Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[CitizenVectron]

Nato members may send troops to Ukraine, warns former alliance chief | Nato | The Guardian

WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM

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Security guarantees and membership path needed at Nato summit to avoid escalation, says Anders Rasmussen

 

Eastern European nations like Poland are demanding a path to NATO membership for Ukraine, and in the absence of that (and stronger arms support) are considering forming a "coalition of the willing" outside of NATO to directly deploy troops and weapons into the country.

[CayceG]

Okay, THAT is an escalation. 

[CitizenVectron]

Sounds like Russia has abandoned a few towns inside Belgorod within Russia, to the Freedom Legion. 

[Jwheel86]

Latest briefing by the Austrian Army. 

 

[Jason]

4 hours ago, Jwheel86 said:

Latest briefing by the Austrian Army. 

 

 

A military slide deck that isn't an eye-blistering clusterfuck?

[CayceG]

7 hours ago, Jason said:

 

A military slide deck that isn't an eye-blistering clusterfuck?

 

That's why he likes this channel so much  

[Signifyin(g)Monkey]

19 hours ago, CayceG said:

Okay, THAT is an escalation. 

 

I've heard speculation from Russian partisans for awhile that if NATO sends in troops, Russia will counterbalance it by convincing China to enter the war.

 

I'm thinking the Chinese leadership would more or less say, "Hey, we love you guys and will still buy your oil but...no. No no no."

[CayceG]

7 minutes ago, Signifyin(g)Monkey said:

 

I've heard speculation from Russian partisans for awhile that if NATO sends in troops, Russia will counterbalance it by convincing China to enter the war.

 

I'm thinking the Chinese leadership would more or less say, "Hey, we love you guys and will still buy your oil but...no. No no no."

 

Yeah, that seems like a very empty threat. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 07 June 2023:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 7, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam is significantly changing the geography and topography of the Kherson frontline sector in southern Ukraine. Near-infrared (NIR) imagery captured at 0400 am ET on June 7 indicates that

 

 

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Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 3pm ET on June 7. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 8 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam is significantly changing the geography and topography of the Kherson frontline sector in southern Ukraine. Near-infrared (NIR) imagery captured at 0400 am ET on June 7 indicates that the flooding is heavily disrupting Russian prepared defensive positions on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River – especially affecting Russian first-line positions in Hola Prystan and Oleshky. Various sources reported that Oleshky, Hola Prystan, Kozacha Laheri, and Dnipryany are almost entirely flooded with water levels rising to the height of a one-story buildings in some areas.[1] The Ukrainian headquarters established to remediate the consequences of the dam’s destruction reported that as of June 7 29 settlements are partially or fully flooded, 19 of which are located on the Ukrainian-controlled territory and 10 on Russian occupied territories.[2] Russian sources published footage indicating that water had begun receding in Nova Kakhovka and had dropped by 30cm.[3] Russian sources also claimed that water levels decreased by three to four meters in some areas from a high of 10 meters.[4] Water levels in nearby Mykolaiv City reportedly increased by 70cm as of June 7.[5] Flooding will likely worsen and further change the geography in Kherson Oblast over the next 72 hours.

 

The destruction of the KHPP dam is affecting Russian military positions on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River. The flooding has destroyed many Russian first line field fortifications that the Russian military intended to use to defend against Ukrainian attacks. Rapid flooding has likely forced Russian personnel and military equipment in Russian main concentration points in Oleshky and Hola Prystan to withdraw. Russian forces had previously used these positions to shell Kherson City and other settlements on the west (right bank) of Kherson. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Russian forces relocated their personnel and military equipment from five to 15 kilometers from the flood zone, which places Russian forces out of artillery range of some settlements on the west (right bank) of the Dnipro River they had been attacking.[6] The flood also destroyed Russian minefields along the coast, with footage showing mines exploding in the flood water.[7] Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo, however, claimed that the destruction of the KHPP is beneficial to the Russian defenses because it will complicate Ukrainian advances across the river.[8] Saldo’s assessment of the situation ignores the loss of Russia’s first line of prepared fortifications. The amount of Russian heavy equipment lost in the first 24 hours of flooding is also unclear.

 

 

 

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Ukrainian officials continued to accuse Russian forces of destroying the KHPP dam out of fear that Ukrainian forces would land on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. Representative of the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Andriy Yusov stated that only Russian forces could have detonated the dam given its structural and engineering features and noted that Russians are “very happy that the islands, on which [Ukrainian forces] were allegedly based, were flooded.”[9] Humenyuk states that Russian forces did not consider the consequences before destroying the dam and were too concerned over a Ukrainian counteroffensive.[10] The Ukrainian General Staff similarly claimed that Russian forces detonated internal structures of the KHPP to damage the dam and thereby prevent the advance of Ukrainian forces.[11] Russian milbloggers had expressed concern about claimed Ukrainian river crossings onto the east bank the day before the destruction of the KHPP dam and on numerous occasions in the past. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that there were active engagements between Ukrainian and Russian forces in the Dachi area on the east bank of the Dnipro River (11km southwest of Kherson City) and on the contested islands near Kherson City as of June 5.[12] The milblogger claimed that the number of Ukrainian speedboats also increased in the Dnipro Delta as of June 5. Another milblogger speculated that Ukrainian forces were attempting to establish a bridgehead by seizing the KHPP dam.[13] ISW offers no assessment of whether the Ukrainians were attempting to cross the river or for what purpose they might have sought to do so. The clear concern in the Russian military information space, however, shows that the fear of such a crossing and belief that it was either underway or imminent was present in the minds of Russians closely following the war shortly before the dam was destroyed.

