Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 15, 2023 Share Posted April 15, 2023 It was never about Russia itself - it was about communism. If the very conservative, very Christian tsarist regime had never fallen, there never would've been any anti-Russian sentiment. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 15, 2023 Author Share Posted April 15, 2023 50 minutes ago, Greatoneshere said: Man, if it's partly as simple as that and they've truly forgotten there are real reasons to at least distrust Russia and 60+ years are no longer sticking to the right wing because owning the libs is truly the most important thing, then that's that I suppose, there's no way to change them at this point then is there? The right-wing in the US (and arguably, anywhere) has no policy or position at this point, it runs entirely on two things: owning the libs grievance culture 3 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted April 15, 2023 Share Posted April 15, 2023 They dream of having a Christian authoritarian kleptocratic government where they can punish their enemies and ban everything they hate. A Christian version of Iran is their dream country but they don't know it. 3 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 16, 2023 Share Posted April 16, 2023 This is completely expected from Hungary, but I'd imagine that Kyiv is completely astounded by this action by Warsaw: Poland, Hungary ban grain and food imports from Ukraine WWW.REUTERS.COM Large quantities of Ukrainian grain, which is cheaper than that produced in the EU, ended up staying in Central European states due to logistical bottlenecks, hitting prices and sales for local farmers. Quote Poland and Hungary have decided to ban imports of grain and other food from neighbouring Ukraine to protect the local agricultural sector, the two governments said on Saturday, after a flood of supply depressed prices across the region. Ukraine expressed regret about the Polish decision, saying that "resolving various issues by unilateral drastic actions will not accelerate a positive resolution of the situation". 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 16, 2023 Share Posted April 16, 2023 ISW analysis for 15 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 15, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Reporting from some Western sources that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin called for Russia to end its war against Ukraine is inaccurate. Some Western reports covering Prigozhin’s April 14 essay on a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive and the f Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Reporting from some Western sources that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin called for Russia to end its war against Ukraine is inaccurate.[1] Some Western reports covering Prigozhin’s April 14 essay on a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive and the future of the war miscontextualized a rhetorical statement in which Prigozhin established a strawman argument he attributed to Russia’s “internal enemies” who seek to rationalize Russia ending the war in Ukraine now.[2] The point of his essay was to attack this strawman, not to advance it. Prigozhin actually called on Russia to commit to a decisive fight that will either defeat Ukraine or result in a temporary Russian defeat that will catalyze Russia’s nationalist rebirth and set conditions for future victory.[3] A full reading of Prigozhin's essay, titled, “Only an Honest Fight: No Negotiations,” does not lend itself to any reasonable interpretation that Prigozhin advocated for an end to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Reading Prigozhin's public communications is not a straightforward undertaking. Much of the nuance included in Prigozhin’s speech is lost when translating Russian to English. Prigozhin has an idiosyncratic rhetorical and writing style that relies heavily on deadpan sarcasm, selective ambiguity, aphorisms, vulgarity, and ironic slang. Prigozhin’s isolated quotes separated from the full context of his messages often lose their initial meaning. Certain Russian players in the information space have also misinterpreted Prigozhin’s essay, further exposing fissures between some Russian milbloggers. Pro-Kremlin news aggregator Readovka noted on April 15 that some unspecified Russian-language Telegram channels – like some Western media – simply repeated Prigozhin’s strawman argument about the seduction of settling for negotiations without “reading any further” into Prigozhin’s call for a protracted struggle.[4] Readovka endorsed Prigozhin’s actual argument that the “uncomfortable truth” is that Russia must continue to fight, concurring that negotiations to end the war would “do more harm than good.”[5] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin – an enemy of Prigozhin – leaned into the misinterpretation of Prigozhin’s essay (possibly on purpose) as part of their ongoing blogging feud. Girkin sarcastically asked, “Do I understand correctly that the Black Clown [Prigozhin] called for the Russian Federation to reject half of the Donetsk People’s Republic and a third of Zaporizhia Oblast...?”[6] Girkin also implied that that Russian prosecutors should investigate Prigozhin for his essay, likely for discrediting the Russian “special military operation,” given that the strawman argument advocates that Russia should simply retain only territory it currently occupies in Ukraine.[7] Prigozhin’s essay may continue to fuel debate along existing cleavages in the Russian information space where Prigozhin’s supporters and competitors may use selective readings of the essay to either praise or malign Prigozhin while advancing their own arguments. The Russian information space is reckoning with demographic transitions within Russia in a way that indicates that the nationalist ideologies underpinning the war in Ukraine will continue to have reverberating domestic impacts. Russian outlet RBC reported on April 13 that a study published by the Russian New Economic Association found that an increase in the number of migrants from 390,000 to 1.1 million annually would help stabilize Russia’s population, which is in decline due to domestic levels of fertility and life expectancy as well as population outflow.[8] Moscow Duma Deputy Andrey Medvedev responded to the study and accused “lobbyists” of advocating for uncontrolled migration from Central Asia, which Medvedev claimed will bring more violence and extremism to Russia at great social and economic cost.[9] Medvedev called instead for a new law on the repatriation of ethnic Russians from all over the world in order to stabilize demographic shifts and save them from “Russophobia” abroad.[10] Russian State Duma Deputy for Defense Dmitry Kuznetsov relatedly reported on April 15 that Voronezh Oblast may begin a pilot program on the social integration of refugees and noted that this program is intended for pro-Russian refugees who left Ukraine for Russia.[11] Kuznetsov’s proposed bill underlines the same brand of staunch nationalism that Medvedev is advocating for and seeks to uphold and codify a sense of exceptionalism for ethnic Russians in Russian at the expense of all ethnic minority populations. The war in Ukraine has had, and will continue to have, substantial population and demographic impacts within Russia.[12] These impacts will leave the door open for the continued weaponization of intensely nationalist rhetoric as the war continues to empower the most staunchly xenophobic (and vocal) factions of Russian society. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party intends to recruit Russian military personnel who have served in Ukraine as candidates for elections in 2023 and 2024, likely in an effort to establish itself as the definitive pro-war party in Russia. United Russia Central Executive Committee Head Alexander Sidyakin announced on April 14 that the Young Guard of United Russia (United Russia’s youth wing) launched an educational module about participating in primaries for Russian military personnel and volunteers who have fought in Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine.[13] Sidyakin reportedly stated that Russian military personnel and volunteers will be on United Russia candidate lists for upcoming regional elections in September 2023.[14] The United Russia party is currently nominating candidates for primaries until April 27, and primaries will run from May 22 to 28.[15] Young Guard of United Russia Chairman Anton Demidov reportedly stated on April 14 that Russian military personnel and volunteers will become the main speakers of the party during Russia’s 2024 presidential election.[16] The recruitment of military personnel as political candidates during a time of war is typical for a society that holds elections, regardless of the fairness or significance of those elections. The Kremlin likely intends to recruit military personnel as candidates to a greater extent than is usual even for a war time country, however. The Kremlin likely aims to use candidates who have served in Ukraine as the public face of the United Russia party in upcoming elections to court the support of military constituents and their family members and to establish United Russia as the definitive political party for the pro-war movement. The potential “militarization” of the United Russia party likely does not presage a Kremlin effort to escalate the war in Ukraine. The Kremlin is likely aiming to co-opt military personnel to support its ongoing effort to curry favor with the pro-war Russian ultranationalist community without fulfilling the community’s extreme demands. Key Takeaways Reporting from some Western sources that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin called for Russia to end its war against Ukraine is inaccurate. Certain Russian players in the information space have also misinterpreted Prigozhin’s essay, further exposing fissures between some Russian milbloggers. The Russian information space is reckoning with demographic transitions within Russia in a way that indicates that the nationalist ideologies underpinning the war in Ukraine will continue to have reverberating domestic impacts. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party announced its intention to recruit Russian military personnel who have served in Ukraine as candidates for elections in 2023 and 2024, likely in an effort to establish itself as the definitive pro-war party in Russia. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna and may be preparing to defend territory in the Kupyansk direction. Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front. Russian forces continued defensive operations in southern Ukraine. A Russian opposition news source reported that Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) head Leonid Pasechnik signed a decree on April 14 authorizing spring and fall conscription in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Russian State Security Service (FSB) is likely involved in efforts to target Ukrainian youth in occupied territories for law enforcement and counter-partisan purposes. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 16, 2023 Share Posted April 16, 2023 New videos from Perun and Kings & Generals: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 17, 2023 Author Share Posted April 17, 2023 Photos of Bradleys have started to appear, repainted in Ukrainian pixel camo: 1 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 17, 2023 Share Posted April 17, 2023 ISW analysis for 16 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 16, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne troops (VDV). The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 16 that it is highly likely that Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne troops (VDV). The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 16 that it is highly likely that VDV commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky has returned to a “major” but unspecified role in Ukraine after reports that the Russian MoD replaced him on January 13.[1] UK MoD noted that Teplinsky’s return to command in Ukraine will not be limited to just VDV units, but that it is also likely that Teplinsky will try to promote the VDV’s traditional role as an elite force.[2] ISW previously assessed on April 1 that milblogger speculation that the Russian MoD recalled Teplinsky from ”leave“ suggests that Russia may be preparing to reshuffle senior commanders following the failed winter offensive and in preparation for a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive.[3] The UK MoD’s apparent confirmation of Teplinsky’s reappointment to a senior command position supports ISW’s assessment, and additionally suggests that the Russian military command is likely seeking to place an increased emphasis on the role of VDV elements in Russian offensive operations. VDV units are actively engaged along critical sectors of the front in Luhansk Oblast and near Bakhmut and have recently received TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems, further indicating that the Russian military command may seek to elevate the VDV to greater operational prominence.[4] News of Teplinsky’s reappointment suggests that the Russian MoD is seeking to work more closely with the Wagner Group in order to complete the capture of Bakhmut, despite obvious tensions between Prigozhin and the traditional MoD establishment. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin seemingly confirmed Teplinsky’s Wagner affiliations in a public show of support for Teplinsky following Teplinsky’s reported dismissal over a disagreement with Chief of the Russian General Staff and overall theater commander Army General Valery Gerasimov in January.[5] Teplinsky became embroiled in the rising tensions between Prigozhin and the Russian MoD establishment (represented by Gerasimov and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu) as the Russian MoD appeared to be actively trying to cut the Wagner Group off from artillery shell supply and otherwise interfere with Wagner’s ability to operate around Bakhmut.[6] Over the past few weeks, however, it appears that the Russian military command has been working more closely with Wagner, likely in an effort to expedite the capture of Bakhmut. The Russian MoD and Prigozhin publicly acknowledged on April 11 that VDV elements are engaged in the Bakhmut area and holding Wagner’s flanks north and south of Bakhmut while Wagner pursues the main offensive effort in the city itself.[7] ISW has recently observed that elements of the 106th VDV division are operating in the Bakhmut area.[8] Prigozhin has also scaled down his explicit rhetorical attacks on the MoD in recent days. Russian milbloggers have reported that Wagner forces are operating T-90 tanks within Bakhmut, suggesting that Russian leadership has allocated more modern assets to Wagner in their efforts to take the city.[9] Teplinsky’s reappointment is therefore likely also an attempt by the Russian MoD to posture itself better to work with Wagner to finish the task of taking Bakhmut. Teplinsky remains highly unlikely to restore the VDV to its prior status as an elite force due to widespread losses to the most elite Russian units. VDV units suffered extraordinarily high losses in the early phases of the war in 2022, and a prominent milblogger claimed on Russian state television on January 31 that VDV forces lost 40 to 50 percent of their personnel between the start of the war and September 2022.[10] BBC Russia Service confirmed the deaths of 1,669 VDV personnel as of April 14, 2023.[11] Widespread losses to previously elite units that are now being restaffed with poorly trained mobilized personnel are likely to have long-term impacts on the combat effectiveness of these units, and the replacement of a single commander is highly unlikely to be able to solve such pervasive damage.[12] Russian milbloggers seized on an opportunity to denigrate St. Petersburg Mayor Alexander Beglov in a manner that indicates that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s anti-Beglov campaign has permeated the Russian ultra-nationalist information space. Russian milbloggers criticized Beglov for standing in front of a Ukrainian flag at a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Interparliamentary Assembly in St. Petersburg on April 13.[13] The milblogger-amplified image shows Beglov standing on the left side of the podium as another official speaks, and the angle of the image shows Beglov standing directly in front of the Ukrainian flag—a perspective likely not indicative of Beglov’s actual location relative to the flag.[14] The milbloggers claimed that a “high-ranking Russian official” such as Beglov should not stand in front of the Ukrainian flag, with one even claiming that the act was analogous to a Leningrad City head standing in front of the flag of Nazi Germany during World War II.[15] The milbloggers also criticized Beglov for standing in front of the flag just a few weeks after the assassination of Russian milblogger Maxim Fomin (Vladlen Tartarsky) in St. Petersburg.[16] Prigozhin himself claimed that the Russian “deep state” is responsible for the flag’s presence, implying that Beglov is part of this deep state.[17] Other milbloggers claimed that the inclusion of the Ukrainian flag at the meeting suggests that Russia has failed to put itself on a wartime footing.[18] One milblogger claimed that CIS protocol required the inclusion of the Ukrainian flag but noted the strangeness of the protocol given the current conflict.[19] Ukraine ended its affiliation with the CIS in 2018 and has never been a full CIS member state.[20] Russian officials may have included the Ukrainian flag in an attempt to convey the fact that the Kremlin does not recognize Ukraine’s withdrawal from the CIS and refusal to conform to Kremlin-controlled international structures, falsely anticipating that the Russian information space would praise this underlying message. The Russian information space appears to be so poisoned against Beglov, however, that milbloggers jumped at the chance to criticize him regardless of the subtle Kremlin messaging. This attack against Beglov also suggests that Prigozhin’s Russian “deep state” narrative, about which also he notably warned in an April 14 essay, has the potential to similarly permeate the Russian information space.[21] The Wagner Group returned 130 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on April 16, suggesting that Wagner may have engaged in the exchange independent of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD).[22] Ukrainian sources confirmed that 130 Ukrainian POWs returned to Ukraine but did not specify how many Russian POWs were exchanged in turn.[23] The Russian MoD deviated from its normal routine and did not confirm the prisoner exchange at all. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin posted a video showing Wagner forces preparing Ukrainian POWs for the exchange.[24] The lack of Russian MoD confirmation contrasted with Prigozhin’s engagement with the exchange may suggest that the Wagner Group maintains a level of autonomy from the Russian MoD and was able to negotiate the exchange with the Ukrainian government independent from the Russian MoD. In the posted video, Prigozhin claimed that he ordered Wagner forces to provide Ukrainian POWs with food and water before their release and personally wished them good luck and health. A Wagner-affiliated milblogger noted that Wagner’s kindness to Ukrainian prisoners is particularly uncharacteristic for a unilateral prisoner exchange that was purportedly not coordinated with the Russian MoD or another entity.[25] Wagner is notorious for the mistreatment of POWs, engaging in several high-profile and widely circulated executions of both returned Wagner POWs and Ukrainian POWs under Wagner’s control.[26] The milblogger also criticized Prigozhin‘s decision to release such a large number of Ukrainian servicemen ahead of the anticipated large-scale Ukrainian counteroffensive.[27] Prigozhin’s decision to release so many Ukrainian POWs at such a time likely suggests that the exchange returned high-value Wagner members whom he intends to redeploy on the battlefield. Prigozhin has previously accused Wagner POWs of being traitors and supported their execution, but the conditions of the April 16 prisoner exchange likely imply that he is prioritizing replenishing diminished Wagner units over his continued effort to project Soviet brutalist strength and appeal to Russian ultranationalists.[28] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov also commented on the prisoner exchange on April 16. Kadyrov reported that five Chechens returned as part of the prisoner exchange but that he refused to meet them upon their arrival in Grozny.[29] Kadyrov claimed that the five Chechen fighters should prove their honor by returning to the frontlines, stating that Chechens do not interpret capture as an excuse to lay down arms but instead as an action forced upon them.[30] Kadyrov is likely using the POW exchange to fortify his own reputation as a capable and brutal silovik. The Wagner Group may be attempting to force mobilized Russian personnel to sign contracts with Wagner, possibly in an effort to offset Wagner’s losses in Ukraine. Mobilized personnel from Moscow and Ivanovo oblasts alleged in a public complaint released on April 16 that the Wagner Group forced 170 mobilized personnel to sign contracts with Wagner.