volunteer” formation that will fight in Ukraine, which would constitute an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. Russian state media reported on October 27 that the “Bogdan Khmelnitsky” volunteer battalion “recruited” roughly 70 Ukrainian POWs from various Russian penal colonies, has begun training, and will deploy to an unspecified area of the front line upon completion of training.[17] Coercing POWs into combat would be a violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, which stipulates that “no prisoner of war may at any time be sent to or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the combat zone” and shall not “be employed on labor which is of an unhealthy or dangerous nature,” as ISW has previously reported.[18]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces marginally advanced on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast and continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 27.

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 26 to 27

Unspecified actors attempted to assassinate Russian-backed former separatist Ukrainian politician Oleg Tsaryov on October 27.

Russian authorities reportedly arrested Russian citizens who allegedly used Telegram channels, including some that identify themselves as insider sources, to extort money from Russian officials.

Russian authorities have likely coerced Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) into joining a “volunteer” formation that will fight in Ukraine, which would constitute an apparent violation of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War.

Russian forces continued offensive operations near Avdiivka on October 27 but did not make any confirmed advances. US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on October 26 that Russian forces have suffered thousands of casualties and have lost at least 125 armored vehicles in recent offensive operations near Avdiivka.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia and advanced near Bakhmut.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov announced the formation of a second Chechen volunteer formation named for a second Chechen figure who fought against imperial Russian rule.

Russian occupation authorities cracked down against pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels operating in occupied Ukraine.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · October 29, 2023

ISW analysis for 28 October 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 28, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Remnants of the Wagner Group appear to be fighting in the Avdiivka direction subordinate to Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled formations. A Russian military correspondent published an interview on October 25 with the commander of the Russian

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Remnants of the Wagner Group appear to be fighting in the Avdiivka direction subordinate to Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled formations. A Russian military correspondent published an interview on October 25 with the commander of the Russian "Arbat" Separate Guards Special Purpose Battalion that is serving the Avdiivka direction, who claimed that an element of the Arbat Battalion is almost entirely composed of former Wagner personnel.[1] The commander claimed that the Avdiivka direction is the Arbat Battalion's "main direction" because the unit is part of the "Dikaya Division of Donbas" and the "Pyatnashka" Brigade — a Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) formation that is responsible for the defending Donetsk City.[2] The commander noted that the Wagner-staffed unit sends drone operators, electronic warfare (EW) specialists, and other fighters to other units in different frontline sectors as needed. The correspondent also indicated that the Arbat Battalion is part of the Russian Armed Forces, and it is likely that the brigade consists of former Wagner personnel who signed military contracts directly with the Russian MoD following Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin's rebellion and or his death.

A Ukrainian military observer also stated on October 25 that Wagner Group remnants are fighting near Avdiivka.[3] Ukrainian and Russian sources have previously stated that small groups of former Wagner personnel, possibly under Russian MoD-controlled formations, are deployed to the Bakhmut area.[4] It is too early to determine what role former Wagner personnel may play in Russian offensive operations against Avdiivka. The Arbat Battalion's commander noted that the battalion's situation on the front line is "good but not great" due to heavy personnel losses near Avdiivka.[5] Ukrainian military observers expressed concern about continued Russian operations in the Avdiivka direction, however.[6]

Commander of the "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces Apty Alaudinov confirmed that Rosgvardia is recruiting former Wagner fighters into Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz units. Alaudinov stated in an interview published on October 28 that a "massive" number of Wagner soldiers have joined various detachments of the "Akhmat" forces and are operating in several unspecified sectors of the front in Ukraine.[7] Alaudinov claimed that former Wagner soldiers are following their former commanders to the "Akhmat" units. Alaudinov noted that Wagner fighters have "always spoken very respectfully about ['Akhmat']," likely in an attempt to stifle discussions of possible tension between the Wagner and Chechen forces after the feud between deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin and Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov.[8] ISW continues to assess that former Wagner forces fragmented between the Russian MoD and Rosgvardia Chechen units across various sectors of the front are unlikely to reemerge as an effective military organization as they will lack the strength Wagner had drawn from being a unitary organization under clear and coherent leadership.[9] They may be tactical combat power multipliers for the units they embed with in some circumstances, however.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[10] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked near Robotyne, Nesteryanka (12km northwest of Robotyne), Kopani (6km northwest of Robotyne), Rivne (8km west of Robotyne), Novoprokopivka (3km south of Robotyne), and Verbove (9km east of Robotyne).[11] A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed on October 27 that Ukrainian forces achieved "minor successes" during attacks near Robotyne.[12]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of October 27 to 28. Ukrainian military sources reported on October 28 that Ukrainian air defenses downed three of four Iskander-K cruise missiles that Russian forces launched from Crimea.[13] The fourth missile reportedly did not reach its target.[14] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces struck Ukrainian infrastructure in Kryvyi Rih and Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and Izmail, Odesa Oblast.[15]

Russian forces are reportedly using a new version of the "Lancet" kamikaze drone that can autonomously identify targets. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces began using the new "Izdeliye-53" kamikaze drone as of October 21.[16] The sources claimed that the "Izdeliye-53" drone reportedly has an automatic guidance system that can distinguish types of targets and increase strike success rates.[17] Russian forces are reportedly not using the "Izdeliye-53" drones on a wide scale yet, but Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are currently testing the drones for mass synchronized swarm strikes.[18] ISW previously reported on October 24 that Russian forces also allegedly recently used the new "Italmas" (also known as "Izdeliye-54") drones during a drone strike on Kyiv Oblast.[19] ISW also previously assessed that the Russian command may believe that a large number of strike drones will allow Russian forces to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses, although the payload of the "Izdeliye-53" drones, which is reportedly between three and five kilograms, may not be sufficient to significantly damage most critical military targets.[20]

Russian authorities are capitalizing on domestic ethnic tensions by increasing public coercion of Central Asian migrants into Russian military service, likely to appeal to Russian ultranationalists ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin's expected presidential campaign announcement. The Moscow Investigative Committee announced on October 27 that it began 12 criminal investigations against naturalized migrants for evading military service and claimed that this number rose on October 28 to 22 opened investigations with 80 migrants already sent to military service.[21] Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Rosgvardia agents detained 40 migrant taxi drivers during a raid at the Norilsk airport in Krasnoyarsk Krai on October 27 for allegedly failing to register with Russian military registration and enlistment offices.[22] These announcements are part of a series of recent measures and statements that highly publicize Russian intent and efforts to mobilize Central Asian migrants likely aimed to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin's ultranationalist constituency, which has long expressed hatred for Central Asian migrants and increasingly called for these migrants to serve in the Russian military.[23]

The Kremlin maintains a relatively measured stance on alleged migrant crimes against ethnic Russians, likely unintentionally establishing a cycle that keeps these ethnic tensions in frequent Russian ultranationalist dialogue. Russian ultranationalist milbloggers expressed anger on October 28 over criticisms of footage that shows a Russian man insulting migrant children while breaking up an alleged fight between 10 migrant children and an ethnic Russian child in Rostov-on-Don.[24] The milbloggers insulted the children and the wider migrant community, with some even claiming that the migrant children intended to kill the ethnic Russian child, but largely praised the Russian man for intervening.[25] The milbloggers claimed that such incidents are commonplace and that no one cares or steps in to mitigate the incidents.[26] Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin announced an investigation into the Rostov-on-Don incident on October 27 as well as claims of separate incidents in Chelyabinsk Oblast on October 25 and Novosibirsk and Novgorod oblasts on October 28.[27]

Key Takeaways:

Remnants of the Wagner Group appear to be fighting in the Avdiivka direction subordinate to Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) controlled formations.

Commander of the "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces Apty Alaudinov confirmed that Rosgvardia is recruiting former Wagner fighters into Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz units.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 28.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile strikes against Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the night of October 27 to 28.

Russian authorities are capitalizing on domestic ethnic tensions by increasing public coercion of Central Asian migrants into Russian military service, likely to appeal to Russian ultranationalists ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin's expected presidential campaign announcement.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in western Donetsk Oblast, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.

A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that he personally heard Russian President Vladimir Putin express his decision to send Russian conscripts to serve in the Russian Border Service.

Pro-Ukrainian actors reportedly conducted a cyber attack against Russian telecom operators in occupied Ukraine.

CitizenVectron · October 30, 2023

Early reports of major Ukrainian strike on Crimea involving ATACMs, Storm Shadows, and unmanned naval drones.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · October 30, 2023

ISW analysis for 29 October 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 29, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Ongoing antisemitic demonstrations in the Republic of Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus are highlighting heightened interethnic and interreligious tensions in Russia. Hundreds of demonstrators in Dagestan broke into Makhachkala airport,

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control-of-terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:30pm ET on October 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ongoing antisemitic demonstrations in the Republic of Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus are highlighting heightened interethnic and interreligious tensions in Russia. Hundreds of demonstrators in Dagestan broke into Makhachkala airport, blocked the runway, and attempted to board a plane arriving from Israel on the evening of October 29 following the circulation of rumors that Russian authorities were planning to resettle "Israeli refugees" in Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus.[1] Hundreds of demonstrators gathered at a hotel in Khasavyurt, Dagestan on the evening of October 28 to look for suspected "Israeli refugees" based on similar rumors.[2] Unknown actors reportedly set fire to a Jewish cultural center under construction in Nalchik, Kabardino-Balkarian Republic on the night of October 28 to 29.[3]

The rumors appear to have originated with a local Dagestani Telegram channel, which claimed that "Israeli refugees" were staying at the hotel in Khasavyurt, Dagestan on October 28 and proceeded to announce plans for demonstrations that took place several hours later in the center of Makhachkala.[4] The Telegram channel called on Makhachkala residents to demonstrate at the airport on the night of October 28 and on October 29 and posted flight tracker data for the plane from Israel ahead of its arrival on the night of October 29.[5] Demonstrations are currently ongoing at the Makhachkala airport, where demonstrators temporarily blocked all individuals at the airport from leaving. Demonstrators also checked identification documents in search of Israeli citizens, although there are no reports of demonstrators finding any Israeli citizens.[6] Demonstrators have chanted "death to Jews" and have also occasionally gotten physical with security personnel at the airport.[7] Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) elements have removed demonstrators from the premises of the airport, but crowds are still present outside of the airport.[8] The Telegram channel that spread the rumors is currently down, which may be the first indicator that Russian authorities are actively trying to suppress the continuation of the antisemitic demonstrations.

