Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (14 May 2024) - Russia launches new invasion from the north into Kharkiv, soon to launch second corridor into Sumy. Situation is dire

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Ukraine's military is overcoming Russia's dense minefields and its counteroffensive is poised to 'gain pace,' Zelenskyy says

WWW.BUSINESSINSIDER.COM

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Russian mines have slowed Ukraine's efforts and forced some soldiers to leave behind Western-supplied tanks and progress on foot.

 

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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Ukraine's military is overcoming Russia's dense minefields and that its counteroffensive was about to ramp up.

 

Speaking via video link, Zelenskyy told the Aspen Security Forum: "We are approaching a moment when relevant actions can gain pace because we are already going through some mines locations and we are demining these areas," the Financial Times reported.

 

Zelenskyy told CNN earlier this month that Ukraine had been "slowed down" by entrenched Russian defenses and that he wanted the counteroffensive to start "much earlier" but felt he had to wait for more Western weapons to arrive.

 

 

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Despite the mine threat, Zelenskyy insisted that Ukraine's counteroffensive was about to "gain pace." 

 

But it is not clear how much of Ukraine's forces have so far joined the counteroffensive efforts. Multiple Ukrainian officials recently said that the bulk of Ukraine's forces had not yet been dispatched to the frontline.

 

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan told the forum that the progress of the counteroffensive would only become clear when Ukraine properly committed all of its forces to the fight.

 

"It is at that moment when they make that commitment that we will really see what the results of the counteroffensive will be," he said, per the Financial Times.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

On 7/21/2023 at 5:57 PM, CitizenVectron said:

 

18 hours ago, Air_Delivery said:

The state of the US giving ATACMS

 

11 hours ago, b_m_b_m_b_m said:

This is an infuriating gif

 

And the gif will still remain infuriatingly relevant:

 

U.S. in no hurry to provide Ukraine with long range missiles - The Washington Post

WWW.WASHINGTONPOST.COM

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The Biden administration is refusing to send long-range missiles to Ukraine despite mounting pressure from U.S. lawmakers and pleas from the government in Kyiv.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 21 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 22, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast area)

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1:00pm ET on July 22. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 23 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast area) and Melitopol directions (western Zaporizhia Oblast).[1] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled 14 Ukrainian attacks south of Kreminna, Luhansk Oblast, and in the Bakhmut area.[2] The Ukrainian General Staff did not publish a situation report about its counteroffensive operations on July 22.

 

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo and that the delay in counteroffensive operations was in part due to limited materiel. Zelensky stated at the Aspen Security Forum on July 21 that Ukrainian forces had plans to launch counteroffensive operations in the spring but that a lack of munitions and military equipment, such as mine-clearing equipment and continued Ukrainian training abroad, necessitated a delay.[3] Zelensky noted that the delay in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations allowed Russian forces to establish minefields and multiple defensive lines.[4] ISW assessed in January 2023 that the provision of Western weapons and materiel to Ukraine has been essential to Ukraine’s previous ability to conduct successful counteroffensive operations and that delays between Western pledges to send higher-end Western systems to Ukraine and the arrival of those systems likely hinder Ukraine’s ability to initiate and sustain large-scale counteroffensive operations.[5] Zelensky stated that counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo due to ongoing mine-clearing operations.[6] US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on July 21 at the Aspen Security Forum that it is too early to draw conclusions about Ukrainian counteroffensive operations and that Ukraine will likely “make a profound difference” on the battlefield as Kyiv commits all of the forces that Ukraine prepared for the counteroffensive.[7]

 

Ukrainian officials stated on July 22 that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in rear areas is successfully degrading Russian logistics and counterbattery capabilities, likely contributing to an asymmetrical attrition gradient in Ukraine’s favor. Ukrainian Chief of the Main Directorate of Missile Troops and Artillery and Unmanned Systems of the General Staff Colonel Serhiy Baranov stated on July 22 that Ukrainian missile and artillery units are responsible for approximately 90 percent of Russian losses.[8] Baranov stated that Ukrainian missile and artillery units have created a long-range “fire fist” thanks to Western high-precision missiles and artillery systems and that Ukrainian strikes are so powerful and accurate that Russian forces can no longer conduct effective counterbattery fire.[9] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated on July 22 that Ukrainian attacks on Russian ammunition concentrations in deep rear areas are causing logistical issues for the Russian military.[10] Humenyuk noted that this trend is reflected in decreased Russian shelling in Kherson Oblast, which indicates that Russian forces are experiencing “shell hunger” in the area.[11] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Commander Brigadier General Oleksandr Tarnavskyi compared Ukraine’s counteroffensive to boxing on July 13 and stated that Ukraine intends to “hold the opponent at arm’s length” in order to avoid close combat because Ukraine can effectively defeat Russian forces from a long distance, likely referencing Ukraine’s continued interdiction campaign in eastern and southern Ukraine.[12] Baranov’s, Humenyuk’s, and Tarnavskyi’s statements suggest that the Ukrainian military is successfully carrying out this interdiction campaign. This campaign is a central aspect of Ukraine’s plan to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.[13]

 

Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot and ammunition depot in Crimea as part of this Ukrainian pressure campaign. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported on July 22 that Ukrainian forces destroyed an oil depot and ammunition depot near Oktyabrske, Krasnohvardiiske Raion, Crimea.[14] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also struck an airfield near Oktyabrske where Russian forces have reportedly been stockpiling equipment for a month.[15] Crimea occupation head Sergey Aksyonov confirmed that Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot, causing it to explode and prompting occupation officials to evacuate residents within a five-kilometer radius of the depot.[16] Aksyonov also stated that Russian authorities suspended rail traffic on the Kerch Strait bridge to minimize risk.[17] A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces launched two Storm Shadow cruise missiles, while other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces used an unspecified number of drones for the strike.[18] ISW cannot confirm what kind of weapons Ukrainian forces used in this strike. A prominent Russian milblogger tied today’s strike to Ukraine’s previous strikes on Russian military warehouses in Crimea and the Chonhar and Kerch Strait bridges.[19] The milblogger claimed that Ukrainian strikes are aimed at disrupting Russian logistics and creating “shell hunger” in Russia’s forces fighting in southern Ukraine.[20]

 

Russian strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine may be subsiding or entering a temporary lull. The intensity of Russian drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine has steadily decreased since July 19. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched only five Shahed drones from the southeast direction – all of which Ukrainian air defense reportedly intercepted – on July 22.[21] In comparison, Russian forces launched 19 Shahed drones, four Iskander missiles, and three Kalibr missiles against Ukraine on July 21.[22] Russian forces launched seven Onyx cruise missiles, four Kh-22 anti-ship missiles, three Kalibr sea-based cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles, and 19 Iranian-made Shahed drones on July 20.[23] Russian forces fired even more ordnance at Ukraine on July 18 and 19, respectively.[24]

 

Further details about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest for extremism continue to suggest a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions and a notable factionalism within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served. ISW has consistently assessed that Girkin likely had the backing of an unknown silovik, possibly within the FSB since Girkin was a former FSB officer and consistently used passports under fictitious names that he received from the FSB.[25] Russian sources, including the Angry Patriots Club, amplified a document from Girkin’s lawyer, Alexander Molokhov, on July 22 purporting to show that FSB investigators initiated the criminal case against Girkin on July 18 and that the Moscow Department of the FSB’s Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order and Combating Terrorism (SZKSBT) provided the materials for the case.[26] Girkin previously suggested that the head of the SZKSBT’s Department for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (UZKS), Lieutenant General Aleksey Zhalo, censored Girkin’s July 9 speaking engagement at a bookstore in St. Petersburg.[27] Zhalo and Girkin have had a longstanding feud after Girkin publicly criticized Zhalo for the arrest of ultranationalist figures in 2018 and for failing to combat the Ukrainian Azov Regiment’s recruitment measures.[28]

 

The involvement of the SZKSBT in Girkin’s case may be indicative of this personal struggle, although it may also suggest a degree of factionalism within the FSB itself. The alleged document also states that the FSB’s Center for Criminalistics (TsST) formally assessed on July 17 that Girkin’s May 25, 2022 Telegram posts, likely referencing comments he made criticizing a lack of payments to Russian personnel, constituted a crime.[29] The TsST and SZKSBT may have approved the initiation of Girkin’s criminal case because FSB leadership decided to stop protecting Girkin as he increasingly became more adversarial towards the Kremlin. It is also possible that the two FSB entities acted on longstanding desires to arrest Girkin after a potential shift in the balance of power in the Kremlin to the FSB’s detriment. FSB Director Alexander Bortnikov reportedly secured security guarantees for Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin in negotiations to end Wagner’s June 24 rebellion and may have lost what appeared to be the Kremlin’s increasing backing for the FSB.[30] Girkin himself recently claimed that Prigozhin’s rebellion shifted the balance of power within the Kremlin to favor factions hostile to the FSB and other Russian security organs.[31] Russian authorities’ recent initiation of criminal cases against other prominent Telegram administrators and ultranationalist figures with connections to the FSB and Russian security services suggests that select Russian officials may be trying to undermine the reputation of these security structures in the wake of a potential shift in the influence of Kremlin factions.[32]

 

Girkin’s affiliates have launched a public effort to cast Girkin as an embattled figure in opposition to the Russian leadership. Angry Patriots Club members gathered at the Moscow Meshansky Court on July 21 and denounced the court’s charges against Girkin and its decision to remand Girkin at an unspecified pre-trial detention center until September 18.[33] Angry Patriots Club Chairman Pavel Gubarev stated in front of the court that the group would fight for Girkin’s release by any legal means and accused Russian leadership of using all of its resources to knock Girkin out of his “public work.”[34] Angry Patriots member and the coordinator for the Other Russia Party, Eduard Limonov, announced in front of the court that the Angry Patriots Club will launch a public campaign defending Girkin as a “political prisoner.”[35] Russian authorities detained Gubarev, Limonov, and Angry Patriots member Yan Sidorov for their demonstrations in front of the court, but later released them.[36] Girkin’s Telegram channel posted on July 22 a screed against Russian authorities for punishing Girkin, a “patriot... who gave his whole life to the service of the motherland,” while allowing those that took part in Wagner’s rebellion to escape punishment.[37] Girkin’s Telegram signed the post as “the Russian Movement in Support of Igor Strelkov” indicating that Girkin’s affiliates intend to galvanize widespread public support for Girkin.[38] It is unclear if Girkin’s affiliates, specifically those in the Angry Patriots Club, will succeed in this effort given that they represent a small, insular group within the wider Russian ultranationalist community.

