Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (16 Apr 2024) - Ukraine "ran out of missiles" around Kyiv, which allowed Russia to destroy major power plant

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

9 minutes ago, Uaarkson said:

That missile was HUGE, Jesus.

It's a Kh-22 which was originally intended to take out aircraft carriers:

 

Kh-22 - Wikipedia

EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG

 

[CayceG]

I said this on the Discord, but I'll repost it here. 

I might be splitting hairs too thin, but this was an accident that led to massive collateral damage. 

And what I mean by that is I think the missile was intended to hit the factory adjacent to the mall. But the shitty old missiles are supposed to be used against aircraft carriers--not fixed targets. They have radar seekers in the nose that look for large radar returns (like an aircraft carrier in the open sea) and that isn't the most useful way of guiding them to a factory target in an urban area.
The missile wasn't appropriate for the intended target (because Russia is scraping the barrel for guided standoff weapons) and because of that, it hit the wrong target.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 29 June 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 29 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 28 that the Kremlin is setting conditions to annex areas of Kherson and Zaporizhia into the Russian Federation under the template of the pre-1917 “Tavriia Gubernia.” The Tavriia (or Tauride) Gubernia was a

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on June 28 that the Kremlin is setting conditions to annex areas of Kherson and Zaporizhia into the Russian Federation under the template of the pre-1917 “Tavriia Gubernia.”[1] The Tavriia (or Tauride) Gubernia was a historical province of the Russian Empire.[2] Under the Tavriia Gubernia scenario, the left bank of Kherson Oblast and part of Zaporizhia Oblast would be directly annexed to the Russian Federation, likely as a single unit.[3] The Ukrainian Resistance Center stated that Russian authorities are preparing for a pseudo-referendum to set conditions for the annexation of the Tavriia Gubernia (as opposed to proxy “people‘s republics“). The Russians are also requiring Ukrainian citizens in southern Ukraine to open bank accounts with Russian state-owned Promsvyazbank.[4] Head of Ukraine’s Kherson Oblast Administration Hennadiy Lahuta reported that Russian forces have locked down civilian traffic in northern Kherson Oblast and are not allowing anyone to enter or exit occupied territory, which may be an additional attempt to control the civilian population in preparation for annexation measures.[5]

 

Ukrainian sources warned on June 29 that Russian forces may be planning a false flag provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to accuse Ukrainian authorities of mishandling nuclear facilities.[6] Ukrainian nuclear operating enterprise Energoatom stated that Russian occupation authorities are planning to throw unsafe objects into the cooling system at the NPP in order to compromise the plant’s cooling mechanisms.[7] Mayor of Enerhodar Dmytro Orlov added that Russian troops have been kidnapping and torturing employees of the NPP to coerce confessions that employees dropped weapons into the cooling systems to sabotage the plant and blame Ukrainian authorities for paying inadequate attention to the management of the NPP.[8] Russian troops have previously demonstrated irresponsible and dangerous behavior in and around nuclear power plants, firing on nuclear facilities at the Zaporizhzhia NPP in early March and digging into radioactive soil in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone.[9]

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian sources reported that Russian authorities may be preparing to annex areas of southern Ukraine as the “Tavriia Gubernia” and that Russian authorities are setting conditions for annexation through preparing referenda in occupied areas.
• Russian forces may be planning a false flag provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Lysychansk.
• Russian forces made marginal gains east of Bakhmut along the E40 highway and may seek to prepare for a direct offensive on Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations to advance on Slovyansk from the northwest near the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.
• Russian forces are continuing to engage in offensive operations north of Kharkiv City, indicating that the Kremlin has territorial ambitions beyond the Donbas that will continue to attrit manpower and equipment, potentially at the cost of offensive power on more critical axes of advance
• Russian forces continued to reinforce their defensive presence along the Southern Axis.

 

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

45 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

 

 

lol "goodwill" after being pounded for weeks by artillery and HIMARS.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

[brucoe]

22 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

It's a Kh-22 which was originally intended to take out aircraft carriers:

 

Kh-22 - Wikipedia

EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG

 

Well, I'm pretty sure it hit any aircraft carriers that were parked in that shopping mall.