The Kremlin has yet to respond and appears to have left regional authorities to make an official response to the demonstrations. Dagestani Republic Head Sergei Melikov, Karachay Cherkess Republic Head Rashid Temrezov, and Kabardino-Balkarian Republic Head Kazbek Kokov called on residents of the North Caucasus earlier on October 29 to refrain from aggressive actions and to suppress attempts to incite interethnic hatred.[9] The Coordination Center for Muslims of the North Caucasus specifically denounced antisemitic actions following the initial demonstrations on the evening of October 28.[10] Dagestani Minister of National Policy Enrik Muslimov and Minister of Youth Kamil Saidov later arrived at the airport on October 29 to speak with demonstrators but appeared unable to dissuade them from breaking into the premises.[11] Melikov later called the demonstration a violation of the law and the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the North Caucasus Federal District warned about the illegality of holding demonstrations without prior government approval.[12]

The Kremlin will likely struggle to reassure constituencies that the situation is under control and convince Jewish audiences that Jewish minorities are safe in Russia despite its efforts to present Russia as a religiously tolerant country. Spokesperson for Russia's Chief Rabbinate in Dagestan Ovadya Isakov stated on October 29 that hundreds of Jewish families in Dagestan should leave Dagestan and Russia altogether because "Russia is not salvation" as "there were pogroms in Russia too."[13] Russian President Vladimir Putin lauded Russia as a beacon of religious harmony at a meeting with leaders of several Russian religious organizations, including Jewish and Islamic faith leaders, on October 25.[14] The Kremlin likely aims to present Russia as protecting its religious minorities to curry favor with Muslim and Jewish audiences against the backdrop of the Israeli-Hamas war and to downplay tensions caused by the increasingly ultranationalist Russian Orthodox Church.[15]

Russian ultranationalists expressed concerns that antisemitic demonstrations will spread from Dagestan and the North Caucasus to elsewhere in Russia. Select Russian ultranationalists blamed the initial rumors on a Ukrainian information operation, but others expressed deep concerns that antisemitic activities may spread and that anti-Russian activities could begin.[16] One Russian milblogger rhetorically asked if there would be "pogroms" in Moscow and claimed that the demonstrations may lead to a situation reminiscent of the murders of ethnic Russians in Tajikistan and the Republic of Chechnya in the 1990s.[17] Russian ultranationalists may also begin to heavily criticize Russian authorities' response to the demonstrations, as several Russian sources bemoaned what they described as a lax official response so far.[18]

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov and Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin may be attempting to capitalize on heightened ethnoreligious tensions in Russia to regain favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian milbloggers observed that Russian officials failed to implement Putin's 2012 policies incentivizing migration to Russia to fix Russia's demographic issues.[19] The milbloggers complained that Putin's policies, while well intended and correct, failed to increase the birth rates or reduce mortality rates to necessary levels and failed to properly integrate the migrants into Russian society and identity.[20] The milbloggers claimed that these policies will not change as long as older politicians from Putin's generation remain in power. One milblogger explicitly named Bortnikov and Bastrykin as "trusted people" who must "fly into [Putin's] orbit and personally convince him of the need to change [Russia's] migration policy."[21] This mention of Bortnikov and Bastrykin implies that they have fallen from Putin's favor and portrays them as the people whom Putin needs to solve Russia's recent ethnoreligious tensions involving Central Asian migrants. The Kremlin is typically slow to respond to events highlighting ethnoreligious tensions, including recent complaints of migrants attacking Russian children, often unintentionally fueling a cycle involving Russian ultranationalist anger at the Russian government for inaction that further exacerbates ethnoreligious tensions.[22] Bortnikov and Bastrykin may seek to portray themselves via the Russian information space as capable of breaking this cycle.[23]

Russian milbloggers claimed on October 29 that Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky replaced Colonel General Oleg Makarevich as the commander of the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces operating in the Kherson direction. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has not announced or confirmed reports of Makarevich's dismissal at the time of this publication and is unlikely to do so given its tendency to regularly conceal high-profile military command changes.[24] One Russian blogger claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed Makarevich during his recent visit to the Southern Military District (SMD) headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on October 19.[25] The blogger also claimed that Teplinsky was effectively demoted from his position as deputy overall theater commander, although it is unclear if Teplinsky still held this position.[26] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that rumors about Makarevich's dismissal emerged over the last week and that his removal was "long overdue" due to his handling of the military situation in the Kherson direction.[27] The milblogger added that Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Colonel General Alexei Kim effectively commands the entire Joint Grouping of Russian Forces in Ukraine.[28] ISW cannot independently verify these claims.

Makarevich's reported dismissal indicates that the Kremlin or the Russian military command may be sufficiently worried and skeptical of his ability to repel recent larger-than-usual Ukrainian ground operations in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that a small Ukrainian "bridgehead" in Krynky (a settlement on east bank Kherson Oblast) likely triggered Makarevich's removal.[29] Other Russian milbloggers reiterated similar theories, claiming that Makarevich's negligence and extreme lack of command initiative enabled repeated Ukrainian landings on east bank Kherson Oblast.[30] One milblogger claimed that Ukrainian "bridgeheads" on east bank Kherson Oblast are setting a dangerous precedent and that Russian forces under Makarevich's command were unable to adequately counter and respond to Ukrainian threats.[31]

Makarevich's opponents, alternatively, may have been successful in convincing Russian President Vladimir Putin of Makarevich's failure to command the Kherson direction against the backdrop of intensified Ukrainian ground attacks. A select group of Russian mibloggers previously accused Makarevich of failing to adequately command and equip Russian forces to respond to Ukrainian raids on east bank Kherson Oblast in summer 2023.[32] Some of these milbloggers notably praised Teplinsky and criticized Makarevich after he reportedly replaced Teplinsky as the VDV commander in winter 2023.[33] A Wagner Group-affiliated milblogger claimed that Makarevich was removed from his position after unspecified intelligence officials notified the Russian "high command" - possibly implying Putin - about Makarevich's failure to provide accurate information about the situation in the area of his responsibility.[34] One Russian blogger also claimed that Russian milbloggers who have been fighting for Makarevich's removal should rejoice.[35]

Ukrainian forces advanced near Bakhmut amid continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 29. Geolocated footage published on October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced over the railway line south of Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[36] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued assault operations south of Bakhmut and continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[37] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces established control over unspecified positions in the Zaporizhia direction (western Zaporizhia Oblast) over the past week.[38]

The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials will send Ukraine hybrid air defense systems in fall 2023.[39] The NYT cited US officials talking about the so-called FrankenSAM systems that that merge advanced Western air defense missiles with modified Soviet launchers or other missile launchers that Ukraine already possesses.[40] The FrankenSAM combinations include modified Soviet Buk launchers and American Sea Sparrow missiles, Soviet-era radars and American Sidewinder missiles, and Cold War-era Hawk systems.[41] The NYT reported that the US is testing a FrankenSAM combination of a Patriot missile and a Ukrainian domestically produced radar system.[42] US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia Policy Laura Cooper stated that the FrankenSAMs contribute to filling critical gaps in Ukrainian air defenses.[43]

Unspecified actors may have purposefully conspired to shut down a prominent Russian Airborne Forces (VDV)-affiliated milblogger. A Russian VDV-affiliated milblogger announced on October 28 that he was forced to shut down his Telegram channel, implying that unspecified actors abducted the raccoon that the milblogger had been using as a mascot to help gain notoriety and fundraise for Russian forces.[44] The milblogger claimed that the channel generated over 20 million rubles ($212,000) for Russian forces within a year.[45] The raccoon gained fame when Russian forces stole it from a zoo when withdrawing from west (right) bank Kherson Oblast in November 2022.[46] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has increasingly targeted Russian milbloggers in censorship and self-censorship campaigns, and it is possible that MoD-affiliated actors aimed to censor this milblogger.[47] The milblogger claimed that "traitors" abducted the raccoon and left occupied Ukraine and suggested that the milblogger may have personally known who took the animal, however.[48] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Military Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that the raccoon had previously attacked Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo and criticized the Russians for losing the raccoon.[49] ISW is unable independently to confirm reports of the raccoon's whereabouts or actions.

The Russian information space continues to debate the future of the Wagner Group's remaining personnel. Wagner-affiliated Russian milbloggers claimed on October 28 that the Wagner Group is officially a detachment of Rosgvardia and will retain its structures and commanders.[50] The milbloggers claimed that Rosgvardia is encouraging active and reserve Wagner personnel to sign contracts with Rosgvardia, including six-month contracts for service in Ukraine or nine-month contracts for service in Belarus, the Middle East, Africa, or Latin America. A smaller group of Wagner-affiliated Russian milbloggers denied recent reports that large groups of former Wagner personnel are joining Chechen "Akhmat" Spetsnaz units in Russia or the Russian Ministry of Defense's (MoD's) Expeditionary Force in Syria.[51] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov posted footage on October 29 claiming to show "Akhmat" Commander Apty Alaudinov and Russian State Duma Deputy Nikolai Brykin welcoming 170 former Wagner fighters to "Akhmat" units.[52]

Key Takeaways:

Ongoing antisemitic demonstrations in the Republic of Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus are highlighting heightened interethnic and interreligious tensions in Russia.

The Kremlin has yet to respond and appears to have left regional authorities to make an official response to the demonstrations.

The Kremlin will likely struggle to reassure constituencies that the situation is under control and convince Jewish audiences that Jewish minorities are safe in Russia despite its efforts to present Russia as a religiously tolerant country.

Russian ultranationalists expressed concerns that antisemitic demonstrations will spread from Dagestan and the North Caucasus elsewhere in Russia.

Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) Head Alexander Bortnikov and Russian Investigative Committee Head Alexander Bastrykin may be attempting to capitalize on heightened ethnoreligious tensions in Russia to regain favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russian milbloggers claimed on October 29 that Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky replaced Colonel General Oleg Makarevich as the commander of the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces operating in the Kherson direction.

Ukrainian forces advanced near Bakhmut amid continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 29.

The New York Times (NYT) reported that US officials will send Ukraine hybrid air defense systems in fall 2023.

Unspecified actors may have purposefully conspired to shut down a prominent Russian Airborne Forces (VDV)-affiliated milblogger.

The Russian information space continues to debate the future of the Wagner Group's remaining personnel.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, near Bakhmut, near Avdivvka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced west of Donetsk City.

Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces have begun deploying a new electronic warfare (EW) data station system in Ukraine.

Russian military personnel continue to commit violent crimes in occupied Ukraine.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · October 31, 2023

ISW analysis for 30 October 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 30, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Russian officials announced that Russian law enforcement suppressed the antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 30. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that employees of the MVD and other law enforcement

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3:00pm ET on October 30. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the October 31 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian officials announced that Russian law enforcement suppressed the antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 30. The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) stated that employees of the MVD and other law enforcement agencies suppressed mass riots in Makhachkala and restored order at the local airport after identifying over 150 participants and detaining 60 rioters.[1] The MVD also claimed that rioters injured at least nine police officers and that searches for other rioters are ongoing. Dagestan Head Sergey Melikov claimed that he personally inspected the Makhachkala airport, which sustained minor damage, and claimed that the MVD and Rosgvardia used physical force as a last resort in hopes of calming the mob with reason.[2] Russian sources claimed that rioters threw stones at law enforcement and that officers responded by firing guns into the air.[3] Melikov stated that unspecified foreign actors, including pro-Ukrainian Telegram channels, are attempting to destabilize the region and claimed that the Telegram channel that published the rumors of the arrival of "Israeli refugees" in Dagestan was managed from Ukrainian territory.[4]

Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the October 29 antisemitic demonstrations in Dagestan by accusing Ukraine of trying to "instigate pogroms in Russia" under Western guidance.[5] Putin claimed during a meeting with members of the Russian Security Council on October 30 that demonstrations in Makhachkala "were inspired, among other things, through social networks, from Ukraine's territory by Western intelligence services." Putin added that the West is trying to use regional conflicts to break Russia from within, and tasked regional authorities with undertaking "firm, timely and clear actions to protect the constitutional system of Russia, the rights and freedoms of [Russian] citizens, interethnic and interreligious harmony." Putin did not specify which measures Russia will undertake to resolve interreligious conflicts and antisemitism in Russia, however. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov did not comment on the measures that could be taken against the demonstrators.[6] Kremlin officials largely reiterated similar statements prior to Putin's speech and refrained from directly condemning the rioters, and the Kremlin's narrative about foreign involvement in the riots is likely an attempt to deflect from the international criticism of antisemitism and growing animosity towards ethnic and religious minorities in Russia.[7]

A minority of Russian officials directly condemned rioters and regional authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes in Dagestan. Melikov stated that rioters betrayed Russian servicemen fighting in Ukraine by "playing for the enemy" and noted that he was ashamed about the riots.[8] Russian State Duma Deputy Vasiliy Vlasov criticized Dagestani authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes and unrest that lasted for three days.[9] Vlasov added that unnamed regional officials should be dismissed from their positions for failing to preempt the riots in time.