 

The New York Times (NYT) reported that engineering and munitions experts believe that a deliberate explosion was the likely cause of KHPP dam’s collapse on June 6.[14] NYT reported that a blast within an enclosed space would cause the most damage, whereas external detonations – such as by targeted missile or artillery strikes – would only exert a fraction of the force necessary to breach the dam. The NYT quoted the experts as acknowledging that the KHPP sustained damage from military operations prior to the collapse but questioning whether this prior damage alone was sufficient to collapse the dam. NYT reported that the dam was first breached in its middle, close to the KHPP on the Russian-held east (left) riverbank, and that more of the dam collapsed throughout the day, a pattern that one expert characterized as inconsistent with the dam failing due to prior damage.

 

Russian forces and occupation authorities are responding to the flooding in Kherson Oblast with a great degree of disorganization and thereby exacerbating harm to the civilian population of occupied areas. Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that Russian authorities have evacuated about 1,500 people from flooded areas and established 48 temporary accommodations in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast to house them.[15] Saldo also claimed that the Kherson Occupation Administration is “almost mandatorily” sending children living in flooded areas to “recreation camps” located deeper in Russian-occupied Kherson Oblast and in occupied Crimea.[16] Saldo‘s reports of proactive efforts on the part of occupation authorities do not cohere with reports by Ukrainian officials and anecdotal evidence from the occupied east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast, however. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian military personnel near Kozachi Laheri (30km southwest of the KHPP on the Russian-occupied east bank of the Dnipro River) purposefully prevented civilian populations from fleeing the area despite flooding.[17] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated that residents of east bank settlements are waiting on their roofs with no food or water for the occupation administration to provide aid and evacuate them, while Russian soldiers abandoned their positions and fled.[18] Russian opposition outlet Verstka reported that civilians in Russian-occupied Oleshky (53km southwest of KHPP) have waited for almost two days on roofs for volunteers and Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations employees to arrive after which they helped civilians evacuate to dry areas of Oleshky, but that Russian forces did not permit civilians to evacuate outside of Oleshky.[19] Russian forces’ and occupation authorities’ varied responses and slow reaction time indicate that they were unprepared to deal with civilian evacuations.

 

Civilian accounts about the lack of evacuations in Belgorod Oblast in response to the pro-Ukrainian all-Russian Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and Freedom of Russian Legion‘s (LSR) raids suggest a similar pattern of Russian authorities struggling to coordinate evacuations even on their own territory.[20]

 

Select Wagner Group-affiliated Russian senior military officers continue to posture as effective commanders to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin by capitalizing on high-profile military events. A Russian milblogger published a long interview with Russian Colonel “K. Zalessky” in which Zalessky claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky played a decisive role in Russian forces’ ability to defend against the ongoing Ukrainian localized counterattacks near Velyka Novosilka, Donetsk Oblast.[21] Zalessky confirmed prior claims that Teplinsky became an overall theater deputy commander responsible for southern Ukraine as of April 1 and praised Teplinsky for being intimately involved in Russian defensive preparations west of Vuhledar and throughout the south.[22] The interview notably portrays the Russian defense against these localized Ukrainian attacks as a significant undertaking, contrasting with some Russian milblogger claims that these Ukrainian operations constitute a reconnaissance-in-force and were not part of a main counteroffensive effort.[23]

 

The pro-Teplinsky interview is likely part of an information operation aimed at undermining the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Zalessky claimed that Teplinsky praised the commanders of the 5th Combined Arms Army and 36th Combined Arms Army (both of the Eastern Military District) for their defensive efforts in the Velyka Novosilka area but claimed that not all of the Russian military command displayed similar bravery.[24] Zalessky claimed that Teplinsky personally arrayed Russian formations across their defensive lines, inspected battalions, and trained personnel, echoing Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 6 criticisms that MoD officials need to visit the front lines.[25] The interview was published almost immediately after the MoD claimed that Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov took command of Russian operations in the south on June 5, and after Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu characterized the defense as an MoD success on June 6.[26] Shoigu notably also praised elements of the 5th and 36th Combined Arms armies but failed to visit them on the frontlines as Teplinsky reportedly did.[27] Teplinsky notably had to use a Russian milblogger to claim credit for repelling claimed Ukrainian attacks in eastern Zaporizhia and western Donetsk oblasts. The MoD has previously blocked Wagner-affiliated commanders from being featured on official platforms.[28] It is noteworthy that Russian commanders and senior military leaders appear to prioritize public posing in the midst of ongoing significant military operations and major catastrophes.

 

Wagner-affiliated commanders’ reactive public relations campaigns may not be sufficient to deflect from battlefield realities. Though some large milbloggers amplified the Teplinsky interview on June 7, the broader Russian information space remained saturated with tactical claims of Ukrainian counterattacks near Velyka Novosilka and with the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam disaster.[29]

 