[CitizenVectron]

It's interesting to hear that the US now doubts that Ukraine will be able to retake all its territory, while the UK seems more optimistic. I don't think Ukraine will be able to (especially Luhansk/Donetsk/Crimea) if Russia commits, but I do think Ukraine will likely retake some/much of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. The thing that will determine Russia's ability to hold the land they've taken isn't really their military power, it's the morale of their troops.

[CitizenVectron]

Well then:

 

 

One caveat - "tanks" in this case refers to any armoured vehicle. Some of those will be real tanks, but not all.

 

[CitizenVectron]

No big deal...just Ukraine saving the EU who are suffering from gas shortages by supplying power to them through grid connections intended to save Ukraine:

 

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 30 June 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, June 30 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces retreated from the Snake Island on June 30 following a Ukrainian missile and artillery campaign. The Russian Defense Ministry spun the retreat as “a step of goodwill.” The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that the Kremlin does not int

 

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian forces retreated from the Snake Island on June 30 following a Ukrainian missile and artillery campaign. The Russian Defense Ministry spun the retreat as “a step of goodwill.”[1] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that the Kremlin does not interfere with United Nations (UN) efforts to organize a humanitarian corridor for agricultural export from Ukraine but did not acknowledge the Ukrainian artillery and missile campaign that had actually caused the retreat. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command had announced elements of that campaign on June 21.[2] The Russian Defense Ministry has claimed that Russian forces defeated all Ukrainian drone and missile attacks leading up to their retreat despite considerable evidence to the contrary.[3] The Russian defeat on the Snake Island will alleviate some pressure off the Ukrainian coast by removing Russian air defense and anti-ship missile systems from the island. The retreat itself will not end the sea blockade, however, as Russian forces have access to land-based anti-ship systems in Crimea and western Kherson Oblast that can still target Ukrainian cargo as well as the use of the remaining ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

 

Russian milbloggers overwhelmingly defended the Russian decision to withdraw troops and equipment from the island, claiming that Russian forces are prioritizing the “liberation of Donbas.”[4] Some said that Russian forces do not have enough capacity to destroy Ukrainian coastal troops and others claimed that Russian forces will be more successful striking Ukrainians when they attempt to deploy their own troops to the island. Milbloggers have previously criticized the Russian military command for failing to retreat to save equipment and manpower and are likely content with the Russian retreat from the Snake Island.[5] Milbloggers, following the Kremlin line, did not acknowledge the role Ukrainian strikes against the island played in compelling Russian forces to retreat.

 

Russian authorities continue to galvanize the support of proxy actors in order to support force generation efforts. Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov announced on June 29 that another Akhmat special battalion, the Vostok (east)-Akhmat battalion, has been successfully formed and will shortly move to its point of permanent deployment and begin active service.[6] As ISW reported on June 28, Kadyrov stated he intends to form four new Akhmat special operations battalions and announced the formation of the Zapad (west)-Akhmat battalion early this week.[7]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian troops made limited gains within the Lysychansk Oil Refinery and around Lysychansk.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations to the south and east of Bakhmut and to the north of Slovyansk.
• Russian forces continued efforts to regain control of settlements north of Kharkiv City.
• Ukrainian counteroffensives continue to force Russian troops on the Southern Axis to prioritize defensive operations.
• Russian occupation authorities took measures to ensure further economic and financial integration of occupied areas into the Russian system.

 

 

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 01 July 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 1 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Kremlin is likely setting conditions for crypto-mobilization of the Russian economy in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine. The Kremlin proposed an amendment to federal laws on Russian Armed Forces supply matters to the Russian State Duma on

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

The Kremlin is likely setting conditions for crypto-mobilization of the Russian economy in preparation for a protracted war in Ukraine. The Kremlin proposed an amendment to federal laws on Russian Armed Forces supply matters to the Russian State Duma on June 30, that would introduce “special measures in the economic sphere” obliging Russian businesses (regardless of ownership) to supply Russian special military and counterterrorist operations.[1] The amendment would prohibit Russian businesses from refusing to accept state orders for special military operations and allow the Kremlin to change employee contracts and work conditions, such as forcing workers to work during the night or federal holidays. The Kremlin noted in the amendment’s description that the ongoing special military operation in Ukraine exposed supply shortages, specifically materials needed to repair military equipment, and stated that Russian officials need to “concentrate their efforts in certain sectors of the economy." Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely mobilizing the Russian economy and industry to sustain the ongoing war effort, but has not yet taken parallel measures to mobilize Russian manpower on a large scale.