 

Girkin’s arrest has not generated widespread outrage in the Russian ultranationalist community as some previous cases have, suggesting an increasing fragmentation within the information space. Russian milbloggers notably did not express anger at Girkin’s arrest as they have in previous instances when Russian authorities have attempted to censor ultranationalist figures. Russian milbloggers recently decried Russian authorities charging pro-war Russian military doctor Yuri Yevich with discrediting the Russian military for offering a negative assessment of the state of Russian combat medicine.[39] The milbloggers defended Yevich and criticized Russian authorities for targeting someone they deemed to be a Russian patriot. Outrage at Girkin’s arrest and the subsequent defense of his patriotism was limited to members and supporters of the relatively isolated and small Angry Patriots Club, which Girkin launched in April, by contrast.[40] Girkin’s critics in the Russian ultranationalist information space notably did not celebrate his arrest, however. The lack of widespread outrage among milbloggers suggests that Girkin’s arrest is unlikely to deeply agitate the majority of the Russian ultranationalist community and Russian military personnel, contrary to some Western reporting. The tepid response from Russian milbloggers concerning Girkin’s arrest and Wagner-affiliated milbloggers’ continued support for Prigozhin after the Wagner rebellion likely indicates an increasing fragmentation within the Russian ultranationalist community along factional affiliations and significant ideological differences about Russia’s approach to the war in Ukraine.[41]

 

Girkin’s arrest is likely not an indicator of a wider effort to censor the Russian ultranationalist community, but rather an attempt to excise a specific segment of the community that is vocally hostile to the Kremlin. Russian insider sources claimed on July 22 that Russian Duma Deputy Oleg Matveychev recently submitted a report to the Russian Presidential Administration proposing to recognize Girkin as a foreign agent in support of an overall effort to encourage self-censorship among jingoistic patriots that criticize the Russian leadership.[42] ISW cannot verify these claims, although they suggest that the Kremlin may have been in active discussions about how it could silence the section of the ultranationalist community that Girkin represents. Putin has routinely sought to maintain relationships with select milbloggers in a bid to leverage their connections to the wider Russian ultranationalist community, and Girkin’s arrest does not likely portend a Kremlin effort to reverse course on courting the increasingly prominent ultranationalist milblogger community.[43] Girkin’s arrest does suggest that the Kremlin views those whose criticism passes certain not entirely clear boundaries as a threat, particularly following the Wagner Group rebellion that aimed to replace Russia’s military leadership.

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 22.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations may soon increase in tempo and that the delay in counteroffensive operations was in part due to limited materiel.
• Ukrainian officials stated on July 22 that Ukraine’s interdiction campaign against Russian military targets in rear areas is successfully degrading Russian logistics and counterbattery capabilities, likely contributing to an asymmetrical attrition gradient in Ukraine’s favor.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian oil depot and ammunition depot in Crimea as part of this Ukrainian pressure campaign.
• Russian strikes against Ukrainian shipping and agricultural infrastructure in southern Ukraine may be subsiding or entering a temporary lull.
• Further details about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest for extremism continue to suggest a shifting balance of power among Kremlin factions and a notable factionalism within the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), in which Girkin had served.
• Girkin’s affiliates have launched a public effort to cast Girkin as an embattled figure in opposition to Russian leadership.
• Girkin’s arrest has not generated widespread outrage in the Russian ultranationalist community as some previous cases have, suggesting an increasing fragmentation within the information space.
• Girkin’s arrest is likely not an indicator of a wider effort to censor the Russian ultranationalist community, but rather an attempt to excise a specific segment of the community that is vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area but did not make gains.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kupyansk and Bakhmut areas and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances in the Kupyansk area.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make advances.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not make any confirmed or claimed advances.
• Prominent Russian Federation Council members opposed a bill aimed at increasing the upper age limit for the conscription age while maintaining the lower limit of 18.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to relocate Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia.
• The Wagner Group’s footprint in Belarus is likely expanding.

 

[CitizenVectron]

According to internal Russian complaining on telegram, Ukraine's targeting of artillery positions and the logistics hubs that supply them has been working, and Ukraine now enjoys a large counter-battery advantage across the south. However, Russia has also been amassing a large collection of forces in the east, and has been trying to make advances there (limited, so far). 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 23 July 2023:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 23, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St.

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 23. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 24 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Russia. Putin made several significant symbolic gestures during his July 23 meeting with Lukashenko, suggesting that Putin sought to project power and confidence in his own supremacy over the Prigozhin-aligned St. Petersburg-based faction. Putin took Lukashenko to visit Kronstadt in St. Petersburg – the historically significant island fortress where Russian soldiers and sailors conducted a famous unsuccessful anti-Bolshevik insurrection in early 1921 that the Soviet government ultimately suppressed.[1] Putin and Lukashenko toured Kronstadt with St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s younger daughter Ksenia Shoigu.[2] Both Beglov and Shoigu are personal enemies of Prigozhin, and Putin‘s public meeting with Beglov, Shoigu‘s daughter, and Lukashenko on the historic grounds of the failed Kronstadt rebellion was almost certainly intended to signal Putin’s and his loyalist cadre‘s defeat of Prigozhin‘s armed rebellion and Prigozhin’s St. Petersburg-based supporters.[3] Putin also made an unusual effort to take photographs with crowds of local Russian citizens, including children, while at Kronstadt, likely to present himself as a popular and beloved leader among the Russian people.[4] These symbolic gestures indicate that Putin is concerned about his perceived popularity, the security of his regime, and the array of factions competing for power within the high echelons of Russian governance.

 

Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power.[5] Lukashenko’s statements were likely meant to make Putin reflect on the uncomfortable (for Putin) fact that Wagner’s new garrison in Belarus puts its forces half as far from Moscow as Wagner’s previous base in southern Russia. The Wagner Group’s previous base in Krasnodar Krai was about 1,370 km from Moscow, whereas its new base in Belarus is about 720 km along an excellent military highway.

 

Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West. The leaders amplified their false claims that Ukraine’s counteroffensive has failed.[6] Senior Western and Ukrainian leaders--and ISW--continue to assess that it is too early to evaluate Ukraine’s counteroffensive since Ukraine still has significant uncommitted prepared forces and retains the ability to launch decisive operations at times and places of its choosing.[7] Lukashenko and Putin also reiterated an information operation that the Wagner Group poses a threat to Poland.[8] There is no indication that Wagner fighters in Belarus have the heavy weaponry necessary to mount a serious offensive against Ukraine or Poland without significant rearmament, as it was a condition of the Putin-Lukashenko-Prigozhin deal ending the armed rebellion that Wagner surrender such weapons to the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD). Maxar imagery of the main Wagner base in Tsel, Asipovichy, collected at an oblique angle on July 23 indicates that the vehicles currently parked in and around the vehicle storage area are primarily hundreds of cars, small trucks, and approximately 35 semi-trailers.[9] Wagner forces in Belarus pose no military threat to Poland or Ukraine, for that matter, until and unless they are re-equipped with mechanized equipment. They pose no meaningful threat to NATO even then.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.[10] This figure is largely consistent with ISW’s current assessment of control of terrain. Analysts can employ several methods to calculate control of terrain with varying results depending on the cartographical projection used and other factors. An estimate using ISW’s control of terrain data and the Mercator projection indicates that Ukrainian forces liberated about 53 percent of the land that Russian forces captured since February 2022. Estimates made using different data sources, measurement methods, or projections will generate different numbers. Factors, such as higher confidence about unconfirmed Russian claimed territorial gains, can impact such estimations as well. ISW appreciates and closely studies government officials’ statements about control of terrain geometry to cross-reference, confirm, and where necessary correct assessments.

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23. Geolocated footage published on July 22 shows that Ukrainian forces made some advances in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and some Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces also advanced near Pryyutne (14km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[11] Geolocated footage published on July 22 also shows that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances in western Zaporizhia Oblast near Kamianske, and Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted additional ground attacks south of Orikhiv near Robotyne (12km south).[12] The Ukrainian General Staff reported continued Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in both areas of the front.[13] Some Russian and Ukrainian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacking on Bakhmut’s northern and southern flanks and reportedly made advances near Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut).[14]

 

Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 19 missiles, including five Onyx, five Iskander-K, four Kalibr, two Kh-22, and two Iskander-M missiles, and that Ukrainian forces shot down four Kalibr and five Iskander-K missiles.[15] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian strikes hit the Odesa Transfiguration Cathedral, and Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that the city center strikes injured 19 civilians.[16] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated that Russian strikes against Odesa City and Oblast intend to disrupt Ukraine’s access to the Black Sea and intimidate international partners working to restore the Black Sea Grain Initiative deal.[17] Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Spokesperson Vadym Skibitskyi warned that Russian forces are also evaluating Ukrainian energy infrastructure to identify critical infrastructure objects, presumably to target in future strikes.[18]

 

Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin. Angry Patriots Club member and leader of the “Civil Solidarity” movement Georgy Fedorov claimed on July 22 that the Club developed a strategy and specific action plan for a campaign to defend Girkin and will be reaching out to grassroots supporters for help.[19] Fedorov also announced that the Angry Patriots Club will release a political statement sometime next week.[20]   A Russian insider source claimed that Girkin planned to start formal legal procedures to create a political party in the spring of 2024.[21] The insider source claimed that Girkin had discussed with Angry Patriots members the possibility of holding a founding party congress in fall 2023 and plans to form regional branches for the Angry Patriots Club.[22] The Angry Patriots Club has opened a St Petersburg regional chapter and published a 17-point political resolution on June 26 that signaled its interest in participating in Russian politics.[23] The Angry Patriots Club’s political resolution explicitly states that it will use legal means to compel Russian leadership to ”end the policy of appeasement and behind-the-scenes agreement with the West” and declares its ”intention to claim political power.”[24] The Angry Patriots Club’s resolution indicates that this section of the pro-war community may have attempted to set conditions for future political actions opposing figures in the Kremlin whom the Angry Patriots Club believes seek to end the war. Girkin previously claimed that there is a faction within the Kremlin arguing in favor of freezing the front line in Ukraine and negotiating with the West, and the Angry Patriots appeared to be preparing to explicitly challenge this faction through a political project.[25] Factions within the Kremlin are likely aiming to maneuver for more influence against the backdrop of Russia’s 2024 presidential elections, and Girkin’s alleged plans to explicitly cast himself and his affiliates as political actors ahead of the elections likely threatened some of these factions.

