Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (16 Apr 2024) - Ukraine "ran out of missiles" around Kyiv, which allowed Russia to destroy major power plant

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 12 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 12 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to mobilize industry to support prolonged war efforts in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin initiated the “industrial mobilization” of the defense enterprises

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

The Kremlin is reportedly attempting to mobilize industry to support prolonged war efforts in Ukraine. The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that the Kremlin initiated the “industrial mobilization” of the defense enterprises in early August, banning some employees and the entire leadership at the Russian state industrial conglomerate company Rostec from taking vacations.[1] The GUR added that the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation, chaired by Russian President Vladimir Putin, is preparing to change the state defense order program by early September to increase expenditures by 600-700 billion rubles (approximately $10 billion). Russian outlet Ura also reported that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu likely visited the Uralvagonzavod factory, the largest tank manufacturer in Russia and the producer of Russia’s T-72 main battle tanks, on August 12.[2] The GUR previously reported that Uralvagonzavod faced financial issues due to Western-enforced sanctions and failure to meet state contract obligations.[3] If true, Shoigu’s visit could suggest that the Kremlin is attempting to restart or expand the operation of the military-industrial complex. ISW has previously reported that the Kremlin has been conducting a crypto-mobilization of the Russian economy by proposing an amendment to the federal laws on Russian Armed Forces supply matters to the Russian State Duma on June 30.[4] The amendment obliges Russian businesses, regardless of ownership, to fulfill Russian military orders and allows the Kremlin to change work conditions for employees. Putin signed the amendment on July 14, which indicates that the Kremlin will continue to introduce more measures to expand the Kremlin’s direct control over the operations of Russia’s military-industrial complex.[5]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted ground attacks east of Siversk and northeast and southeast of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks southwest and northwest of Donetsk City.
• Ukrainian forces destroyed the last functioning bridge Russian forces used to transport military equipment near the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant.
• Ukrainian officials confirmed additional Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots and a logistics point in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian regional officials may be misrepresenting percentage fill of newly formed volunteer battalions.
• Ukrainian partisans are likely targeting Russian occupation officials and Ukrainian collaborators who are preparing for the sham annexation referenda to disrupt the Russian annexation of occupied Ukraine.

 

 

 

[Anathema-]

4 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

Will be interesting if Ukraine can pull this off. From the sounds of it, they've pulled anywhere from 30-60% of Russia's total forces into this circle, and have now blown all the bridges across the river. You can get across on foot, but they won't support tanks, heavy trucks, etc. 

 

what would the ukranians want with huge piles of garbage

[Anathema-]

BTW I've been meaning to say this specifically but thank you @Commissar SFLUFAN for posting the intel updates.  I like keeping up with what's going on and you help me not forget.

[Remarkableriots]

 

[CayceG]

8 hours ago, Remarkableriots said:

 

 

 

 

What a garbage news report!

 

For one, the framing is about the Zaporizhzhia NPP. So she goes to Chernobyl??? 

The Zaporizhzhia NPP has a completely different nuclear reactor type than Chernobyl did. It is inherently safer and can't explode. Likewise, the Chernobyl disaster didn't happen because of external explosions or damage. It was a specific set of instances that caused that disaster. 

 

If the fighting impacts the Zaporizhzhia NPP, it will most likely be at the spent fuel storage area. But that's a far cry from the magnitude of a disaster that Chernobyl was. 

 

This reporter wanted to fearmonger about nuclear power because she doesn't understand it and ABC didn't care. 

Had she wanted to do a proper report (and presuming Ukraine wanted to allow this access to her and the ABC team) she could have gone to Rivne, Ukraine. It has a NPP that is exactly the same as Zaporizhzhia's down to the same type of reactor. 

 

 

There isn't NO danger here with the Zaporizhzhia NPP and the front line's move towards that location. But we're not going to experience another Chernobyl. This is journalistic malpractice. 

 

[Anathema-]

It's also playing into the psychological warfare aspect. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 13 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 13 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that support Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian forces struck the bridge on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) dam

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that support Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian forces struck the bridge on the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) dam again on August 13, reportedly rendering the bridge unusable by heavy vehicles.[1] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command had previously reported on August 10 that the Kakhovka HPP dam bridge was unfit for use.[2] The Kakhovka bridge was the only road bridge Russian forces could use following Ukrainian forces’ successful efforts to put the Antonivsky road bridge out of commission. The UK Defense Ministry has claimed that Russian forces now have no bridges usable to bring heavy equipment or supplies over the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast and must rely mainly on the pontoon ferry they have established near the Antonivsky road bridge.[3]  ISW cannot confirm at this time whether Russian forces can use the Antonivsky rail bridge to resupply forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River. 