The October 29 riots in Dagestan highlight the growing radicalization and factionalism of Russian society resulting from the hyper-nationalist ideologies that the war in Ukraine has empowered. Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Janis Sarts stated that events in Makhachkala represent some of the manifestations of the radicalization of the Russian society resulting from the war in Ukraine and the surrounding media environment.[10] Sarts stated that Russian media has been inciting hatred against Ukrainians, the West, and Israel and observed that many deceased Russian servicemen who had fought in Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine hailed from Dagestan. A Russian milblogger similarly implied that the Kremlin's efforts to blame the riots on foreign psychological and information operations allow Russian officials to avoid responsibility for enabling the strengthening of radical sentiments among Russian Muslim populations.[11] ISW has previously assessed that the hyper-nationalist ideologies espoused by the Kremlin as the justifications for the war are having domestic ramifications for Russia, particularly in ethnic minority communities.[12]

Unidentified Russian soldiers reportedly murdered a Ukrainian family in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast, further highlighting a threatening environment of violence that is pervasive throughout the occupied areas of Ukraine. Ukrainian Human Rights Ombudsman Dmytro Lubinets stated on October 29 that Russian troops killed nine civilians, including two young children, in their home in Volnovakha overnight and suggested that Chechen units may have committed the murders because the family refused to shelter Chechen forces in their house.[13] Several Ukrainian sources and a prominent Russian insider source reported that forensic evidence indicates that well-prepared and well-equipped military personnel likely perpetrated the attack.[14] Attacks on civilians hors de combat (in rear areas far removed from active combat zones) by representatives of an occupying power constitute a clear violation of multiple international legal norms and very likely rise to the level of a war crime or crime against humanity.[15]

Several Russian commentators exploited the circumstances of the tragedy in Volnovakha to accuse Ukraine of trying to stoke interethnic tensions within the Russian information space. One Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sources first reported that "Kadyrov's men" (in reference to Chechen troops) committed the murders and linked the issue to the October 29 riots in Dagestan.[16] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Chechen forces are not deployed anywhere near Volnovakha and accused the Ukrainian information space of trying to use Chechens as a "trigger" to further destabilize Russia.[17] The fixation on the Ukrainian accusation rather than on the atrocity itself, the need to hold the perpetrators accountable, or the unprofessionalism and indiscipline of soldiers committing such crimes suggests that these Russian commentators are very concerned about inter-ethnic tensions in Russia and the Russian armed forces.

Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30. Geolocated footage posted on October 30 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced northeast of Kurdyumivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[18] Additional geolocated footage from October 29 indicates that Ukrainian forces have marginally advanced west of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[19] The Ukrainian General Staff reiterated that Ukrainian forces are continuing offensive actions near Bakhmut and offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[20]

Russian forces continue to use "Storm-Z" assault units predominantly made up of prisoner recruits in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct "meat assaults" (colloquial jargon for infantry-led frontal assaults) near Avdiivka and are training "Storm-Z" assault units for future assaults without equipment.[21] A Russian milblogger reportedly serving in the Avdiivka direction claimed that "meat assaults" are when Russian infantry forces attack without artillery support to suppress Ukrainian firing positions.[22] The milblogger claimed that when two Russian regiments conduct "meat assaults" side by side, the seam between the areas of responsibility of both regiments remains unsecured and vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. Another Russian milblogger claimed that "Storm-Z" assault detachments in the Avdiivka direction and on Bakhmut's southern flank are often destroyed after a few days of active operations and on average lose between 40-70 percent of their personnel.[23] The milblogger criticized the Russian military's poor training of "Storm-Z" units and the unwillingness of superior officers to consider the proposals of "Storm-Z" commanders when assigning them combat missions. The milblogger stated that "Storm-Z" units are often introduced into battle before conducting reconnaissance or establishing connections with neighboring units and typically struggle to evacuate their wounded without artillery cover, leading to higher losses. Both milbloggers noted the lack of proper artillery support for Russian attacks and counterattacks.[24] One milblogger stated that these factors contribute to "Storm-Z" units being turned into "trash" before achieving any significant results.[25] ISW has frequently reported on the ineffectiveness of "Storm-Z" units.[26]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted the allegedly cooperative nature of the Russian-Chinese relationship at the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum on October 30. Shoigu labeled the Russian-Chinese relationship as a "comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction" and stated that Russia and China consider each other "priority partners."[27] Shoigu claimed that the confidential contacts between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping play a "special role" in maintaining the "traditionally friendly relations" between the two states.[28] Shoigu highlighted Russia's cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and noted Russia's desire to increase military and military-technical cooperation with states in the Asian-Pacific region.[29] Despite Shoigu's characterizations of the Russian-Chinese partnership, the majority of his speech focused not on Russia's relationship with China, but rather on the alleged threats of the West, NATO, and the war in Ukraine, likely in an attempt to paint a picture of a world hostile to Moscow and Beijing.[30] ISW continues to assess that China has reservations concerning the Kremlin's desired "no limits partnership" between the two states.[31]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on the night of October 29 to 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 30 that Russian forces launched 12 Shahed 131/136 drones, two Kh-59 missiles, and four Iskander missiles against Ukraine and that Ukrainian air defenses downed all the Shahed drones and the Kh-59s.[32] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command stated that Russian Iskander missiles struck port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces are beginning to use several new "smart" glide bombs – the FAB-250, FAB-500, and FAB-1500.[34] The milblogger claimed that the new glide bombs have laser and satellite guidance, making the accuracy of their impact radius as small as 5 meters, compared to conventional air bombs with an accurate impact radius of 50 meters. The bombs reportedly have a strike range of 200 kilometers. The milblogger claimed that Russian FAB-250 bombs weigh 250 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 99 kilograms, have a damage radius of 120 meters, and can destroy manpower, equipment, and light fortifications. Russian FAB-500 bombs reportedly weigh 500 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 150 kilograms, have a damage radius of 250 meters, and can destroy headquarters, warehouses, and concrete and reinforced concrete objects. Russian FAB-1500 bombs weigh 1550 kilograms, hold an explosive weight of 675 kilograms, have a damage radius of 500 meters, and can destroy underground bunkers up to 20 meters in depth and penetrate up to 3 meters of reinforced concrete. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces can arm Su-34, Su-30, and Su-35 aircraft with the new glide bombs.

Key Takeaways:

Russian officials announced that Russian law enforcement suppressed antisemitic riots in Makhachkala, Republic of Dagestan on October 30. Russian President Vladimir Putin responded to the October 29 antisemitic demonstrations in Dagestan by accusing Ukraine of trying to "instigate pogroms in Russia" under Western guidance.

A minority of Russian officials directly condemned rioters and regional authorities for ignoring antisemitic attitudes in Dagestan.

The October 29 riots in Dagestan highlight the growing radicalization and factionalism of Russian society resulting from the hyper-nationalist ideologies that the war in Ukraine has empowered.

Unidentified Russian soldiers reportedly murdered a Ukrainian family in occupied Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast, further highlighting a threatening environment of violence that is pervasive throughout occupied areas of Ukraine. Several Russian commentators exploited the circumstances of the tragedy in Volnovakha to accuse Ukraine of trying to stoke interethnic tensions within the Russian information space.

Ukrainian forces made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30.

Russian forces continue to use "Storm-Z" assault units predominantly made up of prisoner recruits in highly attritional infantry-led frontal assaults.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted the allegedly cooperative nature of the Russian-Chinese relationship at the 10th Beijing Xiangshan Forum on October 30.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 30 and advanced in some areas.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 1, 2023

ISW analysis for 31 October 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, October 31, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's response to the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan suggests that Russian officials may be increasingly concerned about the weakening of authoritarian control in regions on the periphery of the

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on October 31. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 1 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's response to the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan suggests that Russian officials may be increasingly concerned about the weakening of authoritarian control in regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation. Kadyrov responded to the riots in Dagestan by praising Russian President Vladimir Putin's accusation that the West orchestrated the situation to destabilize Russia.[1] Kadyrov later called on Chechen security forces to immediately detain instigators of any potential riots in Chechnya or to "fire three warning shots in the air and after that, fire the fourth shot in the head."[2] Kadyrov's reactions to the riots in Dagestan suggest that he is first and foremost concerned with maintaining the perception of his unwavering support of Putin and secondly with demonstrating the strength of his authoritarian rule over Chechnya by threatening a violent response to potential future riots.[3]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[4] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met with Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi to discuss the situation on the front in the Kupyansk, Avdiivka, and Kherson directions.[5]

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 31. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched four Iskander-M missiles and an S-300 air defense missile at targets in Ukraine.[6] Zaporizhia Oblast Military Administration Head Yurii Malashko reported that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City with a missile.[7] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Shahed-131/136 drones at targets in Khmelnytskyi and Poltava oblasts and that Ukrainian air defenses activated in these oblasts.[8]

Russian authorities detained two suspects for the murder of a Ukrainian family in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Russian Investigative Committee announced on October 30 that Russian authorities detained two Russian military contract servicemen originally from the Russian Far East as suspects for the murder on October 29 in Volnovakha, Donetsk Oblast.[9] The Investigative Committee stated that the preliminary investigation indicates that the motive of the murders was of a "domestic" nature. A Russian insider source claimed on October 31 that the two detainees were a part of the Russian 155th Separate Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet).[10] Attacks on civilians hors de combat (in rear areas far removed from active combat zones) by representatives of an occupying power constitute a clear violation of multiple international legal norms and very likely rise to the level of a war crime or crime against humanity.[11]

A court in Uzbekistan has reportedly sentenced the first Uzbek citizen to prison for serving as a mercenary for Russian forces in Ukraine. A court in Uzbekistan found an Uzbek man, who reportedly served in the Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) military from 2014-2015, guilty of violating the Uzbek law against mercenarism.[12] Relatives of the convicted man claimed that he did not participate in the war in Ukraine and was in Russia during the indicated years.[13] This sentencing may heighten tensions between the governments of Russia and Central Asian countries as Russian authorities have increased efforts to coerce Central Asian migrants into Russian military service.[14]

Key Takeaways:

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's response to the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan suggests that Russian officials may be increasingly concerned about the weakening of authoritarian control in regions on the periphery of the Russian Federation.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on October 31.

Russian forces launched a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on October 31.

Russian authorities detained two suspects for the murder of a Ukrainian family in occupied Donetsk Oblast.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted combined missile strikes against Sevastopol and elsewhere in occupied Crimea on October 30.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremmina line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.

Former Wagner Group fighters continue to redeploy to Ukraine as part of other Russian formations.