[31] Russian sources previously claimed that 100 mobilized personnel in Luhansk Oblast disappeared as of April 7 after refusing to sign contracts with the Wagner Group, and geolocated footage published on April 11 shows Wagner personnel detaining the mobilized personnel in Kadiivka before escorting the personnel to an unspecified training ground.[32] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) may allow mobilized personnel to fulfill their service obligations by signing contracts with Wagner, although the status of mobilized personnel initially assigned to conventional Russian units who have signed contracts with Wagner is unclear. Wagner’s reported impressment of poorly trained mobilized personnel, in addition to its change in approach to prisoner exchanges, suggests that Wagner is increasingly desperate for manpower as it continues to conduct highly attritional offensive operations in and around Bakhmut. Key Takeaways The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne (VDV) troops. News of Teplinsky’s reappointment suggests that the Russian MoD is seeking to work more closely with the Wagner Group in order to complete the capture of Bakhmut, despite obvious tensions between Prigozhin and the traditional MoD establishment. Russian milbloggers seized on an opportunity to denigrate St. Petersburg Mayor Alexander Beglov in a manner that indicates that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s anti-Beglov campaign has permeated the Russian ultra-nationalist information space. The Wagner Group returned 130 Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) on April 16, suggesting that Wagner may have engaged in the exchange independent of the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Wagner Group may be attempting to force mobilized Russian personnel to sign contracts with Wagner, possibly in an effort to offset Wagner’s losses in Ukraine. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks south of Kreminna. Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Russian forces reportedly intensified the rate of artillery strikes in southern Ukraine. Russian mobilized personnel continue to publish public complaints against Russian commanders alleging mistreatment. A Russian source stated that the Wagner Group is involved in the removal of Ukrainian children from Bakhmut. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 17, 2023 Author Share Posted April 17, 2023 2 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said: ISW analysis for 16 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 16, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG The Russian military command appears to be increasingly shifting responsibility for offensive operations in Ukraine to the Russian Airborne troops (VDV). The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported on April 16 that it is highly likely that I'm honestly surprised Wagner would perform a prisoner exchange at all, they don't seem particularly worried about the safety/status of their own forces. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 17, 2023 Share Posted April 17, 2023 Et tu, Slovakia? Slovakia joins Poland and Hungary in halting Ukraine grain imports | Ukraine | The Guardian WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM EU and Kyiv condemn unilateral bans that aim to protect local farmers amid glut and price crash Quote Slovakia has joined Poland and Hungary by unilaterally halting imports of grain and other food products from Ukraine to protect its farmers in decisions Kyiv and the European Commission have criticised as unacceptable. The EU would expect the central European states “to come up with some explanation”, a senior official said, after Poland and Hungary announced their bans over the weekend and Slovakia followed suit on Monday. Bulgaria has also said it is considering a ban. The official said low global prices and demand meant large quantities of Ukrainian grain in particular were staying in the bloc rather than being sold on, adding: “There is an issue … we’ll see what we can do in the coming weeks and months.” Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 18, 2023 Author Share Posted April 18, 2023 Egypt had a sudden change of heart: Egypt shelved plan to arm Russia, agreed to arm Ukraine, leak shows - The Washington Post T.CO Egypt made detailed plans to export rockets at Moscow’s request, but after a diplomatic offensive from Washington, later approved artillery production for Kyiv. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 18, 2023 Share Posted April 18, 2023 ISW analysis for 17 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 17, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is seemingly regaining some favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely as a result of the Russian conventional military’s inability to accomplish the tasks Putin had set for it during the winter offensive Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is seemingly regaining some favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely as a result of the Russian conventional military’s inability to accomplish the tasks Putin had set for it during the winter offensive in Donbas. Wagner forces appear to be receiving reinforcements, ammunition, and political recognition – which is a stark deviation from the Kremlin’s previous efforts to expend Wagner forces and Prigozhin in Bakhmut since at least January 2023.[1] Wagner-affiliated sources announced on April 17 that Wagner is training up to three motorized rifle brigades of mobilized personnel to reinforce Wagner‘s flanks in Bakhmut.[2] Prigozhin also confirmed that Russian airborne forces (VDV) are operating alongside Wagner and indicated that Wagner is actively receiving artillery shells.[3] Prigozhin advocated for Wagner to receive more artillery shells, which indicates that Prigozhin has reestablished his supply of ammunition from the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Russian State Duma will also consider amendments to the Russian law on veterans’ rights to grant veteran status to private military companies (PMCs) and volunteers.[4] Prigozhin had been routinely advocating for Wagner personnel to be recognized as participants of the ”special military operation” in Ukraine, and the adoption of this bill would signify that Prigozhin’s position in the Kremlin inner circle has improved. The extent of Putin’s trust and favor for Prigozhin is unclear at this time, but it is likely that Putin halted the Russian MoD’s efforts to avenge Wagner by denying Wagner reinforcements and ammunition.[5] The New York Times, citing leaked Pentagon documents, reported that Putin personally attempted to resolve the feud between Wagner and the Russian MoD by holding a meeting between Shoigu and Prigozhin on February 22.[6] Putin could be turning back to Prigozhin after experiencing another disappointment with Russian conventional forces, which did not capture Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts frontlines before the April 1 date that Putin had reportedly set for them.[7] Putin is reportedly once again reappointing select Wagner-affiliated commanders such as VDV commander Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, which if true, suggests that he is prioritizing a decisive victory at least in Bakhmut in the near term.[8] Putin likely needs an immediate victory in Bakhmut ahead of Victory Day on May 9 or the rumored ”Direct Line” press conference he is preparing to hold in June to assert his authority among domestic audiences.[9] Putin’s improving relations with Wagner may also be a symptom of his hesitance to increase mobilization and signal a return to crypto mobilization. Putin increased the annual conscription quota from 134,000 conscripts to 147,000 men for the spring 2023 cycle, and likely is experiencing shortages of trainers to prepare conscripts, remaining mobilized personnel, and volunteers.[10] The Kremlin may be hoping to use Wagner trainers to prepare its mobilized forces. ISW had previously reported that the Kremlin outsourced recruitment of personnel to nationalist groups and is currently carrying out large-scale volunteer recruitment campaigns.[11] Wagner is currently recruiting across Russia, and it is possible that the Kremlin may still see Wagner as a feasible source of combat power. An interview with two former Wagner Group fighters on their treatment of Ukrainian children and other civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) further highlights how Wagner has institutionalized systematic brutality as part of its fundamental modus operandi. Russian human rights organization Gulagu.net released a video interview on April 17 with two former convicts who finished their contracts with Wagner and returned to Russia.[12] One Wagner fighter, Azamat Yaldarov, admitted that Prigozhin ordered his unit to kill children while taking control of Soledar, and that he buried 18 children that he killed in Krasnodar Krai and Saratov and Kirov oblasts.[13] Yaldarov emphasized that Prigozhin gave the order for Wagner fighters to ”eliminate” everyone in Soledar, and that Yaldarov was specifically ordered to kill children. Another Wagner fighter and commander of a reconnaissance unit, Aleksey Savich, told the interviewer that he fired on his own men for disobedience and that he personally witnessed the executions of 80 Wagner fighters for refusing to follow orders. Savich claimed that Wagner command gave the order to kill all civilians in Bakhmut aged 15 and older, and that his unit killed 23 civilians, 10 of whom were unarmed teenagers. Savich recounted other instances from operations in Bakhmut and Soledar in which he murdered children as young as five years old and other civilians. Savich also claimed that Prigozhin has a personal preference for recording videos of the execution of Ukrainian prisoners of war. The extremely graphic atrocities described by Yaldarov and Savich underscore a slate of recent reports of Wagner’s systematic use of brutality as a method of waging war.[14] Prigozhin and Wagner’s command may actively encourage active engagement in atrocities in an attempt to build social cohesion and reputation within Wagner units. This type of engrained violence is likely to have escalating domestic impacts on Russian domestic society, especially as Wagner fighters complete their contracts and return to their homes. Russian society will have to increasingly work to handle the normalized brutality committed by its forces as they reintegrate into the domestic sphere, which will likely have generational domestic societal ramifications. The Gulagu.net interview with the two former Wagner fighters provides valuable insight into Wagner’s force structure and operational prioritization. Yaldarov claimed that he was the commander of Wagner’s 5th Assault Detachment and that he trained with a special unit that specifically taught him to kill.[15] Yaldarov stated that the higher Wagner command gave his unit the order to place a flag on likely the Bakhmut administrative building and that he was not allowed to leave Bakhmut until after its capture. Considering the fact that Yaldarov gave the interview from his home in Russia because he was released from his contract, his anecdote about the administrative building may suggest that Wagner considered the capture of the administrative building and the central Bakhmut area to be threshold for announcing the capture of the city. The apparent return of Putin’s favor to Prigozhin may have resulted in part from Prigozhin’s ability to claim the capture of Bakhmut — his objective — while the Russian MoD’s conventional forces failed to achieve any of their objectives. Yaldarov’s account of Prigozhin’s orders for Wagner troops to massacre civilians and everyone they came across in Soledar in early January additionally indicates that Prigozhin pushed for the quick capture of the settlement and ordered his fighters to take it essentially at any cost. Both Yaldarov and Savich emphasize the way that the Wagner command demands brutal treatment of Wagner dissenters within the ranks and the operational reliance on attritional assaults carried out by convict recruits. The Moscow City Court sentenced Russian opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in prison on the charge of high treason for Kara-Murza's criticism of the Kremlin and the war in Ukraine.[16] The 25-year sentence is the longest and harshest for an opposition activist to date.[17] Kara-Murza's sentencing comes as the Kremlin has continued to intensify domestic repression of dissenting voices through escalated legislative manipulations.[18] The Russian State Duma previously approved amendments to the Russian Criminal Code on April 13 that will introduce life sentences for high treason and increase prison sentences for terrorist activity.[19] Kara-Murza's high-profile case and sentencing are emblematic of the wider trend in Russia towards total and codified authoritarianism. Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 16 and pledged to strengthen military exchanges and cooperation between Russia and China. Li stated that he had arrived in Moscow to implement Chinese President Xi Jinping’s agreement with Putin from late March and claimed that Russian-Chinese relations “have already entered a new era.”[20] Li noted that China is prepared to work with Russia to “strengthen strategic communication between the two militaries, strengthen multilateral coordination and cooperation, and make new contributions to safeguarding regional and global security for peace.”[21] Official Russian and Chinese readouts did not include any mentions of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wang Wenbin reiterated China’s intent to promote peace talks in Ukraine and continuation of cooperation which Xi and Putin agreed upon previously.[22] ISW previously assessed that Putin was unable to secure a no-limits bilateral partnership with China during Xi’s visit to Moscow, and it is likely that the meeting between Li and Putin did not further expand the scope of Russian-Chinese cooperation. Putin continued efforts to portray Russia as an equal defense partner with China and a Pacific naval power amidst Li’s visit. Putin stated that the Russian military is prioritizing the war in Ukraine but continues to develop the Russian Pacific Fleet during his meeting with the Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu on April 17.[23] Shoigu stated that recent Russian combat readiness drills involved 25,000 military personnel, 167 warships and support vessels, and 89 planes and helicopters. Shoigu stated that Russian forces are currently conducting maneuver exercises and are moving to the southern part of the Sea of Okhotsk. Shoigu claimed that the final drills will begin on April 18, a day before Li’s departure from Russia. ISW assessed on April 14 that the Russian Pacific Fleet‘s combat readiness checks are likely meant to signal to China that Russia supports Chinese security objectives in the Pacific, especially ahead of the G7 meeting in Japan between May 19 and May 21.[24] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s newly formed “Club of Angry Patriots” published its manifesto focused on protecting pro-war factions in the Kremlin from possible “sabotage” and “betrayal.” The “Club of Angry Patriots” published its manifesto on April 17 on its newly created Telegram channel, which emphasizes protecting pro-war factions in the Kremlin instead of efforts to win the war in Ukraine.[25] The manifesto claims that unspecified actors who remain in power in Russia have transferred their money and allegiance to the West and may be preparing for a coup and the ”dismemberment” of the Russia Federation. The manifesto likens the Kremlin‘s pro-war and anti-war factions to the fight between the Reds and Whites in the Russian Civil War following the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. The manifesto also claims that Russia is currently fighting the war in a mediocre way and is unable to defeat Ukraine in its current state. ISW previously assessed that Girkin and the “Club of Angry Patriots” may be attempting to advance the political goals of unnamed figures in Russian power structures who want to influence Putin’s decision making through public discourse.[26] Key Takeaways Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is seemingly regaining some favor with Russian President Vladimir Putin likely as a result of the Russian conventional military’s inability to accomplish the tasks Putin had set for it during the winter offensive in Donbas. The extent of Putin’s trust and favor for Prigozhin is unclear at this time, but it is likely that Putin halted the Russian MoD’s efforts to avenge Wagner by denying Wagner reinforcements and ammunition. An interview with two former Wagner Group fighters on their treatment of Ukrainian children and other civilians and prisoners of war (POWs) further highlights how Wagner has institutionalized systematic brutality as part of its fundamental modus operandi. The Gulagu.net interview with the two former Wagner fighters provides valuable insight into Wagner’s force structure and operational prioritization. The Moscow City Court sentenced Russian opposition activist Vladimir Kara-Murza to 25 years in prison on the charge of high treason for Kara-Murza's criticism of the Kremlin and the war in Ukraine. Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 16 and pledged to strengthen military exchanges and cooperation between Russia and China. Putin continued efforts to portray Russia as an equal defense partner with China and a Pacific naval power amidst Li’s visit. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s newly formed “Club of Angry Patriots” published its manifesto focused on protecting pro-war factions in the Kremlin from possible “sabotage” and “betrayal.” Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and south of Kreminna. Russian forces have made further gains in Bakhmut and continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine. The Kremlin’s transition to electronic summonses distribution is continuing to complicate Russian conscription procedures. Russian occupation authorities continue to discuss the provision of Russian passports in occupied areas of Ukraine. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