Key Takeaways

• The destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam is significantly changing the geography and topography of the Kherson frontline sector in southern Ukraine.
• Ukrainian officials continued to accuse Russian forces of destroying the KHPP dam out of fear that Ukrainian forces would land on the east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
• The New York Times (NYT) reported that engineering and munitions experts believe that a deliberate explosion was the likely cause of KHPP dam’s collapse on June 6.
• Russian forces and occupation authorities are responding to the flooding in Kherson Oblast with a great degree of disorganization and thereby exacerbating harm to the civilian population of occupied areas.
• Select Wagner Group-affiliated Russian senior military officers continue to posture as effective commanders to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin by capitalizing on high-profile military events.
• The pro-Teplinsky interview is likely part of an information operation aimed at undermining the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).
• Wagner-affiliated commanders’ reactive public relations campaigns may not be sufficient to deflect from battlefield realities.
• Russian and Ukrainian officials each accused the other state of damaging an ammonia pipeline that runs through Kharkiv Oblast and causing an ammonia leak.
• Russian forces continued to conduct ground attacks around Kreminna.
• Ukrainian officials indicated that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations in the Bakhmut direction as of June 7.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian forces conducted ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on June 7.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly engaged in skirmishes in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russian authorities continue to restrict international travel for those eligible for military service.
• Russian officials and occupation authorities continue to establish patronage programs between Russian regions and occupied territories in order to integrate occupied territories into Russia.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Scratch one Leopard for the UAF.

 

A UAF combined mechanized force consisting of Leopard 2A4s, 2A6s, M2A2 Bradley IFVs, and M113s in Mala Tokmachka, Zaporizhia Oblast was in a staging area when it got it nailed hard by Russian artillery.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Zelenskyy called out the UN and Red Cross as useless yesterday, saying that they have not yet done anything in the flooded areas. Today the UN and Red Cross agreed to evacuate civilians from the Russian-held flooded areas (which is hit 10x harder by the flood). I doubt Russia will let them. There are many videos already of the Russians shooting at Ukrainians trying to escape flood waters.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis 08 June 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 8, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukraine has conducted counteroffensive operations with differential outcomes in at least three sectors of the front as part of wider counteroffensive efforts that have been unfolding since Sunday, June 4. Ukrainian officials signaled that Ukrainian

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 2pm ET on June 8. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 9 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukraine has conducted counteroffensive operations with differential outcomes in at least three sectors of the front as part of wider counteroffensive efforts that have been unfolding since Sunday, June 4. Ukrainian officials signaled that Ukrainian forces have transitioned from defensive to offensive operations in the Bakhmut sector and are making gains of between 200 meters and nearly two kilometers on the flanks of the city.[1] Ukrainian forces have made tactical gains during limited localized counterattacks in western Donetsk Oblast near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border since June 4.[2] Ukrainian forces additionally conducted an attack in western Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of June 7 to 8 but do not appear to have made gains as part of this attack as of the time of this publication.

 

Ukrainian forces conducted a limited but still significant attack in western Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of June 7 to 8. Russian forces apparently defended against this attack in a doctrinally sound manner and had reportedly regained their initial positions as of June 8. Russian sources began reporting late at night on June 7 that elements of Ukrainian brigades that have recently been equipped with Western kit launched an attack southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[3] Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked along the Mala Tokmachka-Polohy line with the aim of breaking through the Russian defensive line between Robotyne and Verbove (both about 15km southeast of Orikhiv).[4] Russian sources acknowledged that Ukrainian forces broke through the first line of defense in this area, held by elements of the 291st and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiments (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) and the 22nd and 45th Separate Guards Special Purpose (GRU) Brigades, but reported that these Russian elements succeeded in counterattacking and eventually pushing Ukrainian forces back to their original positions.[5] Available geolocated combat footage suggests that limited Ukrainian forces crossed the N08 Polohy-Voskresenka highway, but Russian sourcing indicates that Russian forces likely pushed Ukrainians back in the Orikhiv direction towards the frontline and regained the lost positions.[6]

 

Ukrainian forces also reportedly lost Western-provided vehicles on June 8.[7] Losses are inevitable during any military undertaking. Ukrainian forces will suffer losses, including of both Western and Soviet equipment, during any offensive operations. Western equipment is not impervious to damage any more than the equipment that the Ukrainians have been using and losing since February 2022. The loss of equipment — including Western equipment — early on in the counteroffensive is not an indicator of the future progress of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. It is important not to exaggerate the impact of initial losses of Western or any other equipment, particularly in penetration battles against prepared defensive positions.

 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) responded to the Ukrainian attack with an uncharacteristic degree of coherency and praised Southern Military District elements for repelling the attack and regaining lost positions. The Russian MoD published a video statement by the commander of the Russian grouping in the Zaporizhia direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, wherein Romanchuk reported that Ukrainian forces started attacking around 0200 local time June 8 and that Russian forces, particularly those of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, succeeded in repelling the attack.[8] Romanchuk claimed that Ukrainian forces telegraphed the ground attack with extensive artillery preparation of the battlefield.[9] The Russian MoD also released a statement by 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov, who credited elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army with effectively laying mines to impede Ukrainian advances.[10] The overall Russian response to the attack, both among various milbloggers and the Russian MoD, was notably coherent and relatively consistent with the available visual evidence, which may suggest that Russian forces were not surprised and reacted in a controlled and militarily sound manner. As ISW has previously assessed, the Russian information space reacts with a high degree of chaos and incoherence when taken by surprise by battlefield developments that do not allow the propaganda apparatus to develop a clear line.[11] By contrast, the Russian responses to this attack suggest that Russian forces defended in the way that they had prepared to, thus giving Russian sources a rhetorical line to coalesce around.