 

Russian authorities are likely taking measures to integrate the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) directly into the Russian energy system, contradicting previous Russian statements that the Zaporizhzhia NPP would sell electricity to Ukraine. Olga Kosharna, an independent expert on nuclear energy, stated on June 30 that Russia’s Rosatom (Russian state-owned nuclear energy corporation) employees have been taking measures at the Zaporizhzhia NPP to potentially divert its energy to the Russian energy grid.[2] Kosharna added that Russian forces have been working in Chonhard (southern Kherson Oblast) to repair the main energy transmission line that runs into Crimea, which Ukrainian forces had destroyed in 2015 following Russia’s seizure of the transmission line after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Representatives of Ukraine’s Ukrenergo electricity transmission operator had stated as recently as late May that it would be physically impossible for Russia to divert Ukrainian electricity to Russia following the destruction of those transmission lines.[3] Russian forces are likely seeking to ensure physical access to transmission lines in order to support the direct flow of Ukrainian energy into Russia, which may explain some of the military activities observed in recent weeks in the Russian-occupied portions of Zaporizhia Oblast.

 

Russian authorities had indicated on May 18 that while the Zaporizhzhia NPP would work for Russia, it would continue to sell energy to Ukraine, as ISW reported.[4] However, it is becoming increasingly evident that Russian authorities are taking measures to integrate Ukrainian economic assets directly into the Russian economy. Reports that Russian forces may be preparing a false flag provocation at the Zaporizhzhia NPP could be part of this Russian effort--Moscow might use such a false flag attack to accuse Ukrainian authorities of mismanaging nuclear assets and justify taking full control of them and their output.[5]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces continued efforts to encircle Lysychansk and conducted offensive operations to the south and southwest of the city.
• Russian forces have likely not yet reached the T1302 Bakhmut-Lysychansk highway on the ground but are denying Ukrainian forces use of it by continuing artillery and airstrikes against remaining Ukrainian positions along the road.
• Russian forces focused on regrouping and improving their tactical positions north of Slovyansk.
• Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast and continued shelling Ukrainian positions north of Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces conducted artillery and missile strikes along the Southern Axis.
• Russian authorities continue efforts to expand the pool of recruits available to fight in Ukraine. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

Russian military did a training exercise on the Crimean bridge and didn't close it or warn people, lol.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 02 July 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 2 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces likely conducted a deliberate withdrawal from Lysychansk, resulting in the Russian seizure of the city on July 2. Geolocated footage showed Russian forces casually walking around northern and southeastern neighborhoods in Lysychansk in a

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Ukrainian forces likely conducted a deliberate withdrawal from Lysychansk, resulting in the Russian seizure of the city on July 2. Geolocated footage showed Russian forces casually walking around northern and southeastern neighborhoods in Lysychansk in a way that suggests that there are few or no remaining Ukrainian forces in the city as of July 2.[1] Ukrainian military officials did not publicly announce a troop withdrawal but neither did they report on defensive battles around Lysychansk. Ukrainian Internal Affairs Minister Vadym Denysenko vaguely noted that Russian forces have a “high probability” of capturing Lysychansk but that they will have a difficult time advancing in Donetsk Oblast past Slovyansk and Kramatorsk.[2] Ukrainian National Guard Spokesperson Ruslan Muzychuk rejected reports of Russian forces seizing and encircling Lysychansk, but these denials are likely outdated or erroneous.[3] The Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia, Rodion Miroshnik, had previously claimed that Ukrainian forces began withdrawing from Lysychansk on June 28.[4] ISW will continue to monitor the situation.