SuperSpreader Posted April 18, 2023 Share Posted April 18, 2023 5 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said: Egypt had a sudden change of heart: Egypt shelved plan to arm Russia, agreed to arm Ukraine, leak shows - The Washington Post T.CO Egypt made detailed plans to export rockets at Moscow’s request, but after a diplomatic offensive from Washington, later approved artillery production for Kyiv. That's a very nice government you have there, it would be a shame if something happened to it. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 18, 2023 Author Share Posted April 18, 2023 According to the leaks, the Ukrainian counteroffensive was planned for April 30 (approx, obviously). I wonder if they will be changing the general thrusts since Russia will now have a better idea of Ukraine's plans. On the other hand...there are only so many obvious places for Ukraine to push, so it's not like there was any ever real doubt about the strategic-level plans. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 18, 2023 Author Share Posted April 18, 2023 Also, the Russians apparently believe Ukraine will attempt to cross the Dnipro in Kherson as part of the offensive, and believe Ukraine has been massing forces for the crossing. While this is definitely possible (and western allies have provided a lot of bridge-laying equipment, as well as boats), I would imagine it's a trick to keep some Russian forces pinned on the Dnipro. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 19, 2023 Share Posted April 19, 2023 ISW analysis for 18 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 18, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to portray himself as a wartime leader in anticipation of a planned Ukrainian counteroffensive during his visit to occupied Kherson and Luhansk oblasts. The Kremlin announced on April 18 that Putin visited the Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to portray himself as a wartime leader in anticipation of a planned Ukrainian counteroffensive during his visit to occupied Kherson and Luhansk oblasts. The Kremlin announced on April 18 that Putin visited the headquarters of the Russian Dnepr Group of Forces in Kherson Oblast and the Vostok National Guard headquarters in occupied Luhansk Oblast.[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed that Putin visited occupied territories on April 17. Putin, however, stated that Orthodox Easter holiday is “coming up” in one of the videos, which suggests that his visit occurred prior to April 16.[2] The Kremlin later edited the video to exclude Putin’s statement about the then-upcoming East holiday. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky visited the Avdiivka frontline on April 18, and it is possible the Kremlin deliberately released footage of Putin’s visit to overshadow Zelensky’s visit in the information space.[3] ISW reported on Russian milbloggers criticizing Russian officials for failing to visit the frontlines like Zelensky, and Putin had previously visited occupied Mariupol on March 19 to improve his appearance as a wartime leader.[4] Russian occupation officials and milbloggers celebrated Putin’s visit and claimed that he boosted the morale of Russian servicemen preparing to repel Ukrainian counteroffensives.[5] Geolocated footage shows that Putin visited Arabat Spit in southwestern Kherson Oblast - at least 130km from the nearest frontline.[6] Putin’s visit likely also intended to publicly identify potential scapegoats ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensives. Putin received briefings from Commander of Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky, Commander of the Dnepr Group of Forces Colonel General Oleg Makarevich, and other unnamed military commanders regarding the situation along the Kherson and Zaporizhia frontlines.[7] Putin also met with Colonel General Alexander Lapin and other unnamed top-ranking officers to discuss the situation on the Luhansk frontline. Putin likely deliberately singled out Teplinsky and Makarevich as commanders responsible for southern Ukraine, and Lapin as a commander overseeing the Luhansk direction. Putin, Kremlin sources, and milbloggers have been increasingly discussing the prospects for a Ukrainian counteroffensive, and it is likely that the Kremlin is preparing the domestic information space for either military failures or the defeat of the counteroffensive threat.[8] Putin’s demonstrative meetings with Teplinsky, Makarevich, and Lapin likely confirm another change in military command and possibly within the Kremlin’s inner circle. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger observed that the Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu did not attend Putin’s meetings in occupied Ukraine.[9] The milblogger claimed that Teplinsky and Lapin – both of whom had reportedly been placed on a leave – returned to the Russian military command likely against the wishes of Gerasimov and Shoigu. Russian sources previously claimed that the Kremlin replaced Wagner-affiliated Teplinsky with Makarevich as the VDV commander on January 13, likely after the Russian MoD and Gerasimov regained Putin’s favor in the lead up of Russia’s unsuccessful winter-spring offensive operation in Donbas.[10] The meeting confirms previous Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s hints at Teplinsky’s reappointment.[11] ISW previously assessed that Teplinsky’s confirmed reappointment suggests that the Kremlin is likely seeking to work with Wagner to achieve a decisive victory in Bakhmut.[12] The confirmation may further indicate that Prigozhin has at least partly regained Putin’s favor by overriding Gerasimov and Shoigu’s efforts to eliminate Wagner in Bakhmut.[13] Putin may be attempting to balance Wagner’s influence by reappointing Lapin to command the Luhansk sector of the frontline. The Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Lapin assumed the role of the commander of the Vostok National Guard formation and noted that the Putin-Lapin meeting confirms Lapin’s return to the frontlines.[14] Prigozhin and Chechen Leader Ramzan Kadyrov had led a successful campaign to remove Lapin from his position as the commander of the “center” group of Russian forces, likely due to personal conflicts during the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk and Luhansk offensive operations in the summer of 2022.[15] The milblogger speculated that Putin reappointed Lapin to reinforce command in the area or to help Putin avoid conflicts with the Russian Defense Ministry. Select members of the “Club of Angry Patriots” are advocating for a revolution in Russia if the Kremlin freezes the war or pursues peace negotiations with Ukraine and the West. Self-proclaimed former “People’s Governor of Donetsk Oblast” Pavel Gubarev defined the “Club of Angry Patriots” as a “potentially revolutionary power” that will prevent “betrayal” if the government decides to freeze the current frontlines in Ukraine.[16] Gubarev also noted that Russia cannot win the war without a revolution – either from within the government or in society – because oligarchs, agents, ethnic mafias, and nationalist separatists will not allow for the reformation of social-economic institutions to support the war effort. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin noted that Gubarev’s opinion does not represent the collective vision on the “Club of Angry Patriots” and noted that any revolution begins with a “coup from the top” over which he and other members of the group have no control over since they do not have connections to the Kremlin.[17] The official “Club of Angry Patriots” Telegram account amplified a forecast regarding possible political changes within the Kremlin as a result of a Ukrainian counteroffensive, which may represent the group’s concerns over the progress of the war.[18] The group amplified a post from the leader of the Russian “Civil Solidarity” movement Georgiy Fedorov, who stated that the political situation in Russia largely depends on frontline realities. Fedorov assessed that Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s recent statements about the end of the “special military operation” is the start of the campaign to freeze the war in Ukraine. Fedorov stated that if Russians are able to defeat Ukrainian counteroffensives over the summer, then Russian President Vladimir Putin may freeze the war to avoid calling up mobilization ahead of the 2024 presidential election cycle. Fedorov claimed that Russia would likely present a suppressed Ukrainian counteroffensive as a victory and is likely intensifying volunteer recruitment efforts to generate enough contract servicemen to hold existing frontlines. Fedorov claimed that the Kremlin will continue to intensify censorship and repressions and will not replace officials in the Kremlin or within the military command under the conditions of unsuccessful counteroffensive operations. Fedorov stated that if Ukrainians are successful, then political situation within the Kremlin will lead to a deeper conflict between different parties for influence and the Kremlin will conduct personnel changes. Fedorov claimed that despite potential mobilization and disruption in society and the Kremlin, Putin’s system is capable of eliminating all threats “associated with the interception of power.” Fedorov noted that the most unlikely scenario is the imminent dissolution of Putin’s power system, but noted that different financial, regional, and industrial figures may be preparing for such an outcome. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met to discuss unspecified strategic partnership and military cooperation in Moscow on April 18. Shoigu claimed that mutual Russian-Chinese efforts aim to stabilize and reduce conflict and that each state significantly values deepening military cooperation.[19] Shoigu also claimed that Russia and China can deepen their partnership by firmly supporting each other on national security issues. Li stated that his first visit to Russia as Defense Minister demonstrates the determination to strengthen cooperation between the Russian military and the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.[20] Shoigu’s and Li’s remarks largely echoed Li’s and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s remarks on April 16.[21] The Kremlin continued efforts to portray Russia as a respected international partner by meeting with China against the backdrop of the G7 meeting in Japan on April 18. The G7 communique condemned Russian nuclear blackmail rhetoric, Russia’s possible deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, destabilizing Wagner Group activities in Africa, the forced deportation of Ukrainian children from occupied Ukraine, Russia’s suspension of the New START Treaty, and Iran’s provision of combat UAVs to Russia.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense published footage of two Russian strategic bombers flying in international airspace over the Bering and Okhotsk Seas as part of the Pacific Fleet’s ongoing readiness check.[23] ISW previously assessed that the Pacific Fleet’s ongoing readiness checks are likely meant to posture that Russia supports Chinese security objectives in the Pacific ahead of the G7 meeting.[24] Russian authorities detained Russian public relations specialist Yaroslav Shirshikov, an associate of detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, in Yekaterinburg on April 18. Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on April 18 that Russian authorities detained Shirshikov and charged him with justifying terrorism possibly for his social media posts about prominent Russian milblogger Maxim Fomin’s (alias Vladlen Tatarsky) assassination.[25] Shirshikov spoke to Gershkovich shortly before Gershkovich’s arrest and was one of the first people to report Gershkovich as missing.[26] Shirshikov previously stated that Gershkovich had traveled to Yekaterinburg to report on Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s criticisms of Yekaterinburg History Museum Director Igor Pushkarev and locals’ opinions on the war.[27] The Russian State Duma approved a series of possibly unconstitutional amendments to the Russian Criminal Code on April 18 aimed at encouraging domestic self-censorship and repressing the Russian public. The Russian State Duma approved amendments to the Russian Criminal Code that increase the maximum prison sentence for high treason from 20 years to life and authorize the revocation of Russian citizenship for discrediting the Russian military and participating in designated undesirable nongovernmental organizations.[28] The amendment also stipulates that a Russian citizen may not renounce their citizenship if the citizen has an outstanding duty to the state, such as mobilization.[29] These measures appear to violate the Russian Constitution, as Article 6 states that a Russian citizen may not be deprived of their citizenship or of the right to change citizenship status.[30] The State Duma also approved an amendment that criminalizes advising international organizations in which Russia does not belong or foreign states bodies.[31] Russian opposition media outlet OVD-Info states that this amendment would criminalize facilitating international war crimes investigations.[32] International Humanitarian Law, to which Russia is a party, stipulates that states have a duty to investigate and prosecute war crimes.[33] The Russian Immortal Regiment Central Headquarters announced the cancellation of the annual Immortal Regiment Victory Day march, likely in an effort to reduce public discussion of deaths in the current conflict. Russian State Duma Member Deputy and Co-Chair of the Immortal Regiment Central Headquarters Elena Tsunaeva announced the cancellation of the march, which memorializes Russian war dead, on April 18, for unspecified security reasons.[34] Tsunaeva stated that citizens can instead submit photos of relatives to a centralized online database to participate in a ”virtual procession,” which Russian authorities will likely use to hide the number of Russian soldiers killed in Ukraine. Tsunaeva also invited people to share pictures of their deceased family members online, on clothes, and on cars. Key Takeaways Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to portray himself as a wartime leader in anticipation of a planned Ukrainian counteroffensive during his visit to occupied Kherson and Luhansk oblasts. Putin’s visit likely intended to publicly identify scapegoats ahead of the planned Ukrainian counteroffensives. Putin’s demonstrative meetings with Teplinsky, Makarevich, and Lapin likely confirm another change in military command and possibly within the Kremlin’s inner circle. Select members of the “Club of Angry Patriots” are advocating for a revolution in Russia if the Kremlin freezes the war or pursue peace negotiations with Ukraine and the West. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu met to discuss on strategic partnership and military cooperation in Moscow on April 18. The Russian State Duma approved a series of amendments to the Russian Criminal Code on April 18 aimed at encouraging domestic self-censorship and repressing the Russian public. Russian authorities detained Russian public relations specialist Yaroslav Shirshikov, an associate of detained Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich, in Yekaterinburg on April 18. The Russian Immortal Regiment Central Headquarters announced the cancelation of the annual Immortal Regiment Victory Day march, likely in an effort to reduce public discussion of war dead. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast of Kupyansk and along the Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian forces continued to make gains in Bakhmut and conducted ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces continue defensive preparations in southern Ukraine. The Kremlin continues efforts to integrate proxy formations with conventional Russian forces. Russian occupation officials continue to deport Ukrainian civilians to Russia under healthcare and rehabilitation schemes. Belarus may begin economically supporting Russian-occupied Donetsk Oblast with a patronage system. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 20, 2023 Share Posted April 20, 2023 ISW analysis for 19 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 19, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs. Russian state-controlled outlet TASS reported on April 19 that the FSB and the Main Directorate of the Security Service of the Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs. Russian state-controlled outlet TASS reported on April 19 that the FSB and the Main Directorate of the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) have been conducting mass checks at the Moscow Central District Internal Affairs Directorate and several Moscow district police offices for the past several weeks due to “the leakage of data from Russian security forces at the request of Ukrainian citizens.”[1] Another Russian source noted that the FSB and MVD have already detained police officers as part of this investigation.[2] Russian outlets reported that the suspected police officers leaked personal data on Russian security forces to external individuals, some of whom are Ukrainian citizens.[3] The reported FSB and MVD raids on the Moscow police departments are occurring against the backdrop of a series of arrests and dismissals of prominent members of Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) leadership.[4] The Kremlin may be pushing for such arrests and investigations in order to conduct an overhaul of the domestic security apparatus to oust officials who have fallen out of Kremlin favor and consolidate further control internal security organs. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions. Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces will never preemptively announce when the counteroffensive starts and reiterated that Ukrainian forces aim to liberate all Ukrainian territory.[5] Malyar also reported that Russian forces are concentrating on offensives in the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka directions and that Russian forces have concentrated weapons, equipment, and all professional units – including Wagner Group forces, Spetsnaz, and airborne forces (VDV) – around Bakhmut.[6] Malyar noted that Ukrainian counteroffensive actions will be both offensive and defensive in nature given the complex nature of the battlefield. Russian forces continue to use Shahed drones and other lower-precision systems to offset the degradation of Russia’s precision munition supply. Russian forces launched 12 Shahed-131/136 drones at southern Ukraine from the Sea of Azov on the night of April 18 to 19, 10 of which Ukrainian air defense shot down.[7] Ukrainian United Coordination Press Center of the Southern Defense Forces Head Nataliya Humenyuk noted on April 19 that the Shahed strike was a deliberate attempt to find and destroy Ukrainian air defense systems.[8] Russian milbloggers have recently discussed the importance of targeting Ukrainian air defense capabilities in advance of any potential Ukrainian counteroffensives, and the Shahed strikes were likely intended in part to set conditions to do so.[9] Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuri Ihnat noted that Russia has used almost all of its strategic missile stockpile since September 11, 2022, and that Ukrainian forces have shot down 750 of the total 850 missiles that Russian forces have launched at Ukrainian during this period.[10] Ihnat noted that Russian forces have switched to cheaper and shorter-range options such as guided aerial bombs and have removed Kh-50 type missiles from storage for restoration.[11] Ihnat was likely referring to Kh-55 Soviet-era air launched cruise missiles, as Russia is slated to begin production on newer Kh-50 cruise missiles in summer 2023.[12] Russia may be removing Kh-55 cruise missiles from storage to refit them for future strikes on Ukraine. Key Takeaways The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported on April 19 that Ukrainian forces are already conducting some counteroffensive actions. Russian forces continue to use Shahed drones and other lower-precision systems to offset the degradation of Russia’s precision munition supply. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Kreminna. Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian officials continue to prepare to send electronic summonses and establish a digital registry for those eligible for military service. A State Duma deputy proposed a bill that would expand contract conditions for the OMON and SOBR units of Rosgvardia and set conditions for the mobilization of Rosgvardia reservists. Russian officials and occupation authorities continue efforts to further integrate occupied territories into the Russian economic system. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
BloodyHell Posted April 20, 2023 Share Posted April 20, 2023 On 4/17/2023 at 9:17 AM, CitizenVectron said: Photos of Bradleys have started to appear, repainted in Ukrainian pixel camo: digital camo looks so damn good on armored vehicles. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 21, 2023 Share Posted April 21, 2023 ISW analysis for 20 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 20, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG The Kremlin demoted the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet on April 19 amid an ongoing surprise readiness check that began on April 14. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev announced on Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. The Kremlin demoted the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet on April 19 amid an ongoing surprise readiness check that began on April 14. Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev announced on April 19 the “appointment” of Russian Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Sergei Avakyants to the headquarters overseeing Russia’s military sports training and patriotic education centers, a clear demotion for one of the seniormost commanding officers in the Russian Navy.[1] It is unclear why a Kremlin official initially announced Avakyants’ reappointment instead of the Ministry of Defense. The Russian Pacific Fleet reported on April 20 that Avankyants is changing position due to his reaching the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) age limit for military service (65 years).[2] However, Russian state media outlet TASS reported that its sources claimed that Avakyants’ demotion was not due to his old age.[3] Several Russian general officers – including current Russian theater commander in Ukraine and Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov and Commander-in-chief of the Ground Forces Oleg Salyukov – have served in the Russian armed forces beyond turning 65. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced a surprise readiness check of the Pacific Fleet on April 14 that is still ongoing as of April 20.[4] Russian state wire TASS reported on April 20 that two sources close to the Russian Pacific Fleet’s management stated that current Commander of the Russian Baltic Fleet Admiral Viktor Liina may take command of the Pacific Fleet and that Deputy Chief of the General Staff Vice Admiral Vladimir Vorobyov may command the Baltic Fleet.[5] The Kremlin clearly demoted Avakyants from a senior operational commander to a military bureaucrat overseeing programmatic work, despite Russian officials’ framing of the shift as a new “appointment.” Avakyants’ demotion may be connected to the poor performance of Pacific Fleet naval infantry (such as the 155th and 40th naval infantry brigades) around Vuhledar since early 2023. Avakyants alternatively may have failed in some manner to conduct large-scale drills in the Pacific. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin linked Avakyants’ dismissal to the Pacific Fleet drills and sarcastically questioned if someone could conduct drills within the Russian MoD, likely advocating for the dismissal of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.