Russian occupation officials continue efforts to eradicate Ukrainian language and culture in occupied Ukraine.

CitizenVectron · November 1, 2023

Why Vladimir Putin toned down his nuclear rhetoric

WWW.FT.COM

Russia’s president unnerved his foes and friends about the war in Ukraine turning into an atomic conflagration

Apparently last year when Putin was threatening tactical nuclear strikes, both the US and China spoke to him (including Xi, face to face), warning him to shut up. Since then, he hasn't mentioned nuclear weapons.

SuperSpreader · November 1, 2023

2 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

Why Vladimir Putin toned down his nuclear rhetoric

WWW.FT.COM

Russia’s president unnerved his foes and friends about the war in Ukraine turning into an atomic conflagration

Apparently last year when Putin was threatening tactical nuclear strikes, both the US and China spoke to him (including Xi, face to face), warning him to shut up. Since then, he hasn't mentioned nuclear weapons.

bros before nuclear war

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 2, 2023

ISW analysis for 01 November 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 1, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace. In an essay entitled

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. The use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1:30pm ET on November 1. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 2 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace.[1] In an essay entitled "Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It" and an interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi outlined the current operational environment in Ukraine and noted that, despite several previously successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2022, the war is now "gradually moving to a positional form."[2] Zaluzhnyi heavily stressed that the current positional nature of the war is largely a result of military parity between Ukrainian and Russian forces, noting that a deep and dramatic Ukrainian penetration of Russian lines will likely not be possible with the relative technological and tactical equilibrium currently between Ukrainian and Russian forces.[3] In his interview with The Economist, Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that technological and tactical parity between opposing forces in Ukraine has resulted in a "stalemate" similar to the case of the First World War.[4] In the more extensive essay on the subject, Zaluzhnyi notably refrained from classifying the situation as a full stalemate and instead framed it as a "positional" war resulting from aspects of this technological-tactical parity.[5] According to Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine's ability to overcome this technological-tactical parity will be contingent on Ukraine's ability to secure five main operational components that have become particularly significant since the summer of 2023 — gaining air superiority; breaching Russian mine barriers in depth; increasing the effectiveness of counterbattery combat; creating and training the necessary reserves; and building up electronic warfare (EW) capabilities.

Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces. Regarding the issue of air superiority, Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian forces need to significantly improve drone capabilities to gain air superiority along the frontline.[6] Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukrainian forces need to overload Russian air defenses, neutralize Russian strike drones, and degrade Russian visibility over the front by deploying cheap drones en masse, developing specific drones meant to target Russian strike drones, and employing EW complexes throughout the front.[7] Zaluzhnyi argued that to overcome the challenges of EW use on the frontline, Ukrainian forces need to introduce necessary command and control (C2) processes for EW complexes, increase EW production capabilities, and streamline engagements with volunteer organizations that provide smaller EW complexes to Ukrainian forces.[8] Zaluzhnyi also recommended that Ukrainian forces improve counter-EW measures and develop new drones with EWs in mind.[9] To gain counterbattery superiority, Zaluzhnyi recommended that Ukrainian forces use more reconnaissance and strike drones to improve Ukrainian counterbattery fire and argued that Ukrainian forces need to strengthen GPS support for Ukrainian counterbattery units and increase the number of counterbattery assets.[10] Zaluzhnyi stated that improved sensors, more widespread and varied mine clearing capabilities, and anti-drone equipment will allow Ukrainian forces to more successfully breach Russian mine barriers in depth while under concealment.[11]

Zaluzhnyi also highlighted wider administrative adaptations and domestic developments in addition to his specific tactical battlefield solutions. Zaluzhnyi specifically called on Ukraine to introduce a Unified State Register for draftees, reservists, and those liable for military service to prepare a necessary reserve for Ukrainian forces.[12] Zaluzhnyi more broadly called on Ukrainian officials to incentivize Ukrainian citizens to join the military reserve and expand the number of citizens that Ukrainian forces are allowed to train.[13] Zaluzhnyi also noted that improving Ukrainian C2 and logistics support will be critical to improving operations writ large.[14] Zaluzhnyi stated that the formation of a "single information environment" for C2 through the use of modern information technology will allow Ukrainians to get ahead of Russian forces in terms of situational awareness.[15] Zaluzhnyi particularly highlighted the need for Ukraine to develop its own defense industry to sustain operations, long-range strike capabilities, and an asymmetric munitions arsenal to break out of military parity with Russian forces.[16]

Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces near Avdiivka have largely slowed the pace of ground attacks north and south of Avdiivka in favor of heavy indirect fire against Ukrainian frontline positions and near rear areas. Russian forces may be conducting an interdiction campaign against Ukrainian assets in the Avdiivka area, but this heavy fire is more likely air and artillery preparation for the battlefield ahead of another wave of Russian assaults.[17] Other milbloggers also characterized the current Russian operations as "preparatory support," presumably for later assaults.[18] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun also notably stated on October 30 that Russian forces are preparing to conduct "meat assaults" (colloquial jargon for infantry-led frontal assaults) near Avdiivka and are training "Storm-Z" assault units made largely of convict recruits for future assaults without equipment.[19]

Russian forces may be preparing to transition to such infantry-led frontal assaults following heavy artillery preparation to compensate for heavy materiel losses in Avdiivka over the course of October. Open-source geolocation project GeoConfirmed used commercially available satellite imagery to verify that Russian forces have suffered at least 197 damaged and destroyed vehicles since October 9, losing 99 vehicles during the first wave of assaults between October 9 and 13, 94 vehicles during the second wave between October 14 and 23, and four confirmed and 18 potentially lost vehicles between October 24 and31.[20] GeoConfirmed characterized the Russian effort near Avdiivka as the costliest Russian effort thus far in the war in Ukraine.[21]

The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff's wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater. Various Russian elements have engaged in similarly catastrophic mechanized attacks with infantry-led frontal assaults on fortified Ukrainian positions along several different axes over the course of 2022 and 2023, suggesting that the ultimate fault in the lack of strategic adaptation lies with the General Staff. Russian forces previously suffered significant personnel and materiel losses during an unsuccessful offensive against Vuhledar, western Donetsk Oblast in winter 2022-2023, which was characterized by multiple waves of mechanized attacks against fortified Ukrainian positions.[22] These infantry-heavy assaults completely destroyed the Russian units involved in them, including the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), which reportedly had to reconstitute several times due to losses suffered near Vuhledar.[23] By contrast, elements of the 1st Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) Army Corps, operating under the command of the Southern Military District's 8th Combined Arms Army, and elements of the Central Military District's 41st Combined Arms Army, have recently conducted analogous costly mechanized assaults near Avdiivka.[24] The fact that two very distinct groupings of forces have engaged in similarly ineffective operations suggests that the Russian military command is struggling to learn and disseminate lessons across the theater or, in the case, even within the same military district.[25] The Russian General Staff is in principle responsible for learning lessons, adapting Russian doctrine, and disseminating lessons and new approaches throughout the force. Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov is ultimately responsible for this failure both in his capacity of chief of the Russian General Staff and as overall theater commander. The contrast between Gerasimov's failure in this regard and General Zaluzhnyi's thoughtful and public evaluation of the challenges facing Ukraine and the solutions to them is notable.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[26] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Zelenopillya (12km southwest of Bakhmut) and along a section of the railway line between Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and Andriivka (10km southwest of Bakhmut).[27] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced from Shcherbaky (18km west of Orikhiv) towards Myrne (16km southwest of Orikhiv) and made gains west of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv).[28]

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Shoigu stated during a conference call on November 1 that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked in the Zaporizhia, Donetsk, and Kherson directions, grouping Ukrainian activity in the Kherson direction with directions recognized as currently part of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive efforts.[29] Putin described Ukrainian activity in Kherson Oblast as the "next [Ukrainian] counteroffensive" and dismissed all Ukrainian offensive operations as failures during a press conference in Beijing on October 18.[30]

Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 1 that Russian forces launched three Kh-59 missiles and 20 Shahed 131/136 drones and noted that Ukrainian air defenses downed all three of the Kh-59 missiles and 18 Shahed drones.[31] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian drones struck an oil refinery in Kremenchuk, Poltava Oblast.[32] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also struck the Myrhorod airfield in Poltava Oblast.[33] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat stated that Russian forces are targeting "weak points" in Ukrainian air defenses.[34] Ihnat added that Russian forces are looking at several different courses of action to replenish weapons stocks for continued strikes this fall and winter.

The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy. Russian state media outlet TASS reported on November 1 that sources close to the Russian military leadership stated that the Russian Northern, Pacific, Black Sea, and Baltic fleets and Caspian Flotilla will return to direct subordination under Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Nikolai Evmenov on December 1.[35] The Russian Northern Fleet (NF) will also lose its status as a separate military-administrative unit equal to a military district effective December 1, and its ground, aviation, and air defense forces will be transferred to the newly re-created Leningrad Military District. TASS noted that this information has not been officially confirmed. The Russian federal portal of draft regulator legal acts published a presidential decree on October 8, prepared by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), which proposed stripping the NF of its status as a joint "strategic territorial association," signaling that this change would happen in the future but not specifying a date. [36] It remains unclear how Russia intends to mobilize, train, and organize forces previously under its fleets into new military district-level formations, but this restructuring writ large suggests that Russia intends to reconsolidate control of ground forces under the military district structure, including the newly re-created Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, while separating the naval assets under the Russian Navy.

Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia. Russian regional news outlets reported on November 1 that the Wagner Group has resumed recruiting in Perm and Novosibirsk oblasts under Pavel's leadership.[37] Russian outlet Ngs.ru reported that a Wagner representative in Novosibirsk stated that Wagner is no longer recruiting criminals or people with illnesses.[38] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Pavel is the new leader of the remnants of Wagner and expressed hope that Pavel's appointment is an indication that Wagner will survive its subordination to Rosgvardia.[39]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi assessed on November 1 that the war in Ukraine has taken on a positional nature and offered a series of recommendations for Ukraine to restore maneuver to the battlespace. Zaluzhnyi offered a series of specific tactical solutions to the five aforementioned operational components that have created the conditions for positional warfare, which in his view will allow Ukraine to overcome military parity with Russian forces.

Russian forces are likely preparing for another wave of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area.

The current situation near Avdiivka is a microcosm of the Russian General Staff's wider failure to internalize and disseminate lessons learned by Russian forces during previous failed offensive efforts in Ukraine to other force groupings throughout the theater.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 1.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu reiterated Russian President Vladimir Putin's framing of ongoing Ukrainian ground activity on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast as part of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Russian forces conducted a relatively large series of drone and missile strikes mainly targeting Poltava Oblast on the night of October 31 to November 1.

The Russian military appears poised to re-establish its military districts as the primary joint headquarters for its ground forces while transferring naval assets back to the command of the Russian Navy.

Russian sources speculated that Pavel Prigozhin, the son of deceased Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin, is officially the acting head of Wagner remnants operating under the auspices of Rosgvardia.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut direction, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in various sectors of the front.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 2, 2023

In a pair of articles just published in The Economist, the UAF CINC states that the conflict has become "positional" which is to say that it's effectively a static, attritional stalemate and articulates what Ukraine requires to "win" the war.

Ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia

WWW.ECONOMIST.COM

General Valery Zaluzhny admits the war is at a stalemate

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"If you look at NATO's text books and at the maths which we did [in planning the counter-offensive], four months should have been enough time for us to have reached Crimea, to have fought in Crimea, to return from Crimea and to have gone back in and out again," General Zaluzhny says sardonically. Instead he watched his troops and equipment get stuck in minefields on the approaches to Bakhmut in the east, his Western-supplied equipment getting pummelled by Russian artillery and drones. The same story unfolded on the offensive's main thrust, in the south, where newly formed and inexperienced brigades, despite being equipped with modern Western kit, immediately ran into trouble.

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"First I thought there was something wrong with our commanders, so I changed some of them. Then I thought maybe our soldiers are not fit for purpose, so I moved soldiers in some brigades," says General Zaluzhny. When those changes failed to make a difference, the commander told his staff to dig out a book he once saw as a student in a military academy in Ukraine. Its title was "Breaching Fortified Defence Lines". It was published in 1941 by a Soviet major-general, P. S. Smirnov, who analysed the battles of the first world war. "And before I got even halfway through it, I realised that is exactly where we are because just like then, the level of our technological development today has put both us and our enemies in a stupor."

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That thesis, he says, was borne out as he went to the front line in Avdiivka, also in the east, where Russia has recently advanced by a few hundred metres over several weeks by throwing in two of its armies. "On our monitor screens the day I was there we saw 140 Russian machines ablaze—destroyed within four hours of coming within firing range of our artillery." Those fleeing were chased by "first-person-view" drones, remote-controlled and carrying explosive charges that their operators simply crash into the enemy. The same picture unfolds when Ukrainian troops try to advance.

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But by holding back the supply of long-range missile systems and tanks, the West allowed Russia to regroup and build up its defences in the aftermath of a sudden breakthrough in Kharkiv region in the north and in Kherson in the south late in 2022. "These systems were most relevant to us last year, but they only arrived this year," he says. Similarly, F-16 jets, due next year, are now less helpful, suggests the general, in part because Russia has improved its air defences: an experimental version of the S-400 missile system can reach beyond the city of Dnipro, he warns.

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Yet the delay in arms deliveries, though frustrating, is not the main cause of Ukraine's predicament, according to General Zaluzhny. "It is important to understand that this war cannot be won with the weapons of the past generation and outdated methods," he insists. "They will inevitably lead to delay and, as a consequence, defeat."

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General Zaluzhny is desperately trying to prevent the war from settling into the trenches. "The biggest risk of an attritional trench war is that it can drag on for years and wear down the Ukrainian state," he says. In the first world war, mutinies interfered before technology could make a difference. Four empires collapsed and a revolution broke out in Russia.

The commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces on how to win the war

WWW.ECONOMIST.COM

Technology is the key as the war becomes “positional”, says Valery Zaluzhny

Quote

Basic weapons, such as missiles and shells, remain essential. But Ukraine's armed forces need key military capabilities and technologies to break out of this kind of war. The most important one is air power. Control of the skies is essential to large-scale ground operations. At the start of the war we had 120 warplanes. Of these, only one-third were usable.

Russia's air force has taken huge losses and we have destroyed over 550 of its air-defence systems, but it maintains a significant advantage over us and continues to build new attack squadrons. That advantage has made it harder for us to advance. Russia's air-defence systems increasingly prevent our planes from flying. Our defences do the same to Russia. So Russian drones have taken over a large part of the role of manned aviation in terms of reconnaissance and air strikes.

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Drones must be part of our answer, too. Ukraine needs to conduct massive strikes using decoy and attack drones to overload Russia's air-defence systems. We need to hunt down Russian drones using our own hunter drones equipped with nets. We must use signal-emitting decoys to attract Russian glide bombs. And we need to blind Russian drones' thermal cameras at night using stroboscopes.

This points to our second priority: electronic warfare (ew), such as jamming communication and navigation signals. EW is the key to victory in the drone war.

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The third task is counter-battery fire: defeating enemy artillery. In this war, as in most past wars, artillery, rocket and missile fire make up 60-80% of all the military tasks. When we first received Western guns last year, we were quite successful at locating and striking Russian artillery. But the effectiveness of weapons such as Excalibur, a gps-guided American shell, has declined dramatically owing to improved Russian electronic warfare.

Meanwhile, Russia's own counter-battery fire has improved. This is largely thanks to its use of Lancet loitering munitions, which work alongside reconnaissance drones, and its increasing production of precision-guided shells that can be aimed by ground spotters.

Quote

The fourth task is mine-breaching technology. We had limited and outdated equipment for this at the start of the war. But even Western supplies, such as Norwegian mine-clearing tanks and rocket-powered mine-clearing devices, have proved insufficient given the scale of Russian minefields, which stretch back 20km in places. When we do breach minefields, Russia quickly replenishes them by firing new mines from a distance.

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My fifth and final priority is to build up our reserves. Russia has failed to capitalise on its hefty manpower advantage because Vladimir Putin is worried that a general mobilisation might spark a political crisis, and because Russia cannot train and equip enough people. However, our capacity to train reserves on our own territory is also limited. We cannot easily spare soldiers who are deployed to the front. Moreover, Russia can strike training centres. And there are gaps in our legislation that allow citizens to evade their responsibilities.

PDF of Zaluzhnyi's paper "Modernal Positional Warfare and How to Win In It"

https://infographics.economist.com/2023/ExternalContent/ZALUZHNYI_FULL_VERSION.pdf

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 2, 2023

Also, it appears that the artillery munitions supplied by the DPRK are making their presence known on the battlefield:

South Korea's spy agency says North Korea shipped more than a million artillery shells to Russia

APNEWS.COM

North Korea has likely sent more than a million artillery shells to Russia since August to help fuel Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine.

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South Korea’s top spy agency believes North Korea sent more than a million artillery shells to Russia since August to help fuel Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war on Ukraine, according to a lawmaker who attended a closed-door briefing Wednesday with intelligence officials.

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According to lawmaker Yoo Sang-bum, the South Korean National Intelligence Service believes the North shipped more than a million artillery shells to Russia through ships and other transport means since early August to help boost Russia’s warfighting capabilities in Ukraine. Those shells would roughly amount to two months’ worth of supplies for the Russians, Yoo said.

The agency believes North Korea has been operating its munitions factories at full capacity to meet Russian munition demands and has also been mobilizing residents to increase production, Yoo said. There are also signs that North Korea dispatched weapons experts to Russia in October to counsel Russian officials on how to use the exported North Korean weapons.

5910.jpg?width=1200&height=630&quality=8

Ukraine reports most extensive Russian shelling of the year | Ukraine | The Guardian

WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM

Russia bombards 100 settlements within 24 hours as top Ukrainian commander warns war has become deadlocked

Quote

Russia has carried out its biggest artillery attack so far this year, Ukraine has said, as Kyiv’s top general admitted the war had reached a deadlock, with little prospect that his troops would make “a deep and beautiful breakthrough”.

Gen Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s commander in chief, gave a bleak assessment of the situation on the battlefield, 20 months after Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion.

He acknowledged that his soldiers had failed to punch through entrenched Russian defensive positions and minefields. A counteroffensive which began five months ago, with the aim of driving the Russians from the occupied south of the country, had not worked.

“Just like in the first world war, we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate,” he told the Economist, in an interview published on Wednesday. He added: “There will most likely be no deep and beautiful breakthrough.”

Quote

Russian troops have bombarded Ukrainian towns and villages across a 600-mile frontline. In recent weeks they have pulverised the southern city of Kherson – which Ukraine took back last year – and targeted numerous settlements in the eastern Donbas.

“Over the last 24 hours, the enemy shelled 118 settlements in 10 regions,” Ihor Klymenko, Ukraine’s interior minister, wrote on social media. He added: “This is the highest number of cities and villages that have come under attack since the start of the year.”

marioandsonic · November 2, 2023

So basically it just depends on who runs out of soldiers or supplies first?

CitizenVectron · November 2, 2023

6 minutes ago, marioandsonic said:

So basically it just depends on who runs out of soldiers or supplies first?

Yes, and the west isn't giving enough, and is giving what it has way too late. NATO believes its tactics and tech can defeat Russia...but doesn't understand that it can't without air power.

CitizenVectron · November 2, 2023

Russia is pushing hard in Andiivka again, this time using a lot of armour. Ukraine appears to be holding, but there are concerns over artillery ammunition. Russia is likely losing 500+ soldiers per day in this assault, along with dozens of tanks and vehicles.

Breaking the rule as I can't find this elsewhere, but this footage of a repelled armour assault is insane. Russia just sends tanks in columns across open fields:

https://x.com/GloOouD/status/1720128886858457513?s=20

Hmm, can't get to embed.

Ricofoley · November 3, 2023

I think Twitter/X embeds are just flat out broken now, because I couldn't get one to work right in a Discord server either.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 3, 2023

Just now, Ricofoley said:

I think Twitter/X embeds are just flat out broken now, because I couldn't get one to work right in a Discord server either.

Oh no.

How terrible.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 3, 2023

ISW analysis for 02 November 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 2, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike on the Russian “Dnepr” Grouping of Forces headquarters in Kherson Oblast on November 1. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched Storm Shadow cruise mis

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 3pm ET on November 2. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 3 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike on the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces headquarters in Kherson Oblast on November 1.[1] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched Storm Shadow cruise missiles and Neptune anti-ship missiles targeting Strilkove, Kherson Oblast, on the Arabat Spit and that Russian air defenses only intercepted half of the missiles.[2] Multiple Russian sources claimed that Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, the recently named commander of the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces operating in the Kherson direction, was uninjured.[3] Russian opposition media outlet Astra reported that four Ukrainian missiles struck the "Aura" recreation center near Strilkove that served as the Russian Dnepr Grouping's headquarters.[4]

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Bakhmut and continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 2. Geolocated footage published on November 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces advanced further northeast of the railway line near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[5] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[6]

The Russian information space's reaction to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi's November 1 interview and essay about the current operational environment in Ukraine was relatively muted. Several Russian sources simply summarized Zaluzhnyi's points, while others suggested that Zaluzhnyi was primarily acknowledging the superiority of Soviet-era military strategy over NATO doctrine.[7] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov expressed disagreement with Zaluzhnyi's conclusions and stated that the war has not reached a "dead end."[8]

South Korean officials reported that North Korea is reportedly increasing its weapons and ammunition transfers to Russia and has reportedly delivered more than one million artillery rounds to date.[9] South Korean lawmaker Yoo Sang-bum told reporters that the South Korean National Intelligence Service said that there have been about 10 weapon shipments from North Korea to Russia since August 2023 – totaling about one million rounds of artillery.[10] Yoo added that North Korea also sent advisers to Russia to guide Russians on the use of the munitions. South Korean Yonhap news agency reported the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) estimated that North Korea shipped about 2,000 containers of military equipment and munitions from its northeastern port of Rajin to Vladivostok in Russia's Far East.[11] Yonhap estimated that these containers can carry 200,000 122mm artillery shells or over one million of 152mm shells. Yonhap reported that North Korea may also have supplied other weapons to Russia, including T-series tank ammunition, anti-tank guided missiles, rocket launchers, rifles and machine guns, and possibly short-range ballistic missiles. A senior South Korean military official observed that North Korean maritime trade with Russia increased in August before North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un's trip to Russia in September. The official also noted that Russia may consider providing North Korea with technological support for military satellites, nuclear weapons, fighter jets, and air defense systems. Yonhap reported that South Korean officials believe that North Korea is in the final stage of preparations to launch a surveillance satellite after two previous failed attempts, and it is possible that Pyongyang seeks to expand its military-technological relationship with the Kremlin in exchange for munitions.