 

Russian sources provided explanations for claimed Russian successes during the June 8 attacks, praising Russian forces’ effective use of electronic warfare (EW) systems, air support, and landmines against Ukrainian forces. Multiple Russian sources reported that Russian EW severely interfered with Ukrainian command and control signals, GPS-enabled devices, UAV controls.[12] Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces had insufficient air defense in the Orikhiv sector, that Russian forces operated with an “unprecedented” amount of rotary wing air support, and that Russian aviation was able to return to a high level of activity after not actively engaging in combat operations since the beginning of the full-scale invasion in 2022.[13] Continuous Russian missile and drone attacks against Kyiv and critical Ukrainian infrastructure may have fixed Ukraine’s more advanced air defense systems away from the frontline, although ISW cannot assess which systems would be effective against the kinds of air support missions Russian aircraft were flying. ISW’s previous assessments that Russian air and missile attacks were not setting conditions to defend against the Ukrainian counter-offensive may thus have been inaccurate. Russian sources also praised at length their claimed defensive success using layered field fortifications and landmines, with Major General Popov stating that Russian minefields played a “very important role” in defeating the initial Ukrainian advance in the early hours of June 8.[14] CNN additionally reported that an anonymous US official said that Russian landmines degraded Ukrainian armored vehicles.[15]

 

Russian forces appear to have executed their formal tactical defensive doctrine in response to the Ukrainian attacks southwest of Orikhiv. Russian doctrine for a defending motorized rifle battalion calls for a first echelon of troops to repel or slow attacking forces with minefields, fortifications, and strongpoints, with a second echelon of forces counterattacking against an enemy breakthrough.[16] Russian forces apparently operated in this fashion in this sector – Ukrainian forces penetrated the initial defensive lines; Russian forces pulled back to a second line of fortifications; and Russian reserves subsequently counterattacked to retake the initial line of defenses.[17] This maneuver is a regular feature of defensive operations and has been executed by both Ukrainian and Russian forces throughout the war. Early control of terrain changes day to day should thus not be misconstrued as the overall result of a wider attack.

 

Ukrainian attacks in western Zaporizhia on June 8 do not represent the full extent of Ukrainian capabilities in the current counteroffensive. Ukraine previously demonstrated the ability to conduct a coordinated and effective offensive operation using multiple mechanized brigades as early as September 2022 during the liberation of Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian forces possessed this capability – in terms of both available forces and the capacity to coordinate complex attacks – before the provision of Western kit for offensive brigades and additional training from NATO partners. Ukraine’s counteroffensive will likely consist of many undertakings of varied size, including more localized attacks as observed in this sector on June 8, and the smaller efforts do not represent the maximum capacity of Ukrainian numbers or effectiveness. Ukraine reportedly formed 12 dedicated counteroffensive brigades, nine equipped with Western kit and three with existing equipment, and these units will almost certainly be joined by experienced Ukrainian units already online.[18] Ukraine appears to have committed only a portion of the large reserve of forces available for counteroffensive operations, and observers should avoid counting down reported Ukrainian brigades committed or reportedly damaged Western kit as the measure of the remaining effective combat power of Ukrainian forces.

 

It is additionally noteworthy that the Russian Southern Military District Forces deployed in this particular area are likely to be a higher quality force grouping than Russia has elsewhere in theater, and their defensive performance is unlikely to be reflective of defensive capabilities of Russian groupings elsewhere on the front. Elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army have been deployed in a doctrinally consistent manner to the Orikhiv area and have been conducting defensive preparations in this sector of the front for several months.[19] The 291st and 70th Motorized Rifle Regiments in particular have reportedly gained experience in defending against limited Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force efforts this area over the past months and have had time to commit to and prepare for defensive operations and familiarize themselves with the terrain.[20] The 58th Combined Arms Army elements in this sector, therefore, are likely generally fresher and more experienced than elements in other areas of the front. The Russian defense of this sector should not be taken as indicative of overall Russian defensive capabilities as Ukraine continues counteroffensive operations. Russian forces defending in other sectors have indeed performed much more poorly. Ukraine, having recently regained the battlefield initiative across the theater, will be able to choose exactly where in to continue attacking based on observed defensive capabilities of various Russian groupings along the frontline among other factors.

 

Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to exacerbate the humanitarian ramifications of the flooding resulting from the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam break. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on June 8 that Russian forces are hiding amongst civilians who are evacuating from flooded settlements on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River and that occupation authorities are housing evacuated residents in boarding houses and recreation centers where Russian troops and equipment are located.[21] Several Ukrainian and Western sources additionally reported that Russian troops shelled a flooded evacuation site in Kherson City, killing one civilian and injuring nine.[22] Russian occupation authorities claimed that Ukrainian forces shelled evacuation efforts on the east bank but did not provide visual evidence commensurate with these allegations.[23]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin has reportedly postponed his annual press conference from June 2023 until November or December 2023.[24] Russian news outlet Kommersant claimed on June 8, citing sources within the Kremlin, that Putin is postponing his annual “Direct Line” live journalistic forum until the Russian military situation is more stable, which the sources characterized as likely in November or December. Kommersant’s source reportedly stated that these dates are preliminary, and that Putin aims to hold the “Direct Line” before the March 2024 presidential elections.[25] ISW has previously assessed that Putin would likely hold the “Direct Line” in early June 2023 after Russian forces captured Bakhmut, and pushing back the forum indicates that the Kremlin may perceive the capture Bakhmut as an insufficient informational victory to compensate for the overall unstable Russian military situation in Ukraine.[26] Delaying the “Direct Line” forum further illustrates Putin’s decline from a seemingly involved and strong leader to one more often portrayed as minutely involved in small infrastructure projects, as ISW has previously noted.[27]