[6] Another milblogger welcomed Avakyants’ dismissal, stating that Russia needs to appoint younger commanders like Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov.[7] A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military’s ineffective use of Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces in Ukraine. The milblogger argued on April 20 that Russian forces are relying on VDV, Spetsnaz, and naval infantry units to conduct ground attacks in Ukraine due to a lack of high-quality infantry, despite VDV and Spetsnaz units not initially being prepared for conducting combined arms operations.[8] The milblogger argued that VDV, Spetsnaz, and naval infantry units need to carry out their intended purposes and not serve as the Russian military’s elite infantry and assault groups in Ukraine.[9] The milblogger particularly criticized Spetsnaz units for not conducting enough sabotage and targeting operations and VDV units for being too large and requiring expensive specialized equipment that is not useful in the current tactical realities in Ukraine.[10] The milblogger asserted that the Russian military will not be able to normalize command, management, and planning for major operations until it establishes clear roles for VDV, naval infantry, and Spetsnaz units.[11] The milblogger additionally admitted that the Russian military has in practice formed light infantry units without transports for some time, despite the Russian military’s doctrinal focus on ”motorized rifle” (mechanized infantry) units. ISW previously assessed that Russia’s most elite forces – VDV and Spetsnaz – are diluting their combat effectiveness and doctrinal specialties with poorly trained mobilized personnel and volunteers due to high casualties sustained in Ukraine.[12] The milblogger’s criticism of the use of these elite forces further suggests that these units’ reputation as Russia’s elite fighting force in Ukraine is questionable. The Russian State Duma adopted a law on April 20 that grants members of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s (DNR and LNR) Militias veterans' status and could apply to select PMC or other irregular personnel but fails to explicitly address the status of PMC groups as legal entities.[13] The law (adopted in its third reading) provides veteran status to members of the DNR and LNR Militias who have fought since Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, as well as to personnel who served in unspecified organizations which “contribute to the tasks of the Russian Armed Forces” in Ukraine. This framing will likely allow the Kremlin to provide veteran status to select PMC personnel without recognizing the legality of PMCs like the Wagner Group, for which Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has long campaigned.[14] Prigozhin focused on the lack of recognition of the Wagner Group, though this law would have been an unusual way for the Kremlin to legally recognize Wagner. Prigozhin griped that unnamed Russian entities seek to “forever remove [Wagner] from the history of Russia.”[15] Prigozhin claimed that he is happy for the DNR and LNR militiamen and that he is okay not receiving recognition until authorities eventually punish the individuals who stole Wagner’s recognition. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to resolve issues at the Gukovo checkpoint on the Ukrainian-Russian border during a meeting with government officials on April 19.[16] Putin claimed that he personally traveled through the Gukovo checkpoint, which connects Rostov and Luhansk oblasts, when returning from his recent trip to occupied Luhansk and Kherson oblasts.[17] Putin stated that poor road conditions at the checkpoint caused a civilian backup and forced trucks delivering perishable goods to wait for hours before passing through, causing shipment delays and price increases in occupied territories.[18] Putin added that some trucks must bypass the checkpoint entirely as the roads are too narrow and practically nonexistent.[19] Putin called on Russian special services and law enforcement to increase the number of inspection complexes and employees at checkpoints and ordered Russian officials to improve roads around checkpoints and establish routes from Rostov-on-Don to Luhansk Oblast.[20] Putin’s orders indicate that Russia intends to maintain customs checkpoints with the illegally annexed eastern regions out of security concerns. ISW previously reported that Russian milbloggers complained that Russian checkpoints at the international customs line significantly slowed down Russian deliveries of ammunition to the frontlines in Donetsk Oblast.[21] The Kremlin’s failure to implement meaningful integration policies and secure occupied Ukraine is likely undermining Russia’s ability to provision forces on the front line, as ISW has previously assessed.[22] Putin is likely attempting to remedy the delays by expanding staffing to speed up inspections at the checkpoints and is not entertaining the possibility of removing these obstructions. Russia previously intensified security measures and inspections around the Kerch Strait Bridge, the Kremlin likely continues to use these checkpoints for similar security reasons.[23] The Kremlin may also use these checkpoints to prevent the mass movement of men from occupied Ukraine escaping forced mobilization, to stop Russian mobilized personnel from fleeing to Russia, and to maintain Russian filtration measures. The existence of these checkpoints further highlights that Russian officials do not view the residents of occupied Ukraine as Russian nationals and are governing as the occupying power they are, despite ongoing claims the illegally annexed territories are part of Russia. Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss announced his resignation on April 20, reportedly in response to an offer from Russian President Vladimir Putin to work at the federal level.[24] The reason for Uss’ promotion is currently unclear but may be part of Putin’s efforts to strengthen control over regional officials. Key Takeaways The Kremlin demoted the commander of the Russian Pacific Fleet Sergei Avakyants amid an ongoing surprise readiness check that began on April 14. It is unclear if the Kremlin demoted Avakyants due to his poor performance in the ongoing rills or for other reasons. A prominent Russian milblogger criticized the Russian military’s use of Russian airborne (VDV), naval infantry, and Spetsnaz forces as frontline infantry in Ukraine. The Russian State Duma adopted a law granting members of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Militias veterans' status which could possibly cover PMC personnel but does not formally recognize PMC formations. Russian President Vladimir Putin instructed Russian Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin to resolve issues at the Gukovo checkpoint during a meeting with government officials, indicating continued Russian challenges integrating illegally annexed Ukrainian territory. Russian forces continued limited ground attacks in the Kreminna area. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued reconnaissance activity northwest of Svatove. Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk frontline, and in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian forces continued defensive preparations in southern Ukraine out of concern for a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Kremlin may be eliminating or deprioritizing formal force structures controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and permitting private military companies (PMCs) to absorb their soldiers. Russian occupation authorities continue to target Ukrainian youth to consolidate societal control of occupied territories. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 22, 2023 Author Share Posted April 22, 2023 Yeah, that leaker is going to prison for a long time: Jack Teixeira Posted Sensitive Intelligence More Widely Than Previously Known - The New York Times WWW.NYTIMES.COM A Discord user matching the profile of Jack Teixeira distributed intelligence to a larger chat group, days after the beginning of the Ukraine war. Started posting secret documents within days of the war starting and continued until last month. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Air_Delivery Posted April 22, 2023 Share Posted April 22, 2023 On 4/18/2023 at 7:49 AM, CitizenVectron said: According to the leaks, the Ukrainian counteroffensive was planned for April 30 (approx, obviously). I wonder if they will be changing the general thrusts since Russia will now have a better idea of Ukraine's plans. On the other hand...there are only so many obvious places for Ukraine to push, so it's not like there was any ever real doubt about the strategic-level plans. So does Ukraine have Bradleys and western MBTs up and running yet? I have yet to see any videos with them in it. It could be because of OPSEC but still I have yet to see any evidence of them using them. I'd imagine they aren't doing a counter offensive until they have them up and running and in numbers. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 22, 2023 Author Share Posted April 22, 2023 2 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said: So does Ukraine have Bradleys and western MBTs up and running yet? I have yet to see any videos with them in it. It could be because of OPSEC but still I have yet to see any evidence of them using them yet. I'd imagine they aren't doing a counter offensive until they have them up and running and in numbers. I saw recently that they've received 230 MBTs and 1,500+ "armoured vehicles," but while Bradleys are included in the latter, they are a small %. But I believe they do have some ready. Most of the tanks should be deployed, in terms of delivered Challengers and Leopards. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 22, 2023 Share Posted April 22, 2023 ISW analysis for 21 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 21, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Russian forces used a new delivery of Shahed drones to strike Ukraine for the third consecutive day, targeting Kyiv for the first time in 25 days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 26 drones on April 20, of which Ukrainian Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Russian forces used a new delivery of Shahed drones to strike Ukraine for the third consecutive day, targeting Kyiv for the first time in 25 days. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 26 drones on April 20, of which Ukrainian forces shot down 21 and 12 drones on April 21, of which Ukrainian forces shot down eight.[1] Russian forces targeted Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts overnight on April 19 to 20 and 20 to 21.[2] The Kyiv City Military Administration reported no damage from the strikes in Kyiv.[3] Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on April 20 that Russian forces waited until a new shipment of Shahed drones arrived to use them for further strikes and noted that Russian use of missiles has also decreased.[4] Commander of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet Admiral Viktor Liina reportedly assumed command of the Russian Pacific Fleet on April 21 following the completion of Russian drills in the Pacific on April 20. Kremlin newswire TASS, citing an unnamed source, reported that Liina replaced Admiral Sergei Avakyants who had commanded the Russian Pacific Fleet since 2012.[5] Unofficial reports of Liina’s appointments coincide with the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) announcement that the Pacific Fleet and elements of the Russian Aerospace Forces completed drills in the Pacific under the supervision of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov.[6] The Russian MoD may have named Yevmenov as the supervisor for these drills following milblogger and nationalist discourse about Avakyants’ abrupt termination amidst the combat readiness checks.[7] ISW previously assessed that Avakyants’ dismissal may have been a result of his inability to recreate pre-war, large scale Pacific Fleet combat readiness checks due to the Pacific Fleet’s significant combat losses in Ukraine.[8] A Russian fighter-bomber accidentally bombed Belgorod on April 20. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced on April 20 that a Russian Su-34 bomber accidentally dropped a bomb while flying over Belgorod City.[9] The explosion left a crater with a 20-meter (65-foot) radius in the southern part of the city and injured three civilians.[10] The cause of the accidental bombing remains unclear, as does the reason for flying an armed bomber over a populated city. Russian milbloggers did not react to the bombing with the same vitriolic anger they often use with Russian battlefield failures. One milblogger compared the accidental bombing to the Su-34 crash in Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai, in October 2022, claiming that Belgorod residents should be thankful that the bomb did not hit a residential building.[11] Another milblogger expressed appreciation for the MoD taking responsibility for the accident and characterized the act as an atypical sign of health in the MoD.[12] A Rossiya-1 broadcaster, speaking about the event, stated that “modern military equipment allows Russian units to eliminate extremists in the special operation zone from a minimal distance”-- likely an error that indicates confusion in Russian state media on how to frame the accident in the information space.[13] The Angry Patriots Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of supporting efforts to freeze the war in Ukraine. Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin and his Angry Patriots Club posed 40 direct questions addressed towards the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the Russian military command about Russia’s conduct of the war in Ukraine, foreign affairs, and domestic power struggles.[14] Girkin asked why Russian authorities are not arresting Prigozhin for his “direct calls” to freeze the war at the current frontlines, which Girkin characterized as calls to “violate the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.”[15] Girkin notably mentioned Prigozhin when asking who was responsible for Russian withdrawal from Kherson Oblast – an operation overseen by Wagner-affiliated former Commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine at that time Army General Sergey Surovikin.[16] Girkin and Prigozhin have a long-standing feud – likely as a result of competition for patronage – and Girkin’s accusations against Prigozhin may be an attempt to discredit his rival.[17] This accusation may also indicate that Prigozhin has found a patron – possibly affiliated with the Russian MoD – who supports the temporary freeze of the war in Ukraine for political reasons. The Angry Patriots Club previously amplified a forecast that miscontextualized Prigozhin’s April 14 essay as a call to end the war in Ukraine, stating that Prigozhin’s essay was the start of a political campaign to move to the defense of new territories and freeze the war.[18] The forecast noted that the Russian MoD and Russian private military companies (PMCs) are already recruiting contract servicemen to defend occupied positions, while Russian propagandists are entertaining news about the counteroffensive to possibly present a major victory to Russians if Ukrainians are unsuccessful.[19] The forecast argues that Russia would freeze the war for 2024 for political reasons such as the presidential elections if Russia is successful in repelling Ukrainian counteroffensives. Prigozhin’s essay notably called on Russia to commit to a decisive battle in Ukraine or embrace a temporary defeat that would allow Russia to set conditions for a future victory without negotiations.[20] It is possible that Girkin and his patrons are fearful that Prigozhin has joined the political faction that is urging Russian President Vladimir Putin to stop the war on current lines following planned Ukrainian counteroffensive.[21] Prigozhin publicly restored his cooperation with the Russian MoD and seemingly regained some Kremlin-allocated privileges at the start of April after a months-long feud with the Russian military command.[22] The Russian MoD and the Russian military command could be interested in freezing the war to reconstitute Russian forces. ISW previously assessed that the Russian MoD had likely advised Putin early on about measures such as mobilization that could have changed the course of the war earlier, and the Russian MoD had previously ordered a short-lived operational pause over the summer of 2022, for example.[23] Prigozhin’s recent cooperation with the Russian MoD indicates that he may have reached an agreement with the Russian military command – possibly offering to advocate to Putin for a temporary ceasefire to regain the ability to grow his forces and expand his political standing ahead of Russian gubernatorial and presidential elections. Prigozhin had also been criticizing Putin’s maximalist goals in Ukraine and offering grim forecasts about Russia’s need for years-long grinding attacks to capture Donbas, which are likely part of the ceasefire narrative.[24] A temporary ceasefire in Ukraine and protraction of the war will only benefit Russia by allowing it to reconstitute its forces and wear down Western support for Ukraine. Russia will use occupied territories in Ukraine as a springboard for future offensive operations after it restores its combat capabilities. Russia is continuing to weaponize information operations in the West to discourage military aid provisions, and such efforts will only intensify if Russia is able to establish a strong defensive line with contract servicemen and conscripts that will slow Ukrainian advances.[25] Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to set conditions for domestic crackdowns and the removal of officials who have fallen out of favor. Putin signed a bill on April 14 increasing administrative liabilities for unauthorized entry into critical energy infrastructure facilities and facilities operated or protected by Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard), the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Russian penitentiary system, the federal executive body for mobilization, and the Russian Armed Forces.[26] The Kremlin likely intends to use these increased punishments to obscure the activities of Russian military and security organs while also expanding these entities' ability to oust officials and crack down on Russian citizens under accusations of trespassing. Putin recently signed bills expanding legal punishments for the discreditation of all Russian personnel fighting in Ukraine and for the misappropriation of Russian military assets, and Russian security organs have increasingly used these laws as pretexts for the arrest of Russian citizens.[27] ISW has previously assessed that the Kremlin may be using the pretext of threats to Russia’s defense industrial base (DIB) to justify crackdowns, and the new law likely aims to broaden the guises under which Russian authorities justify internal repressions.[28] ISW previously assessed that the FSB appears to be conducting a large-scale overhaul of domestic security organs, which the new law may further augment.[29] Key Takeaways Russian forces used a new delivery of Shahed drones to strike Ukraine for the third consecutive day, targeting Kyiv for the first time in 25 days. Commander of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet Admiral Viktor Liina reportedly assumed command of the Russian Pacific Fleet following the completion of Russian drills in the Pacific. A Russian fighter-bomber accidentally bombed Belgorod on April 20. The Angry Patriots Club accused Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin of supporting efforts to freeze the war in Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law aimed at supporting the Kremlin’s ongoing efforts to set conditions for domestic crackdowns and the removal of officials who have fallen out of favor. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line. Russian forces continued to advance in and around Bakhmut, although Russian forces have not completed a turning movement around the city. Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front and conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have established positions on the east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast. Russian federal subjects are forming new cross-regional volunteer formations to support the ongoing force generation campaigns. Russian authorities are expanding the logistics capabilities and security measures on the Arabat Spit likely to prepare for a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 23, 2023 Share Posted April 23, 2023 ISW analysis for 22 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 22, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Russian milbloggers have provided enough geolocated footage and textual reports to confirm that Ukrainian forces have established positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of April 22 though not at what scale or with what intentions. Geolocated Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Russian milbloggers have provided enough geolocated footage and textual reports to confirm that Ukrainian forces have established positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of April 22 though not at what scale or with what intentions. Geolocated footage published by a Russian milblogger on April 22 shows that Ukrainian forces have established positions on the Dnipro River bank north of Oleshky (7km southwest of Kherson City) and advanced up to the northern outskirts of the settlement on the E97 highway, as well as west of Dachi (10km south of Kherson City).