 

Russian forces will likely establish control over the remaining territory of Luhansk Oblast in coming days and will likely then prioritize drives on Ukrainian positions in Siversk before turning to Slovyansk and Bakhmut. A Ukrainian withdrawal to Siversk would allow Ukrainian forces reduce the risk of immediate encirclement, but Ukrainian forces may continue a fighting withdrawal to a line near the E40 highway from Slovyansk to Bakhmut.

 

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov inspected Russian troop groupings in Ukraine on July 2.[5] The Russian MoD posted a slideshow of images that reportedly prove that Gerasimov still holds his position as Chief of General Staff and that he had recently been in Ukraine, but notably did not include any video footage of Gerasimov’s purported inspection of Russian troops. This post was likely a response to recent speculation that Gerasimov had been removed from his post as part of the Kremlin’s purge of high-level Russian military leadership due to Russian failures in Ukraine. The Russian MoD amplified a claim that Ukrainian media has been lying about Gerasimov’s removal and stated that Gerasimov is still serving as the Chief of the General Staff.[6] The hasty presentation of a slideshow that does not clearly demonstrate that Gerasimov was recently performing his duties in Ukraine suggests that the Russian leadership is sensitive to rumors of a purge of senior Russian officers or possibly to the impression that the senior most officers are absent or uninvolved in the conflict. The Kremlin likely also seeks to retain or rebuild trust in Russian military leadership against the backdrop of major organizational restructuring, failures, and high casualties, as ISW has previously reported.[7]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces entered Lysychansk and advanced within the city on July 2.
• Russian forces are conducting offensive operations southwest of Lysychansk likely to push westward towards Siversk and complete the capture of the entirety of Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian forces continued unsuccessful ground assaults north of Slovyansk.
• Russian forces conducted limited attacks southwest of Donetsk City but did not make any confirmed gains.
• Ukrainian troops are likely planning to threaten Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) throughout Kharkiv Oblast using Western-supplied weapons.
• Ukrainian counterattacks and partisan activity continue to force Russian troops to prioritize defensive operations along the Southern Axis.
• Proxy leadership may be setting conditions for the direct annexation of proxy republics by the Russian Federation.

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Kings & Generals overview of the third month of the war:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 03 July 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 3 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces have likely secured the Luhansk Oblast border, although pockets of Ukrainian resistance may remain in and around Lysychansk. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that Russian forces have captured Luhansk Oblast on July 3, after

 

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian forces have likely secured the Luhansk Oblast border, although pockets of Ukrainian resistance may remain in and around Lysychansk. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced that Russian forces have captured Luhansk Oblast on July 3, after seizing Lysychansk and settlements on the Luhansk Oblast administrative border.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff also announced that Ukrainian forces withdrew from Lysychansk to avoid personnel losses.[2] Russian forces have likely not fully cleared Lysychansk and Luhansk Oblast as of July 3, despite Shoigu’s announcement. The Russian Defense Ministry stated that Russian forces are still fighting within Lysychansk to defeat remaining encircled Ukrainian forces, but the Ukrainian withdrawal means that Russian forces will almost certainly complete their clearing operations relatively quickly.[3]

 

Russian forces will likely next advance on Siversk, though they could launch more significant attacks on Bakhmut or Slovyansk instead or at the same time. Ukrainian forces will likely continue their fighting withdrawal toward the E40 highway that runs from Slovyansk through Bakhmut toward Debaltseve. It is unclear whether they will choose to defend around Siversk at this time.

 

Two very senior Russian commanders are reportedly responsible for the tactical activities around Lysychansk. Commander of the Central Military District Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin and Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces Army General Sergey Suvorikin (who also commands Russia’s “southern” group of troops in Ukraine) have been responsible for securing Lysychansk and the area to the west of it respectively.[4] The involvement of two such senior officers in the same undertaking in a small part of the front is remarkable and likely indicates the significance that Russian President Vladimir Putin has attributed to securing Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast border as well as his lack of confidence in more junior officers to do the job.