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukraine has conducted counteroffensive operations with differential outcomes in at least three sectors of the front as part of wider counteroffensive efforts that have been unfolding since Sunday, June 4.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a limited but still significant attack in western Zaporizhia Oblast on the night of June 7 to 8. Russian forces apparently defended against this attack in a doctrinally sound manner and had reportedly regained their initial positions as of June 8.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) responded to the Ukrainian attack with an uncharacteristic degree of coherency and praised Southern Military District elements for repelling the attack and regaining lost positions.
• Russian sources provided explanations for claimed Russian successes during the June 8 attacks, praising Russian forces’ effective use of electronic warfare (EW) systems, air support, and landmines against Ukrainian forces.
• Russian forces appear to have executed their formal tactical defensive doctrine in response to the Ukrainian attacks southwest of Orikhiv.
• Ukrainian attacks in western Zaporizhia on June 8 do not represent the full extent of Ukrainian capabilities in the current counteroffensive.
• It is additionally noteworthy that the Russian Southern Military District Forces deployed in this particular area are likely to be a higher quality force grouping than Russia has elsewhere in theater, and their defensive performance is unlikely to be reflective of defensive capabilities of Russian groupings elsewhere on the front.
• Russian forces and occupation authorities continue to exacerbate the humanitarian ramifications of the flooding resulting from the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam break.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin has reportedly postponed his annual press conference from June 2023 until November or December 2023.
• Russian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove line and around Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces made limited gains around Bakhmut, and Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct limited ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
• The Russian MoD continues to posture itself as a firm authority over the defense industrial base (DIB) through emphasizing its ability to transport new equipment to the front.
• Russian occupation authorities are reportedly resorting to punitive measures against civilian populations in occupied Ukraine due to Russian occupation authorities’ decreasing influence over civilians.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

The above-posted ISW analysis indicates that the Russians do genuinely appear to be executing their defensive actions in a much more tactically sound manner than usual.  The reality is that the UAF is going to have a very rough time achieving significant breakthroughs against defensive positions that have had the benefit of months of preparation, especially since the UAF simply lacks the volume of firepower (specifically, artillery) that would be necessary to soften the positions prior to a sustained mechanized assault.

 

Ukrainian forces suffer 'stiff resistance' and losses in assault on Russian lines | CNN Politics

WWW.CNN.COM

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Ukrainian forces have suffered losses in heavy equipment and soldiers as they met greater than expected resistance from Russian forces in their first attempt to breach Russian lines in the east of the country in recent days, two senior US officials tell CNN.

 

Quote

 

Ukrainian forces have suffered losses in heavy equipment and soldiers as they met greater than expected resistance from Russian forces in their first attempt to breach Russian lines in the east of the country in recent days, two senior US officials tell CNN.

 

One US official described the losses – which include US supplied MRAP armored personnel vehicles as “significant.”

 

Ukrainian forces managed to overrun some Russian forces in the east around Bakhmut. However, Russian forces, armed with anti-tank missiles, grenades and mortars, have put up “stiff resistance,” with their forces dug into defensive lines that are several layers deep in some areas and marked by minefields that have taken a heavy toll on Ukrainian armored vehicles.

 

 

[Signifyin(g)Monkey]

@Commissar SFLUFAN

@CayceG

 

I was wondering what your thoughts were on Peter Zeihan's comments/predictions in the last few minutes of this exchange, or in general:

 

 

I've heard the guy's pronouncements on China, which I think are totally misguided, but I don't know if maybe that's just not his wheelhouse and he's better informed about Russia/Ukraine--or if he's just a total moron in regards to every subject he weighs in on. (Rogan tends to invite a lot of those types onto his show)

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

3 minutes ago, Signifyin(g)Monkey said:

@Commissar SFLUFAN

@CayceG

 

I was wondering what your thoughts were on Peter Zeihan's comments/predictions in the last few minutes of this exchange, or in general:

 

 

I've heard the guy's pronouncements on China, which I think are totally misguided, but I don't know if maybe that's just not his wheelhouse and he's better informed about Russia/Ukraine--or if he's just a total moron in regards to every subject he weighs in on. (Rogan tends to invite a lot of those types onto his show)

 

I'll just say right from the outset that I will absolutely not engage with anything involving Joe Rogan in any way, shape, or form

 

So you (or someone else) will just have to tell me what he says!

[Spork3245]

1 minute ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

I'll just say right from the outset that I will absolutely not engage with anything involving Joe Rogan in any way, shape, or form

 

I'm kind of surprised that posting Rogan's youtube isn't a bannable offense tbh  

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

I will say that I've downloaded the Kindle sample of Zeihan's book "The End of the World Is Just the Beginning" but I haven't gotten around to reading it to see if the full book is something worth my time.

[CayceG]

11 minutes ago, Signifyin(g)Monkey said:

@Commissar SFLUFAN

@CayceG

 

I was wondering what your thoughts were on Peter Zeihan's comments/predictions in the last few minutes of this exchange, or in general:

 

 

I've heard the guy's pronouncements on China, which I think are totally misguided, but I don't know if maybe that's just not his wheelhouse and he's better informed about Russia/Ukraine--or if he's just a total moron in regards to every subject he weighs in on. (Rogan tends to invite a lot of those types onto his show)

 

I have no clue who this guy is and I'm not listening to 12 minutes of Joe Rogan. Where am I supposed to start?