 

Russian forces cannot support mechanized operations at scale without a reliable GLOC.  Bringing ammunition, fuel, and heavy equipment sufficient for offensive or even large-scale defensive operations across pontoon ferries or by air is impractical if not impossible. If Ukrainian forces have disrupted all three bridges and can prevent the Russians from restoring any of them to usability for a protracted period then Russian forces on the west bank of the Dnipro will likely lose the ability to defend themselves against even limited Ukrainian counterattacks.

 

Indicators of degraded Russian supplies resulting from the disruption of Russian GLOCs over the Dnipro River would include: observed fuel and ammunition shortages among Russian forces in western Kherson Oblast; abandoned Russian vehicles; decreased intensity and, finally, cessation of Russian ground assaults and artillery attacks; possibly increased instances of Russian looting; increased reports from Russian soldiers about supply shortfalls; increased numbers of Russian prisoners of war taken by Ukrainian forces; and an observed absence of new heavy machinery transported to western Kherson.  Such indicators could take days or weeks to observe depending on how much Russian forces have been able to stockpile supplies on the west bank of the

Dnipro and how successful Ukrainian forces are at finding and destroying those stockpiles while keeping the bridges inoperable.

 

Ukrainian Mykolaiv Oblast Head Vitaly Kim reported that unspecified Russian military command elements left upper Kherson Oblast and relocated to the left bank of the Dnipro River, suggesting that the Russian military leadership is concerned about being trapped on the wrong side of the river.[4] Ukrainian Advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs Rostislav Smirnov also stated that Russia has deployed 90% of its air assault forces (presumably 90% of those deployed in Ukraine) to unspecified locations in southern Ukraine to augment Russian defenses or possibly prepare for Russian counteroffensives.[5] It is unclear whether the Russian airborne units Smirnov mentioned are concentrated exclusively in Kherson Oblast or also deployed near Zaporizhia. Elements of the Russian 7^th Airborne Division are known to be operating in Kherson Oblast as of at least August 10.[6] The concentration of Russian Airborne Forces in western Kherson Oblast could indicate Russian efforts to use forces to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive that they are more likely to be able to exfiltrate by air if they are unable to hold the Ukrainians back or reestablish their GLOCs.  Airborne forces are easier to move by aircraft than regular mechanized forces, of course, although the Russians could find it challenging and very risky to try to move forces by air given Ukrainian attacks on airfields in Kherson Oblast and Russian failure to secure air superiority.

 

Russian forces may be reprioritizing advances in northeastern Donetsk Oblast in order to draw attention from Ukrainian counteroffensive actions in Southern Ukraine. Russian forces had seemingly scaled back offensive actions east of Siversk and conducted sporadic and limited ground attacks while relying heavily on artillery barrages of surrounding settlements since August 6.[7] However, since August 11, Russian forces have increased the number of limited ground attacks in the Siversk area.[8] These attacks, along with continued assaults in the direction of Bakhmut, may constitute an effort to draw Ukrainian materiel and personnel to the Bakhmut-Siversk line in northeastern Donetsk Oblast in order to detract Ukraine’s attention from critical areas in the South, where Ukrainian troops have been conducting effective counterattacks and may be setting conditions to launch a counteroffensive.[9] Russian forces may hope to shift both tactical and rhetorical focus away from the south in order to alleviate pressure on their own operations along the Southern Axis. ISW will continue to monitor the situation around Siversk. 

 

Key Takeaways

• Ukrainian forces are continuing efforts to disrupt Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) that support Russian forces on the right bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian forces may be reprioritizing efforts in northeastern Donetsk Oblast in order to draw Ukrainian attention away from the Southern Axis.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk, east of Siversk, and south and east of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted a limited ground assault north of Kharkiv City.
• Russian and Ukrainian authorities accused each other of shelling the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
• Russian authorities are failing to pay Russian reservists and members of volunteer units for service in Ukraine.
• Russian-backed occupation authorities are likely dealing with internal challenges that are complicating efforts to administer occupation regimes and institute restoration projects in decimated areas of Donbas.