 

Ukrainian forces likely used US-provided HIMARS rocket artillery systems to strike a Russian ammunition depot at the Melitopol airfield on July 3. Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov reported that Ukrainian forces launched two strikes on one of the four Russian depots in Melitopol.[5] Russian Telegram channel Rybar released footage of a large cloud of smoke over the city, and Russian-appointed Melitopol Governor Yevhen Balytskyi falsely claimed that Ukrainian forces aimed to strike residential buildings, but instead hit areas around the airfield.[6]

 

The Kremlin likely seeks to expand Russian state control over private Russian companies that support elements of Russia’s military industrial base. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 3 that the Russian government’s inability to pay Russian firms supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine is degrading Russia’s ability to repair damaged vehicles. The GUR reported that the directors of Russian military vehicle repair centers are not accepting new Russian equipment for repair because the Russian military has not paid these centers for previous work.[7] Recently proposed Russian legislation suggests that Kremlin leadership shares GUR’s assessment. Russian legislators in the Russian State Duma submitted a bill on June 30 that would empower the Kremlin to introduce “special measures in the economic sphere” enabling the Russian government to force private Russian companies to provide supplies for Russian military operations.[8] The bill prohibits Russian businesses from refusing to fulfil Russian government procurement orders connected to Russian military operations.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces seized the remaining territory between Lysychansk and Luhansk Oblast’s administrative borders on July 3.
• Russian forces launched assaults northeast of Bakhmut and north of Slovyansk but did not secure new territorial gains.
• Russian forces conducted extensive artillery attacks in the western part of the Southern Axis likely to disrupt Ukrainian counteroffensives.
• The Kremlin continued to set conditions for potential Russian annexation of proxy republics.
• Ukrainian partisans reportedly derailed a Russian armored train carrying ammunition near Melitopol on July 2.

 

 

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

 

[CitizenVectron]

You can see the frontline in the east and south of Ukraine on the world fire map:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

The next few weeks (or maybe month or more) will be interesting to watch in the south at Kherson. Reports are that Ukrainian forces have sent scout parties as close at 1km from the outskirts of Kherson (city). Ukraine needs to retake Kherson as part of their effort to secure the western bank of the Dnieper (which is a bare minimum for Ukrainian "victory" in the sense of holding Russia to eastern Ukraine). The question is: what is Ukraine willing to do to retake it? It's still very well populated, so I think it's unlikely that Ukraine will engage in bombardment prior to taking it (which is what the Russians have done). More likely is that Ukraine will attempt to encircle the city but leave a corridor out for retreating Russians, and hope that they can force that retreat without massive damage to the city.

 

In other news, it appears that Ukraine has annihilated at least four major ammo depots in the last few days in eastern Ukraine (held by Russians) using HIMARS.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 04 July 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 4 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian President Vladimir Putin celebrated the Russian seizure of Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast border and appeared to direct the Russian military to conduct an operational pause. Putin met with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu on July 4 to

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin celebrated the Russian seizure of Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast border and appeared to direct the Russian military to conduct an operational pause. Putin met with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu on July 4 to discuss recent Russian gains in Luhansk Oblast and presented Colonel General Alexander Lapin and Major General Esedulla Abachev with the “Hero of Russia” award for their leadership during the Lysychansk operation.[1] Putin and Shoigu presented the capture of Lysychansk and Luhansk Oblast as a major victory for Russian forces in Ukraine. Putin also stated that the Russian units that participated in the battle for Lysychansk should rest to increase their combat capabilities.[2] Putin‘s public comment was likely meant to signal his concern for the welfare of his troops in the face of periodic complaints in Russia about the treatment of Russian soldiers. His comment was also likely accurate—Russian troops that fought through Severodonetsk and Lysychansk very likely do need a significant period in which to rest and refit before resuming large-scale offensive operations. It is not clear, however, that the Russian military will accept the risks of a long enough operational pause to allow these likely exhausted forces to regain their strength.