[Signifyin(g)Monkey]

15 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

I'll just say right from the outset that I will absolutely not engage with anything involving Joe Rogan in any way, shape, or form

Apologies; he kind of repeats most of the key points he makes here:

 

 

Just to be clear, the Rogan clip just showed up on my feed and seemed to solely involve Zeihan explaining his views on the outcome of the war.  I would otherwise not be caught dead listening to the dude.  (But go ahead and make it a bannable offense--I'll be sure not to post anything from him in the future)

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Alright @Signifyin(g)Monkey - I held my nose and watched the Rogan clip and honestly, he isn't saying anything particularly insightful nor which hasn't been stated by just about every informed analyst.

[CayceG]

It is nice to see someone speaking even the simplest and most basic facts about the Russian invasion and how Ukraine is clearly in the right to Joe Rogan and his meathead audience. 

 

I'm sure they'll forget it by the time Glenn Greenwald comes on the show next week. 

[TUFKAK]

24 minutes ago, CayceG said:

It is nice to see someone speaking even the simplest and most basic facts about the Russian invasion and how Ukraine is clearly in the right to Joe Rogan and his meathead audience. 

 

I'm sure they'll forget it by the time Glenn Greenwald comes on the show next week. 

As a meathead I’m offended. His audience doesn’t actually lift!

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

In the non-Rogan video, he mentions the demographic situation for Ukraine which is something that I hadn't considered to this point, especially in regard to Ukrainian women and children who departed the country and will more than likely never return, to say nothing of the Ukrainian children kidnapped by Russia.

 

This conflict is very much a demographic catastrophe for Ukraine in a different way than it is for Russia (loss of male population).

[CayceG]

19 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

This conflict is very much a demographic catastrophe for Ukraine in a different way than it is for Russia (loss of male population).

 

If Russia can't win by overwhelming military force, they will enact their genocide in different ways. If not by direct murder, then by indiscriminate murder. If not by occupation and cultural reeducation, then by kidnapping. If not by forcible location through troop presence, then by ecocide through intentional ecological disasters. 

[CitizenVectron]

There is a very real chance that if Ukraine can't push Russia out in the next 12-24 months, then the war will effectively drag on until Putin dies (or even after), with Russia launching 10-100 missiles/drones at Ukraine monthly, hitting random civilian targets. I don't think Russia stands much of a chance of taking much more territory than they have if the war freezes, given their supply issues (which could theoretically be resolved in a few years), but they can continue randomly striking civilians for years.

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine appears to have pulled off some kind of boat raid to Oleshky, rescuing dozens of people from the occupied zone across the Dnipro. They used the flood waters to move boats and rescue people from the Russian side.

[Jason]

Acer reportedly sent Russia $70M in PC gear after saying it paused business there

ARSTECHNICA.COM

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Reuters says Acer used Swiss subsidiary to send Russia "at least" 744 shipments.

 

[CayceG]

I like my Acer. 

[Jason]

Just now, CayceG said:

I like my Acer. 

 

🇷🇺

[Jason]

seriously though one of the Ars commenters has an interesting take on it

 

Quote

Some things to consider that may explain why Acer did this, though I'm uncertain how much weight it may carry.

1. Taiwan is under constant threat from China.
2. The only thing that keeps China in check is a strong Russia, or a breakdown in China/Russia ties (since China has been unusually friendly toward Russia as of late).
3. The more hostile/distant Russia and China are, the less likely China will invade Taiwan and take on the rest of the world. They don't need the hassles on two distant fronts.

So, Taiwan sending sanctioned computer equipment to Russia reduces their dependence on CHINA for the same equipment. Given China's tendency to turn electronics into state-controlled spy gear, Taiwan would be a better supplier from a national security point of view than China.

Yes, the equipment was allegedly for "civilian use", but the workers in the Russian government are "civilians", and destinations for them may have been known.

The end result is less dependence, and debt, to China, and not needing to kowtow to China in any way.

The relevance of this observation depends heavily on the recipients of that equipment needing equipment that was unquestionably clean of Chinese spyware. Monitors have cameras and microphones these days, so it's a real threat. But I can't say for sure if there was one, or how much of one it was if there was.

It also gives Taiwan another tiny pinprick to piss off China, which in and of itself, could be the only reason they did it.

It's just weird behavior to be based on profit alone, especially considering the potential risks to future profits. Assuming it was deliberately sent to its final destination, and no actual profit motive involved, there has to be some political/national security component involved instead, and likely sanctioned (if not ordered) by the Taiwan government.

I admit I could be completely off base, but the geopolitical situation suggests this was something bigger than profits, because, IMHO, that wasn't a profitable enough transaction to justify risking the bad publicity when this became public. They could lose a lot more in sales than they got in profits from this, and they'd know it.

 

https://arstechnica.com/civis/threads/acer-said-it-halted-business-in-russia-but-kept-selling-monitors-reportedly-pcs.1492590/post-41939378

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 09 June 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 9, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in least four areas of the front on June 9. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled limited and localized Ukrainian ground attacks in the Kreminna area. Ukrainian

