Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (13 June 2024) - US and Ukraine sign bilateral security agreement for long-term supply and cooperation

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

There are pictures of dead and tortured children floating around, just fyi. 

[CitizenVectron]

Wow:

 

 

[Brian]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Jomini of the West's intelligence briefing for Day 37:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Lithuania becomes the first EU nation to downgrade its diplomatic relationship with Russia.  I expect that Poland and the other Baltic states will soon follow.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

Damn, I'm crying.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 03 April 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 3 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukraine has won the Battle of Kyiv. Russian forces are completing their withdrawal, but not in good order. Ukrainian forces are continuing to clear Kyiv Oblast of isolated Russian troops left behind in the retreat, which some Ukrainian officials describe

 

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Ukraine has won the Battle of Kyiv. Russian forces are completing their withdrawal, but not in good order. Ukrainian forces are continuing to clear Kyiv Oblast of isolated Russian troops left behind in the retreat, which some Ukrainian officials describe as “lost orcs.” Russian forces had attempted to conduct an orderly retreat from their positions around Kyiv with designated covering forces supported by artillery and mines to allow the main body to withdraw. The main body of Russian troops has withdrawn from the west bank of the Dnipro and is completing its withdrawal from the east bank, but the retrograde has been sufficiently disorderly that some Russian troops were left behind.

 

The war is far from over and could still turn Russia’s way if the Russian military can launch a successful operation in eastern Ukraine. The current line of Russian occupation in southern and eastern Ukraine is still a significant gain in Russian-controlled territory since the start of the war. If a ceasefire or peace agreement freezes a line like the current front-line trace, Russia will be able to exert much greater pressure on Ukraine than it did before the invasion and may over time reassemble a more effective invasion force. Ukraine’s victory in the Battle of Kyiv is thus significant but not decisive.

 

The disorder of the Russian withdrawal suggests that at least some of the units now reconcentrating in Belarus and western Russia will remain combat ineffective for a protracted period. Russian troops attempting to refit after pulling back from around Kyiv will likely have to reconsolidate into their units, identify which soldiers are still present, sort out their equipment and assess its combat readiness, and generally reconstitute before they can even begin to receive replacements and new equipment and prepare for further combat operations.

 

Russian forces are likely abandoning the east bank of the Dnipro fully as well, withdrawing from around Chernihiv to the north and from Brovary to the east. Russian troops will likely seek to hold a salient around Konotop and Sumy long enough to allow their forces to complete their retrograde from near Kyiv but will then likely withdraw back to Russia from almost all their positions west of Kharkiv.

 

Moscow is attempting to concentrate reserves and some units pulled from the fight around Sumy to reinforce its offensive operations in the east but is encountering serious challenges in that effort. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 3 that Russian soldiers are resisting and in some cases refusing orders to enter or re-enter the war effort. The General Staff asserted that the two battalion tactical groups (BTGs) that moved from South Ossetia toward Donbas less than a week ago refused to fight and that plans to move them back to South Ossetia are in train.[1] The General Staff claimed that about 25 soldiers of the Russian 31st Separate Airborne Brigade refused orders to re-enter combat citing excessive losses.[2] The General Staff also asserted that commanders at various echelons in the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division have refused to participate in combat operations.[3] We have no independent verification of these reports, but they are credible in light of the losses Russian forces have suffered and of independent reports of Russian soldiers killing commanders and commanders committing suicide from earlier in the conflict.

 

Russian efforts to advance its offensive operations in eastern Ukraine made limited progress in the past 24 hours. Fighting continues in Mariupol and on the Izyum-Severodonetsk axis.

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukraine has won the Battle of Kyiv, and Russian forces are completing their withdrawals from both the east and the west banks of the Dnipro in disorder.
• Russian forces retreating from around Kyiv will likely need considerable time before they can return to combat.
• Incidents of refusals of orders to engage in combat operations among Russian units continue and may lead to the redeployment of two BTGs that had arrived near Donbas within the last few days to their home stations in South Ossetia.
• The continued existence of an independent Ukrainian state with its capital in Kyiv is no longer in question at this time, although much fighting remains and the war could still turn Russia’s way.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CayceG]

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

The bloody Central Powers are at it again!

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

I mean it doesn't take the entire EU to ban Russian gas for individual nations to elect not to use it. If everyone but Hungary agrees to the ban, then those nations can just not use it.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

 

[Zaku3]

Is it really that hard to not commit war crimes?

[Air_Delivery]

5 minutes ago, Zaku3 said:

Is it really that hard to not commit war crimes?

War crimes are an integral part of Russian culture.

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

I do not envy what many will likely go through in Russian captivity.

[brucoe]

1 hour ago, Air_Delivery said:

War crimes are an integral part of Russian culture.

Most weapons have a "war crimes" versus "no war crimes" toggle on them. It's so easy to forget to switch to the right one after cleaning your weapon.

[PaladinSolo]

Assuming Ukraine moves forces, i don't see Russia making much headway without full mobilization.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

 

[CayceG]

27 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

 

 

So Aaron Mate and the Gray Zone crew were lying? NO WAY!

[brucoe]

2 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

 

So Aaron Mate and the Gray Zone crew were lying? NO WAY!

I don't think they really care if they get caught lying. They're playing from the Trump playbook all the way, in that they lie all the way through and could care less what anyone says in response. We've hit a new era in information these days where the truth is completely subjective and almost tied to what side you like better than the other.

[CayceG]

15 minutes ago, brucoe said:

I don't think they really care if they get caught lying. They're playing from the Trump playbook all the way, in that they lie all the way through and could care less what anyone says in response. We've hit a new era in information these days where the truth is completely subjective and almost tied to what side you like better than the other.