 

Former Russian military commander Igor Girkin, an ardent Russian nationalist who commanded militants during the 2014 war in Donbas, posted a scathing critique of the Kremlin’s handling of the war on his Telegram channel and questioned the significance of the seizure of Lysychansk. He suggested that Russian forces had paid too high a price for a limited gain. In a series of Telegram posts published prior to Putin’s meeting with Shoigu on July 4, Girkin complained that Russian forces have failed to meet the announced goals of the “second stage of the special operation” (the operations in eastern Ukraine following Russia’s retreat from Kyiv) to his nearly 400,000 subscribers.[3] Girkin noted that the Ukrainian defense of Lysychansk was deliberately designed to inflict maximum damage on Russian troops and burn through Russian manpower and equipment. He strongly suggested that accepting battle on the Ukrainians‘ terms was a significant misstep by the Russian leadership.[4] Girkin stated (before Putin’s remarks were made public) that Russian troops need time to rest and replenish in order to recover their offensive potential and noted that the lack of individual soldier replacements and unit rotations is severely degrading morale. He warned, however, that taking time to reconstitute offensive capability would allow Ukrainian troops to seize the initiative and further threaten Russian gains.[5] Girkin additionally claimed that Russian forces have limited prospects of advancing elsewhere in Ukraine due to Ukrainian personnel and equipment superiority.[6]

 

Girkin’s critique is a noteworthy example of the way Russian milbloggers and military enthusiasts have become disillusioned with the Kremlin’s handling and execution of operations in Ukraine, particularly after the dramatic failed river crossing attempt at Bilohorivka in early May.[7] Girkin’s statements directly undermine the Kremlin’s efforts to frame Lysychansk as a significant victory or turning point and show that the disillusionment amongst ultra-nationalist elements in the Russian information space continues to run deep. Girkin’s assessment of Russian military failures notably aligns with much of ISW’s (and other Western agencies’ and experts’) analysis, suggesting that he and some other milbloggers continue to make and publish assessments of the situation and forecasts independent of the Kremlin line. Girkin likely hopes to use his status as a prominent former participant in the war in Donbas in 2014 to persuade Putin to take certain measures to secure Russian success in a war that Girkin still thinks is justified and necessary—specifically mobilizing the Russian population for war on a much larger scale.[8] Girkin, along with other members of the Russian nationalist milblogger space, will likely continue to offer critiques of the Kremlin’s line on operations in Ukraine to advocate for general mobilization and more competent Russian military leadership.

 

Ukrainian forces are increasingly targeting Russian military infrastructure with indirect fire and US-provided HIMARS systems deep in occupied territory. Ukrainian forces reportedly struck Russian ammunition depots in Dibrivne, Kharkiv Oblast, (close to the frontline) on July 4 and Snizhne, Donetsk Oblast, (approximately 75 km from the frontlines) overnight on July 3-4 following a strike on one of four Russian ammunition depots in Melitopol on July 3.[9] The Ukrainian General Staff also published a video on July 4 of a Ukrainian HIMARS (high mobility artillery rocket system) operating in an unspecified area of Zaporizhia Oblast.[10] The increased ability of Ukrainian forces to target critical Russian military facilities with Western-provided HIMARS demonstrates how Western military aid provides Ukraine with new and necessary military capabilities.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian leadership may be setting conditions for an operational pause following the seizure of Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast boundary.
• Russian forces are consolidating territorial and administrative control over Severodonetsk and Lysychansk.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations to the east of Bakhmut to prepare for advances on Bakhmut and Siversk.
• Russian forces continued limited and unsuccessful assaults north of Kharkiv City.
• Ukrainian partisan activity is targeting Russian railway lines around Melitopol and Tokmak.
• Russian leadership may be setting conditions for the conscription of Ukrainian citizens living in occupied territories.

 

 

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

There is a chance that this is as much land as Russia takes. I hope that is the case.

[Jwheel86]

11 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

 

Snake Island is going to become a major front in ideological civil war happening now in the US Marine Corps

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

What the fuck is plarf 

[Jwheel86]

15 minutes ago, b_m_b_m_b_m said:

What the fuck is plarf 

People's Liberation Army Rocket Force. Everything from nuclear ICBMs, conventional warhead missiles, to cruise missiles of various flavors. 

[ThreePi]

Isn't China's artificial island in the South China Sea supposed to be the same idea? 

