Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[CitizenVectron]

Is Ukraine flying sorties over Russia, now?

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 30 April 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 30 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Further Russian reinforcements to the Izyum axis are unlikely to enable stalled Russian forces to achieve substantial advances. Elements of unspecified Eastern Military District units and several air-defense assets are reportedly deploying from Belgorod

 

 

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Further Russian reinforcements to the Izyum axis are unlikely to enable stalled Russian forces to achieve substantial advances. Elements of unspecified Eastern Military District units and several air-defense assets are reportedly deploying from Belgorod to the Izyum front to support likely degraded Russian units attempting to advance south of the city. These forces are unlikely to enable Russian forces to break the current deadlock, as Russian attacks remain confined to two major highways (toward Slovyansk and Barvinkove) and cannot leverage greater numbers. Several successful Ukrainian counterattacks out of Kharkiv city in the last 72 hours have additionally recaptured a ring of suburbs north and east of the city and may additionally force Russian forces to redeploy units intended for the Izyum axis to hold these positions. Russian forces appear increasingly unlikely to achieve any major advances in eastern Ukraine, and Ukrainian forces may be able to conduct wider counterattacks in the coming days.

 

Key Takeaways

• A Ukrainian counteroffensive out of Kharkiv City will likely alleviate pressure on parts of the city that have suffered the most from Russian shelling and may force Russian troops from Izyum to re-deploy northward to support forces maintaining the partial encirclement of Kharkiv.
• Additional Russian forces are deploying to the Izyum front but are unlikely to enable any major advances.
• Russian troops did not make any confirmed advances to the southwest or southeast of Izyum or to the west of the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline.
• Russian forces in Kherson are pausing major offensive operations to improve their tactical positions and regroup to prepare for a renewed offensive to capture the administrative borders of Kherson.
• Russian occupation forces in Mariupol announced plans to consolidate their control over the city and intend to return Ukrainian citizens forcibly deported into Russia at some point in the future.

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 01 May 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces are setting conditions to establish permanent control over the areas of southern Ukraine they currently occupy, either as nominally independent “People’s Republics” or by annexing them to Russia. Russian sources reported that stores in occu

 

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Russian forces are setting conditions to establish permanent control over the areas of southern Ukraine they currently occupy, either as nominally independent “People’s Republics” or by annexing them to Russia. Russian sources reported that stores in occupied Melitopol and Volnovakha are beginning to transition to using the Russian ruble.[1] British Defense Intelligence reported that the ruble will be used in Kherson City starting on May 1 as part of a 4-month currency transition scheme enacted by the occupation administration.[2] These measures, which are not necessary or normal in military occupation administrations, indicate that Russian President Vladimir Putin likely intends to retain control over these areas and that his ambitions are not confined to Donbas.

 

Western and Ukrainian sources claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin may announce a “general mobilization” of the Russian military on May 9th. British Defense Minister Ben Wallace claimed that Putin may make this announcement, although Wallace admitted this was a personal opinion and not based on intelligence.[3] Advisor to the Ukrainian President Mikhail Podolyak amplified Wallace’s claims and stated that a general mobilization on May 9 would be consistent with the economic imperatives faced by Russia as a result of the invasion of Ukraine.[4] ISW has no independent verification of these claims, which would not in any event generate large numbers of usable soldiers for many months.

 

The Kremlin likely seeks to leverage its partners in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to evade Western sanctions. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russia is courting CSTO members to procure input goods and materials for dual-use technologies that Russia cannot directly purchase due to Western sanctions.[5] The GUR stated that this effort will increase CSTO members’ economic dependence on Russia and enable Russian sanction evasion by using third-party countries to re-export Russian products to international markets.[6] The GUR stated that the Russian Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant is attempting to obtain German components needed for the production of Buk surface-to-air missile systems and Tunguska missiles via Kazakhstan. Western sanctions may need to target Russia’s partners in the CSTO and Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) customs union to prevent Russian sanctions evasion.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian occupying forces are setting conditions to allow Russia to permanently govern occupied areas in southern Ukraine, not just in Donbas.
• Ukrainian forces likely conducted a rocket artillery strike on a Russian command post in Izyum on April 30 that struck after Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov had left but killed other senior Russian officers.
• Russian forces continue to make incremental advances moving southwestward in the direction of Lyman but are largely stalled against Ukrainian positions on the pre-February 24 frontline.
• Russian forces continued re-grouping and reconnaissance on the Southern Axis and did not make any confirmed advances.