 

Absolutely. They don't care. They just want to jump back and forth between lies to destroy the truth. 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 04 April 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 4 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces continue to make little to no progress in frontal assaults to capture Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, their current main effort of the war. Russian units in Donbas face growing morale and supply issues. Additionally, the Ukrainian defenders

 

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Russian forces continue to make little to no progress in frontal assaults to capture Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, their current main effort of the war. Russian units in Donbas face growing morale and supply issues. Additionally, the Ukrainian defenders of Mariupol have outperformed ISW’s previous estimates and continue to hold the city. Russian efforts to generate replacements from reservists and feed damaged units from northeastern Ukraine into frontal assaults in eastern Ukraine are unlikely to increase their chances of success.

 

However, Russian forces advancing from the Kharkiv axis are setting conditions to resume offensive operations through the city of Slovyansk to link up with other Russian forces in Donbas and encircle Ukrainian defenders. Russian forces captured Izyum (southeast of Kharkiv) on April 1 and have conducted active preparations to resume offensive operations for the past three days—stockpiling supplies, refitting damaged units, repairing the damaged bridge in Izyum, and conducting reconnaissance in force missions toward the southeast. Russian forces will likely begin offensive operations towards Slovyansk, 50km southeast of Izyum, in the coming days.

 

Efforts by Russian forces advancing from Izyum to capture Slovyansk will likely prove to be the next pivotal battle of the war in Ukraine. Russian forces likely intend to cut off Ukrainian forces in eastern Ukraine and will need to take Slovyansk as their minimum step to do so. If Russian forces take Slovyansk, they will then have the option to advance directly east to link up with Russian forces fighting in Rubizhne—a shorter drive that will not isolate many Ukrainian forces—or advance toward Horlivka and Donetsk to attempt a wider encirclement of Ukrainian forces. Both options could enable at least limited Russian breakthroughs in Luhansk Oblast. If Russian forces are unable to take Slovyansk at all, Russian frontal assaults in Donbas are unlikely to independently breakthrough Ukrainian defenses and Russia’s campaign to capture the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts will likely fail.

 

Degraded Russian forces in northeastern Ukraine continued to withdraw to Russia and are unlikely to be effective elsewhere, despite ongoing Russian efforts to redeploy them to eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian forces are conducting operations to clear Russians left behind in the withdrawal, and Russian forces are unlikely to hold any cohesive defensive positions. The Ukrainian military reported that elements of Russian VDV (Airborne) units withdrawn from northern Kyiv flew to Belgorod, Russia, on April 4. These units are understrength, missing equipment, and likely highly demoralized. Russian servicemen from the Kyiv axis ordered to renter combat operations may desert or refuse orders, which has occurred in several Russian units throughout the war—including several units that had not yet entered combat.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces in Izyum are setting conditions to begin offensive operations southeast toward Slovyansk in the coming days to link up with other Russian forces in Donbas and encircle Ukrainian defenders.
• Russian forces in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts continue to make little to no progress and face mounting casualties and declining morale. Replacements and reinforcements from northeastern Ukraine are highly unlikely to meaningfully change the balance of forces.
• Efforts by Russian forces advancing from Izyum to capture Slovyansk and threaten Ukrainian forces in Donbas with encirclement will likely prove to be the next pivotal battle of the war in Ukraine. If Russian forces are unable to take Slovyansk, Russia’s campaign to capture the entirety of Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts will likely fail.
• The defenders of Mariupol have outperformed ISW’s previous estimates, and Russian forces are likely taking heavy casualties in ongoing efforts to capture the city.
• Ukrainian forces likely conducted successful counterattacks in Kherson Oblast in the last 24 hours.
• Russian forces have almost completely withdrawn from Chernihiv and Sumy oblasts and will likely completely vacate these regions in the coming days.
• Russian forces withdrawn from the Kyiv axis are highly unlikely to be effectively deployed elsewhere in Ukraine and are likely a spent force.

Russian forces already deployed to the Kremlin’s main effort in eastern Ukraine are highly demoralized and do not have a cohesive command structure. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 4 that Russian forces are attempting to create an operational group and expand control structures to “prepare for an offensive operation in eastern Ukraine” and are continuing to deploy additional forces to eastern Ukraine.[1] Russian officers will struggle to develop a new command structure from highly damaged units while simultaneously attempting to continue offensive operations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on April 4 that losses of the 33rd, 255th, and 294th Motor Rifle Regiments of the 20th Motor Rifle Division (part of the 8th Combined Arms Army and likely active in fighting in Donbas or Mariupol) amounted to up to 40% of equipment and personnel, and surviving servicemen are attempting to leave the military.[2] Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) separately reported that it acquired a document signed by Deputy Southern Military District commander Pyotr Gibert indicating that Russian officers are compensating their troops with the promise of additional leave days due to the inability to pay promised monthly salaries in cash.[3]

 

Russian efforts to generate reserves and replace officer casualties continue to face serious challenges. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that the Russian military is deploying students and educators at higher military educational institutions directly to Ukraine to replace mounting officer casualties.[4] The deployment of untrained officers—and more crucially educational staff—to the war in Ukraine will impede the Russian military’s ability to develop its next generation of officers for years to come. The General Staff additionally reported on April 4 that the Kremlin began “hidden mobilization” measures to send approximately 60,000 personnel to Ukraine.[5] The General Staff stated the Kremlin is prioritizing reservists of all ranks who already have combat experience, particularly in Krasnodar Krai, Perm Oblast, the Dagestan Republic, Ingushetia, and Kalmykia.

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Extensive analysis by General Hertling as to what the next Russian phase might look like:

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Jomini of the West's intelligence briefing for Days 38-40:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

I believe Ukraine should have control of it by now, though.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

About goddamned time.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Zelenskyy: If UN Security Council won't do anything about anything, then it's time to abolish it