[CitizenVectron]

Interesting (but good):

 

Americans’ preparedness to pay a price for supporting Ukraine remains robust

WWW.BROOKINGS.EDU

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Americans' willingness to pay a price for supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia is slightly up in the latest University of Maryland Critical Issues Poll on the conflict, though the general trend masks partisan differences, Shibley Telhami writes.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 05 July 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 5 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russia’s stated objectives in its invasion of Ukraine remain regime change in Kyiv and the truncation of the sovereignty of any Ukrainian state that survives the Russian attack despite Russian military setbacks and rhetoric hinting at a reduction in war a

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russia’s stated objectives in its invasion of Ukraine remain regime change in Kyiv and the truncation of the sovereignty of any Ukrainian state that survives the Russian attack despite Russian military setbacks and rhetoric hinting at a reduction in war aims following those defeats. Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev stated on July 5 that the Russian military operation in Ukraine will continue until Russia achieves its goals of protecting civilians from “genocide,” “denazifying” and demilitarizing Ukraine, and obliging Ukraine to be permanently neutral between Russia and NATO—almost exactly restating the goals Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in his February 24 speech justifying the war.[1] Putin had stated that the operation aimed to protect civilians from humiliation and genocide, demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, and prosecute genocidal perpetrators.[2] Patrushev’s explicit restatement of Putin‘s initial objectives, nearly five months later, strongly indicates that the Kremlin does not consider recent Russian gains in Luhansk Oblast sufficient to accomplish the initial goals of the "special operation,” supporting ISW’s ongoing assessment that the Kremlin has significant territorial aspirations beyond the Donbas. Patrushev’s statement suggests that Russian military leadership will continue to push for advances outside Donetsk and Luhansk blasts and that the Kremlin is preparing for a protracted war with the intention of taking much larger portions of Ukraine.[3]

 

Patrushev’s statement is noteworthy because of its timing and his position as a close confidante of Putin. Patrushev is very unlikely to stray far from Putin’s position in his public comments given his relationship with Putin and his role in the Kremlin. His restatement of virtually the same maximalist objectives that Putin laid out before the invasion even as Russian forces seemed to be closing in on the more limited objectives of securing Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts—which Putin and other Russian leaders had hinted were their new aims following their defeats around Kyiv—strongly suggests that those hints did not reflect any actual change in Kremlin policy. Patrushev’s statement significantly increases the burden on those who suggest that some compromise ceasefire or even peace based on limited additional Russian territorial gains is possible, even if it were acceptable to Ukraine or desirable for the West (neither of which is the case).

 

Igor Girkin, a Russian nationalist and former commander of militants in the 2014 war in Donbas, responded to Patrushev’s statements and continued expressing his general disillusionment with the Kremlin’s official line on operations in Ukraine. Girkin said that the intended goals of “denazification” and “de-militarization” will only be possible with the total defeat of the Ukrainian military and the surrender of the Ukrainian government.[4] Girkin noted that Russian victory is premised on the capture of "Novorossiya”—a notional territory that encompasses eight Ukrainian oblasts, including the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and much of eastern and southern Ukraine. Girkin also claimed that the capture of “Novorossiya” is the bare minimum and that Russian goals will be realized through the total capture of “Malorossiya,” which is an invocation of the Russian imperial concept for almost all Ukrainian territory. Girkin is once again pushing back on the Kremlin line, which he views as insufficient in securing Russian objectives in Ukraine. Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Ambassador to Russia Rodion Miroshnik similarly suggested that the Kremlin has not yet met its goals in Ukraine, despite reaching the borders of his claimed oblast, and stated that LNR authorities are still not confident in the security of the LNR.[5] Girkin and Miroshnik’s statements, taken together, indicate that Russian nationalists continue to push for further territorial gains and, at least in Girkin’s case, full-scale regime change and the incorporation of most of Ukraine into Russia. Patrushev’s statement suggests that Kremlin thinking may not be that far removed from these extremist nationalist ambitions.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev restated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initial objectives for operations in Ukraine, suggesting that the Kremlin retains maximalist objectives including regime change and territorial expansion far beyond the Donbas.
• Russian forces continued offensive operations northwest and east of Slovyansk.
• Russian forces are attempting to advance west of the Lysychansk area toward Siversk.
• Russian forces are likely attempting to gain access to village roads southeast of Bakhmut in order to advance on the city from the south.
• Ukrainian forces conducted a limited counterattack southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces continued limited and unsuccessful assaults in northern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian authorities are conducting escalated conscription measures in occupied territories to compensate for continuing manpower losses.
• Russian authorities are continuing to consolidate administrative control of occupied areas of Ukraine, likely to set conditions for the direct annexation of these territories to the Russian Federation.