 

[CayceG]

Some of my friends have reunited. They escaped Kyiv the day the Russians invaded and the wife took their two kids to Germany. Sasha, the husband, stayed in Ukraine moving around in the West. Since Russia pulled back from Kyiv, he had been able to go back to Kyiv. 

 

This week, they reunited and went back home to Obolon in Kyiv. 

 

He sent me photos of some spoils of war on display in the Capital. 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

98% of Ukrainians believe Ukraine will win the war against Russia

WWW.YAHOO.COM

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98% of Ukrainians believe in the victory of Ukraine in the full-scale war against Russia, and 91% approve of the actions of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, according to a survey done by the Ukrainian sociological research group Rating, commissioned by the Center for Insights in Survey Research (CISR) of the International Republican Institute (IRI) on June 27-28.

 

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When asked whether they support the actions of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 59% answered that they strongly support them and 32% that they rather support them. Thus, overalll, 91% of respondents support the president's actions.

 

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The actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine are fully supported by 88% of respondents, and mostly supported by 10%. Thus, 98% of Ukrainians approve of the actions of the army.

 

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At the same time, according to the survey, support for NATO membership has increased in recent months. 72% of Ukrainians would support joining the alliance if a referendum on the matter was held now. This is a jump of 13 percentage points compared to the results of a similar survey conducted in April.

 

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64% believe that Ukraine will keep all territories from its internationally recognized borders in 1991 after the current war. 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Oh also, when you hear a phrase like "Wagner soldiers revealed the location of their base in photos," you might think it means they showed an identifiable building, landmark, or even accidentally didn't wipe the gps metadata. But...they literally posted photos with the building's address showing.

[PaladinSolo]

1 hour ago, CitizenVectron said:

98% of Ukrainians believe Ukraine will win the war against Russia

WWW.YAHOO.COM

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98% of Ukrainians believe in the victory of Ukraine in the full-scale war against Russia, and 91% approve of the actions of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, according to a survey done by the Ukrainian sociological research group Rating, commissioned by the Center for Insights in...

 

 

 

 

 

Like I said earlier in here, giving Ukraine a bunch of shit were not using or going to be using is the easiest expansion of the US empire/influence  we've ever done. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 14 August 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 14 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian and proxy troops in Ukraine are likely operating in roughly six groups of forces oriented on Kharkiv City and northeastern Kharkiv Oblast; along the Izyum-Slovyansk line; the Siversk-Lysychansk area; Bakhmut; the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area; and

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian and proxy troops in Ukraine are likely operating in roughly six groups of forces oriented on Kharkiv City and northeastern Kharkiv Oblast; along the Izyum-Slovyansk line; the Siversk-Lysychansk area; Bakhmut; the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area; and Southern Ukraine. The Kharkiv City and Siversk-Lysychansk groups are likely built around cores drawn from the Western and Central Military Districts respectively. The Izyum-Slovyansk axis is increasingly manned by recently formed volunteer battalions that likely have very low combat power. Wagner Group private military company (PMC) soldiers are in the lead around Bakhmut, while forces drawn from the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) predominate in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area. Troops from the Southern Military District (SMD) likely formed the original core of forces in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts but have been reinforced with troops of the Eastern Military District, Airborne Forces, and Rosgvardia. None of these groupings is homogeneous—elements of various military districts, proxy forces, volunteer units, and other formations are scattered throughout the theater. 

 

These dispositions suggest that Moscow is prioritizing the advance around Bakhmut and, possibly, toward Siversk with its Russian forces while seeking to draw on the enthusiasm of DNR forces to seize ground they have failed to take since 2014 on the Avdiivka axis. The high concentration of volunteer battalions around Izyum and Slovyansk suggests that that area is not a focus of Russian attention and may be vulnerable to Ukrainian counterattacks. The congeries of forces in and around Kherson Oblast may pose significant challenges to Russian command and control, especially if Ukrainian forces press a counteroffensive there.