 

 

 

[CayceG]

29 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

Is Ukraine flying sorties over Russia, now?

 

 

 

 

 

This is a wild guess on my part:

 

I saw a video a few days ago where the Ukrainians downed a Russian helicopter. The helicopter was consistently and at regular intervals popping flares as a means of consistent air defenses in hostile territory. But what if it wasn't doing so because it expected Ukrainian fire... but if it was a measure to signal to friendly Russian troops that it wasn't hostile? Based on that, maybe these fighters were doing the same thing. 

 

 

That may be too convoluted. My guess is the flares over Belgorod are Russian fighters doing it as standard practice or something. 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[PaladinSolo]

The TOS getting hit and just lobbing thermobarics into the forrest due to the fire is kinda nuts.

 

But overall it kinda just looks like Russia driving into areas getting blown to bits and retreating all over again.

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Whoops

 

 

[CayceG]

Russia continues the grand tradition of totalitarian governments planting trees in a pattern of images of oppression.

 

 

[Kal-El814]

1 hour ago, CayceG said:

Russia continues the grand tradition of totalitarian governments planting trees in a pattern of images of oppression.

 

 

 

A classic. 

YTMND - OMG, Secret Nazi Forest!!

OMGSECRETNAZIFOREST.YTMND.COM

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Couldn't recreate naziforest even though the site is deleted, what the hell max, why is it so hard to preserve ytmnd history?

 

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine appears to be making major advances in the Kharkiv Oblast since Russia moved most of their stuff further east.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

I imagine if Russia tries this that Ukraine will attempt a shootdown:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

From one of my favorite YouTube channels:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

19 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

From one of my favorite YouTube channels:

 

 

 

Pretty sure it was through the use of Bayraktar strike videos superimposed with metal and europop songs.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Lavrov says Israel has the history of the Holocaust "all wrong."

 

 

Also:

 

 

So:

 

Israel reportedly leaning toward sending defensive military aid to Ukraine

WWW.TIMESOFISRAEL.COM

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Officials expected to support sending defensive equipment at symbolic levels in attempt to keep Russia ties intact; Israel recently agreed to send defensive aid to...

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

If true, it's going to be a very bloody underground battle.

[CitizenVectron]

Reports that Ukraine has managed to retake Staryi Saltiv. This cuts off much of the Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk, making retreat harder.

 

[silentbob]

2 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

Reports that Ukraine has managed to retake Staryi Saltiv. This cuts off much of the Russian forces in Kharkiv Oblast from Donetsk, making retreat harder.

 

Now let’s give them the weapons so they can destroy them all

[CayceG]

 

 

This might be why Ukraine isn't making a ton of pushes that get them a ton of land--they are outnumbered and naturally arranged in a salient. 

 

[CitizenVectron]

5 minutes ago, CayceG said:

 

 

This might be why Ukraine isn't making a ton of pushes that get them a ton of land--they are outnumbered and naturally arranged in a salient. 

 

 

Yeah, I believe estimates put the Russian manpower advantage in the Donbas at 8:1, which makes Ukraine's defense even more remarkable. The question is: where are the rest of the Ukrainian soldiers, and when are they headed to the eastern front?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 02 May 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 2 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Ukraine on May 2. The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on the Russian command post in Izyum may be continuing to disrupt Russian efforts on the Izyum axis. Russian troops on the

 

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Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in Ukraine on May 2. The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on the Russian command post in Izyum may be continuing to disrupt Russian efforts on the Izyum axis. Russian troops on the Donetsk-Luhansk frontline and Southern Axis continued to regroup, likely in preparation for renewed offensives or to resist or reverse Ukrainian counter-offensives.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks along any axes of advance and instead shelled Ukrainian positions on the frontlines.
• The April 30 Ukrainian artillery strike on Russian command headquarters near Izyum likely disrupted Russian operations on the Izyum axis and may hinder Russian offensives from Izyum for the next few days.
• Russian forces on the Southern Axis continued to regroup and reconnoiter likely in preparation for ground assaults in the direction of Kryvyi Rih, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Apparently Russian soldiers are now terrified of Ukrainian artillery (which could be tied to the apparently introduction of M777 systems, which are scary accurate) and are refusing to enter combat. Officers are threatening to shoot soldiers if they refuse to advance:

 

 

[Chairslinger]

1 minute ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

 

 

Super smart Russian soldier: I don't want to die so I broke my tank.