The Wagner Group is reportedly planning to provide Hezbollah with Pantsir-S1 air defense systems. The Wall Street Journal reported on November 2 that U.S. officials stated that intelligence indicates that Wagner plans to give Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense missile systems.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has reportedly attempted to subsume Wagner operations abroad, including in the Middle East.[13] Russia and Iran have recently increased their military-technical ties; Iran has provided Russia with Shahed 136/131 drones and domestic Shahed production capabilities, and Russia reportedly provided Iran with advanced surveillance software and cyber weapons and promised Iran Su-35 aircraft.[14]

A Russian State Duma official attempted to deny ongoing claims that Rosgvardia will structurally absorb the Wagner Group private military company (PMC), rather than individually recruit former Wagner personnel. The Head of the Russian State Duma Information Policy Committee Alexander Khinshtein denied claims on November 1 that the Wagner private military company (PMC) is structurally integrated into Rosgvardia as a PMC and is recruiting personnel for Rosgvardia.[15] Khinshtein claimed that only former Wagner fighters, not the entire PMC, can sign individual contracts with Rosgvardia and that Rosgvardia cannot structurally absorb PMCs. Khinshtein was likely responding to a claim by a Wagner instructor known under the alias "Brest," who claimed that Wagner PMC would officially become part of Rosgvardia.[16] Khinshtein's denial contradicts prior Russian claims that Rosgvardia allowed Wagner personnel to sign individual and group agreements with Rosgvardia "as a guarantee that [Wagner] will not be 'torn apart.'"[17] Khinshtein's denials also contrast with "Akhmat" Spetsnaz forces Commander Apty Alaudinov's claims that former Wagner fighters are joining Rogvardia's Akhmat forces to follow their former commanders.[18] Russian sources reported that former Wagner personnel have created their own "Kamerton" detachment subordinated under Akhmat Spetsnaz forces that will soon deploy to an unspecified frontline in Ukraine.[19]

The fate of the Wagner PMC as an entity, its assets, and its remaining personnel is unclear at this time. A former Wagner fighter also told Russian opposition outlet Verstka that former Wagner personnel are currently torn between signing contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) or Rosgvardia or returning to civilian life.[20] Russian security structures, namely the Russian MoD and Rosgvardia, are competing for Wagner PMC's assets, likely prompting numerous contradictory statements about the fate of Wagner PMC as an entity.

Select Russian milbloggers accused Chechen officials and Akhmat Spetsnaz of attempting to defame and censor milbloggers who criticized Wagner's integration into Rosgvardia. Some milbloggers claimed that they had a negative opinion about Wagner's transfer to Rosgvardia and that Wagner fighters could have joined other security structures, directly criticizing the character of Rosgvardia's Director Army General Viktor Zolotov.[21] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger amplified claims that a prominent Russian milblogger got into an altercation with Akhmat's and Kadyrov's "public relations people" after the milblogger criticized Wagner's transfer to Akhmat units.[22] Russian milbloggers claimed that Kadryrov's people began to spread rumors about the milblogger and offered money to Telegram channels in return for reposting incriminating evidence against the milblogger.[23]

Russian officials appear to be pursuing limited punishments for the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan, which several Russian officials and Russian state media have called "pogroms." Russian authorities have arrested 15 individuals in connection with the riots at the Makhachkala airport as of November 1 and Dagestani Republic Head Sergei Melikov stated on November 1 that he dismissed the administrative head of Batyrkhanov, Dagestan, for participating in the riots.[24] Kremlin press wire TASS paraphrased Melikov as stating that only those who encroached on the lives of police officers and those who initiated the pogrom would face legal punishment.[25] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on November 2 that the Kremlin supports Melikov's approach to punishing only select rioters.[26] The Head of the Spiritual Administration of the Republic of Tatarstan, Kamil Samigullin, had called on Russian authorities earlier on November 1 to show leniency towards those who fell for the "provocation" in Dagestan since outside forces allegedly organized the riots.[27] Samigullin also called the riots "pogroms" and called on Muslims in Russia not to attack Jews.[28] Telegram reportedly blocked an additional two channels on November 1 that also incited antisemitic unrest in Dagestan, following the removal of the Telegram channel that had initially promoted rumors that sparked the riots.[29] Select Russian ultranationalists criticized calls for leniency and warned that Dagestani public opinion leaders would escalate tensions in Dagestan in the absence of Kremlin control over the information space there.[30]

The Russian leadership is likely avoiding wider punishments for antisemitism in the North Caucasus out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin. Russian officials have rhetorically signaled support for fighting antisemitic actions since the October 29 riots but have likely failed to convince domestic and international constituencies of Russia's ability to protect Jews in Russia. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Spokesperson Maria Zakharova on November 2 condemned the Israeli travel warnings for the North Caucasus as "anti-Russian" actions and argued that Russian authorities at all levels have sufficiently dealt with the events in Dagestan.[31]

Russian authorities elsewhere in the North Caucasus have indicated concerns about the potential for similar riots. The Sunzhi City Administration in the Republic of Ingushetia announced on November 1 that Russian authorities would strengthen security at the Magas airport following the circulation of rumors about the arrival of a flight, presumably from Israel, on the night of November 1.[32] Russian state-run outlet Izvestia reported on November 1 that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) detained an unspecified number of men in the Republic of Ingushetia who were organizing a demonstration at the Magas airport for the night of October 30.[33]

Key Takeaways:

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a missile strike on the Russian "Dnepr" Grouping of Forces headquarters in Kherson Oblast on November 1.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Bakhmut and continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 2.

The Russian information space's reaction to Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi's November 1 interview and essay about the current operational environment in Ukraine was relatively muted.

South Korean officials reported that North Korea is reportedly increasing its weapons and ammunition transfers to Russia and has reportedly delivered more than one million artillery rounds to date.

The Wagner Group is reportedly planning to provide Hezbollah with Pantsir-S1 air defense systems.

A Russian State Duma official attempted to deny ongoing claims that Rosgvardia will structurally absorb the Wagner Group private military company (PMC), rather than individually recruit former Wagner personnel.

Select Russian milbloggers accused Chechen officials and Akhmat Spetsnaz of attempting to defame and censor milbloggers who criticized Wagner's integration into Rosgvardia.

Russian officials appear to be pursuing limited punishments for the October 29 antisemitic riots in the Republic of Dagestan, which several Russian officials and Russian state media have called "pogroms."

Russian authorities elsewhere in the North Caucasus have indicated concerns about the potential for similar riots.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.

Russian irregular forces are continuing to form new assault detachments and are incentivizing recruitment by offering recruits semi-independence from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Recent Russian border restrictions are reportedly complicating the return of Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia.

**Jason** · November 3, 2023

2 hours ago, Ricofoley said:

I think Twitter/X embeds are just flat out broken now, because I couldn't get one to work right in a Discord server either.

**Jason** · November 3, 2023

Looks fine to me.

**Jason** · November 3, 2023

Putin ally warns 'enemy' Poland: you risk losing your statehood | Reuters

WWW.REUTERS.COM

A top ally of President Vladimir Putin warned Poland on Thursday that the NATO member state was now considered a "dangerous enemy" by Russia and could end up losing its...

SuperSpreader · November 3, 2023

20 minutes ago, Jason said:

Looks fine to me.

I didn't see anything but I also didn't watch the whole thing

mclumber1 · November 3, 2023

30 minutes ago, SuperSpreader said:

I didn't see anything but I also didn't watch the whole thing

TUFKAK · November 3, 2023

9 hours ago, Jason said:

Putin ally warns 'enemy' Poland: you risk losing your statehood | Reuters

WWW.REUTERS.COM

A top ally of President Vladimir Putin warned Poland on Thursday that the NATO member state was now considered a "dangerous enemy" by Russia and could end up losing its...

Poland be like

marioandsonic · November 3, 2023

20 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

Yes, and the west isn't giving enough, and is giving what it has way too late. NATO believes its tactics and tech can defeat Russia...but doesn't understand that it can't without air power.

So...Ukraine is fucked then?

CitizenVectron · November 3, 2023

35 minutes ago, marioandsonic said:

So...Ukraine is fucked then?

Not really, as Russia clearly also lacks the ability to conquer Ukraine. Assuming the west stopped giving additional support at this point (but continued with the existing contracts Ukraine has signed for the next few years), Russia might be able to take a little bit more land (at incredible cost), but it wouldn't even be able to fully capture the oblasts it's in right now.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 4, 2023

ISW analysis for 03 November 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 3, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Russian forces conducted a notably larger series of drone strikes throughout Ukraine on November 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four dozen Shahed-131/-136 drones from Kursk Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai,

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 1pm ET on November 3. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 4 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Russian forces conducted a notably larger series of drone strikes throughout Ukraine on November 3. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched four dozen Shahed-131/-136 drones from Kursk Oblast and Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai, and a Kh-59 cruise missile from occupied Kherson Oblast at targets in Ukraine.[1] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses shot down the Kh-59 cruise missile and 24 of the Shahed drones.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian forces intercepted over half of the roughly 40 drones that Russian forces launched at Ukraine.[3] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces struck targets in Kharkiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Odesa oblasts, and Zelensky stated that Ukrainian air defenses activated in Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kyiv, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, and Lviv oblasts.[4] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces primarily struck civil infrastructure, and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast Military Administration Head Svitlana Onyshchuk stated that Russian forces struck an unspecified military facility in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast.[5] Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces launched small groups of Shaheds to identify the locations of Ukrainian air defenses and then launched several waves of drones to complicate the Ukrainian response.[6] Ukrainian officials, including Zelensky, stated that Russian forces plan to launch more damaging strikes throughout Ukraine as winter approaches.[7]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on November 3, primarily aimed at strengthening Ukraine's air defenses. The US DoD announced an aid package of military materiel support for Ukraine valued at $125 million, including munitions for National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS) and HIMARS; 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds; Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) anti-tank missiles; Javelin and AT-4 anti-armor systems; and over three million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades.[8] The US DoD will also allocate $300 million to the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) to strengthen Ukraine's air defenses over the long term. The US DoD will provide Ukraine laser-guided munitions to counter UAVs under USAI.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 3. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled eight Ukrainian assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast and several Ukrainian attacks near Bakhmut from October 28 to November 3.[10]

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the Russian military command for failing to establish long-term training capabilities because it is keeping skilled commanders and soldiers at the front and leaving inexperienced careerists to train new recruits and officers. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russia continues to only learn from its mistakes at the cost of significant losses and that the Russian military command fails to teach effective tactics employed by competent commanders and servicemen to new personnel.[11] The milblogger claimed that the Russian military command commits the most capable commanders and servicemen to the most dangerous frontlines in Ukraine instead of using them to train the incoming class of Russian soldiers. The milblogger added that Russia needs to resolve this problem on a systemic level, otherwise newly formed units will repeat prior Russian mistakes on the frontline. Another Russian milblogger responded to the milblogger's critiques, noting that Russia needs to have experienced servicemen teach graduating classes at Russian military schools since graduates only study theory and do not receive any practice in modern warfare.[12] The milblogger implied that there are problems with Russian military theory and a lack of proper officer training because generals and officers who receive teaching positions do not have combat experience and only care about their own career growth. The milblogger concluded that the poor command of Russian operations in the Avdiivka direction and near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) indicates that Russian generals do not think about the wellbeing of the Russian Armed Forces in the long-term.