 

 

 

 

 

[Ghost_MH]

Google allowed sanctioned Russian ad company to harvest user data for months

ARSTECHNICA.COM

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Info included unique mobile phone IDs, IP addresses, location information, and more.

 

Quote

Google spokesperson Michael Aciman said that the company blocked RuTarget from using its ad products in March and that RuTarget has not purchased ads directly via Google since then. He acknowledged the Russian company was still receiving user and ad buying data from Google before being alerted by ProPublica and Adalytics.

 

Love the doubletalk there. Yes, we blocked them back in March. Yes, they continued to receive location and other user data from people in Ukraine.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 06 July 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 6 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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There were no claimed or assessed Russian territorial gains in Ukraine on July 6 for the first time in 133 days of war, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have largely initiated an operational pause. The Russian Defense Ministry claimed t

 

 

Quote

 

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

There were no claimed or assessed Russian territorial gains in Ukraine on July 6 for the first time in 133 days of war, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russian forces have largely initiated an operational pause.[1] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed territorial gains every day from the start of the war but has not claimed any new territory or ground force movements since completing the encirclement of Lysychansk on July 3.[2] However, Russian forces still conducted limited and unsuccessful ground assaults across all axes on July 6.[3] Such attempts are consistent with a Russian operational pause, which does not imply or require the complete cessation of active hostilities. It means, in this case, that Russian forces will likely confine themselves to relatively small-scale offensive actions as they attempt to set conditions for more significant offensive operations and rebuild the combat power needed to attempt those more ambitious undertakings.   

 

The Kremlin continued to set conditions for the crypto-mobilization of the Russian economy in anticipation of protracted operations in Ukraine. The Russian State Duma adopted the third and final reading of a law introduced by the cabinet of ministers on June 30 that will allow the Russian government to oversee and regulate labor relations in Russian enterprises (both state and privately-owned).[4] This law, as ISW has previously reported, will allow government officials to recall workers from personal vacations, reschedule time off without employee consent, and require employees to work weekends, holidays, and nights. These measures allow the Kremlin to take much more direct control of most aspects of the Russian economy, including suspending rights and protections some workers would normally have.[5] The law must still be sent to the Federation Council before it reaches Russian President Vladimir Putin and is officially published, but the Kremlin is likely seeking to use the law to leverage domestic labor to maximize economic output and prepare for protracted operations in Ukraine.[6] Russia’s largest lead production plant reportedly stopped production on July 6 due to the almost-total halt of Russian metallurgical exports, and the Kremlin will likely continue to take measures to codify economic mobilization to offset or mitigate the effects of sanctions and the war on essential industries.[7]

 

Key Takeaways

• The Russian Ministry of Defense has not claimed any territorial gains since July 3, supporting the assessment that Russian forces are conducting an operational pause while still engaging in limited ground attacks to set conditions for more significant offensive operations.
• The Kremlin continues to prepare for a protracted war by setting conditions for crypto-mobilization of the economy and largely initiating an operational pause in Ukraine.
• Russian forces conducted offensive operations northwest and east of Slovyansk.
• Russian forces continued efforts to push westward toward Siversk from the Luhansk-Donetsk oblast border.
• Russian forces continued attempts to advance toward Bakhmut from the south.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks north of Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground assaults in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces may be setting conditions for a counteroffensive toward Kherson City.
• Russian forces may be forming a new military unit in Mulino, Nizhny Novgorod Oblast.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Not nearly as sexy as taking out artillery units or tanks, but Ukraine has been using the HIMARS to great effect. Here is a map of the confirmed large depots destroyed in the last week:

 

 

This doesn't include oil refineries/depots hit today.

 

[CitizenVectron]

I have never seen two men that are so identifiably Ukrainian and British:

 

 

[CayceG]

Give Ukraine Typhoon FGR4s!