 

Also super smart Russia soldier: *Casually discussing his treason on the radio*

[Spork3245]

5 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 Officers are threatening to shoot soldiers if they refuse to advance:

 

Ah, so they've readopted their WW2 tactics

[Comet]

1 hour ago, Spork3245 said:

 

Ah, so they've readopted their WW2 tactics

Back to the front! 

[Uaarkson]

3 hours ago, Spork3245 said:

 

Ah, so they've readopted their WW2 tactics

Even back in 2002 the Russians were known for this shit.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 03 May 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian officials reported with increasing confidence that the Kremlin will announce mobilization on May 9. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Kyrylo Budanov said on May 2 that the Kremlin has begun to prepare mobilization processes

 

 

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Ukrainian officials reported with increasing confidence that the Kremlin will announce mobilization on May 9. Ukraine’s Main Military Intelligence Directorate Chief Kyrylo Budanov said on May 2 that the Kremlin has begun to prepare mobilization processes and personnel ahead of the expected May 9 announcement and has already carried out covert mobilization.[1] Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council said that high-ranking Russian officials are trying to legitimize a prolonged war effort as the Third World War against the West, rather than the "special military operation” against Ukraine, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has hitherto framed Russia’s invasion.[2] ISW has no independent confirmation of Russian preparations for mobilization.

 

A significant Ukrainian counteroffensive pushed Russian forces roughly 40 km east of Kharkiv City.[3] A senior American defense official reported the Ukrainian operation, which is consistent with social media reports from both Ukrainian and Russian sources that Ukrainian troops took control of Staryi Saltiv on May 2.[4] This Ukrainian counteroffensive is very unlikely to affect Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum, as the Russians have not been relying on GLOCs from Kharkiv to support their operations in Izyum but have been using routes further to the east and well beyond the most recent Ukrainian counteroffensive’s limit of advance. The Ukrainian counteroffensive may, however, unhinge the Russian positions northeast of Kharkiv and could set conditions for a broader operation to drive the Russians from most of their positions around the city. This possibility may pose a dilemma for the Russians—whether to reinforce their positions near Kharkiv to prevent such a broader Ukrainian operation or to risk losing most or all of their positions in artillery range of the city.

 

Russia’s long-term intentions regarding the status of Mariupol and other occupied areas seem confused. Some anecdotes from Mariupol indicate that Russia may plan to incorporate Mariupol and the surrounding environs into the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), and possibly annex the DNR to the Russian Federation. Other anecdotes suggest that Russia could directly absorb Mariupol into Rostov Oblast. These inconsistencies could simply be artifacts of reporting or confusion on the ground, but they could also indicate actual confusion about Russia’s long-term plans for governing the Ukrainian regions that Moscow’s forces currently occupy. These anecdotes clearly support the assessment that Putin has no intention of ceding occupied territories back to an independent Ukraine and is, at most, considering exactly how he intends to govern regions that Russia has illegally seized.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces resumed air, artillery, and ground assaults on the Azovstal Steel Plant following the conclusion of the May 2 evacuation efforts.
• Russian forces continued to regroup on the Donetsk-Luhansk axis in likely preparation for a westward advance in the direction of Lyman and Slovyansk.
• The Ukrainian Armed Forces conducted a counteroffensive that likely pushed Russian forces up to 40 km east of Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground offensives in Zaporizhia Oblast in the vicinity of Huliapole and intensified reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of Odesa amid growing tensions in Transnistria.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Realistically, how does mobilization change things for Ukraine?

[PaladinSolo]

8 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

Realistically, how does mobilization change things for Ukraine?

Probably not much, fresh bodies, but not as well trained or as motivated though.

[Chris-]

Apparently contact has been lost with the holdouts in Azovstal. 

[CitizenVectron]

 

The ultimate revenge.