[1] This footage also indicates that Russian forces may not control islands in the Kinka and Chaika rivers less than half a kilometer north of the geolocated Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge. Russian milbloggers claimed on April 20 and 22 that Ukrainian forces have maintained positions in east bank Kherson Oblast for weeks, established stable supply lines to these positions, and regularly conduct sorties in the area—all indicating a lack of Russian control over the area.[2] Another milblogger’s battle map claimed that Russian forces do not control some Dnipro River delta islands southwest of Kherson City as of April 22, suggesting possible Ukrainian advances on these islands.[3] Some milbloggers complained that the slow rate of Russian artillery fire due to the over-centralization of the Russian military command allowed Ukrainian forces to land on the east bank.[4] Russian forces may be prioritizing maintaining defenses in urban areas such as Oleshky and Nova Kakhovka, leaving the islands in the Dnipro River delta unmanned. The extent and intent of these Ukrainian positions remain unclear, as does Ukraine’s ability and willingness to maintain sustained positions in this area. ISW is recoding territory on the east bank of the Dnipro River to Ukrainian-held only now because this is the first time ISW has observed reliable geolocated imagery of Ukrainian positions on the east bank along with multi-sourced Russian reports of an enduring Ukrainian presence there. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely attempting to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to go over to the defensive ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive. Prigozhin argued on April 21 that Russia needs to “anchor itself in such a way that it is only possible to tear out [Russian forces from their positions] with the claws of the opponent.”[5] Prigozhin’s comment followed a discussion of the Ramstein meeting results, Western commitments to train more Ukrainian personnel and continuous military support for Ukraine. Prigozhin also noted that Ukraine will try to “tear” Russian forces apart and that Russia needs to resist such attacks. Prigozhin has been increasingly alarmist in his recent rhetoric and has made similar statements about the uncertain future of Russian offensive operations in Donbas.[6] Prigozhin’s calls for strengthening Russian defenses in occupied territories and frequent discussions of the prospects of Ukrainian counteroffensives are notable as they indicate that he is trying to amplify the discussion in the Russian domestic information space. Russia, however, continues to conduct offensive operations in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Prigozhin is also advocating for Russia to focus on holding the current frontlines rather than seeking more gains so that Russian forces can regain their combat effectiveness for later offensive operations. Prigozhin is not arguing for Russia to end the war and negotiate with Ukraine and the West as some Russian and Western sources reported, as ISW previously observed, but is instead condemning the faction within the Kremlin that is hoping to end the war in negotiations.[7] Prigozhin is actually arguing that Russia needs to meet the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive at full strength and try to hold the current frontlines without ending the war or entering into peace negotiations.[8] He argues that a pause after the Ukrainian attack culminates would allow Russia to regain combat power and build nationalist support within the Russian society for renewing the fight even in the event of a defeat.[9] Prigozhin is also attempting to redefine and undermine some of Putin’s key maximalist goals in Ukraine—namely the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine—likely to minimize the informational impact that might result from going over to the defensive and abandoning efforts to gain more ground now.[10] Russian far-right paramilitary formation Rusich (Sabotage Assault Reconnaissance Group), which facilitates recruitment of Russian ultranationalist and irregular forces, echoed Prigozhin’s rejection of the “denazification” and “demilitarization” goals.[11] Rusich noted that Russia is fighting Ukraine to avenge Donbas, for living space, and for combat experience—rather than fighting claimed Ukrainian “fascism” and “Nazism.” By reframing Putin’s goals, Prigozhin and some factions within the ultranationalist community may be attempting to condition the Russian domestic information space for the prospect of frozen frontlines, potentially near the initial lines of February 23, 2022. The Russian military command is likely attempting to convince Putin to turn to defensive operations as well—but may be unable to bluntly deliver this message to Putin. Some ultranationalist figures argued that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled efforts to recruit 400,000 contract servicemen to ensure that Russia has enough military personnel to defend existing frontlines and to efficiently freeze the current frontlines in Ukraine.[12] The Russian military command is also reportedly transferring conscripts to hold Russian lines in Crimea and may be planning to prepare other resources to ensure that Russia can retain some lines once the potential Ukrainian counteroffensive culminates.[13] Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov are likely sensible to the threat of the Ukrainian counteroffensive but are likely continuing to send contract servicemen to reinforce senseless offensive operations at Putin’s insistence.[14] Kremlin sources previously revealed that Putin favors loyalty over competence, and this sentiment likely prevents Shoigu and Gerasimov from focusing on setting optimal conditions for an efficient defense by refusing to expend Russian elite units in grinding attritional battles for marginal gains.[15] ISW previously observed that Shoigu and Gerasimov were likely unable to convince Putin to conduct mobilization in May 2022—despite the fact that Russia needed such a measure to reconstitute forces necessary to maintain offensive operations in Ukraine.[16] The Russian military command may have partially repaired its strained relationship with Prigozhin to persuade Putin to halt offensive operations via the Russian information space. ISW has observed a sudden improvement in Prigozhin’s relations with the Russian MoD and the Kremlin since early April. The Russian MoD, for example, began to directly acknowledge Wagner forces in its daily situational reports and provided Wagner with ammunition and mobilized personnel as reinforcements in early April 2023.[17] Prigozhin and Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers amplified claims that Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s son Nikolai Peskov is reportedly serving with Wagner in Ukraine—likely an information operation to publicly mend the relationship and possibly elevate Prigozhin’s loyalty to the Kremlin.[18] Prigozhin had previously been able to impact Putin’s decision-making by engineering the appointment of Wagner-affiliated commanders and the dismissal of inept military officials and breaking through Putin’s close circle with his critiques of the progress of the war.[19] A Russian political expert observed that different Kremlin officials have historically voiced their plans and projects publicly to convince Putin to implement changes, and it is likely that Prigozhin follows the same model of influence.[20] The Russian military command and select Kremlin officials who are advocating for Putin to freeze the war may have reapproached Prigozhin to influence Putin one more time. Putin’s continued insistence on Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine suggests that the group that wants to freeze the war along the current front lines has not fully persuaded Putin. Russian forces are continuing attritional offensives to capture Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka in Donetsk Oblast as well as limited offensive operations in Luhansk and western Donetsk Oblast, despite increasing Russian fears about the threat of a potential imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive.[21] The Russian winter offensive failed to achieve the Kremlin’s ambitious goals of seizing the Donetsk and Luhansk oblast administrative borders by March 31, but it appears that Russian forces have not subsequently deemphasized their operational focus on tactical gains, no matter how marginal and costly those gains are.[22] Russian forces suffered significant manpower and equipment losses during the winter offensive campaign that are currently constraining their abilities to maintain offensive operations along more than one axis and that will likely limit the Russian military’s ability to respond to possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[23] Russian forces have not responded to these constraints by prioritizing one axis or by conducting an operational pause along any axis that would allow Russian forces to replenish and reconstitute for a decisive defensive effort. Russia forces are continuing to deploy contract servicemen and remaining combat-effective units to support offensive operations in eastern Ukraine instead of conserving this critical pool of combat power to respond to a Ukrainian counter-offensive.[24] Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka offer no significant operational benefits to Russian forces, and any marginal tactical gains along any axis are unlikely to improve the Russian military’s ability to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Putin may be hesitant to commit to a ceasefire due to the influence of select unknown pro-war figures or out of concern for the implications for his regime’s stability. The insistence on tactical gains suggests that the pro-war camp advocating for maintaining offensives at any cost is likely still influencing Putin’s decision-making for the war. A possible shift to preparing for defensive operations ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive would likely indicate that Putin had finally rejected the pro-war camp’s views in favor of the more pragmatic group’s. The possible success of the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive could determine the outcome of this struggle for influence over Putin’s decisions. Russian occupation authorities are continuing to oppress Roman Catholics in occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to suppress Ukrainian religious institutions beyond Moscow’s control. Head of the Ukrainian Berdyansk City Military Administration Viktoria Halitsina reported on April 22 that Russian forces seized the Church of the Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary in occupied Berdyansk.[25] Halitsina stated that Russian propagandists accused the clergy of hiding weapons and collaborating with Ukrainian forces because of their previous service as chaplains for the Ukrainian Armed Forces in 2015. ISW has also reported on two other instances of Russian occupation authorities persecuting Roman Catholics in occupied Ukraine.[26] ISW has previously reported on Russian authorities’ weaponization of religion in occupied territories as part of an ongoing cultural genocide.[27] Russian authorities continue to arrest personnel associated with the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) likely to justify crackdowns and further conceal DIB activities. The Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) announced on April 22 that it arrested the deputy head of the testing laboratory at the Promtekhnologiya weapons plant in Moscow on suspicion of treason.[28] The FSB did not provide additional details about the alleged treasonous act. The Promtekhnologiya plant participates in the development and modernization of high-tech weapons. The Promtekhnologiya plant claimed that it had not employed the arrested employee since March 2021.[29] ISW has reported on other recent arrests that are part of an ongoing crackdown using the pretext of threats to Russia’s DIB.[30] A Russian fighter-bomber accidentally bombed Belgorod on April 21 with two FAB-500 bombs, one of which likely malfunctioned. Russian authorities announced on April 22 the presence of a second, undetonated bomb that landed in Belgorod.[31] Belgorod authorities evacuated 3,000 civilians from the city while sappers extracted and later detonated the bomb.[32] Russian authorities have so far provided no further explanation as to the cause of the accidental bombing. The Russian fighter bomber either intended to drop the bombs on a different target and one bomb failed to detonate, or the fighter bomber did not arm the bombs to drop them, and one bomb improperly detonated. Key Takeaways Russian milbloggers have provided enough geolocated footage and textual reports to confirm that Ukrainian forces have established positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast as of April 22 though not at what scale or with what intentions. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is likely attempting to persuade Russian President Vladimir Putin to go over to the defensive ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive. The Russian military command is likely attempting to convince Putin to turn to defensive operations as well—but is unable to bluntly deliver this message to Putin. The continued insistence on Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine suggests that the group that wants to freeze the war along the current front lines has not fully persuaded Putin of its views. Russian occupation authorities are continuing to oppress Roman Catholics in occupied Ukraine, likely in an effort to suppress Ukrainian religious institutions beyond the Kremlin’s control. A Russian fighter-bomber accidentally bombed Belgorod on April 21 with two FAB-500 bombs, one of which likely malfunctioned. Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and near Siversk. Russian forces continued to advance around Bakhmut on April 22, although Russian forces have not completed a turning movement around the city. Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations along the Avdiivka-Donetsk front and conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast. Russian authorities have made headway in their attempts to compel international recognition of Russian ownership over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Continued Russian efforts to block evacuations of wounded soldiers, likely to prevent soldiers from leaving the combat zone, have contributed to the deaths of some Russian soldiers. Russian occupation officials are expanding patronage networks in occupied territories. 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Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 23, 2023 Share Posted April 23, 2023 Bind Ukraine Closer to American Military Learning - War on the Rocks WARONTHEROCKS.COM Is the United States doing everything it can for itself in Ukraine? Unfortunately not. While American support for Ukraine is admirable and worthwhile, Quote Is the United States doing everything it can for itself in Ukraine? Unfortunately not. While American support for Ukraine is admirable and worthwhile, Washington ought to be bolder in using the ongoing war as a testbed for emerging technologies and operational concepts that could be of use to deter or, if necessary, defeat its adversaries on the battlefield. There are many ways in which the Biden administration could be more forward-learning in this regard, including experimenting with uncrewed systems, exploring new ways to produce munitions, and using battlefield observers. Readers may not agree with all of my suggestions — and that’s fine — but I hope to at least impress upon leaders the value of having a set of policies and programs that are more serious and deliberate about learning from what is happening in Ukraine. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 23, 2023 Share Posted April 23, 2023 ‘They’ll kill me if I come back’: Abduction, torture become routine in Russian-occupied Melitopol KYIVINDEPENDENT.COM In a rare glimpse, the Kyiv Independent talked to some who escaped Russian-occupied Melitopol and learned what's happening behind the curtain of Russia's occupation. Since Melitopol fell to Russian forces in March 2022, the city's residents constantly fear being kidnapped, sometimes in broad daylight, and end up being tortured or worse in one of the city's basements for a "conversation," as Russians call it. Quote Maryna didn’t need to see the faces of the soldiers who had kidnapped her. Even though they put a woven bag on her head, she already knew some of them by voice. They had come to her house before, to ask questions about the residence and “stuff their faces” with apples she had sitting on her windowsill. When they demanded $1,000 to allow her to keep the old car she and her husband used to drive on her farm, she agreed, thinking they would leave her alone after that. Except, they didn’t. Seven soldiers, who used to roam her village near Melitopol, came knocking at her door that one September morning. She already knew where they would take her. She never hid her pro-Ukrainian stance, she told the Kyiv Independent months later, in the city of Zaporizhzhia. “If they don’t like someone, they just take this person into a car and abduct them,” she said. “Your relatives will never know what happened to you.” The Russian soldiers took her to a small, disgusting cell in a former pre-trial detention center in Melitopol for a “talk,” as they put it. “One was asking the questions, and the other beat me,” she recalled. She was beaten whenever her answers didn’t suit the interrogators or when she replied in Ukrainian. “They threatened to break my nose, beat me on the floor, and hand me over to the Chechen soldiers for ’entertainment,” she said. She was beaten three times over the span of 22 days before being released in a prisoner exchange on Sept. 27. The Russian troops filmed one of these beatings. Murder, ‘alcohol and prostitutes’: Wagner convicts pardoned by Putin return to terrorise home towns | Russia | The Guardian WWW.THEGUARDIAN.COM Violent criminals who served with the notorious Russian militia in Ukraine are terrorising the communities they return to Quote He strode up and down the central street of Tskhinvali on Monday, like he did most days, occasionally stopping to chat with passersby. Locals knew the man, Soslan Valiyev, 38, as an idiosyncratic but popular fixture in Tskhinvali, the tiny capital of the Russian-backed breakaway region of South Ossetia in Georgia. Tsugri, as Valiyev was affectionately nicknamed by everyone in town, had a developmental disability. “As long as I could remember Tskhinvali, Tsugri was always there, greeting cars as they entered the city with his big smile,” said Alik Puhati, a journalist and South Ossetian native. “He was loved by everyone in our tight community. A welcomed guest at weddings and dinners, people really took care of and protected him,” Puhati added. The shock was therefore palpable in Tskhinvali when the news broke out that Tsugri had been killed that evening. A harrowing video published on Telegram channels showed a man chasing and kicking Tsugri moments before he reportedly stabbed him to death. “Everyone is in shock,” Puhati said, “people ask themselves, ‘How could this have happened?’” Local authorities announced in the early hours of Tuesday that they had arrested a man who was suspected of murdering Tsugri. The man, who was identified by state-run media, was Georgiy Siukayev, a convicted murderer who was recruited from jail last autumn by the Wagner paramilitary organisation to fight in Ukraine. Quote At the end of March, Yulia Buiskich, an 85-year-old pensioner, was killed at home in the sleepy town of Novyj Burets in the Kirov region, 600 miles east of Moscow. The perpetrator, 28-year-old Ivan Rossomakhin, was already a repeat offender when he was sentenced to 10 years in prison for murder in 2020. He too was recruited by Prigozhin and recently returned to his home town after fighting in Ukraine. News of Rossomakhin's return deeply unsettled Novyj Burets' modest community of a few hundred people and led to a town hall meeting, which was filmed by a local TV channel. During the meeting, police chief Vadim Varankin promised that the "problematic troublemaker" Rossomakhin would be taken away from the town on 28 March. But a day later, on 29 March, Rossomakhin entered the wooden house of Buiskich, where he is believed to have killed her with an axe. "The state and personally Putin and Prigozhin are to blame for Yulia's death and should answer for it," said a close relative of Buiskich, speaking under condition of anonymity. "They released a sick bastard into society." Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 23, 2023 Author Share Posted April 23, 2023 The first Patriot system is up in running in Ukraine, and will be used against S-300 missiles and other targets that were previously untouchable. 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 24, 2023 Share Posted April 24, 2023 ISW analysis for 23 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 23, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG ISW is publishing a special edition campaign assessment today, April 23. This report outlines the current Russian order of battle (ORBAT) in Ukraine, assesses the offensive and defensive capabilities of Russian force groupings along the front, and Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain maps that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. ISW is publishing a special edition campaign assessment today, April 23. This report outlines the current Russian order of battle (ORBAT) in Ukraine, assesses the offensive and defensive capabilities of Russian force groupings along the front, and discusses major factors that may complicate Russian defensive operations in the event of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. This report is based on a number of assumptions about Ukrainian capabilities that ISW does not, as a matter of policy, attempt to assess or report on. It assumes, in particular, that Ukraine will be able to conduct a coordinated multi-brigade mechanized offensive operation making full use of the reported nine brigades being prepared for that operation. That task is daunting and larger than any offensive effort Ukraine has hitherto attempted (four Ukrainian brigades were reportedly used in the Kharkiv counter-offensive, for example). It also assumes that Ukraine will have integrated enough tanks and armored personnel carriers of various sorts into its units to support extended mechanized maneuver, that Ukrainian mechanized units will have sufficient ammunition of all sorts including artillery, and that Ukraine will be able to conduct long-range precision strikes with HIMARS and other similar systems integrated with and supporting maneuver operations as it has done before. It further assumes that Ukrainian forces will have the mine-clearing and bridging capabilities needed to move relatively rapidly through prepared defensive positions. ISW sees no reason to question any of these assumptions given the intensity with which Ukraine has reportedly been preparing for this operation and the time it has taken to do so, as well as the equipment reportedly delivered to Ukrainian forces by Western countries. If any significant number of these assumptions prove invalid, however, then some of the assessments and observations below will also be invalid, and the Russians’ prospects for holding their lines will be better than presented below. ISW offers no assessment of or evidence for these assumptions, and thus offers no specific forecast for the nature, scale, location, duration, or outcome of the upcoming Ukrainian counter-offensive. Ukraine has attractive options for offensive operations all along the line, and ISW does not assess that the information presented in this report or any observations ISW has made below lead obviously to the conclusion that Ukrainian forces will attack in one area or another. Russian forces in Ukraine are operating in decentralized and largely degraded formations throughout the theater, and the current pattern of deployment suggests that most available units are already online and engaged in either offensive or defensive operations. ISW assesses that Russian forces are currently operating along seven axes: Kupyansk; Luhansk Oblast; Bakhmut; Avdiivka-Donetsk City; western Donetsk/eastern Zaporizhia; western Zaporizhia; and Kherson Oblast. Russian forces are pursuing active offensive operations on at least five of these axes (Kupyansk, Luhansk, Bakhmut, Avdiivka-Donetsk City, and western Donetsk/eastern Zaporizhia) and predominantly pursuing defensive operations on the western Zaporizhia Oblast and Kherson Oblast axes. The forces currently committed to both offensive and defensive operations in Ukraine are both regular (doctrinally consistent based on Russian pre-war units) and irregular (non-standard and non-doctrinal) forces, and it is highly likely that the majority of Russian elements throughout Ukraine are substantially below full strength due to losses taken during previous phases of the war. This report will discuss “elements” of certain units and formations deployed to certain areas, but it should not be assumed that any of these units or formations are operating at full strength. Kupyansk Axis (Northeastern Kharkiv Oblast) Russia has committed elements of previously damaged Western Military District (WMD) formations to the Kupyansk area. Russian forces have been pursuing limited offensive operations on the Kupyansk axis in the first few months of 2023, but have failed to make operationally significant gains towards Kupyansk and have made only occasional and localized tactical gains. ISW has observed mentions of unknown units of unspecified echelon of the 1st Guards Tank Army (1st GTA)’s 47th Tank Division operating in the Kupyansk direction.[1] The 1st GTA notably suffered major manpower and equipment losses during the Russian offensive in Chernihiv Oblast early in the war in 2022, and then once again during Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive in fall 2022.[2] The 1st GTA’s 4th Tank Division, particularly its 12th and 13th Tank Regiments, lost nearly 100 tanks in a few days in September 2022, so any constituent elements of the 1st GTA that are currently operating near Kupyansk are likely short of tanks and other critical systems.[3] The commitment of damaged and understrength 1st GTA elements to this line likely suggests that the Russian military command is not immediately prioritizing this as an axis of advance or defense. Geolocated footage from February 2023 additionally shows that the WMD’s 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) has committed unknown units of unspecified echelon near the Fyholivka-Novomlynsk area, about 19km directly north of Kupyansk.[4] A Russian milblogger additionally indicated that elements of the 6th CAA’s 138th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade are operating in Kharkiv Oblast, likely near Kupyansk. Based on the pattern of deployment of WMD formations on the Kupyansk and Luhansk axes, the WMD’s 2nd Motor Rifle Division (1st GTA) has likely deployed toward along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border. ISW has previously noted that it has not yet observed explicit confirmation that the 2nd MRD has come online but considering that unnamed 1st GTA elements are deployed near Kupyansk and that it is highly unlikely that Russia can afford to hold a division in reserve while trying to pursue offensive and defensive operations, the 2nd MRD has likely deployed near Kupyansk.[5] Quote Observed elements: 1st Guards Tank Army [6] o 47th Tank Division [7] 6th Combined Arms Army [8] o 138th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade [9] Quote Svatove/Kreminna line Russia has committed elements of two military districts and two airborne (VDV) divisions to an unsuccessful offensive in Luhansk Oblast that has operationally culminated. ISW assessed in February that WMD elements had been committed to decisive offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line in Luhansk Oblast but forecasted that this offensive was extraordinarily unlikely to achieve meaningful gains. This offensive has now operationally culminated and has made only a few localized tactical gains. Elements of the WMD’s 20th Combined Arms Army (20th CAA); the Central Military District (CMD)’s 41st Combined Arms Army (41st CAA); VDV forces; the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU); forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), and various ad hoc irregular formations have been fighting along the Svatove-Kreminna line since early 2023. ISW has observed a heavy commitment of the 20th CAA’s 144th and 3rd Motor Rifle Divisions (MRDs) along the Svatove-Kreminna line, including all three of the 144th MRD’s constituent regiments (the 254th and 488th Guards Motor Rifle regiments and the 59th Guards Tank Regiment) and two of the 3rd MRD’s motorized rifle regiments (the 752nd and 252ndMotorized Rifle Regiments).[10] Considering that most of these elements have been actively engaged in offensive operations along an active front for the greater part of four months they are likely exhausted and substantially degraded. Russia has also committed elements of the CMD to the Svatove-Kreminna line, particularly in the area west of Kreminna. Geolocated footage posted in late February shows that elements of the 35th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army (41st CAA) conducted a failed vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against Ukrainian positions near Chervonopopivka, 6km north of Kreminna.[11] The 6th Tank Regiment of the 90th Tank Division is likely also engaged near Svatove, and a Russian milblogger noted in early January that mobilized servicemen of this regiment have been fighting in this area without rotation since October 2022, which suggests that the CMD largely lacks other forces with which to conduct necessary troops rotations.[12] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) additionally refers to the “Central Group of Forces” (another name for the CMD grouping in Ukraine) operating in the Lyman direction west of Kreminna in its daily situation reports.[13] The CMD under Colonel General Alexander Lapin was responsible for the major Russian operational defeat following the Ukrainian liberation of Lyman on October 1, 2022.[14] CMD elements were likely severely degraded during the fall of Lyman and subsequent Ukrainian counteroffensive pushes, and the current CMD grouping near Kreminna is therefore likely comprised of partially reconstituted remnants of the October withdrawal. The exact hierarchy of command and control on this sector of the front is unclear-- Lapin was dismissed following the fall of Lyman but then apparently reappointed as commander of the Luhansk axis as of April 18.[15] VDV forces are also actively engaged near Kreminna. ISW has observed mentions of the 237th Guards Air Assault Regiment of the 76th VDV Division and the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th VDV Division operating in the forested area to the west and southwest of Kreminna.[16] The Russian military command notably appears to be increasing the prominence of VDV forces, and the Russian MoD reported on April 3 that VDV units received TOS-1A “Solntsepek” thermobaric artillery systems for the first time in history.[17] Geolocated footage confirms that Russian forces have used TOS-1A systems near Kreminna as recently as April 1.[18] TOS-1A systems are military district-level assets that are not tied to specific formations, so their use around Kreminna by VDV elements is noteworthy and suggests that the Russian military command may be trying to empower VDV units to conduct further offensive operations on this front. However, the commitment of a single type of artillery asset is unlikely to lend VDV forces a decisive offensive edge on this axis and does not replace the core requirement for better (and more) Russian infantry capabilities, as ISW has previously assessed.[19] The Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) has also deployed limited special forces (Spetsnaz) elements along the Svatove-Kreminna line, likely to offset the lack of needed infantry capabilities. Russian milbloggers have posted footage claiming that the 24th Separate Special Purpose Brigade and 3rd Guards Special Purpose Brigade are operating near Makiivka (22km northwest of Kreminna) and around Kreminna itself.[20] The Russian military continues to use Spetsnaz units to conduct ground attacks and infantry maneuvers instead of for their primary sabotage and targeting missions, as ISW has previously observed.[21] The apparent increased prominence of Spetsnaz units in this area is likely part of the Russian military command’s effort to mitigate losses to ground assault elements by committing elite formations that traditionally have different functions to regular combat missions.[22] Several irregular Russian formations have additionally been playing a supplementary role along the Svatove-Kreminna line. LNR, BARS (Russian Combat Reserve), Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz, and the “Don” Cossack Regiment appear to be participating in hostilities in this area, albeit to a much more limited extent than more conventional units.[23] ISW has observed two BARS detachments—BARS “Kaskad” and BARS-13—engaged near Kreminna, and the 4th LNR Brigade and 3rd LNR Battalion additionally have been fighting alongside Chechen “Akhmat” elements south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[24] Russian forces have failed to make meaningful advances in Luhansk Oblast in 2023, despite the heavy commitment of elements of at least three armies of two military districts, elements of two VDV divisions, and the support of numerous irregular formations. The forces that have been fighting along this line for at the better part of four months are likely exhausted and substantially degraded. They have continued to attack, have not rotated to rest and refit, and do not appear to have prepared themselves to receive a Ukrainian offensive. Observed elements: Spetsnaz o 24th Separate Special Purpose Brigade [25] o 3rd Guards Special Purpose Brigade [26] VDV o 76th VDV Division § 237th Air Assault Regiment [27] o 98th VDV Division [28] § 331st Airborne Regiment [29] 20th Combined Arms Army o 144th Motor Rifle Division [30] § 254th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment [31] § 488th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment [32] § 59th Guards Tank Regiment [33] o 3rd Motor Rifle Division [34] § 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment [35] § 252nd Motorized Rifle Regiment [36] Central Military District o 41st Combined Arms Army § 35th Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade [37] § 90th Tank Division § 6th Tank Regiment [38] o Other unspecified echelons in the Lyman direction 2nd Luhansk Army Corps elements o 4th Brigade [39] § TF SURRICATS anti-drone unit [40] o 3rd Battalion [41] Irregulars o BARS § BARS-13 [42] § BARS “Kaskad” [43] o Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz [44] o Don Cossacks [45] Quote Bakhmut The current Russian pattern of commitment around Bakhmut suggests that the Russian military leadership is increasingly prioritizing the completion of the capture of the city before the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive if possible. The Wagner Group continues to take heavy losses. It may well be able to complete the seizure of the city at some point. Sustaining Wagner’s advance beyond its culmination required the Russian MoD to commit VDV formations to allow Wagner to concentrate almost entirely on the urban fight. Wagner financier and chief Yevgeny Prigozhin ceded the northern and southwestern flanks to the Russian MoD and confirmed that VDV elements are supporting the Wagner main effort in Bakhmut in this way. VDV support in this area will likely enable Wagner to make more gains within the city and may persuade Ukrainian forces to withdraw. VDV units near Bakhmut are likely further removed from direct, highly attritional urban combat than Wagner elements, and will thus likely emerge from the battle for Bakhmut in substantially better shape than Wagner. Russian milbloggers have noted that elements of the 106th VDV Division are defending the line near Yakovlivka, about 17km northeast of Bakhmut.[46] The announcement of Wagner and the VDV working together around Bakhmut suggests that the Russian military leadership is seeking to cooperate with Prigozhin despite previously growing frictions in order to expedite the capture of Bakhmut. The Russian MoD’s apparent desire to reduce friction with Wagner over Bakhmut is also evidenced by the apparent reappointment of former VDV commander and Wagner affiliate Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky to an unspecified but “major” role in Ukraine after alleged previous disagreements with the MoD and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov.[47] These efforts on the command level are additionally having tactical impacts--Russian milbloggers noted that Wagner is now operating T-90 tanks in Bakhmut, which suggests that the Russian military leadership has allocated more modern assets to Wagner in an attempt to expedite the capture of the city. Certain irregular Russian formations are also engaged near Bakhmut, although in a notably much more limited capacity than Wagner. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 25 that around 200 Chechen “Akhmat” special purpose police arrived in Bakhmut to combat desertion and sabotage by other Russian forces in the area.[48] “Akhmat” forces are unlikely to have engaged in actual combat, however. The “Lystan” volunteer detachment, part of the “Don” Cossack” formation, claimed to be fighting near Bakhmut as of March 18.[49] Quote Observed elements: Wagner [ISW does not attempt to maintain a detailed order of battle of Wagner forces] o 11th Reconnaissance and Assault detachment [50] VDV o 106th VDV Division [51] Irregulars/ volunteer battalions o Chechen “Akhmat” Spetsnaz for military law enforcement within Bakhmut [52] o Lystan volunteer battalion [53] Quote Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis The Russian military command has heavily committed a variety of Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) elements to the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline, alongside some Southern Military District (SMD) and Northern Fleet units. These elements have made no operationally significant progress on this axis in 2023 beyond marginal tactical advances around Avdiivka and within Marinka. DNR forces have notably been active along this axis since 2014, and the current frontline in this area is within kilometers of the line that has held for eight years. DNR elements in this area have particularly suffered from poor and abusive command culture, which has been greatly exacerbated by the Russian MoD’s recent campaign to officially integrate and formalize DNR forces within the Russian military. The Russian military formally integrated and acknowledged control of the existing 1st and 2nd Army Corps (forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, respectively), and these formations are now officially operationally subordinated to the 8th Combined Arms Army (Southern Military District).[54] This official subordination has caused widespread issues for DNR forces, however. Russian sources have circulated reports that the DNR command is sending mobilized servicemen from throughout Russia to fill out DNR units with minimal training and that DNR commanders badly mistreat mobilized servicemen and force them into attritional assaults with no preparation.[55] The Russian MoD’s desire to rapidly integrate DNR and Russian forces by staffing DNR units with Russian mobilized personnel has likely degraded the combat capabilities of forces on this front.[56] DNR brigades, regiments, battalions, and other constituent elements notably are not manned or equipped in accord with normal Russian tables of organization and equipment. DNR forces initially started as militia-style proxy forces in 2014 and have maintained much of that irregularity within their formations despite their formal integration into the 8th CAA. The DNR calls certain formations “brigades,” “regiments,” or “battalions,” but these elements are not equivalent to Russian formations with the same echelon designation. ISW has observed numerous DNR elements near Avdiivka and on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City. The DNR has heavily committed all eight of its known “brigades”—the 1stSlavic, 3rd Horlivka, 5th, 9th, 14thKalmius, 100th, 114th, and 132nd—to the area north and northwest of Donetsk City.[57] The 56th and 58th Separate Special Purpose Battalions, 10thTank Battalion, as well as the “Sparta” Separate Guards Reconnaissance Battalion and “Somalia” Separate Guards Assault Battalion have been prominent in DNR operations around Avdiivka and in the Vodyane area just southwest of Avdiivka.[58] A number of other DNR regiments are additionally engaged in this sector of the front.[59] The SMD’s 8thCombined Arms army (8th CAA) has committed elements of both of its two motorized rifle divisions to operations in the Marinka area on the southwestern outskirts of Donetsk City. The 150th Motorized Rifle Division’s two tank regiments (68th and 163rd) and the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division’s 255th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment have been fighting in Marinka since at least February 2023.[60] Mobilized servicemen from Krasnodar Krai posted a video appeal on March 9 in which they reported that they are serving in the 2nd Motorized Rifle Company (1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, 255th Motor Rifle Regiment) and that their command threw them into attritional assaults near Donetsk City (likely near Marinka) in late February.