 

Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure. Angry Patriots Club member Yevgeny Mikhailov continued to criticize the Kremlin, calling Girkin’s arrest a ”gross mistake” and highlighting the double standards that Russian authorities use for prominent Russian officials who have criticized Russian forces’ conduct in the war in Ukraine.[26] Mikhailov noted the hypocrisy of arresting a ”Russian patriot” who he claimed ”led the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics to victory in 2014” while allowing Russian State Duma Deputy Sergei Morozov to go unpunished for saying that officers who sent mobilized personnel into combat without preparation “should be shot themselves.”[27] Another Angry Patriots member, Vladimir Grubnik, expressed his loyalty to Girkin claiming that he joined at Girkin’s invitation and would leave the organization if Girkin chose to leave.[28] Grubnik claimed that 95 percent of the people joined the Angry Patriots Club because of Girkin’s personality and reputation.[29] The continued support for Girkin despite his arrest suggests that Girkin established a strong personal loyalty among his affiliates reminiscent of other ultranationalist figures, particularly Prigozhin’s support among Wagner personnel and affiliated milbloggers.[30]

 

The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin. Russian news outlet Kommersant reported on July 21 that Russian law enforcement is investigating Angry Patriots Club Chair Pavel Gubarev for extremism because of his Telegram posts.[31] Milbloggers outside of Girkin’s relatively isolated Angry Patriots Club have notably not commented on Girkin’s arrest, suggesting a fragmentation in the Russian ultranationalist community along factional affiliations and ideological differences on Russia’s approach to the war in Ukraine. Continued Russian law enforcement censorship of Angry Patriots members likely indicates that the Kremlin does not intend to censor the wider ultranationalist community at this time and is likely isolating this round of censorship primarily to the Angry Patriots movement and their affiliates.

 

The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22. Russian law enforcement found “IKS Holding” Head Anton Cherepennikov dead in his office on July 22 and later claimed that Cherepennikov suffocated during a xenon gas therapy session.[32] IKS Holding owns the developer of the YADRO data storage system, which Russian authorities reportedly use in efforts to monitor Russian internet users, and the Citadel Group, which produces operational-search measures that Russian special services use to listen to phone calls and monitor internet activities.[33]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed his continuing concern over the potential threats that the Wagner Group and Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose to him through symbolism and posturing during a meeting with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in St. Petersburg, Russia.
• Lukashenko told Putin that the Wagner Group in Belarus will remain in central Belarus likely subtly reminding Putin of the threat the Wagner military organization still poses to him and underlining Lukashenko’s control over that power.
• Putin and Lukashenko also amplified information operations targeting the West.
• US Secretary of State Antony Blinken told CNN on July 23 that Ukrainian forces have liberated approximately 50 percent of the territory that Russian forces captured since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front line and advanced on July 23.
• Russian forces conducted another series of missile strikes against port infrastructure and the city center in Odesa City overnight on July 22 to 23, severely damaging civilian areas.
• Further speculation about former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin’s arrest and the public posturing of Girkin’s affiliates suggests that a limited section of the pro-war community may have been contemplating political action in opposition to the Kremlin.
• Angry Patriots members likely view Girkin’s arrest as an existential threat to the segment of the ultranationalist community he represents and will likely intensify their campaign to cast Girkin as an opposition figure.
• The Kremlin may be attempting to censor an isolated segment of the Russian ultranationalist community that is consistently vocally hostile to the Kremlin.
• The head of one of the largest suppliers of surveillance equipment to Russian special services died on July 22.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and reportedly made tactically significant gains.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and in the Bakhmut area, and reportedly made gains near Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka-Donetsk City areas but did not advance.
• Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia oblasts border area.
• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to recruit prisoners to fight in Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities are bringing foreign citizens to occupied Ukraine to artificially alter demographics.

 

[Remarkableriots]

Instagram Model Moved To Ukraine To Become An 'Emotional Support Stripper' – OutKick

WWW.OUTKICK.COM

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Instagram model Fan-Pei Koung moved to Ukraine earlier this year to volunteer as an "emotional support stripper" for the soldiers.

 

[CayceG]

39 minutes ago, Remarkableriots said:

Instagram Model Moved To Ukraine To Become An 'Emotional Support Stripper' – OutKick

WWW.OUTKICK.COM

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Instagram model Fan-Pei Koung moved to Ukraine earlier this year to volunteer as an "emotional support stripper" for the soldiers.

 

 

Fuck Clay Travis and his garbage website built for and by mouth breathing chuds. 

[Jason]

14 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

Fuck Clay Travis and his garbage website built for and by mouth breathing chuds. 

 

therock's social media feeds must be really and truly cursed 

[GeneticBlueprint]

27 minutes ago, Jason said:

 

therock's social media feeds must be really and truly cursed 

 

Probably but he posts some funny stuff in the humor thread pretty often.

[CitizenVectron]

This war has highlighted the incredible lack of preparedness of most western militaries for actual war. The US is the best-prepared, but obviously still has issues with ammunition stockpiles, etc. 

 

For example, Germany has revealed that it's current inventory of 155mm HE shells is only 20,000. That sounds like a lot...but would only last Ukraine about 2-10 days in the current war:

 

Boris Pistorius macht Munitionsproduktion zur Chefsache

T.CO

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In der Ukraine wird die Artilleriemunition knapp, im Westen sind die Bestände weitgehend leer. Verteidigungsminister Pistorius will nach SPIEGEL-Informationen nun 20 Milliarden Euro für die Produktion bereitstellen.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 24 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 24, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) suppressed two Ukrainian UAVs that

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on July 24. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 25 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) suppressed two Ukrainian UAVs that detonated, damaging two non-residential buildings.[1] One drone detonated on Komsomolsky Prospekt within 500 meters of the MoD building and within 200 meters of a reported secret Russian General Staff Main Directorate (GRU) building.[2] Russian sources reported that the second drone hit a business center on Likhachev Prospekt.[3] CNN reported that an unspecified Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed that Ukrainian forces conducted the attack.[4] Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that unspecified UAVs attacked the capital and warned that more UAV attacks against Russia will occur.[5] Russian opposition source The Insider reported that Russian authorities banned Russian television channels from covering the drone strikes, citing sources in Russian state media channels.[6] Russian milbloggers had a muted reaction to these strikes; some criticized the Russian air defenses for allowing the drones to penetrate that far into Moscow, while others argued that the informational victory of such attacks is minimal and short-lived.[7]

 

Likely Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, temporarily disrupting Russian logistics through Crimea on July 24. The Russian MFA accused Ukrainian forces of attacking occupied Crimea with 17 UAVs, and the MFA claimed that Russian EW suppressed 14 UAVs while air defenses shot down three UAVs.[8] Crimean occupation head Sergey Aksyonov claimed that one UAV hit an ammunition depot in Dzhankoy Raion.[9] A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces also launched three Storm Shadow missiles at an ammunition depot in Vilne (19km southwest of Dzhankoy) and a repair base in Novostepne (immediately south of Dzhankoy).[10] Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andyushchenko reported that strikes injured three Russian personnel at the Vesele military airfield (10km southwest of Dzhankoy) and reported additional explosions near Krasnohvardiiske (20km southwest of Dzhankoy).[11] Aksyonov temporarily suspended road traffic on the Dzhankoy-Simferopol highway as well as rail traffic through Dzhankoy Raion.[12] Aksyonov also announced the evacuation of all civilians within a five-kilometer radius of the strike area in Dzhankoy Raion.[13] Crimean occupation advisor Oleg Kryuchkov stated that occupation authorities will strictly monitor social media posts that could help Ukrainian forces identify targets in Crimea.[14]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an article published on July 24 likely intended to mitigate damage to Russia’s position in Africa and his own reputation resulting from Russia’s withdrawal from the Ukraine-Russia grain deal, Russian attacks on Ukrainian grain and port facilities, and Putin’s inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit due to the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued for him. Putin outlined Russia’s goals for establishing partner relationships with Africa and called for the continuation of “traditionally close cooperation on the world stage.”[15] Putin also emphasized Russia’s trade with African economic partners and the importance of “uninterrupted food supply” for the “maintenance of the political stability of African states,” accusing the collective West of exploiting the grain deal for its own benefit at the expense of Russia and countries such as Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia.[16] Putin’s article follows Russia’s withdrawal from the grain deal and attacks that have destroyed tens of thousands of tons of Ukrainian grain and Ukrainian facilities essential to transporting the grain to areas of Africa that rely heavily on Ukrainian grain. Putin is also likely attempting to mitigate the opportunity cost and embarrassment of his inability to personally attend the BRICS Summit in South Africa due to the ICC arrest warrant.[17]

Russia conducted another drone strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast overnight on July 23-24. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched Iranian-made Shahed drones at port infrastructure in Reni, along the Danube River in far western Odesa Oblast, within a few kilometers of the Romanian border.[18] Odesa Oblast Head Oleh Kiper also stated that the drone strikes damaged 25 architectural monuments in Odesa Oblast, including the Transfiguration Orthodox Cathedral in Odesa City.[19] Russian sources claimed that Ukraine used the port infrastructure in Reni for the export of weapons, equipment, and grain.[20]

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 24 and have reportedly advanced in certain areas. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that over the past week, Ukrainian forces have advanced gradually on the southern flank of Bakhmut and in the Berdyansk (western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area) and Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) directions.[21] Malyar also noted that these counteroffensive actions are taking place against the backdrop of continued Russian offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Avdiivka, and Marinka directions.[22] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast south of Velyka Novosilka and advanced south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff indicated that Ukrainian troops are continuing offensive actions in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions but did not specify locations or outcomes.[24]

 

The Kremlin continues to codify domestic repression into Russian law, generating minimal opposition from select Russian lawmakers. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed laws on July 24 allowing the Russian Ministry of Justice to conduct unscheduled inspections of those classified as “foreign agents” under new Russian laws and requiring Russian citizens, government officials, and organizations to comply with restrictions on foreign agents.[25] Putin also signed a law that would fine citizens up to 50,000 rubles (about $550), officials up to 100,000 rubles (about $1,100), and organizations up to 300,000 (about $3,300) rubles for violating the law on foreign agents.[26] Russian opposition news outlet Vazhnye Istorii reported on July 24 that the Russian Federation Council proposed a bill that would allow Russian authorities to deprive natural born Russian citizens of citizenship due to certain “political crimes” and “desertion.”[27] Vashnye Istorii also noted, however, three senators Olga Bas (representing the Luhansk People’s Republic), Ekaterina Altabayeva, and Sergei Kolbin (both representing Sevastopol in occupied Crimea) withdrew their authorship of the bill, potentially due to nuances and intricacies within the ever-expanding new body of Russian law pertaining to citizenship in occupied areas.[28] Federation Council Constitutional Legislation and State Building Committee Head Andrey Klishas criticized the bill and claimed that it would violate the Russian Constitution, likely referencing Article 6 which states that a Russian citizen may not be deprived of their citizenship or of the right to change citizenship status.[29] Vazhnye Istorii reported that Russia has already adopted a law that would allow Russian authorities to revoke Russian citizenship from an individual who did not acquire Russian citizenship by birth for posing what the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) deems a “security threat.”[30] ISW has previously reported on measures taken by Russian authorities to intensify domestic repression and encourage self-censorship through various amendments to and manipulations of domestic law.[31]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24.
• Likely Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, temporarily disrupting Russian logistics through Crimea on July 24.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an article published on July 24 likely intended to mitigate damage to Russia’s position in Africa and his own reputation resulting from Russia’s withdrawal from the Ukraine-Russia grain deal, Russian attacks on Ukrainian grain and port facilities, and Putin’s inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit due to the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued for him.
• Russia conducted another drone strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast overnight on July 23-24.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 24 and have reportedly advanced in certain areas.
• The Kremlin continues to codify domestic repression into Russian law, generating minimal opposition from select Russian lawmakers.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made marginal gains south of Kreminna.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and in the Bakhmut area and reportedly advanced in the Bakhmut area.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and did not make any confirmed or claimed gains.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in the Orikhiv area.
• Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed successes of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
• Ukrainian officials continue to reveal the involvement of Belarusian entities in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Man, this guy must REALLY hate the Russians!
 