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:30pm ET on June 9. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the June 10 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 9. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled limited and localized Ukrainian ground attacks in the Kreminna area.[1] Ukrainian officials stated on June 9 that Ukrainian forces advanced 1.2 kilometers in continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on June 8.[2] Ukrainian forces continued limited counteroffensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast near the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border on June 9, and made tactical gains in the area.[3] Ukrainian forces also continued ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast overnight from June 8 to 9 and during the day on June 9, and a Russian source suggested that Ukrainian forces made incremental gains during the attacks.[4]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 9 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive recently began and noted that Ukrainian forces still have offensive potential, a departure from previous Kremlin efforts to downplay Ukrainian counteroffensives.[5] Putin stated that fighting has been ongoing for five days and claimed that Ukrainian forces “did not reach their aims in any area of combat” after committing “strategic reserves.”[6] Putin claimed that Ukrainian forces suffered significant losses and attributed Russian successes to superior Russian military equipment and personnel. Putin added that the Russian military command is “realistically” assessing the current situation and “will proceed from these realities.” Putin’s discussion of the Ukrainian counteroffensive is a notable departure from his previous distanced approach to discussing battlefield realities and may indicate that the Kremlin is learning from its previous failed approach to rhetorically downplay successful Ukrainian counteroffensives in 2022. ISW previously reported on May 2 that the Kremlin reportedly adopted a new information policy directing officials to not downplay the prospects of a Ukrainian counteroffensive and focus on the Russian fight against Western-provided weapon systems.[7]

 

Contrarily, much of the Russian information space prematurely claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed after Russian forces damaged more Western-provided Ukrainian military equipment on June 9. Battlefield footage shows damaged or destroyed Western-provided infantry fighting vehicles and tanks in western Zaporizhia Oblast, though the number of Ukrainian vehicles several Russian sources claimed Russian forces destroyed are highly inflated.[8] Ukrainian forces previously lost military equipment in the same location on June 8.[9] Some prominent Russian ultranationalists claimed that damaged or destroyed Western-provided equipment indicated that Ukrainian forces failed to launch a large-scale counteroffensive.[10] Russian nationalists are widely celebrating the 58th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District), despite Russian forces only executing basic defensive operations that should not be so unusual as to deserve wide praise. One Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian offensive activity is in the decline, while a retired Russian general expressed gratitude to elements of the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army and proclaimed these elements as heroes despite battles continuing along different frontlines.[11] Another Russian milblogger claimed that a counteroffensive can only last up to 10 to 15 days, implying that Ukrainian counteroffensive will soon culminate.[12] However, other ultranationalists warned that Ukrainian forces have not yet carried out the main offensive and noted that Russian forces are reinforcing the second echelon in anticipation of Ukrainian breakthroughs.[13] A Wagner-affiliated milblogger condemned the excessive enthusiasm around the destruction of Ukrainian military equipment, noting that Western kit is not “some kind of magic.”[14] Many Russian ultranationalists appear to be overcorrecting for their previous fears of the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[15]

 

Ukrainian officials directly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces expect to suffer equipment losses during counteroffensive operations. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on June 9 that losses are expected during combat operations and that “military equipment that cannot be destroyed” has yet to be invented.[16] Malyar added that Russian sources are heavily amplifying footage of Ukrainian equipment losses for informational effects.[17] The Economist reported that Ukrainian forces are using critical Western equipment in areas of the frontline where Ukrainian forces have recently suffered equipment losses.[18] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces appear to have committed only a portion of their available reserves for current counteroffensive operations, and that the existing reports of damaged Western-provided equipment are not a definitive measure of current Ukrainian combat power.[19] Available footage of Ukrainian equipment losses additionally indicates that many of these armored vehicles have been rendered immobile, but not outright destroyed, and are likely recoverable by Ukrainian forces.[20] The footage also suggests that the Ukrainian crews of these armored vehicles, who are far more valuable than the vehicles themselves and can remount new or repaired vehicles, likely survived and withdrew once the vehicles became immobilized.[21]

 

The Russian command structure responsible for areas of southern Ukraine is unclear and likely overlapping. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) published a video statement on June 8 from the commander of the Russian grouping in the Zaporizhia operational direction, Colonel General Alexander Romanchuk, wherein he reported details about Ukrainian assaults in southern Ukraine.[22] Romanchuk is reportedly the Deputy Commander of the Southern Military District (SMD), although his level of responsibility for southern Ukraine remains unclear.[23] A Russian colonel previously claimed that Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinksy also played a decisive role in commanding Russian forces that repelled recent Ukrainian assaults in southern Ukraine.[24] Teplinsky is rumored to be deputy theater commander and responsible for the Zaporizhia, Kherson, and southern Donetsk operational directions.[25] It is unclear if Romanchuk would report to Teplinsky or SMD Commander Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev. The Russian MoD also claimed that overall theater commander and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov took command of Russian operations in southern Ukraine on June 5.[26] The command relations between these four officers — Romanchuk, Teplinsky, Kuzovlev, and Gerasimov — who have all been described as primarily responsible for Russian forces in this area are unclear.

 

Russian forces carried out missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on the night of June 8 to 9. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 16 Shahed-131/136 drones and six Kh-101/55 cruise missiles fired from two Tu-95 aircraft over the Caspian Sea and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down 10 Shahed drones and four Kh-101/55 missiles.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces launched eight missile strikes against residential buildings in Zhytomyr Oblast.[28] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported that current Russian missile strikes aim to distract Ukrainian air defense systems, while Russian missile strikes in May mainly targeted Kyiv.[29]

 