Alleged long-time allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin are reportedly financing two Russian Ministry of Defense–subordinated private military companies that have subsumed former Wagner Group operations in Africa. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on November 3 that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), including Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and members of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), is continuing efforts to subsume Wagner Group activities in Africa under the MoD-subordinated Redut and Convoy private military companies (PMCs).[13] WSJ reported that Arkady Rotenberg and Gennady Timchenko, two Russian billionaires who have known Putin for decades and are in Putin's inner circle, are financing Convoy and Redut, respectively. This decision is likely an attempt to prevent a single PMC and single financier from again gaining the power and influence to potentially threaten Putin and the Russian central leadership. ISW has previously assessed that Putin routinely appoints people to positions such that no one figure amasses too much political influence.[14] WSJ also reported that Konstantin Pikalov leads Convoy PMC and that Konstantin Mirzayants leads Redut PMC. Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Andrei Kartopolov stated on November 3 that Wagner has "completely disbanded" and that some Wagner fighters continue to operate in Africa but under a "different brand" under the Russian MoD.[15]

Wagner elements in Syria will reportedly transfer Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has agreed to provide to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah. (NOTE: This text also appeared in the Critical Threats Project's (CTP) November 3 Iran Update) CNN reported on November 3 that two people familiar with US intelligence stated that Assad agreed to provide the Russian air defense systems to Hezbollah and tasked Wagner with their delivery during joint conversations between the three actors.[16] WSJ reported on November 2 that US intelligence indicated that Wagner itself would give the Russian air defense systems to Hezbollah.[17] Israel frequently conducts airstrikes on Iranian weapons shipments into and through Syria, and Assad may have asked Wagner to deliver the air defense systems to Hezbollah to act as a deterrent to potential Israeli interdiction efforts.[18] CTP-ISW has previously assessed that Russia may be able to facilitate weapons shipments in Syria without risking Israeli airstrikes, and the Kremlin may believe that this Israeli reluctance will extend to Wagner.[19] Russia and Israel have a complex relationship in Syria, as Israel has historically relied on Russia to curb Iranian activities in Syria.[20]

Dagestani officials claimed they would punish those who participate in and organize alleged future demonstrations, in contrast to calls for leniency for those participating in the October 29 antisemitic riots. The office of the Mayor of Makhachkala called on local residents to refrain from participating in unauthorized rallies, including one allegedly planned for November 5, and preemptively threatened that participants and "those who provoke the population" will face "serious consequences."[21] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Telegram channels continue to call on Dagestani residents to attend a November 5 demonstration to demand the release of those detained for the October 29 antisemitic riots.[22] A Russian milblogger continued to criticize the weak official response to the recent riots, stating that "to have mercy means to show weakness."[23]

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's continued appeals to Chechen nationalists likely aim to solidify domestic support without disrupting his appearance as a steadfast supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Kadyrov announced on November 3 that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a decree assigning original Chechen names to eight Chechen villages that suffered from Stalin-era deportations and that Soviet authorities disbanded.[24] Russian officials have increasingly suppressed acknowledgements of Stalinist deportations, yet the Kremlin's support for reversing Stalin's 1944 order disbanding these Chechen villages suggests that Kadyrov is coordinating his rhetorical appeals with the Kremlin.[25] This likely rhetorical overture follows similar allusions to Chechen national history from Kadyrov, who recently named two new Chechen volunteer battalions after 18th and 19th Century Chechen fighters who resisted Russian imperial rule.[26] These allusions to Chechen national history are a low stakes approach to currying favor with Chechen nationalists who may have negative attitudes towards the Kremlin and Kadyrov's avowed support of Putin. Kadyrov's rhetorical support for historical Chechen nationalism diverts conversations away from his current support of the increasingly ultranationalist Kremlin, while only drawing temporary ire from select Russian ultranationalists.[27]

Key Takeaways:

Russian forces conducted a notably larger series of drone strikes throughout Ukraine on November 3.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced new military aid packages to Ukraine on November 3, primarily aimed at strengthening Ukraine's air defenses.

Russian milbloggers continued to criticize the Russian military command for failing to establish long-term training capabilities because it is keeping skilled commanders and soldiers at the front and leaving inexperienced careerists to train new recruits and officers.

Alleged long-time allies of Russian President Vladimir Putin are reportedly financing two Russian Ministry of Defense–subordinated private military companies that have subsumed former Wagner Group operations in Africa.

Wagner elements in Syria will reportedly transfer Russian Pantsir-S1 air defense systems that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has agreed to provide to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah.

Dagestani officials claimed they would punish those who participate in and organize alleged future demonstrations, in contrast to calls for leniency for those participating in the October 29 antisemitic riots.

Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov's continued appeals to Chechen nationalists likely aim to solidify domestic support without disrupting his appearance as a steadfast supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, near Vuhledar, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.

Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers began advertising recruitment into an "elite regiment" in Moscow Oblast and offering recruits one-million-ruble (about $10,900) salaries.

Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued attempts to discredit information about Russia's deportation of Ukrainian children.

CitizenVectron · November 4, 2023

Ukraine appears to have hit the Kerch shipyard, damaging (perhaps severely) the missile cruiser Askold.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 5, 2023

ISW analysis for 04 November 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 4, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized that the war in Ukraine is not a “stalemate” in a comment to the media about Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s essay on the positional nature of warfare in Ukraine. Zelensky stated d

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 2:30pm ET on November 4. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 5 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized that the war in Ukraine is not a “stalemate” in a comment to the media about Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s essay on the positional nature of warfare in Ukraine.[1] Zelensky stated during a joint press conference with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on November 4 that the current situation on the frontlines is “not a stalemate” even if “time has passed” and “people are tired.” Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine prioritizes the safety of its servicemen and needs US F-16 fighter aircraft and air defenses to gain an advantage over Russian forces. Zelensky recalled that many observers were quick to call the battlefield situation in 2022 “a stalemate,” but that Ukrainian forces with several “tricks, tactics, [and] military operations” were able to liberate Kharkiv Oblast and west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Zelensky added that Russian President Vladimir Putin will not stop at Russia’s currently occupied lines and noted that Ukraine “has no right to even think about giving up.” Zelensky’s statements largely mirror the main arguments in Zaluzhnyi’s essay entitled, “Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It.”

Zaluzhny’s long essay, “Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It,” outlines Zaluzhnyi’s consideration of the changes Ukraine must make to overcome the current “positional” stage of the war more clearly than the shorter op-ed and the Economist article it accompanied. Zaluzhnyi wrote that the war “is gradually moving to a positional form” and noted that Ukraine needs to gain air superiority; breach mine barriers in depth; increase the effectiveness of counter-battery; create and train the necessary reserves; and build up electronic warfare (EW) capabilities to overcome positional warfare.[2] Positional warfare refers to military operations that do not result in rapid or dramatic changes to the frontline despite both sides‘ continuing efforts to improve their positions. Zaluzhnyi notably did not say that the war was stalemated in his essay or suggest that Ukraine could not succeed. His essay focused, rather, on explaining that the current positional character of the war was a result of technological-tactical parity on the battlefield and the widespread use of mine barriers by Russian and Ukrainian troops. Zaluzhnyi considered the opportunities presented to Ukraine by Russia’s challenges, including the significant losses suffered by Russian aviation; Ukrainian use of Western missile and artillery weapons; and Russia’s failure to take advantage of its human mobilization resources due to political, organizational, and motivational issues. Zaluzhnyi argued that to avoid World War I-style “trench war” and move to maneuver warfare, Ukraine must develop new approaches including technological and other changes, some of which depend on Western support and others require adaptations within the Ukrainian military, state, and society. Zaluzhnyi concluded that positional warfare benefits Russia as it prolongs the war and could allow Russia to achieve superiority in certain areas. Zaluzhnyi argued that Ukraine or Russia could return to rapid maneuver warfare under the right circumstances, which for Ukraine must include Western-provided military resources. Zaluzhnyi’s essay was all about how to restore maneuver to a positional war, not an argument that the war has reached a stalemate.

Zelensky also denied Western reports that US and European officials are pressuring Ukrainian officials to discuss the possibility of peace negotiations. NBC, citing current and former US officials, reported on November 3 that US and European officials have been “quietly” discussing the prospects of peace negotiations with Ukrainian officials.[3] NBC’s sources stated that these discussions took place during a meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group in the past month and were the result of Ukrainian acknowledgment of Western concerns that the war has reached a “stalemate.” Zelensky stated during the press conference on November 4 that, as the leader of Ukraine, he can attest that no one in Europe or the United States is pressuring him to discuss peace negotiations.[4] Von der Leyen also expressed her support for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

NBC added that US officials have no indication that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to negotiate with Ukraine or doubts that Russia can continue its war until Western aid for Ukraine falters.[5] ISW has also not observed any indications that Russia is prepared to enter peace negotiations with Ukraine in good faith. Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov expressed the Kremlin’s disagreement with the characterization of the war in Ukraine as a “stalemate” on November 2, stating that the war in Ukraine “has not reached a dead end” and that the Russian military continues to conduct offensive operations.[6] Russia’s offensive operations around Avdiivka indicate that the Kremin continues to believe that it is possible to achieve its objectives with military force and is unlikely to enter peace negotiations with Ukraine, except to buy time to reconstitute for future offensive operations. Pressure on Ukraine to negotiate an end to the war will likely remain meaningless if not harmful as long as Putin believes that he can achieve his objectives on the battlefield.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) allegedly used claims that the Syrian government agreed to supply weapons to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah to subsume remnants of the Wagner Group in Syria and seize their air defense systems. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed on November 4 that Israel communicated information via diplomatic channels to Russia a few weeks ago about Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s alleged agreement to supply Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah with weapons.[7] The milblogger claimed that remnants of the Wagner Group were operating in Syria under an agreement with the Syrian government and that the Russian MoD used this alleged information to pressure the Syrian government to allow the Russian MoD to force Wagner fighters in Syria to transfer their weapons to and sign contracts with the Russian MoD. The milblogger claimed that the Russian MoD seized a Pantsir-S1 air defense system from Wagner personnel near Palmyra, Syria. CNN previously reported that Assad agreed to provide the Russian air defense systems to Hezbollah and tasked Wagner with their delivery.[8] The milblogger did not specify whether the allegations about Assad’s agreement with Hezbollah were true and instead claimed that the truth of that matter is not as important as the fact that the Russian MoD used it as a pretext to make demands of Wagner. The Russian MoD has consistently pursued efforts to subsume Wagner operations abroad recently and is likely concerned about air defense systems in Wagner’s possession because Wagner forces used air defense systems to shoot down multiple Russian aircraft during the June 24 rebellion.[9]