Marine veteran Trevor Reed, released by Russia in prisoner swap, hurt while fighting in Ukraine

WWW.NBCNEWS.COM

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Reed had been wrongfully detained in Russia for three years before his release in April 2022.

 

Quote

 

Marine veteran Trevor Reed, who was wrongfully detained in Russia for three years before being released as part of a prisoner exchange last year, has been injured while fighting in Ukraine, the State Department confirmed Tuesday.

 

"We are aware that Trevor Reed was injured while participating in fighting in Ukraine," deputy spokesperson Vedant Patel said at a news conference. "Mr. Reed has been transported to Germany, and he is receiving medical care."

 

Patel did not say how Reed was injured or give his condition. Reed was transferred to Germany by a nongovernmental organization, but Patel did not name that organization or say whether he was being treated at a military or civilian hospital.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

The UK believes Russia may begin attacking civilian cargo vessels going to/from Ukraine.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

On 7/24/2023 at 3:37 PM, CitizenVectron said:

This war has highlighted the incredible lack of preparedness of most western militaries for actual war. The US is the best-prepared, but obviously still has issues with ammunition stockpiles, etc. 

 

For example, Germany has revealed that it's current inventory of 155mm HE shells is only 20,000. That sounds like a lot...but would only last Ukraine about 2-10 days in the current war:

 

Boris Pistorius macht Munitionsproduktion zur Chefsache

T.CO

---

In der Ukraine wird die Artilleriemunition knapp, im Westen sind die Bestände weitgehend leer. Verteidigungsminister Pistorius will nach SPIEGEL-Informationen nun 20 Milliarden Euro für die Produktion bereitstellen.

 

 

I chuckled when this video appeared in my YouTube subscription feed today.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 25 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 25, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. P

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 25. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 26 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. Petersburg. BBC’s Russian Service reported on July 25 that Putin told Lukashenko at the beginning of their July 23 meeting that Putin was ready to adjust his schedule to prolong Lukashenko’s visit and “discuss important topics in more detail.”[1] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov reported on July 25 that Putin and Lukashenko intended to “’synchronize watches’ and exchange views” but not sign any agreements during their prolonged meeting.[2] Peskov also reported that Putin and Lukashenko discussed the Wagner Group, the Union State, and external threats on the borders of Russia and Belarus.[3] Putin’s decision to prolong his meeting with Lukashenko likely shows Putin’s continued concerns about Wagner, which it appears that Lukashenko did not allay.

 

Lukashenko likely seeks to leverage his power over the Wagner Group to gain concessions from Putin. A Russian insider source claimed that the Wagner Group was the most important topic during the Putin-Lukashenko meeting, and that Lukashenko sought more economic assistance to Belarus through Union State programs.[4] The insider source also claimed that Putin wanted Belarus to be more involved in the war in Ukraine and rejected Lukashenko’s compromise offer to have Belarusian forces conduct a show of force on Belarus’ border with Ukraine.[5]  Lukashenko was likely trying to leverage Putin’s concern over the Wagner Group throughout the entire visit to Russia to gain favorable conditions in Belarusian-Russian relations while deflecting Putin’s demands for closer integration into the Union State and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine.

 

Russian leadership is attempting to mitigate the security vacuum left by the Wagner Group’s departure by creating formalized but decentralized military “enterprises” on the basis of federal subjects (regions). The Russian State Duma adopted the second and third readings of amendments to the federal law regulating the circulation of weapons in constituent entities of the Russian Federation on July 25 that will allow heads of Russian federal subjects to create specialized state unitary enterprises.[6] Russian opposition media noted that certain intricacies in the amendments allow regional heads to create regionally based militarized state enterprises that are analogous to private military companies (PMCs) during a period of mobilization under martial law.[7] The amendments notably require regional and local budgets to finance the special enterprises, which will be equipped with small arms by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and will assist the Russian State Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and other military authorities in ensuring public order and border security.[8] The amendments would allow Russian President Vladimir Putin to create the enterprises on a temporary basis and later abolish them, after which these enterprises would have to transfer all small arms and other weapons back to the Russian MoD within a month.[9]

 

The Kremlin is likely trying to balance two competing security requirements—the need for combat capable formations that can fulfill roles left by the Wagner Group following their armed rebellion and relocation to Belarus and the desire not to recreate the systemic threats to the Russian state that Wagner’s independence posed. The creation of formal militarized state enterprises that will fulfill border security and domestic law enforcement tasks is likely intended in part to remedy the gap left by Wagner. However, the fact that these enterprises are so heavily decentralized and will operate under the auspices of internal security organs on the basis and expense of regional and local governments suggests that the Russian military leadership is very alive to the risk of recreating a powerful Wagner analogue and is therefore trying to limit the scale and power each individual enterprise can obtain. These state enterprises also appear to be a renewed iteration of the failed volunteer battalion model that Russian regions employed throughout the summer of 2022, but these enterprises will operate under formalized and consolidated domestic security organs such as the FSB, likely to mitigate many of the weaknesses in the old volunteer battalion system.

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced on July 25.[10] Geolocated footage published on July 25 shows that Ukrainian forces have made tactically significant gains south of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Bakhmut, Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast), and Berdyansk (Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area) directions.[12] Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to 750 meters in the direction of Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and Russian sources claimed Ukrainian forces made marginal advances west of Orikhiv.[13] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Russian forces are dying at a rate eight times higher than Ukrainian forces in the Bakhmut area and 5.3 times higher in the Berdyansk and Melitopol directions.[14] ISW has previously assessed that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations aim to create an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment.[15]

 

Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes on rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 24-25. Ukrainian Air Force Spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat reported on July 25 that Ukrainian forces recorded the launch of about 10 Shahed drones, five of which Ukrainian forces destroyed.[16] Ukrainian military sources reported drones over Kyiv City and Cherkasy, Sumy, Poltava, and Zhytomyr oblasts.[17] The Kyiv City Military Administration noted that this was the sixth drone strike on the capital city in July alone.[18] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources claimed that the strikes targeted Ukrainian concentration areas, Western-provided military equipment and other military infrastructure, but Ukrainian sources noted that many of the drones struck open fields and empty hangars.[19]

 

The Angry Patriots Club continues efforts to cast former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) as an opposition figure and may be attempting to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin through rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest. The Angry Patriots Club, known in the Russian information space for its virulent pro-war, ultranationalist rhetoric and willingness to criticize the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Kremlin, and even Putin himself, has unexpectedly postured itself as an organization concerned about the rule of law following Girkin’s arrest.[20] The organization is attempting to cast Girkin as an opposition figure in Russian politics by arguing that his arrest is unlawful and by launching the social media campaign “#FreedomtoStrelkov.”[21] The Angry Patriots Club may be employing rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest as an appeal to Putin, who has historically (and ironically) portrayed himself as a defender of Russian democracy and has seemingly been hesitant to abandon the veil of legitimacy that Russia’s democratic institutions provide his authoritarian and corrupt rule.[22] The Angry Patriots Club may believe that the veneer of legality in Russia is personally important to Putin and that Putin might feel compelled to intervene if he believes Girkin’s arrest and detention is illegal. It is a further irony that Girkin’s statements seem straightforwardly to violate Russia’s repressive laws prohibiting criticism of the war and its leaders.[23] Russian opposition figures Alexei Navalny and Mikhail Khodorkovsky amplified the Angry Patriots Club’s framing of Girkin as a political prisoner and his arrest as illegal, though it is unclear how Navalny and Khodorkovsky intend for their support to affect Girkin’s detention and eventual sentencing.[24]

 

Putin and the Kremlin reportedly failed to respond promptly to the Wagner Group’s June 24 rebellion, leaving local Russian officials to make decisions concerning the group’s drive on Moscow. The Washington Post reported on July 25 that Ukrainian and European security officials stated that Putin did not issue orders for most of June 24 despite warnings from Russian security services about the likelihood of the rebellion at least two or three days beforehand.[25] Russian security services reportedly increased security at several strategic locations, including the Kremlin, in the days before the rebellion but took no other actions.[26] Regional Russian officials reportedly had to decide how to respond to the rebellion, and regional military and security officials were reportedly the ones that decided not to try to stop Wagner convoys by force.[27] The Kremlin’s and Putin’s alleged lack of response indicates that the Russian security apparatus had likely not prepared for a direct challenge to the Russian military leadership and likely did not have the capacity to quickly bring the rebellion to an end. The Kremlin is likely aware that its paralysis highlighted a degree of regime instability and appears to be consolidating Russia’s internal security apparatus in the Rosgvardia (Russian National Guard) to prepare for further internal threats and to signal resolve.[28] Putin’s failure to act quickly also suggests that he is uncertain about his ability to rally the Russian elite around him and may indicate how factional internal Kremlin politics have become. A senior NATO official reportedly stated that unspecified senior Russian political figures in Moscow appeared ready to rally behind Prigozhin in the event that Wagner’s rebellion succeeded.[29] The Kremlin is likely trying to identify Russian elites who may have been prepared to side with Prigozhin and likely views regional officials’ decisions not to stop Wagner's advance as an indicator of disloyalty. Tula Oblast Governor and former head of Russia’s Special Operations Forces Alexei Dyumin has likely drawn further suspicion due to his previous affiliations with Prigozhin and his role in the negotiations that ended the rebellion.[30]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Russian President Vladimir Putin continued to manifest concern over potential threats that the Wagner Group and its financier Yevgeny Prigozhin may pose during an impromptu two-day extension of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s visit to St. Petersburg. Lukashenko likely seeks to leverage his power over the Wagner Group to gain concessions from Putin.
• Russian leadership is attempting to mitigate the security vacuum left by the Wagner Group’s departure by creating formalized but decentralized military “enterprises” on the basis of federal subjects (regions).
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced on July 25.
• Russian forces conducted another series of Shahed drone strikes on rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 24-25.
• The Angry Patriots Club continues efforts to cast former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin (Strelkov) as an opposition figure and may be attempting to appeal to Russian President Vladimir Putin through rhetoric about the illegality of Girkin’s arrest.
• Putin and the Kremlin reportedly failed to respond promptly to the Wagner Group’s June 24 rebellion, leaving local Russian officials to make decisions concerning the group’s drive on Moscow.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Svatove, Kreminna, the Bakhmut area, the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, and the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area and made claimed advances near Svatove, Kreminna, and Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations near Kreminna, the Bakhmut area, the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area, along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced in the Bakhmut area, in some areas along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and west of Orikhiv.
• US intelligence officials warned on July 25 that Russia’s drone supply will dramatically increase as a result of continued bilateral Russo-Iranian cooperation.
• Russian officials continue efforts to deconflict legal discrepancies as part of the incorporation of occupied territories.