Several independent sources reported additional evidence that an internal explosion likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6. Norwegian seismic monitoring center NORSAR reported that seismic data indicates that an explosion occurred on June 6 at 2:54am local time, about the same time as the collapse of the KHPP dam.[30] NORSAR seismologist Volker Oye stated that seismic data indicated a pulse of energy that was “typical of an explosion.”[31] Seismic data cannot locate the energy pulse of the explosion to a more exact location than within 20 to 30km of the KHPP, however.[32] Oye stated that it would be an “unusual coincidence” if something other than an explosion caused the energy pulse.[33] The New York Times reported that an unnamed senior White House official stated that US spy satellites equipped with infrared sensors detected an explosion at the KHPP dam before it collapsed.[34] The Wall Street Journal reported that multiple engineers and munition experts assessed that an explosive blast likely detonated at a specific point or multiple points of weakness, which destroyed the KHPP dam.[35] ISW previously reported that engineering and munitions experts that the New York Times interviewed believe that a deliberate explosion caused the KHPP dam’s collapse.[36] The preponderance of evidence suggests that a deliberate explosion damaged the KHPP dam. ISW continues to assess that the balance of evidence, reasoning, and rhetoric suggests that the Russians deliberately damaged the dam.[37]

 

The White House revealed on June 9 that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia, underscoring the growing military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow despite Western sanctions.[38] National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby stated on June 9 that the drone factory — which the Wall Street Journal reported in February 2023 could produce at least 6,000 Iranian Shahed-136 drones — could be operational by early 2024.[39] Kirby previously announced on May 15 that Russia is seeking to purchase new drones from Iran after expending most of its Iranian drone supply.[40] A factory producing Iranian drones in Russia would support Russia’s war effort against Ukraine. Russia could provide Iran with advanced military equipment that would modernize Iran’s air force, such as Su-35 fighter jets, attack helicopters, radars, and YAK-130 combat trainer aircraft, in return for helping construct the factory. Officials of an unspecified US ally previously stated that Iranian officials travelled to Yelabuga in January 2023 to discuss the construction of a new drone manufacturing facility in the city, reporting the same claim the facility could produce 6,000 or more drones in the coming years.[41]

 

Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov discussed increasing Russian-Chinese military cooperation with Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli on June 9. Gerasimov emphasized the importance of joint military exercises within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of South East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting (SMOA Plus) format.[42] Gerasimov also claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping confirmed that Russian–Chinese strategic cooperation is at “the highest level.”[43]

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least four areas of the front on June 9, making further gains around Bakhmut and in Western Donetsk.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin acknowledged on June 9 that the Ukrainian counteroffensive recently began and noted that Ukrainian forces still have offensive potential, a departure from previous Kremlin efforts to downplay Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• Contrarily, much of the Russian information space prematurely claimed that the Ukrainian counteroffensive has failed after Russian forces damaged more Western-provided Ukrainian military equipment on June 9.
• Ukrainian officials directly acknowledged that Ukrainian forces expect to suffer equipment losses during counteroffensive operations.
• The Russian command structure responsible for areas of southern Ukraine is unclear and likely overlapping.
• Russian forces carried out missile and drone strikes across Ukraine on the night of June 8 to 9.
• Several independent sources reported additional evidence that an internal explosion likely destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (KHPP) dam on June 6.
• The White House revealed on June 9 that Iran is helping Russia build a drone manufacturing factory in Yelabuga, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia, underscoring the growing military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow despite Western sanctions.
• Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov discussed increasing Russian-Chinese military cooperation with Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) Joint Staff Department Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli on June 9.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited and localized ground attacks south of Kreminna.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
• Ukrainian forces continued limited ground attacks on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• Russia continues to evade international sanctions and has reportedly restored access to key Western microchips and electronics that Russia needs to produce military equipment.
• A Ukrainian report states that Russian authorities may be preparing evacuations from northern Crimea.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on June 9 that Russia will begin deploying tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus in July 2023, and this is not an escalation from Putin’s prior nuclear weapons rhetoric.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Some early reports that Ukraine may have breached Russia's second defensive line north of Tokmak.

 

It looks like Ukraine is banking on Russia following Soviet doctrine for defense...and they are. Effectively, the Russians will have a line, and when Ukraine pushes they will fall back to the second line. They wait for Ukraine to culminate, and then surge back with new gathered reserves, taking back the land to the front line. Unfortunately for Russia, Ukraine appears to know this, and is hammering the gathered reinforcements with himars and artillery after they cause the first retreat. Not saying it's going to work forever or end up being enough for Ukraine to have a massive breakthrough.

[CayceG]

5 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

Some early reports that Ukraine may have breached Russia's second defensive line north of Tokmak.

 

It looks like Ukraine is banking on Russia following Soviet doctrine for defense...and they are. Effectively, the Russians will have a line, and when Ukraine pushes they will fall back to the second line. They wait for Ukraine to culminate, and then surge back with new gathered reserves, taking back the land to the front line. Unfortunately for Russia, Ukraine appears to know this, and is hammering the gathered reinforcements with himars and artillery after they cause the first retreat. Not saying it's going to work forever or end up being enough for Ukraine to have a massive breakthrough.

 

 

This is the benefit of having people in your military that were trained in Soviet doctrine and now are learning the NATO doctrine of countering Soviet doctrine!

[TUFKAK]

Russia claims it blew up advanced Ukrainian tank, but video shows its helicopter attacked a tractor | AP News

APNEWS.COM

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WASHINGTON (AP) — A grainy black-and-white gunsight video Russia released this week to bolster a claim its military blew up some of Ukraine's most fearsome tanks actually...

 

[Spork3245]

3 hours ago, TUFKAK said:

Russia claims it blew up advanced Ukrainian tank, but video shows its helicopter attacked a tractor | AP News

APNEWS.COM

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WASHINGTON (AP) — A grainy black-and-white gunsight video Russia released this week to bolster a claim its military blew up some of Ukraine's most fearsome tanks actually...

 

Considering the arms that Russia currently has available, I understand their confusion.