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on November 3 and 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed two Shahed-131/136 drones targeting Sumy Oblast on the night of November 3 to 4 and three Iskander-K cruise missiles targeting Dnipropetrovsk and Poltava oblasts on the evening of November 4.[10] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian weapons and ammunition arsenal in Pryluky, Chernihiv Oblast.[11] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also targeted Ukrainian rear areas, including the Kanatove airfield, Kirovohrad Oblast; Myrhorod, Poltava Oblast; Kharkiv City, Kharkiv Oblast; Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast; Odesa Oblast; and Lviv Oblast.[12]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 4. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and Bakhmut directions.[13] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced along the forest line north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut) and are gaining a foothold in the area.[14]

English-language Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported that the Russian government dismissed TASS General Director Sergei Mikhailov on July 5 due to TASS’s failure to align with Kremlin narratives while reporting on the Wagner Group rebellion. The Moscow Times cited anonymous Russian government officials, including from the presidential administration and the State Duma, as stating that the Kremlin dismissed Mikhailov because TASS’s coverage of the Wagner rebellion did not paint Russian authorities in a favorable light and did not include enough pro-Kremlin coverage.[15] Russian government officials stated that Mikhailov was fired because “TASS covered [the Wagner rebellion] in too much detail and promptly” and that “they [TASS employees] had forgotten that their main task is not to report the news [but] to create an ideologically correct narrative for the Kremlin.” A source admitted that the news outlet’s “neutrality” is useless with the war in Ukraine ongoing and the upcoming Russian presidential elections, which Putin “must win on record.” A TASS source stated that Mikhailov adhered to the “basic rules of journalism” and claimed that Russian state media outlet RIA Novosti, in contrast, is similar to a tabloid. ISW previously assessed that Mikhailov had rebranded TASS into a modern publication since his appointment in 2012 and that his dismissal may indicate that the Kremlin was unhappy with the media coverage of the Wagner rebellion and highlighted the continued importance of loyalty to Putin over professional achievement.[16] Putin previously awarded Mikhailov the Order of Friendship in 2021 for his professional successes and “many years of conscientious work.”[17]

The Russian government is testing an electronic voting system ahead of the 2024 presidential elections, likely to further support efforts to manipulate the results in favor of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russian opposition outlet Meduza reported on November 4 that the Russian government services portal Gosuslugi sent letters inviting Russian citizens, including Meduza employees, to test the remote electronic system on November 15-17. The letters also stated that all adult Russian citizens are eligible to participate in the test.[18] The Russian government officially announced the tests on October 31, and Meduza reported that a government source stated that the Russian government intends to have as many Russian federal subjects utilize electronic voting as possible in the presidential election.[19] These public election preparations are notable as Putin has not announced his official campaign and Russian state media has not yet begun posturing Putin as the only viable candidate.

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky emphasized that the war in Ukraine is not a “stalemate” in a comment to the media about Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s essay on the positional nature of warfare in Ukraine.

Zaluzhny’s long essay, “Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It,” outlines Zaluzhnyi’s consideration of the changes Ukraine must make to overcome the current “positional” stage of the war more clearly than the shorter op-ed and Economist article it accompanied.

Zelensky also denied Western reports that US and European officials are pressuring Ukrainian officials to discuss the possibility of peace negotiations.

NBC added that US officials have no indication that Russian President Vladimir Putin is willing to negotiate with Ukraine or doubts that Russia can continue its war until Western aid for Ukraine falters.

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) allegedly used claims that the Syrian government agreed to supply weapons to Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah to subsume remnants of the Wagner Group in Syria and seize their air defense systems.

Russian forces conducted a series of missile and drone strikes against Ukraine on November 3 and 4.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast on November 4.

English-language Russian outlet the Moscow Times reported that the Russian government dismissed TASS General Director Sergei Mikhailov on July 5 due to TASS’s failure to align with Kremlin narratives while reporting on the Wagner Group rebellion.

The Russian government is testing an electronic voting system ahead of the 2024 presidential elections, likely to further support efforts to manipulate the results in favor of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, north and south of Bakhmut, around Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, near Vuhledar, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in eastern and western Zaporizhia Oblast, and advanced in various sectors of the front.

The BBC and Russian opposition media outlet Mediazona confirmed that at least 35,780 Russian servicemen have died in the war in Ukraine since February 24, 2022, as of November 3, 2023, including 923 deaths in the past two weeks.

Russian authorities continue efforts to settle Russian citizens in occupied Ukraine.

CitizenVectron · November 5, 2023

13,000 visually confirmed Russian vehicle losses as of today. Just shy of 2,500 confirmed tank losses. Insane.

**Commissar SFLUFAN** · November 6, 2023

ISW analysis for 05 November 2023:

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, November 5, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4, likely damaging a naval vessel. The Ukrainian Amed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Click here to see ISW's 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this data-heavy tool.

Click here to access ISW's archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

Note: The data cut-off for this product was 12:30pm ET on November 5. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the November 6 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4, likely damaging a naval vessel. The Ukrainian Amed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated that Ukrainian forces conducted successful strikes on Russian marine and port infrastructure at the Zalyv Shipyard in Kerch on the evening of November 4.[1] Satellite imagery from November 4 shows that the strike damaged a Project 22800 Karakurt-class Kalibr missile carrier corvette at the shipyard, although the extent of the damage to the ship is currently unclear.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces intercepted 13 of 15 Ukrainian missiles targeting the shipyard and acknowledged that two missiles damaged an unspecified ship.[3] Ukrainian officials stated that Ukrainian cruise missiles damaged the Askold missile carrier, a Karakurt-class corvette that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) launched in 2021.[4] The Zalyv shipyard reportedly planned to construct 14 warships intended for the BSF between 2016 and 2021, including eight Project 22800 Karakurt-class corvettes.[5] ISW has only confirmed that three Project 228000 Karakurt-class corvettes have launched from the Zalyv shipyard as of 2023, however.[6] The Zalyv shipyard is the largest shipyard in Eastern Europe and is likely the main repair facility for the BSF in Crimea following a successful Ukraine strike on the Russian state-owned ship repair facility Sevmorzavod in Sevastopol on September 13, 2023.[7] The extent of damage to the repair facilities at the Zalyv Shipyard is unclear, although the available satellite imagery suggests that the Ukrainian strike has likely not caused damage that will disrupt its operations in the medium-to-long term, unlike the previous strike on the Sevmorzavod facility.[8] Radio Free Europe/Free Liberty (RFE/RL) has reported that Russian forces have three active shipyards, including the Zalyv facility, in occupied Crimea.[9] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces have conducted an interdiction campaign against Russian military infrastructure in occupied Crimea, primarily BSF assets, since June 2023 to degrade the Russian military's ability to use Crimea as a staging and rear area for Russian operations in southern Ukraine.[10]

Ukrainian forces reportedly intensified strikes on rear Russian areas in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea on November 5. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces struck Skadovsk, occupied Kherson Oblast on the night of November 4-5.[11] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces also disabled Ukrainian drones targeting a railway at an oil refinery in Dzhankoi, occupied Crimea on November 5.[12] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a Storm Shadow missile strike on Berdyansk, Zaporizhia Oblast on November 5.[13] Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Head Viktoria Halitsyna stated that locals reported two explosions in the city but that the Ukrainian General Staff was clarifying information.[14] Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of the Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems Brigadier General Serhiy Baranov notably stated in an interview with the Independent published on November 4 that Ukrainian forces intend to "capitalize" on their learned experiences and conduct large-scale drone strikes on Russian targets when fighting slows in the winter.[15] The Independent reported that Baranov stated that Ukraine intends to build on its "significant successes" with recent drone strikes that targeted critical Russian military assets and naval sites.[16]

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave an interview to NBC and repeated that the war is not in a stalemate. Zelensky emphasized that the situation on the battlefield remains very challenging but noted that he does not believe that the war is at a "stalemate." He described it instead as a "check on the part of the Russian army," suggesting that Ukraine can resume making significant advances when it resolves the military parity with Russian forces described by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.[17] Zelensky noted that Ukraine continues to destroy Russian Black Sea Fleet assets and continued to reiterate Ukraine's urgent need to receive air defense systems from Western partners. Zelensky further noted that Ukraine will not negotiate with Russia until or unless Russia entirely withdraws from Ukrainian territories, concluding that Ukraine is not ready to concede its freedom to the "f###ing terrorist Putin."[18] ISW continues to assess that external pressure to force Ukraine to negotiate with Russia is harmful and counterproductive as long as Putin maintains his maximalist objectives and believes that he can attain them on the battlefield.[19]

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made confirmed gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut and in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[20] Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces have made limited advances west of Verbove (10km east of Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast), as well as on the east bank of Kherson Oblast near Pidstepne (12km east of Kherson City and 3km from the Dnipro River) and in Krynky (30km east of Kherson City and 2km from the Dnipro River).[21]

Chechen officials announced that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his 15-year-old-son Adam to a prominent position in a Chechen security service, though there is confusion over Adam Kadyrov's exact position. Chechen Duma Chairperson Magomed Daudov, Chechen Republic Press Head Akhmed Dudaev, and Russian State Duma Deputy Adam Delimkhanov stated that Adam holds an unspecified "important position" in the security service of the Head of the Chechen Republic.[22] Chechen Ministry of Internal Affairs special regiment commander Zamid Chalaev and Health Minister Adam Alkhanov claimed that Adam Kadyrov was appointed as the head of this security service.[23] Ramzan Kadyrov has not yet commented on his son's appointment. Ramzan Kadyrov notably headed the security service of his father, former Chechen Republic President Akhmat Kadyrov, in the early 2000s until Akhmat Kadyrov's death in 2004.[24] Adam Kadyrov will turn 16-years-old on November 24, 2023.[25]

Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly charged participants in the antisemitic riots on October 29 with minor crimes and issued limited punishments. Russian authorities reportedly charged many of the antisemitic riot participants with using obscene language, disobedience of police orders, petty hooliganism, and violations of procedures for holding a rally.[26] Dagestani courts sentenced rioters to six to 10 days of administrative arrest or compulsory labor. ISW previously assessed that the Russian leadership is likely avoiding wider punishments for antisemitism in the North Caucasus out of concerns that they will inflame discontent towards the Kremlin.[27]

Key Takeaways:

Ukrainian forces conducted a successful strike on a Russian shipyard in Kerch, occupied Crimea on November 4, likely damaging a naval vessel. Ukrainian forces reportedly intensified strikes on rear Russian areas in southern Ukraine and occupied Crimea on November 5.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky gave an interview to NBC and repeated that the war is not in a stalemate.

Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and made confirmed gains in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 5.

Chechen officials announced that Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov appointed his 15-year-old-son Adam to a prominent position in a Chechen security service, though there is confusion over Adam Kadyrov's exact position.

Courts in the Republic of Dagestan reportedly charged participants in the antisemitic riots on October 29 with minor crimes and issued limited punishments.

Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west and southwest of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in some areas.

A Russian milblogger called on Russian "propagandists" to increase the use of Russian propaganda against Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) held in Russia in an effort to increase the number of "volunteers" in the Russian military.

Kremlin-appointed Children's Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova continued to promote the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia under the guise of vacations.

CitizenVectron · November 6, 2023

I would say that, yes, Ukraine hit the Askold missile cruiser:

CitizenVectron · November 6, 2023

Also, confirmed photos of Ukraine moving an IFV across the Dnipro to their bridgehead. They appear to have used marines in recent weeks to secure a foothold in Krynky, and the Russians have been unable to drive them out.

Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (14 May 2024) - Russia launches new invasion from the north into Kharkiv, soon to launch second corridor into Sumy. Situation is dire

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