 

[CitizenVectron]

U.S. Says Main Thrust of Ukraine's Counteroffensive Underway: Live Updates - The New York Times

WWW.NYTIMES.COM

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Artillery duels flared along the southern front, as troops trained and equipped by the West pressed forward.

 

There have been signs the last two days that this is true, especially with the arrival of fresh forces in the Tokmak direction. Ukraine has been hammering Russian artillery positions and supply depots to the point where the Russians are running out of ammo in the south in many areas, leaving mines as the major deterent. Moreover, Russia has shifted resources to the east. This is likely Ukraine's best chance to make major gains this summer/fall. 

 

EDIT - Of course, Tokmak could also be a feint (like Kherson) and Mariupol is the real goal.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

11 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

U.S. Says Main Thrust of Ukraine's Counteroffensive Underway: Live Updates - The New York Times

WWW.NYTIMES.COM

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Artillery duels flared along the southern front, as troops trained and equipped by the West pressed forward.

 

There have been signs the last two days that this is true, especially with the arrival of fresh forces in the Tokmak direction. Ukraine has been hammering Russian artillery positions and supply depots to the point where the Russians are running out of ammo in the south in many areas, leaving mines as the major deterent. Moreover, Russia has shifted resources to the east. This is likely Ukraine's best chance to make major gains this summer/fall. 

 

EDIT - Of course, Tokmak could also be a feint (like Kherson) and Mariupol is the real goal.

 

 

As per Mentalist over at RestERA:

 

Quote

Tokma-Polohy is the most fortified section of the frontline.

I have severe reservations about this.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New video from Kings & Generals

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 26 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 26, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces launched a significant mechanized counteroffensive operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 and appear to have broken through certain pre-prepared Russian defensive positions south of Orikhiv. Russian sources, including the

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30pm ET on July 26. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 27 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces launched a significant mechanized counteroffensive operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 and appear to have broken through certain pre-prepared Russian defensive positions south of Orikhiv. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and several prominent milbloggers, claimed that Ukrainian forces launched an intense frontal assault towards Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and broke through Russian defensive positions northeast of the settlement.[1] Geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces likely advanced to within 2.5km directly east of Robotyne during the attack before Russian forces employed standard doctrinal elastic defense tactics and pushed Ukrainian troops back somewhat, although not all the way back to their starting positions.[2]

 

Russian sources provided a wide range of diverging claims as to the scale of both the attack and resulting Ukrainian losses, indicating that the actual results and Ukrainian losses remain unclear. The Russian MoD claimed that up to three battalions engaged in a “massive assault” near Orikhiv, but ISW has not yet observed visual evidence to suggest that such a large number of personnel (a full brigade) were involved in the attack.[3] One prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces used over 80 armored vehicles, and other milbloggers more conservatively claimed that the number was closer to between 30 and 40.[4] Various Russian milbloggers additionally made disparate claims about how many armored vehicles Russian forces destroyed.[5] ISW has also not yet observed a large number of heat anomalies from NASA’s FIRMS / VIIRs sensors in this area of the frontline of the sort that have historically accompanied large, mechanized pushes.[6] The disagreement amongst several prominent Russian sources, who have generally tended to offer more mutually consistent claims about the size of and losses resulting from previous Ukrainian attacks, indicates that the situation remains less than clear and that Ukrainian forces may have been more successful than assessed by Russian commentators.

 

The battlefield geometry around Robotyne, as well as the force composition of the Russian elements defending there, offer important color to speculation surrounding the Ukrainian attack and gains. Geolocated footage from July 27 shows two Ukrainian Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and a T-72 tank either disabled or abandoned about 2.5km due east of Robotyne, which is a point that is about 2.5km south of the current frontline.[7] This geolocated point is beyond the forward-most pre-prepared Russian defensive fortifications in this area, indicating that Ukrainian forces managed to penetrate and drive through tactically challenging defensive positions. This kind of penetration battle will be one of the most difficult things for Ukrainian forces to accomplish in pursuit of deeper penetrations, as ISW has previously assessed. The defensive lines that run further south of Robotyne are likely less well-manned than these forward-most positions, considering that Russian forces have likely had to commit a significant portion of available forces to man the first line of defensive positions that are north and east of Robotyne.

 

Ukrainians appear to have rotated fresh forces into this area for the operation whereas Russian forces remain pinned to the line apparently without rotation, relief, or significant reinforcement in this sector. Russian milbloggers and unnamed Pentagon officials additionally noted that the Ukrainian units that participated in the July 26 attack are reserves that belong to older and more established Ukrainian brigades.[8] These reports indicate that Ukraine may now be employing fresh and generally more experienced units in the battle, whereas the same Russian 58th Combined Arms Army elements (particularly the 71st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division) have been engaged in defensive operations in this very area continually since the beginning of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in early June without relief.[9]The introduction of fresh Ukrainian reserves to the effort, together with the geometry of Russian defensive lines and the likely degraded overall state of Russian forces in this area, may allow Ukraine to begin pursuing more successful advances south of Orikhiv in the coming weeks.

 

Western and Ukrainian officials suggested that the attacks towards Robotyne mark an inflection in Ukraine’s counteroffensive effort. The New York Times reported on July 27, citing two anonymous Pentagon officials, that the “main thrust” of the Ukrainian counteroffensive has begun in earnest.[10] The Western officials noted that this is an opportune moment for Ukrainian efforts given recent gradual Ukrainian operations to clear Russian defensive positions, Russian command changes following the dismissal of 58th Combined Arms Army Commander Major General Ivan Popov, and continued Ukrainian artillery strikes against Russian concentration areas in southern Ukraine, which are all elements that are consistent with ISW’s assessment on the state of play in southern Ukraine.[11] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky also cryptically stated in his nightly address on July 27 that Ukrainian forces “had very good results today” and that he will provide more details at a later date.[12]

 

Today’s actions around Robotyne are likely the start of any “main thrust” Ukrainian forces might be launching, if the US officials are correct, rather than the sum of such a thrust. Even accepting the high estimate of three battalions as the Ukrainian force offered by the Russian MoD, three battalions comprise a single brigade, whereas Ukraine is known still to have in reserve multiple uncommitted brigades readied for the counteroffensive.

 

Western officials are unhelpfully raising expectations for rapid and dramatic Ukrainian advances that Ukrainian forces are unlikely to be able to meet, as well as offering forecasts of the likely Ukrainian avenues of advance that should probably not have been shared publicly. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces can make significant gains in their counteroffensive operations, but that such gains are likely to occur over a long period of time and interspersed with lulls and periods of slower and more grinding efforts as the Ukrainians come to successive Russian defensive lines and themselves require relief and rotation.

 

Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike largely aimed at rear areas in Ukraine on the night of July 26. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 40 missiles, including three Kalibr cruise missiles and four Kh-47 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles.[13] Ukrainian air defenses shot down at least 36 missiles, including all three Kalibr missiles.[14] It is currently unconfirmed if Ukrainian air defenses shot down the four Kinzhals.[15] The Ukrainian Air Force Command reported that missiles were recorded over Kharkiv, Poltava, Kirovohrad, Vinnytsia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Ternopil, Lviv, Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Khmelnytskyi Oblasts.[16] Various Russian sources claimed that the strikes hit the Starokostyantyniv Air Base in Khmelnytski Oblast.[17]

 

The Russian Black Sea Fleet is increasing military posturing in the Black Sea, likely in an attempt to set conditions to forcibly stop and search civilian vessels and exert increased control in the area. The Ukrainian Military Media Center and UK Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that Russian forces are preparing vessels on the Black Sea to “enforce a blockade on Ukraine.”[18] The Ukrainian Military Media Center reported that the Black Sea Fleet is increasing combat training for its surface forces and naval aviation.[19] The Black Sea Fleet is unlikely to attempt a full blockade of Ukraine despite increased measures against civilian vessels, however. A full Russian blockade of Ukraine in the Black Sea would mean that Russian forces could fire on all vessels attempting to reach Ukraine. Russia is highly unlikely to attempt to enforce such a complete blockade lest it trigger military conflict with Black Sea littoral countries including NATO members Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey that the Kremlin has hitherto worked hard to avoid. Current Russian posturing in the Black Sea more likely suggests that Russia is setting conditions to search civilian and commercial vessels while posturing for a blockade as a means of gaining additional leverage. The UK MoD reported that the Russian corvette “Sergei Kotov” is patrolling the shipping lane between the Bosphorus Strait and Odesa Oblast and that the “Sergei Kotov” corvette may be part of a task group to intercept commercial vessels that Russian forces assess are headed to Ukraine.[20] The Russian MoD claimed on July 20 that Russian forces would consider all vessels en route to Ukraine as potential carriers of military cargo.[21] Russian opposition outlet Astra reported on July 24 that the Russian State Security Service (FSB) announced that it searched a foreign cargo ship heading from Turkey to Rostov-on-Don and denied its passage through the Kerch Strait.[22] The FSB claimed that the ship could be delivering explosives to Ukraine because the ship’s crew included 12 Ukrainian citizens and announced that it would search other vessels crossing Kerch Strait.[23]

 

The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 26 that it authorized another presidential drawdown to provide an additional $400 million of security assistance to Ukraine.[24] The DoD stated that the package will include ammunition for HIMARS, munitions for Patriot air defense systems and National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), and other critical military equipment.[25]

 