[61] Elements of the Northern Fleet’s 14th Army Corps were also active in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area but have likely withdrawn further into the rear due to high combat losses. Russian milbloggers claimed on March 22 that the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) attacked Ukrainian positions near Tonenke, 7km west of Avdiivka.[62] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Direction Head Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi, however, reported on April 3 that the 200th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade withdrew from the frontline in order to refit and recover.[63] Several volunteer battalions are also reportedly fighting on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis. Russian sources have reported that the Perm Oblast “Molot” Tank Battalion, the “Wolves” Sabotage and Reconnaissance Battalion, and the “Nevsky” volunteer detachment are fighting near Avdiivka and in the Donetsk City area.[64] Dmytrashkivskyi noted on March 5 that the “Steppe” Cossack Battalion arrived at an unspecified area in the Donetsk City direction but reported that the “Steppe” Battalion was very distrustful of command and in panic.[65] Former Russian proxy commander and prominent critical milblogger Igor Girkin revealed on April 7 that the “Nevsky” volunteer detachment, which he enthusiastically advertised on his Telegram account, is essentially a sham that threw recruits into attritional assaults with no training or equipment and that its total complement is 1,186 despite the fact that it was advertised as a brigade (typically numbering approximately 3,200 to 3,600 personnel) .[66] Reports from both Russian and Ukrainian sources on irregular Russian formations operating in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area suggest that these units are faced with pervasive issues of morale, organization, and command and are likely not particularly combat effective. A reportedly captured Russian military manual offers insight into how 8th CAA and DNR forces are utilizing company-sized units in urban combat to mitigate limitations on the combat effectiveness of these formations as they fight along the Donetsk City line. A Ukrainian reserve officer released a captured Russian manual on April 6 that details the formation of “Storm Z” companies, which are staffed with recruits and created within elements of the 8th CAA and DNR.[67] These ”Storm Z” companies are staffed with 100 personnel (divided into four capture squads, four fire support squads, a command element, a combat engineering group, reconnaissance group, medevac group, and UAV crew) and are created outside the conventional army unit structure and attached to existing regiments and brigades.[68] These formations are meant to conduct urban combat operations or operations in challenging geographic areas with the intent of capturing strategic objects and are likely being employed in urban combat in highly fortified small settlements near Donetsk City. Their existence suggests that 8th CAA and DNR elements are so badly damaged that they need this sort of irregular tactical arrangement. Such ad hoc tactical formations integrated into already disorganized units are unlikely to lend Russian forces on this axis a significant offensive advantage.[69] Observed elements: 1st Donetsk Army Corps elements o 1st Slavic Brigade [70] § 1453rd Regiment [71] § 1439th Regiment [72] o 3rd (Horlivka) Brigade [73] o 9th Brigade [74] § 6th Rifle Battalion [75] o 5th Brigade [76] o 14th “Kalmius” Brigade [77] o 110th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade [78] § 2nd Battalion [79] § Pyatnashka Battalion [80] o 132nd Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade [81] o 9th Separate Naval Infantry Regiment [82] o 10th Tank Battalion [83] o 114th Brigade (formerly 11th Regiment) [84] o 87th Regiment (formerly 9th Regiment) [85] o 1454th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment [86] o 23rd Anti-Aircraft Missile Division [87] o “Somalia” battalion [88] o “Sparta battalion”[89] o 56th Separate Special Purpose Battalion [90] o 58th Special Purpose Battalion (previously 3rdSeparate DNR Special Purpose Brigade) [91] o Unspecified DNR Spetsnaz elements [92] Southern Military District o 8th Combined Arms Army § 150th Motorized Rifle Division [93] § 68th Tank Regiment [94] § 163rd Tank Regiment [95] § 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division § 255th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment [96] § 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion [97] Northern Fleet o 14th Army Corps § 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade [98] Irregulars o 3rd Army Corps § 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade [99] o Volunteer battalions § Perm “Molot” Tank Battalion [100] § 1st Sabotage and Reconnaissance Battalion “Wolves” [101] § Nevsky Volunteer Detachment [102] § Steppe Cossack Battalion [103] Quote Southern Donetsk/Eastern Zaporizhia axis Eastern Military District (EMD) elements have been committed to western Donetsk Oblast near Vuhledar since fall 2022 and have suffered continued losses during repeated failed attempts to take Vuhledar. The EMD’s 29th and 36th Combined Arms Armies (CAAs) and Pacific Fleet have been pursuing offensives towards Vuhledar over the course of the first few months of 2023.[104] An obituary posted on March 23 indicates that the 36th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th CAA) fought in Mykilske, 4km southeast of Vuhledar.[105] Geolocated footage shows that a 36th CAA unit of unspecified echelon actively stormed Ukrainian positions near Mykilske in late February.[106] The 36th CAA’s 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade are also likely operating near Vuhledar.[107] Pacific Fleet elements, particularly the 40th and 155th Naval Infantry Brigades, have been the most actively engaged in this area since fall 2022.[108] EMD elements in the Vuhledar area have been restaffed in various iterations with poorly trained and disciplined mobilized personnel to compensate for overall unit degradation. Following another notorious failed offensive on Vuhledar in early February 2023, Dmytrashkivskyi reported that naval infantry elements were losing 150 to 300 personnel per day and that the 155thBrigade therefore needed to be entirely restaffed for a third time.[109] Ukrainian intelligence also noted that elements of the 98th VDV Division arrived to support the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade around Vuhledar, further highlighting the destruction of this formation.[110] The failures of EMD units in this area have additionally been reflected on the strategic level—Russian sources speculated in late March that the Russian MoD dismissed EMD Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov for command failures leading to operational disaster in western Donetsk Oblast.[111] Limited DNR elements, a GRU brigade, several volunteer battalions, and a BARS detachment are also operating near Vuhledar. The “Kaskad” operational-combat tactical formation, comprised of DNR internal ministry and law enforcement personnel, has claimed that it is active in the Vuhledar direction.[112] A Russian milblogger posted a picture purportedly of a fighter from the GRU’s 14th Separate Special Purpose Brigade near Vuhledar.[113] The “Hispaniola,” “Alga,” and “Steppe/Tigr” battalions and BARS-23 detachment are also fighting in the area.[114] The “Hispaniola” Battalion is notably comprised of Russian sports fans and reportedly has been coordinating with the DNR “Vostok” Battalion, a militant formation formed in 2014 under the command of Alexander Khodakovsky.[115] “Alga” Battalion volunteers reported that they were charged with desertion after trying to leave the Vuhledar area upon the completion of their contracts, and the Ukrainian General Staff similarly reported that the Russian command has “lost control” over the “Steppe/Tigr” detachment near Vuhledar.[116] These reports suggest that volunteer elements near Vuhledar are likely poorly disciplined and are therefore combat ineffective. Quote Observed elements: Eastern Military District o 29th Combined Arms Army [117] § 36th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade [118] o 36th Combined Arms Army [119] § 37th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade [120] § 5th Separate Guards Tank Brigade [121] o Pacific Fleet § 40th Naval Infantry Brigade [122] § 155th Naval Infantry Brigade [123] o VDV § 98th VDV Division [124] GRU o 14th Separate Special Purpose Brigade [125] DNR elements o OBTF “Kaskad” [126] Irregulars o Volunteer battalions § “Hispaniola” sports fans [127] § “Alga” battalion [128] § “Steppe/Tigr” Cossack battalion [129] o BARS elements § BARS-23 [130] Quote Zaporizhia Oblast Russia has committed SMD elements and several irregular formations to defensive operations in western Zaporizhia axis. Russian sources claimed that elements of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA)’s 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division—specifically its 70th and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiments—repelled a series of Ukrainian reconnaissance-in-force operations in the Zaporizhia direction on March 19.[131] A Russian milblogger noted that elements of the 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment, including its 2nd Battalion, repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne, about 55km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City.[132] Geolocated footage posted on March 20 confirms that a 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment tank moved through Robotyne towards the frontline.[133] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of GRU’s 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade also defended against Ukrainian attacks on this sector of the front alongside 58th CAA elements, likely also near Robotyne.[134] Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) released an audio intercept on February 24 in which a Russian serviceman of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division’s 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment says that his command ordered his unit to attack Shcherbaky, 33km southeast of Zaporizhzhia City.[135] Russian milbloggers have also highlighted the operations of the Black Sea Fleet’s 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade in the Zaporizhia direction.[136] One milblogger claimed that the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade (EMD) is also active in this area.[137] However, the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade became the 143rd Motor Rifle Regiment (127th Motorized Rifle Division, 5th CAA) in 2019, and it is unclear if the milblogger erroneously referred to the 143rd Motor Rifle Regiment as the 60th Brigade. The presence of EMD elements on this sector of the front is therefore low confidence.[138] Numerous irregular formations are also present in Zaporizhia Oblast but are mainly engaged in defensive actions further in the rear. ISW has observed discussions about at least three volunteer battalions in the Zaporizhia direction. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation head Yevgeny Balitsky has notably formed his own “Sudoplatov” volunteer battalion, mainly comprised of foreign volunteers and individuals forcibly mobilized from occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[139] The “Sudoplatov” battalion is active in Zaporizhia Oblast, but likely operating deeper in the rear. Russian sources have also claimed that the “Crimea” Battalion and the Ossetian “Storm” Battalion are active in the Zaporizhia direction.[140] Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov stated on April 2 that personnel of the Chechen “South-Akhmat” Battalion are using UAVs to conduct reconnaissance of Ukrainian positions in the Zaporizhia direction.[141] A Russian milblogger reportedly visited a Bashkort mobilized regiment conducting defensive preparations in Zaporizhia Oblast on March 14 and claimed that the regiment had already built 37km of trenches in the rear.[142] Russian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast are likely less exhausted and degraded than forces elsewhere on the front due to the largely defensive nature of operations on this front so far in 2023. While limited SMD and GRU elements have reportedly seen some active combat, most Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast are preparing for defense in depth. These troops are predominantly comprised of mobilized recruits and volunteers and are therefore likely to face some problems with poor training and discipline. They have, however, had more time on whole to rest and reconstitute following Ukraine’s 2022 southern counteroffensive. Observed elements Southern Military District o 58th Combined Arms Army § 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division § 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment [143] § 291st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment [144] § 2nd Battalion[145] § 19th Motorized Rifle Division § 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiment [146] o Black Sea Fleet § 810th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade [147] Eastern Military District o 5th Combined Arms Army § 127th Motorized Rifle Division § 143rd Motor Rifle Regiment (formerly the 60th Motorized Rifle Brigade)[148] Spetsnaz GRU o 22nd Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade[149] Irregulars o Volunteer battalions § Yevgeny Balitsky’s “Sudoplatov” battalion [150] § “Crimea” battalion [151] § Ossetian “Storm” battalion [152] o Random Wagner personnel[153] o Chechen “Akhmat” forces [154] Quote Kherson axis The Russian grouping in Kherson Oblast is likely the most disorganized and undermanned in the entire theater. Prior to the Russian withdrawal from the west (right) bank of Kherson Oblast on November 9-11, 2022, elements of the 76th and 106th VDV Divisions and 22nd Army Corps were committed to the area.[155] These elements have since been reconstituted and redeployed to other areas of the front. It is highly likely that the remaining grouping on the east (left) bank is mainly comprised of badly understrength remnants of mainly mobilized units. These elements have been removed from combat since the withdrawal in fall 2022, so they may be slightly fresher than elements elsewhere on the frontline. However, morale issues and poor training and discipline are likely common in this area, especially since more competent conventional elements are engaged elsewhere. The information space in Kherson Oblast is notably very opaque, largely because this sector of the front has been mostly static since the Russian withdrawal from west bank Kherson in November 2022. The corps of military correspondents who report on frontline activities are elsewhere in Ukraine, so available information on the Russian grouping here is substantially limited. ISW has observed the presence of the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade of the Black Sea Fleet’s 22nd Army Corps near Velykyi Potemkin Island in the Dnipro River delta south of Kherson City.[156] Geolocated footage from February 18 additionally confirms that the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, SMD) was operating in Nova Kakhovka.[157] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov’s 300-person Wagner Group-affiliated “Convoy” private military company is also reportedly operating somewhere in Kherson Oblast.[158] It appears that the SMD has general responsibility for the Kherson sector of the front, but is less engaged here than it is in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian troops in Kherson Oblast, as in western Zaporizhia, are likely relatively less exhausted than forces elsewhere in theater and instead are preparing for defense in depth. However, the Russian grouping in Kherson is evidently scattered and undermanned. Quote Observed elements: Black Sea Fleet o 22nd Army Corps § 126th Coastal Defense Brigade [159] Southern Military District o 49th Combined Arms Army § 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade [geolocated to Nova Kakhovka] [160] Quote Black Sea Fleet Naval Capabilities The Russian military command may commit ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) to supporting Russian troops attempting to defend in southern Ukraine, especially as operations move toward the coast. The BSF is unlikely to make a material difference in ground operations, however. Ukrainian forces have damaged all three Admiral Grigorovich-class BSF frigates: “Admiral Grigorovich, “Admiral Essen,” and “Admiral Makarov,” and the immediate status of the “Essen” and “Grigorivich” is unclear.[161] Satellite imagery from February 10, 2023, may suggest that the “Grigorovich” sailed to Sevastopol.[162] Krivak-class patrol ships “Ladnyi” and “Pytlivyi” have been participating in exercises in the Black Sea in 2023.[163] The BSF’s 197th Assault Ship Brigade is comprised of two Alligator-class, three Ropucha-I, and one Ropucha-II landing ships, all of which have been reported as active as of summer 2022.[164] These landing ships are the most relevant asset in terms of direct strike capabilities because they carry ground attack missile systems. The BSF also has an assortment of corvettes, minesweepers, antisubmarine ships, missile boats and landing ships in the Black Sea. These ships are unlikely to provide Russia a substantial defensive edge against any future Ukrainian counteroffensives into southern Ukraine, however, as they would likely need to move close enough to the coastline that they would make themselves attractive targets. Russian ships are primarily focused on anti-air, anti-ship, and anti-submarine missions, moreover, and generally do not carry many munitions appropriate for defending against mechanized counter-offensive operations. The Russian obsession with continuing small-scale tactical offensive operations past the point of operational culmination has left Russian forces ill-prepared to respond to a large-scale mechanized counter-offensive. Russian forces have been prioritizing small-scale frontal assaults in order to make incremental tactical gains and reinforce small-scale tactical successes on limited areas of the front. These small-scale attacks do not require particularly involved command and control capabilities as local commanders can likely choose particular units or groups of individuals for attacks at times and places of their choosing and then focus their attention on those localized operations. Defensive maneuvers against a large-scale counter-offensive are much more complicated and will require involved and careful exercise of command and control over large units and large areas. Attacking Ukrainian forces will determine the times and places at which fighting occurs and will likely press across much wider areas than the attack sectors Russian commanders have typically focused on. Russian commanders will likely have to rely on all their units and sub-units fighting, not a chosen few, and will likely have to coordinate the defensive operations of all their units at the same time, rather than concentrating on a sector of their choice. The experience of combat that most Russian tactical and even operational commanders have is thus unlikely to prepare them well for the challenges they are likely to face. The majority of the Russian units in important sectors of the front have been filled out with mobilized servicemen who were called up following Ukraine’s successful Kherson and Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensives and have not had experience defending against or withdrawing from a mechanized, multi-brigade advance, moreover. They are unlikely to be emotionally or intellectually prepared to respond to such an assault regardless of combat experience they have gained in the offensive operations of which they have hitherto been part. Sound defense and retrograded withdrawal will also likely be complicated by pervasive and endemic issues with morale and discipline of Russian forces. ISW has reported on many previous instances of servicemen in different areas of the front complaining about conditions within their units, abuse at the hands of commanders, dismissive command attitudes towards casualties, and desertion.