Angry Patriots Club members may be attempting to align their movement to free former Russian officer and prominent ultranationalist milblogger Igor Girkin with outrage at an anti-war sociologist’s arrest in order to appeal to a broader audience. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on July 26 that Russian authorities arrested Director of the Institute of Globalization and Social Movements (which the Russian Ministry of Justice designated as a foreign agent in 2018) and professor at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences Boris Kagarlitsky on charges of “justifying terrorism” in a post on Telegram about the Ukrainian strike on the Kerch Strait Bridge in October 2022.[26] The Angry Patriots Club published a Telegram post expressing solidarity with Kagarlitsky and claiming that both Girkin’s and Kagarlitsky’s arrests were politically motivated.[27] The Angry Patriots acknowledged that Girkin and Kagarlitsky hold different political views but called for the freedom of political prisoners.[28] Girkin’s supporters may be attempting to frame Girkin’s arrest as a fight against political repression in order to galvanize support for Girkin from beyond the narrow confines created by his ultranationalist ideology and difficult personality. ISW continues to assess that the Angry Patriots Club movement is relatively isolated in the Russian ultranationalist information space, and the Angry Patriots Club may be attempting to make Girkin’s arrest more palatable to a general audience in order to increase support for the movement to free him.[29]

 

Russia continues to find ways to remind Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow’s military and diplomatic presence in the South Caucasus is necessary. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan, and Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov met in Moscow for bilateral and trilateral negotiations regarding Nagorno-Karabakh on July 25.[30] Lavrov walked a careful balance between mediator and participant during the trilateral negotiations, signaling Russia’s support for various Armenian and Azerbaijani positions while continuing to delay any real discussion of a long-term, effective peace agreement. A Kremlin-affiliated Russian milblogger highlighted that an assistant was caught on a live microphone, likely intentionally, telling Lavrov not to refer to Nagorno Karabakh as the “former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast” because the Azerbaijanis would not appreciate it.[31] The milblogger noted that this was a simple, yet effective manipulation tactic that signaled to Armenia Russia’s desire to please Azerbaijan.[32] Lavrov managed to cater to Armenia as well by stating the importance of “direct dialogue between Stepanakert and Baku” and “guaranteeing the rights and security of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh” supporting Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s most recent rhetoric about these issues.[33] It is likely Lavrov also secured Azerbaijan’s approval for the Armenian government to send 400 tons of humanitarian aid to the residents of Nagorno Karabakh through Russian peacekeepers during the July 25 trilateral negotiation.[34]

 

The Russian government may have intended for the Russia-Armenia-Azerbaijan trilateral meeting to reduce possible Iranian efforts to supplant Russian influence with Armenia by providing Shahed drones to Yerevan.[35] Israel-based i24News claimed on July 16 that Armenia has used Iranian Shahed drones in several recent clashes with Azerbaijan.[36] The American Enterprise Institute’s Critical Threats Project previously assessed that Iran may expand its military support to Armenia in response to Russian “negligence” towards the Caucasus.[37] The trilateral meeting may have been an attempt to reassert Russia’s influence over Armenia vis-à-vis Iran, influence that has become particularly fragile following Russia‘s redeployment of elements of its “peacekeeping force” from Nagorno-Karabakh to Ukraine in March 2023.[38]

 

A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger expressed his incredulity that the US has not provided Ukraine F-16 fighters yet and did not assess Russian deterrence or escalation cycle dynamics to be a factor. The milblogger expressed surprise at the West’s lack of progress in giving Ukraine F-16s, stating it is “not entirely clear why Washington is dragging its feet.”[39] The milblogger laid out at length several hypotheses and potential explanations for the lack of progress in approving the final policy on giving Ukraine F-16s.[40] The milblogger notably did not include the threat of Russian nuclear escalation or other deterrence factors in his list of hypotheses of why Western policymakers have not yet sent the fighters to Ukraine.[41] ISW continues to assess that the risk of nuclear escalation remains extremely low.[42]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces launched a significant mechanized counteroffensive operation in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 26 and appear to have broken through certain pre-prepared Russian defensive positions south of Orikhiv.
• Russian sources provided a wide range of diverging claims as to the scale of both the attack and resulting Ukrainian losses, indicating that the actual results and Ukrainian losses remain unclear.
•  The battlefield geometry around Robotyne, as well as the force composition of the Russian elements defending there, offer important color to speculation surrounding the Ukrainian attack and gains.
• Western and Ukrainian officials suggested that the attacks towards Robotyne mark an inflection in Ukraine’s counteroffensive effort. Today’s actions around Robotyne are likely the start of any “main thrust” Ukrainian forces might be launching, if US officials are correct, rather than the sum of such a thrust.
• Russian forces conducted a large-scale missile strike largely aimed at rear areas in Ukraine on the night of July 26.
• The Russian Black Sea Fleet is increasing military posturing in the Black Sea, likely in an attempt to set conditions to forcibly stop and search civilian vessels and exert increased control in the area.
• The US Department of Defense (DoD) announced on July 26 that it authorized another presidential drawdown to provide an additional $400 million of security assistance to Ukraine.
• Russia continues to find ways to remind Armenia and Azerbaijan that Moscow’s military and diplomatic presence in the South Caucasus is necessary. The Russian government may have intended for the Russia-Armenia-Azerbaijan trilateral meeting to reduce possible Iranian efforts to supplant Russian influence with Armenia by providing Shahed drones to Yerevan.
• A prominent Kremlin-linked milblogger expressed his incredulity that the US has not provided Ukraine F-16 fighters yet and did not assess Russian deterrence or escalation cycle dynamics to be a factor.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in western Donetsk Oblast, and in western Zaporzhia Oblast on July 26 and have made advances in certain areas.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 26 and have advanced in certain areas.
• Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces have begun using Russian-produced Shahed drones against Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to pursue infrastructure projects in occupied areas to facilitate the economic integration of occupied Ukraine into the Russian system.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Quote

Western officials are unhelpfully raising expectations for rapid and dramatic Ukrainian advances that Ukrainian forces are unlikely to be able to meet, as well as offering forecasts of the likely Ukrainian avenues of advance that should probably not have been shared publicly. ISW continues to assess that Ukrainian forces can make significant gains in their counteroffensive operations, but that such gains are likely to occur over a long period of time and interspersed with lulls and periods of slower and more grinding efforts as the Ukrainians come to successive Russian defensive lines and themselves require relief and rotation.

 

I'm in agreement with ISW's exasperation at the nature of these leaks from Western military/intelligence sources.  Just what the hell are they thinking?!?

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine’s top fencer disqualified from world championship after refused handshake with Russian | CNN

EDITION.CNN.COM

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The leader of Ukraine’s national fencing team, Olga Harlan, has been disqualified from participating in the World Championships after she refused to shake hands with Anna Smirnova, who is from Russia.

 

Politeness is what the rich and powerful people value most, over justice or ethics.

[CitizenVectron]

U.S. expects to begin delivering Abrams tanks to Ukraine in September - POLITICO

WWW.POLITICO.COM

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The news, provided by six people familiar with discussions, marks the most specific information to date on Washington's plans.

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 27 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment July 27, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 1pm ET on July 27. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 28 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky posted footage on July 27 showing that Ukrainian forces liberated Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) in western Donetsk Oblast following heavy fighting in the area.[1] Geolocated footage published on July 26 indicates that Ukrainian forces also made marginal advances north of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[2] Geolocated footage published on July 26 suggests that Ukrainian forces made additional advances east of Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) during offensive operations on July 26.[3] Ukrainian Director of the Department of Application Planning at the Main Command of the National Guard Mykola Urshalovych stated on July 27 that Ukrainian forces achieved tactical victories in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) direction.[4] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults at a lower tempo and with far less manpower near Robotyne on July 27 after Ukrainian forces launched an intense mechanized frontal assault that broke through Russian defensive positions northeast of the settlement on July 26.[5] Geolocated footage published on July 27 suggests that Ukrainian forces may be operating in areas well forward of where ISW assesses Ukrainian advances to be as a result of ISW’s intentionally conservative assessments about control of terrain (covered in more detail in Southern Axis text).[6]

 

The Kremlin and the wider Russian information space are intensifying efforts to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated to a reporter on July 27 that in recent days Russian forces destroyed 39 armored vehicles out of 50 that Ukrainian forces committed to intensified assaults in the Zaporizhia direction.[7] Putin claimed that Russian forces also killed 60 percent of the Ukrainian personnel that conducted these assaults as well as 40 percent of Ukrainian combat aviation pilots in the area.[8] Putin has previously claimed that Russian forces have destroyed an implausible amount of Ukrainian equipment during Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, although his figures concerning Ukrainian assaults in recent days indicate an inflection in his exaggeration of likely Ukrainian losses.[9] Russian milbloggers similarly claimed that Russian forces destroyed dozens of Ukrainian armored vehicles and celebrated the alleged losses as proof that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is stalling.[10] The Kremlin’s and the Russian information space’s framing of the Ukrainian counteroffensive notably violates a reported Kremlin manual instructing Russian media not to downplay the potential for successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[11] The intensifying portrayal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failed effort suggests that the Kremlin’s policy on the coverage of the war is to bolster efforts to promote itself as an effective manager of the war effort.

 

A US official expressed caution about assessing that the July 26 uptick in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast is part of the Ukrainian main effort, tempering July 26 statements to the contrary.[12] The Washington Post cited an unspecified US official as saying that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Zaporizhia direction may be shaping operations for a later counteroffensive effort, but that US officials do not assess that these operations are part of Ukraine’s main effort.[13] CNN cited two US officials as saying that Ukrainian forces have deployed the “main bulk” of their reserve forces to southern Ukraine to capitalize on recent Ukrainian gains.[14] UK Minister for the State of the Armed Forces James Heappey stated that Ukrainian forces are being “appropriately cautious” and are meeting current expectations.[15]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 to continue efforts to posture Russia as a more attractive ally to African partner states than the collective West. Putin met with several African leaders at the forum, including Ugandan President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Zimbabwe Emmerson Dambuzo Mnangagwa, President of the Republic of Burundi Evariste Ndayishimiye, President of Mozambique Filipe Jacinto Nyusi, and President of Comoros Azali Assoumani.[16] During his speech at the plenary session of the forum, Putin emphasized the importance of expanding Russian–African cooperation and Russia’s investment in the development of African nations, notably accusing Ukraine and the West of interfering with Russia’s supply of grain and fertilizers to the African continent and claiming that Russia will provide between 25 and 50 thousand tons of grain free of charge to Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Mali, Somali, Central African Republic, and Eritrea over the coming months.[17] Putin announced that Russia is helping to develop over 30 energy infrastructure projects in 16 African states and called for an expansion of cultural and social integration between Russia and the African continent, stating that Russia plans to open branches of Russian universities in Africa and increase enrollment of African students in Russian educational institutions.[18]

 

Beyond the typical diplomatic platitudes and promises of continued cooperation and development, Putin’s rhetoric during the Russia-Africa forum does not represent a major inflection in the Kremlin’s policy toward the African continent. Putin previously signed an article published on July 24 to posture Russia’s commitment to African development and mitigate damage done to Russia’s position in Africa and his personal reputation with African leaders.[19] Putin’s and the Russian government’s reputations likely suffered due to a number of recent factors: Russia’s recent withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative and strikes on Ukrainian port infrastructure (both of which were critical for grain exports to various African countries) and his inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit because of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant against him.

 

Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was also present in St. Petersburg on July 27 and took the opportunity to informally meet with an unknown number of African leaders, suggesting that the Wagner Group intends to remain a significant player in Africa. Russian milbloggers amplified photos of Prigozhin shaking hands with a Central African Republic official and the “director of Afrique media.”[20] A Russian insider source claimed that Prigozhin held private, informal meetings with representatives of an unknown number of African governments in a hotel close to the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum but did not attend the summit itself.[21] Prigozhin's continued efforts to meet with and message to African leaders are likely part of Wagner's efforts to maintain its profitable military and mining contracts in Africa. An unnamed Wagner commander who recently returned from CAR claimed on July 26 that Wagner is working on increasing its operations in Africa to fund its presence in Belarus.[22]Prigozhin additionally used the backdrop of the Russia-Africa summit to position Wagner as a viable anti-Western partner for post-coup Niger. Wagner-affiliated Telegram channels began circulating an audio recording reportedly of Prigozhin on July 27 wherein Prigozhin praised the Nigerien military’s removal of Nigerien President Mohamed Bazoum and lauded it as an act of “gaining independence,” while accusing Western nations of deliberately destabilizing the situation in Africa and supporting terrorist organizations.[23] Prigozhin suggested that a “thousand fighters” from Wagner would be able to restore order, presumably in post-coup Niger.[24] Several Russian milbloggers responded to Prigozhin’s purported audio recording and suggested that Niger will need “help” from Wagner similar to what Mali needed following its coup in May 2021.[25] Prigozhin is posturing Wagner as a viable security partner for Niger, which is largely consistent with ISW’s and the Critical Threats Project’s (CTP) previous assessment that Wagner is likely to maintain and even expand its presence in the African continent following its July 24 armed rebellion.[26]

 

The Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual to Russian state media on framing the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus on July 28, likely as part of continued information operations and propaganda narratives to advance Russian military objectives. Russian opposition news outlet Meduza reported on July 27 that it obtained the manual but did not publish the manual itself, which reportedly directs Russian state media to frame the Baptism of Rus as “a key turning point in Russian history” and “the point of formation of statehood.”[27] The manual reportedly emphasized that a “common faith” allowed the “East Slavic tribes” to unify as “one people.”[28] The manual reportedly instructs state media to paint Russian President Vladimir Putin as the one who “brought the mission of defending the Orthodox faith back to Russia” and reportedly labels the Ukrainian government an “apostate regime” and a “satanic regime” that is trying to “destroy” Orthodoxy in Ukraine and “the spiritual ties of the fraternal peoples.”[29] These Kremlin-dictated religion-based narratives come as Russia is itself committing systematic religious repressions and persecutions throughout Ukraine, including against Orthodox Christians, in an effort to destroy Ukrainian cultural and national identity.[30] The Kremlin reportedly issued a similar manual to state media in May aimed at controlling the narratives about a potential upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive, and the distribution of these manuals demonstrates the Kremlin’s use of various information operations to spread propaganda messages and discredit Ukraine in the international arena.[31]

 

Russia conducted another strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 26–27. Ukrainian military sources reported that Russian forces launched two Kalibr cruise missiles that damaged port infrastructure in Odesa City.[32] Ukrainian military sources also reported that Russian forces launched eight Shahed drones and that Ukrainian air defenses shot down all eight.[33]

 

US President Joe Biden has reportedly ordered the US government in recent days to share evidence of Russian war crimes in Ukraine with the International Criminal Court (ICC) in the Hague.[34] This will be the first time the US will share evidence with the ICC as part of a criminal investigation into a country that is not a part of the ICC.[35]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and made gains in some areas, although Ukrainian forces appear not to have continued significant mechanized assaults south of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• A US official expressed caution about assessing that the July 26 uptick in Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast is part of the Ukrainian main effort, tempering July 26 statements to the contrary.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin used the Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum in St. Petersburg on July 27 to continue efforts to posture Russia as a more attractive ally to African partner states than the collective West.
• Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin was also present in St. Petersburg on July 27 and took the opportunity to informally meet with an unknown number of African leaders, suggesting that the Wagner Group intends to remain a significant player in Africa.
• Prigozhin additionally used the backdrop of the Russia-Africa summit to position Wagner as a viable anti-Western partner for post-coup Niger.
• The Kremlin reportedly distributed a manual to Russian state media on framing the anniversary of the Baptism of Rus on July 28, likely as part of continued information operations and propaganda narratives to advance Russian military objectives.
• Russia conducted another strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast and rear areas of Ukraine overnight on July 26–27.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 27 and did not make any confirmed advances.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 27 and have advanced south of Bakhmut, in the Zaporizhia-Donetsk Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
• The Russian State Duma approved measures on July 27 aimed at clarifying confusion surrounding the recently updated laws regarding conscripts and reservists.
• Russian authorities are discriminating against Ukrainian refugees in Belgorod Oblast, Russia.

 

[CayceG]

Seymour Hersh made an oopsie-doo and published in English a phrase which is not a common idiom in English... but IS in Russian!

 

 

 

 

 

 

Also, the dig his "source" makes about Nigeria is likewise a relatively common line in Russian politics. Nigeria being the key example of political corruption. We don't really say that here in the US!

 

 

I think Hersh's "source" is some Russian propagandist. Whether the source is doing this on his own, part of a subcontracted group, or employed by the Kremlin itself does not matter. The point is Hersh is a moron and is printing this because he believes it. 

[CitizenVectron]

The front lines can be seen from regular satellite imagery due to the war's impact on the environment:

 

 

You can see the tan colour of the dried-up Dnipro river/reservoir, and then the thick green line of unharvested fields where it's too dangerous to farm.

[CitizenVectron]

Russian forces have ceded more ground on the Dnipro to Ukrainian recon forces. Basically, Ukraine has recon/advance forces where these boxes are:

 

I don't think it's likely that Ukraine will make any push here, but it's possible if they think Russia has pulled far enough back. Apparently Russian forces at this area are the weakest/least-armed of anywhere on the line.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 28 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 28, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on July 28. Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the northern

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 12:30 pm ET on July 28. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 29 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on July 28. Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on the northern and southern flanks of Bakhmut, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on July 27 that Ukrainian forces continued advancing south of Bakhmut.[1] A Russian milblogger claimed on July 28 that Ukrainian forces advanced near Kurdyumivka and Andriivka.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), and some milbloggers acknowledged that Ukrainian forces captured Staromayorske on July 27.[3] A Ukrainian source claimed that Ukrainian forces have advanced to within 10-12 kilometers of the main Russian defensive line in the Berdyansk direction.[4] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv), Verbove (17km southeast of Orikhiv), and Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[5] Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky stated that Ukrainian forces can conduct strikes against the full depth of defending Russian forces and that these strikes are killing Russian commanders and degrading Russian command and control.[6] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that the 247th Guards Air Assault (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) refused to go to combat near Staromayorske due to heavy Russian losses and Ukrainian battlefield victories.[7]

 

Russian naval posturing in the Black Sea likely aims to impose a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports without committing the Black Sea Fleet to the enforcement of a naval blockade. Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk reported on July 28 that Ukrainian officials have intercepted radio transmissions of Russian forces warning civilian ships in the Black Sea against heading to Ukrainian ports.[8] A Russian milblogger amplified an audio recording purportedly of a Russian warship telling a civilian vessel in the Black Sea that Russian forces would consider the vessel involved in the conflict in Ukraine as a military cargo ship if it sailed towards a Ukrainian port.[9] Russian sources also claimed that Russian authorities announced a nighttime navigation ban for all small vessels near the Kerch Strait due to concerns about Ukrainian naval drones.[10] The Black Sea Fleet conducted exercises on July 27 wherein naval warships launched a missile at a target ship in the Black Sea.[11] The Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) recently attempted to soften the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) July 19 announcement about viewing civilian ships in the Black Sea as legitimate military targets by claiming that the announcement meant that Russian forces would inspect ships.[12] The Russian MoD itself has not clarified what actions its announcement will allow the Russian military to take and even the Russian MFA’s interpretation would require Russian forces to board and possibly seize foreign civilian vessels. The Russian naval posturing in the Black Sea is likely intentionally ambiguous to generate widespread concern about possible detention by the Russian navy or outright strikes on civilian vessels. The Kremlin likely aims for this posturing to have a chilling effect on maritime activity so that Russian naval assets do not need to enforce an actual blockade of Ukrainian ports. A naval blockade is only mandatory for neutral entities to follow under international law if a belligerent declares the existence of the blockade, and Russia has yet to do so.[13]

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to reassure African partner states that Russia will maintain its economic and security commitments during the second day of the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg. Putin addressed African heads of state and representatives at the summit’s plenary session on July 28 and highlighted military-technical agreements with 40 African countries and plans to expand Russia’s diplomatic presence in Africa.[14]  Putin stated that Russia aims to help train African partners‘ military and law enforcement personnel and noted that there are many African personnel at the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) academy.[15] Putin also claimed that between 2022 and 2023 Russia wrote off $23 billion of debt for African countries.[16] Putin claimed that Russia has sent almost 10 million tons of grain to African countries so far in 2023 and reiterated a pledge to send 25,000 to 50,000 tons of grain to six African countries in the next three to four months free of charge.[17] Putin pointedly stated that Russia will always be a responsible international supplier of agricultural products, likely aiming to reassure African partners concerned about food security following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative.[18]

 

African Union Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat stated at the summit that disruptions to energy and grain supplies must end, and both Mahamat and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi explicitly called for the revival of the grain deal.[19] Al-Sissi also promoted a Kremlin talking point that Russia quit the grain deal because the grain corridor was not facilitating grain shipments to the poorest of countries, even though Putin himself cited Russian producers’ losses at depressed grain prices as a primary reason for leaving the deal.[20] African countries are likely appealing to Russia without fully backing its position concerning the grain deal in hopes of retaining Russian economic and security commitments, in line with their likely primary objective to mitigate the economic fallout from the war in Ukraine affecting their economies.[21]

 

The Kremlin continues to display little interest in an unspecific peace plan focused on eliminating disruptions to international trade proposed by African heads of state. Congolese President Denis Sassou Nguesso, Senegalese President Macky Sall, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, and Mahamat all appealed to Putin to consider a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine.[22] A delegation representing seven African states proposed a generalized peace plan focused on resuming international trade to Putin on June 17.[23] Putin responded to renewed calls to engage with this peace plan at the summit by stating that Russia is respectfully and carefully considering the proposal.[24] Putin has yet to address the feasibility of the peace plan and instead reiterated boilerplate rhetoric that Ukraine and the West are preventing negotiations from taking place.[25] The Kremlin is likely trying to portray itself as considering the peace plan to promote ongoing Russian information operations that feign interest in a negotiated settlement while aiming to slow Western security assistance to Ukraine.[26] The Kremlin is also likely using the proposal to pursue strengthened bilateral and multilateral engagement with African states as part of an overall effort to present itself as a more attractive ally than the collective West.[27] The Kremlin has not demonstrated any intent to engage with any peace process meaningfully.