[165] These factors are detrimental to unit cohesion and will likely further degrade overall Russian defensive capabilities. The array of Russian fortifications throughout the theater is indicative of the defensive maneuvers Russian forces may have prepared to conduct. Russian forces have constructed a hard line of fortifications along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast line at a distance of between 5 and 20 kilometers behind the front line with the bulk of Russian combat power deployed forward of its fortification lines all along the front. This array suggests that Russian forces intend to withdraw from the frontline to the fortification line and defend there in case of a Ukrainian breakthrough. Similarly, the lines of fortifications in the Bakhmut and Donetsk City area are 5 to 20 kilometers behind the current line of contact, in principle leaving Russian forces space to withdraw through a buffer zone and man a system of defenses behind the line. Defensive lines in southern Ukraine, however, look very different. Russian forces in southern Ukraine have ostensibly prepared for defense in depth, with multiple lines of fortifications that go further into the rear. These defensive lines are mostly likely not all heavily manned—Russian forces simply do not have the personnel to properly man fortifications in areas far removed from the frontline at force densities sufficient to withstand a determined mechanized attack. Successful Russian defense in depth will likely require that Russian forces instead coordinate multiple retrograde maneuvers to fall back on each subsequent line of defense, which will require a high level of motivation and discipline among troops and sound command and control to oversee the complex and dangerous operation. Russian forces also suffer from significantly degraded mechanized maneuver capabilities and would likely be retrograding to secondary defensive lines largely by foot in the face of any potential mechanized Ukrainian counteroffensive push. The current Russian ORBAT in Ukraine suggests that there are very few Russian units that are not actively online in the theater and emphasizes the widespread losses that Russian conventional elements have suffered throughout the war so far. The Russian military has 12 combined arms armies. ISW has observed reports of elements of all but two armies in operations so far in 2023—the EMD’s 35th CAA and the CMD’s 2nd CAA. Russian milbloggers reported that the 35th CAA was essentially completely destroyed by Ukrainian forces near Izyum in June 2022, and remnants of the 35th CAA reportedly deployed to west (right) bank Kherson Oblast to defend against Ukrainian counteroffensives in the summer of 2022.[166] It is therefore likely that remnants of the 35th CAA are scattered throughout southern Ukraine (particularly in rear Kherson Oblast and around critical areas in rear Zaporizhia Oblast) or even elsewhere in the theater and have likely been deployed in formations that are neither doctrinal nor at effective combat capability. The 2nd CAA has likely suffered losses similar to those of the 35th CAA. Ukrainian sources reported in April 2022 that elements of the 2nd CAA redeployed to Russia following the Russian withdrawal from Kyiv Oblast.[167] Elements of the 2nd CAA thereafter deployed in more piecemeal formations to the Izyum area in Kharkiv Oblast and likely suffered substantial losses during Ukraine’s autumn 20222 Kharkiv Oblast counteroffensive and around Lyman, Donetsk Oblast, in early October.[168] The Russian MoD’s daily situation reports mention CMD formations in the Lyman direction, which may mean that elements of the 2nd CAA and other CMD units are operating in this area but are so understrength that they cannot be counted as formal elements. The pattern of Russian deployments throughout Ukraine strongly suggests that most of the available maneuver elements of all military districts, as well as major surviving Airborne forces, are already committed to either active offensive or defensive operations in Ukraine. Russia will need to commit significant reserves to any discrete axis in order to conduct effective offensive operations, and the generally exhausted condition of troops and the apparently disorganized and fragmented deployment pattern in some areas will likely pose significant obstacles to Russia’s prospects for defending critical sectors of the frontline. Key inflections in ongoing military operations on April 23: Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he ordered Wagner Group personnel not to capture Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) but instead only kill Ukrainian personnel on the battlefield.[169] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 23.[170] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Raion Administration Head Roman Vlasenko reported that Russian forces are building fortifications around Severdonetsk and other large cities in Luhansk Oblast.[171] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian servicemen and Wagner personnel engaged in a shootout in Stanytsia Luhanska, Luhansk Oblast following a dispute about responsibility for tactical miscalculations and losses.[172] Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[173] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi reported on April 23 that Russian forces concentrated most of their efforts in the Avdiivka direction and conducted 28 assaults in the Donetsk direction.[174] Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating in areas northwest of Oleshky on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[175] Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo denied that Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead on the east (left) bank as of April 23.[176] The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 23 that Russian forces are planning to mobilize migrants from Central Asia by threating to deport migrants and revoke their Russian citizenship if they do not fight in the war.[177] Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on April 22 that Wagner Group fighters are helping Russian occupation officials assert control over the civilian population on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[178] A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.[179] 1 Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
SuperSpreader Posted April 24, 2023 Share Posted April 24, 2023 Chinese ambassador sparks European outrage over suggestion former Soviet states don't exist | CNN WWW.CNN.COM European countries are demanding answers from Beijing after its top diplomat in Paris questioned the sovereignty of former Soviet republics, in comments that could undermine China's efforts to be... Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
b_m_b_m_b_m Posted April 24, 2023 Share Posted April 24, 2023 14 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said: A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.[179] not just gonna let this slip by at the bottom lol Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 24, 2023 Author Share Posted April 24, 2023 More camo pics of Bradleys: Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 25, 2023 Share Posted April 25, 2023 ISW analysis for 24 April 2023: Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 24, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered additional military command changes on April 20. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Putin signed a decree on April 20 about a series of military command changes and Quote Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report. Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly. Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered additional military command changes on April 20. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Putin signed a decree on April 20 about a series of military command changes and formally dismissed Commander of the Eastern Military District Colonel General Rustam Muradov.[1] The milblogger noted that Muradov’s dismissal likely resulted from his disastrous offensive on Vuhledar that resulted in many casualties among Russian personnel and the loss of much military equipment. The milblogger added that the decree also forced Army General Aleksandr Dvornikov — who reportedly commanded Russian forces in Ukraine in April 2022 — to retire. The milblogger claimed that Putin forced former commander of the Western Military District Colonel General Alexander Zhuravlyov into retirement alongside other unnamed commanders as well. The milblogger claimed that the Kremlin is now relying on newly reappointed Commander of the Russian Airborne Forces Colonel General Mikhail Teplinsky to achieve decisive results. These reports about command changes and dismissals follow the Kremlin’s reported dismissal of Russian Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Sergei Avakyants on April 19.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that Avakyants was not fired as a result of poor performance during military drills in the Pacific, but that he will be forming a new “organization” under the rumored control of the “gas sector.”[3] It is unclear if this was an intentionally vague reference to the reports about Russian state-owned gas company Gazprom‘s formation of a private security company. The milblogger noted that he is not sure if the organization will cooperate with the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF) or the Young Cadets National Movement (Yunarmiya). ISW previously reported that Russian state gas companies — namely Gazprom — are forming new military formations and that DOSAAF has been proactive in Russian military recruitment efforts.[4] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched an information operation to undermine the credibility of Russian state-affiliated private military groups (PMCs). Prigozhin claimed to visit the positions of “Potok” and the “Alexander Nevsky” units - which Prigozhin characterized as “micro-PMCs” - and harshly criticized the poor condition of these units on April 24.[5] The Potok battalion is reportedly one of three volunteer detachments of the Russian state-owned energy company Gazprom and is analogous to the Russian State Combat Reserve (BARS).[6]The Potok battalion is reportedly subordinated to the Russian Ministry of Defense PMC Redut.[7] Prigozhin claimed that these units are supposed to cover Wagner‘s flanks and asked how these units can conduct combat operations if they lack the proper supplies and weapons. Prigozhin also criticized the general proliferation of such PMCs, which likely suggests that Prigozhin views these new entities as Wagner’s competition. Wagner-affiliated sources claimed on April 24 that Wagner forces tasked Potok with defending unspecified newly captured positions to allow Wagner to regroup, but that Potok abandoned these positions and allowed Ukrainian forces to recapture the area.[8] Alleged personnel of the Potok unit posted a video message on April 24, blaming the leadership of Gazprom and PMC Redut for failing to provide Potok with proper weapons and supplies as well as blaming Wagner for forbidding the Potok personnel from leaving their positions.[9] Some milbloggers — including Wagner-affiliated milbloggers — criticized the Potok unit for blaming leadership and instead attributed their poor combat performance to their status as volunteers.[10] The milbloggers’ and Prigozhin’s reports indicate that Wagner has authority over Russian MoD-owned entities, which in turn indicates that Prigozhin has regained some favor with the Kremlin. Kremlin authorities proposed equalizing pay between mobilized personnel and volunteers likely in an attempt to incentivize military service. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with United Russia Secretary Andrey Turchak on April 24 to discuss initiatives to provide benefits to Russian military personnel. Putin expressed support for Turchak’s proposal to equalize the salary of “all participants” of the war in Ukraine.[11] Turchak claimed that mobilized personnel currently receive 195,000 rubles (about $2,400) monthly no matter where they serve, whereas contract soldiers receive the same amount only when serving on the frontlines. Turchak claimed that contract soldiers serving in the rear are receiving salaries “several times less” than those received by soldiers in the same role on the front line. Turchak also proposed to implement other social benefits including: setting an admission quota at Russian universities for veterans, for those awarded Hero of Russia of three Orders of Courage, and for children of participants in the war; reducing or canceling the commission fees for withdrawing or transferring money; and extending or canceling loans for parents, spouses, and children of veterans in the event of death or severe disability. ISW previously reported on conflicts between different groups of Russian servicemen regarding unequal payments and social benefits, and the Kremlin is likely attempting to appear to resolve these discrepancies to encourage enlistment.[12] The Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee detained a former Wagner Group commander who told Russian human rights organization Gulagu.net about Wagner’s murder of children and other civilians in Bakhmut. Gulagu.net founder Vladimir Osechkin reported on April 24 that the Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee arrested Wagner commander Azamat Uldarov, who detailed Wagner’s practice of killing children in Bakhmut and the group’s treatment of prisoners of war on Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s orders (which Prigozhin denied).[13] Osechkin stated that four other Wagner mercenaries accompanied the Investigate Committee and threatened Uldarov with death for his testimony against Prigozhin.[14] Wagner’s cooperation with local investigative authorities indicates that Wagner and Prigozhin are able to influence certain local authorities and security organs. This anecdote further suggests that Wagner is deeply invested in encouraging participation in atrocities in order to build social cohesion among the group and indicates that Wagner uses the threat of retribution to discourage dissenting voices that expose Prigozhin to discredit the wider group.[15] Ukrainian forces likely conducted a naval drone attack against the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) base in Sevastopol in the early morning of April 24. Geolocated footage shows a likely Ukrainian naval drone detonating in the port of Sevastopol reportedly around 3:30am on April 24.[16] The extent of damage from the strike is unclear. The Russian Ministry of Defense announced on April 24 that Ukrainian forces attempted to attack the BSF base in Sevastopol with three unmanned surface vehicles and claimed that Russian forces destroyed all three vehicles.[17] Russian occupation governor of Sevastopol Mikhail Razvozhaev reported that of the two of the three unmanned surface vehicles entered Striletskyi Bay and that one of them detonated on its own, damaging four residential buildings.[18] Razvozhaev reported that the attack did not damage any military infrastructure.[19] Ukrainian forces have likely targeted the Russian BSF before: the Ukrainian forces likely attacked a Grigorovich-class frigate of the BSF near Sevastopol with unmanned surface vehicles on October 29, 2022.[20] Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in New York City on April 24 to chair a session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).[21] Lavrov led a session on April 24 entitled “maintenance of international peace and security” and was met with widespread condemnation by other members of the session.[22] ISW has previously assessed that Russia uses its position at the UNSC as a method of power projection and forecasted that Russia would likely exploit its one-month UNSC presidency to amplify Kremlin talking points about the war in Ukraine.[23] The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 24 that Russian ships are ferrying Iranian ammunition across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine.[24] The WSJ, citing unnamed Middle Eastern officials, stated that cargo ships have carried over 300,000 artillery shells and a million ammunition rounds from Iran to Russia via the Caspian Sea over the past six months. The unnamed officials reportedly said that the last known shipment left Iran for Astrakhan in early March and carried 1,000 containers with 2,000 artillery shells. The WSJ noted that the Iranian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has a contract with Russian state-owned joint stock company Rosobronexport for the sale of 74,000 artillery shells at a price of $1.7 million. A prominent Russian milblogger responded to the report and claimed that he has not yet seen the arrival of this ammunition on the front despite continued Russian–Iranian defense cooperation.[25] Krasnoyarsk Krai deputy Konstantin Senchenko resigned on April 24 following the resignation of Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss on April 20. Senchenko reportedly left Russia over a year ago and actively criticized the war, earning himself a fine in January for “discrediting the army.”[26] Uss reportedly resigned following an offer by Russian President Vladimir Putin to work on the federal level.[27] Senchenko’s and Uss’s resignations may signal discontent with Kremlin leadership on more regional levels of Russian government. Key Takeaways Russian milbloggers speculated that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered additional military command changes on April 20. Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin has launched an information operation to undermine the credibility of Russian state-affiliated private military groups (PMCs). Kremlin authorities proposed equalizing pay between mobilized personnel and volunteers, likely in an attempt to incentivize military service. Saratov Oblast Investigative Committee detained a former Wagner Group commander who told Russian human rights organization Gulagu.net about Wagner’s murder of children and other civilians in Bakhmut. Ukrainian forces likely conducted a naval drone attack against the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s (BSF) base in Sevastopol in the early morning of April 24. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in New York City on April 24 to chair a session of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on April 24 that Russian ships are ferrying Iranian ammunition across the Caspian Sea to resupply Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. Krasnoyarsk Krai deputy Konstantin Senchenko resigned on April 24 following the resignation of Krasnoyarsk Krai Governor Aleksandr Uss on April 20. Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains south of Kreminna as of April 24 and continue to target Russian logistics nodes in rear areas of Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces continued ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City frontline. Some Russian sources denied claims from other Russian milbloggers that Ukrainian forces established enduring positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast. The Kremlin continues crypto-mobilization efforts likely in an attempt to avoid a second wave of formal mobilization. The Wagner Group may be attempting to fill law enforcement roles in occupied territories. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
Commissar SFLUFAN Posted April 25, 2023 Share Posted April 25, 2023 Russia's new T-14 Armata battle tank debuts in Ukraine - RIA WWW.REUTERS.COM Russia has begun using its new T-14 Armata battle tanks to fire on Ukrainian positions "but they have not yet participated in direct assault operations," the RIA state news agency reported on Tuesday, quoting a source close the matter. Quote Russia has begun using its new T-14 Armata battle tanks to fire on Ukrainian positions "but they have not yet participated in direct assault operations," the RIA state news agency reported on Tuesday, quoting a source close the matter. RIA said that the tanks have been fitted with extra protection on their flanks and crews have undergone "combat coordination" at training grounds in Ukraine. The T-14 tank has an unmanned turret, with crew remotely controlling the armaments from "an isolated armoured capsule located in the front of the hull." The tanks have a maximum speed on the highway of 80 kilometres (50 miles) per hour, RIA reported. In January, British military intelligence reported that Russian forces in Ukraine were reluctant to accept the first tranche of the tanks due to their "poor condition." It also said that any deployment of the T-14 would likely be "a high-risk decision" for Russia, and one taken primarily for propaganda purposes. "Production is probably only in the low tens, while commanders are unlikely to trust the vehicle in combat," the British military said. "Eleven years in development, the programme has been dogged with delays, reduction in planned fleet size, and reports of manufacturing problems." They're essentially being used as a mobile artillery platform, not as an actual MBT. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CayceG Posted April 25, 2023 Share Posted April 25, 2023 18 hours ago, CitizenVectron said: More camo pics of Bradleys: It's like 1987 all over again! Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
CitizenVectron Posted April 25, 2023 Author Share Posted April 25, 2023 Sounds like Ukraine has established a "beachhead" across the Dnipro in Kherson. And by that previous sentence, I mean that special forces are rotating back and forth unopposed, and Russian forces in the area are worried it means Ukraine will try and cross the river as part of the counteroffensive. In reality, this is almost certainly just Ukraine trying to scare the Russians into keeping some forces there. It does sound like this area is by far the weakest for Russia (and they can't even coordinate artillery against these repeated small landings), but it's also the most difficult for Ukraine to actually try to take thanks to the river, so there is a less than 1% chance it amounts to anything more than a scare tactic. Quote Link to comment Share on other sites More sharing options...
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