 

Russian authorities may be increasingly concerned about how the Russian electorate views the war ahead of regional elections in September 2023 and the Russian presidential election in 2024. A Russian insider source and independent Russian opposition news outlet Verstka both claimed that the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) initiative to increase the maximum conscription age from 27 to 30 years old caused a heated discussion among Kremlin officials.[28] The sources claimed that the Russian Security Council urged the Presidential Administration not to support the MoD’s initiative over concern that the initiative would cause public backlash and affect Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval ratings.[29] The sources reported that Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu pushed the initiative through and maintained Putin’s support, despite the Security Council’s concerns.[30] Verstka claimed that Putin supported the MoD’s initiative after listening to Shoigu‘s arguments about the shortage of soldiers in Ukraine.[31] Verstka also reported that sources stated that United Russia officials are afraid to use the war in Ukraine in their election campaigns in upcoming regional and local elections because they are concerned about how voters will react to it.[32] Verstka‘s sources claimed that United Russia intends to highlight and appeal to local issues instead of highlighting the war in Ukraine. Verstka claimed that it has reviewed United Russia’s election materials and stated that the war is not a main theme.[33] The concern among elements of the Kremlin and United Russia indicates concern over domestic support for the war and fears that the Kremlin’s perceived electoral legitimacy could weaken in upcoming elections - though to be sure this loss of support primarily presents United Russia with a greater need to falsify election results and the possibility of local losses to other “managed opposition” parties, not a legitimate threat to its dominance of Russian politics.

 

Politico reported that the first batch of refurbished US Abrams tanks will likely arrive in Ukraine in September. Politico cited six US officials as saying that the US plans to deliver six to eight Abrams (two platoons) to Germany in August for refurbishment before shipping the tanks to Ukraine in September and that the US will send a total of 31 Abrams (roughly an understrength armored battalion, at most one-third of a full Ukrainian brigade) to Ukraine.[34]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and reportedly advanced near Bakhmut on July 28.
• Russian naval posturing in the Black Sea likely aims to impose a de facto blockade on Ukrainian ports without committing the Black Sea Fleet to the enforcement of a naval blockade.
• Russian President Vladimir Putin attempted to reassure African partner states that Russia will maintain its economic and security commitments during the second day of the Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg.
• The Kremlin continues to display little interest in an unspecific peace plan focused on eliminating disruptions to international trade proposed by African heads of state.
• Russian authorities may be increasingly concerned about how the Russian electorate views the war ahead of regional elections in September 2023 and the Russian presidential election in 2024.
• Politico reported that the first batch of refurbished US Abrams tanks will likely arrive in Ukraine in September.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, and in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 28 and made advances in certain areas.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front on July 28 and have reportedly advanced along the Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, and along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border.
• The Russian Federation Council approved measures allowing the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) to receive heavy military equipment and increasing the upper limit of the conscription age range from 27 years old to 30 years old.
• Russian authorities continue to deport Ukrainian teenagers to Russia under the guise of summer camp programs.

 

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine appears to have destroyed the Chonhar bridge, one of the main roadways between Crimea and mainland Ukraine.

[CitizenVectron]

Posting X link because there's nothing else at the moment. Drone strike on Moscow:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

New video from Perun:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 29 July 2023:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 29, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around the Kremlin’s narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about R

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Click here to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will update this time-lapse map archive monthly.

 

Note: The data cutoff for this product was 11:30am ET on July 29. ISW will cover subsequent reports in the July 30 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment.

 

Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around the Kremlin’s narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about Russia's losses and challenges than they had been. Prominent Russian milbloggers have been increasingly presenting Ukrainian counteroffensive operations inaccurately as a series of failed Ukrainian assaults along the entire line of contact.[1] Russian milbloggers widely amplified footage on July 29 claiming that it showed a single Russian tank defeating an entire Ukrainian company with armored vehicles as if the event had occurred recently, but the footage is actually from June 7 and shows Russian artillery units striking the Ukrainian column.[2] Russian sources have previously recirculated old footage to support claims that Ukrainian forces are suffering significant armored vehicle losses, and the amplification of the footage on July 29 indicates that Russian sources are deliberately amplifying old footage to support the Kremlin narrative.[3] Russian President Vladimir Putin recently claimed that Ukrainian forces lost 39 armored vehicles in a few days of fighting in western Zaporizhia Oblast, a notable inflection in his exaggeration of Ukrainian losses during the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[4] ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin is likely shifting its policy about the coverage of the war to downplay the possibilities of a successful Ukrainian counteroffensive and to promote itself as an effective manager of the war effort.[5] Russian milbloggers continue to report on localized Ukrainian advances and some issues with Russian defensive operations, but the pro-war Russian information space’s wider operational framing of the Ukrainian counteroffensive aligns with the likely shift in the Kremlin’s portrayal of the counteroffensive.[6]

 

Select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their depiction of the wider Ukrainian counteroffensive for fear of Kremlin punishment following the arrest of prominent pro-war critic Igor Girkin. A Russian insider source claimed on July 28 that sources within the presidential administration stated that the Kremlin recently encouraged Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers to reduce their coverage of the war in Ukraine in general and to post more positive content on topics of nationalistic pride.[7] ISW has not observed Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers reducing their coverage of the war, although Kremlin-affiliated milbloggers have begun to argue more emphatically that the Ukrainian counteroffensive is a failure.[8] The arrest of notable critics of the Russian war effort in Ukraine such as Girkin along with ongoing Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space may be prompting select milbloggers to align their portrayal of the war with the Kremlin’s more than they have normally done.[9]

 

The Kremlin’s ability to establish a more cohesive narrative about the war within the Russian information space remains uncertain, and subsequent Russian failures or significant Ukrainian successes could disrupt the Kremlin’s progress in this effort. Segments of the Russian information space do continue to complain about systemic issues within the Russian war effort in Ukraine, and many Russian milbloggers would likely reverse course on their portrayal of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the event of significant Ukrainian gains. The milblogger community continues to be highly reactive and motivated by salient topics of outrage, and many milbloggers would likely abandon efforts to align themselves with the Kremlin’s messaging about the war in the event that a controversy about Russian failure prompts renewed intense ire towards the Russian military leadership.[10] A cohesively amplified and unchallenged Kremlin narrative concerning the tactical and operational situation in Ukraine would make accurate coverage of battlefield realities more challenging, particularly in the absence of more detailed reporting from the Ukrainian side.

 

Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on July 29. Geolocated footage published on July 28 confirms that Ukrainian forces have advanced close to the northwestern outskirts of Kurdyumivka (13km southwest of Bakhmut).[11] Geolocated footage published on July 29 shows that Ukrainian forces advanced to positions near the northern outskirts of Pryyutne (16km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[12] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued assaults near Klishchiivka, Kurdyumivka, and Andriivka south of Bakhmut.[13] Ukrainian officials reported that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[14] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Rivnopil, Staromayorske, and Urozhaine in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.[15] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Robotyne in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and one milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces captured a forest northeast of Robotyne.[16] A Russian milblogger stated that Russian defensive fortifications will not matter if Ukrainian forces inflict heavy losses on Russian forces to the point that there are not enough Russian personnel to man the fortifications.[17] The milblogger also stated that the depth of Ukrainian advances into Russian defensive lines matters less than the degree to which the balance of forces has shifted to favor Ukraine during the course of the counteroffensive.

 

Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Crimea on July 28 and 29. The Ukrainian Armed Forces reported that Ukrainian forces struck the Chonhar bridge between occupied Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast on the morning of July 29.[18] Kherson Oblast occupation head Vladimir Saldo claimed Ukrainian forces launched 12 Storm Shadow missiles at the Chonhar rail bridge, but claimed that Russian air defenses intercepted all 12 missiles.[19] Some social media sources stated that locals reported explosions in the Chonhar area, but there is currently no visual evidence of the strike or claims about the consequences of the strike at the time of this publication.[20] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that saboteurs set explosives against a Russian ammunition depot in Kozacha Bay near Sevastopol, Crimea on July 28 and that locals reported primary and secondary detonations.[21] Sevastopol occupation head Mikhail Razvozhaev claimed on July 28 that any explosions in the Kozacha Bay area were due to Russian military exercises.[22]

 

Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of July 28. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces struck a residential building and a Ukrainian Security Services (SBU) building in Dnipro City with two Iskander cruise missiles.[23]

 

Key Takeaways:

• Segments of the Russian pro-war ultranationalist information space appear to be coalescing around a Kremlin narrative effort to portray the Ukrainian counteroffensive as a failure, increasingly overstating Ukrainian losses and writing less about Russia's losses and challenges than they had been.
• Select Russian milbloggers may be shaping their depiction of the wider Ukrainian counteroffensive for fear of Kremlin punishment following the arrest of prominent pro-war critic Igor Girkin.
• The Kremlin’s ability to establish a more cohesive narrative about the war within the Russian information space remains uncertain, and subsequent Russian failures or significant Ukrainian successes could disrupt the Kremlin’s progress in this effort.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least three sectors of the front and advanced in some areas on July 29.
• Ukrainian forces likely targeted Russian military and logistics assets in occupied Crimea on July 28 and 29.
• Russian forces conducted a missile strike on Dnipro City, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on the evening of July 28.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line and the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made claimed advances along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line, around Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and advanced around Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and south of Orikhiv and advanced along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and south of Orikhiv but did not make confirmed or claimed advances.
• A Ukrainian report indicates that Russian occupation authorities continue crypto-mobilization efforts in occupied Ukraine to replenish losses from combat casualties.
• Russian authorities continue to forcibly deport Ukrainian children in occupied Ukraine to Russia under the guise of rest and rehabilitation programs.

 

[CitizenVectron]

According to NYT, Musk personally thwarted a Ukrainian mission he disagreed with, denying the use of starlink near Crimea. Maybe this is why the DoD demanded some starlink systems without any geolocking:

 

With Starlink, pedo guy megalomaniacal manchild’s Satellite Dominance Is Raising Global Alarms - The New York Times

WWW.NYTIMES.COM

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The tech billionaire has become the dominant power in satellite internet technology. The ways he is wielding that influence are raising global alarms.

 

 

 

[TUFKAK]

Nationalize it

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

One man, unelected at that, should never have that kind of power