 

Kharkiv City and northeastern Kharkiv Oblast:

 

Mainly Western Military District units

 

Russian force composition around Kharkiv City is at least in part composed of Western Military District (WMD) units. The Ukrainian General Staff has identified that Russian forces concentrated WMD units around Kharkiv City and in border areas of Russia’s Kursk and Bryansk Oblasts (northeast of the city).[1]Russian offensive operations on this axis have generally been desultory and suggest a lack of focus, possibly reflected in more limited force deployments.

 

Izyum-Slovyansk line:

 

Mainly Volunteer Battalions and some Eastern Military District units

 

Russian forces are likely committing volunteer units and some remaining detachments of the Eastern Military District (EMD) to the Izyum-Slovyansk line and are likely deprioritizing the axis in favor of defending positions in southern Ukraine. Ukrainian military officials reported that EMD elements that had previously supported offensive operations towards Slovyansk have been redeploying to the Southern Axis in an effort to defend occupied territories in western Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts.[2] Russian outlets and Telegram channels have begun identifying and announcing recruitment for volunteer units operating near Izyum around reports of Ukrainian counteroffensive preparations. Russian media outlet Readovka reported that the volunteer Cossack detachments “Yermak” and “Kuban” are recruiting reinforcements for offensive operations in Kharkiv Oblast, likely around Izyum given that Cossack units have been operating in the area since April.[3] Kremlin-affiliated outlet Kommersant also reported that the “Don” Cossack Detachment that has been fighting around Velyka Komyshyvakha (southwest of Izyum) since April is joining volunteer and other Cossack units (including the ”Kuban” detachment).[4] Russian war correspondent Sasha Kots reported that the “Russian Legion” is recruiting personnel to operate on the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border.[5] The “Russian Legion” has reportedly operated southeast of Izyum since entering Ukraine on May 12. Reliance on volunteer forces may explain the lack of Russian progress and some successful Ukrainian counterattacks on the Izyum-Slovyansk line.

 

Siversk-Lysychansk:

 

Central Military District with some DNR and LNR units

 

Units of the Russian Central Military District (CMD) and some LNR and DNR units are operating on the Siversk-Lysychansk axis and have resumed their offensive operations likely following an operational pause initiated in late July. CMD Commander Colonel General Aleksandr Lapin visited Lysychansk on August 8 and likely ordered CMD troops to resume offensive operations towards Siversk during his visit. The Russian Defense Ministry identified Lapin as responsible for securing Lysychansk on July 3, and he had likely continued to command the troops in the area since then.[6] The grouping has been consistently launching offensive operations in the Siversk area since August 8, whereas they had previously engaged in sporadic limited assaults usually at two-to-three-day intervals.[7] Social media footage published on Twitter on August 5 showed elements of the Russian 55th Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 41st Combined Arms Army of the CMD reportedly operating in the direction of Siversk.[8] ISW has previously reported that Russian forces also moved a CMD battalion tactical group (BTG) to the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area in late June.[9]

 

Bakhmut:

 

Wagner Group with LNR and some WMD units

 

Detachments of the Wagner Group private military company (PMC) have been active in Russian efforts to gain ground around Bakhmut and have likely contributed to recent successes in this area. Various Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Wagner Group mercenaries were instrumental in the previous captures of Pokrovske (due east of Bakhmut), Klynove (18km southeast of Bakhmut), Novoluhanske (25km southeast of Bakhmut), and the Vuhlehirska Power Plant (about 20km southeast of Bakhmut).[10] Russian Telegram channels lauded the work of the Wagner Group in completing the tactically complicated capture of the Vuhlehirska Power Plant on July 26, showing the approval that the Russian information space has recently awarded the Wagner Group.[11] LNR units, such as the 6th Cossack Regiment, and other WMD detachments are operating in the Bakhmut direction as well.[12]

The Wagner Group also reportedly maintains a headquarters in Popasna, about 40km northeast of Bakhmut. A Russian miblogger posted imagery on Telegram of his reported visit to the Wagner Group headquarters, which he claimed was in Popasna, on August 9.[13] This location likely allows Wagner Group command to coordinate various offensive operations in northeastern Donetsk Oblast from well within Russian-occupied territory in Luhansk Oblast. Various Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Ukrainian forces targeted and destroyed the headquarters on August 14, possibly based on geolocation of the aforementioned milblogger’s Telegram post.[14] The strike may impact Wagner’s command and control abilities in the Bakhmut area.

 

Avdiivka-Donetsk City:

 

DNR units

 

DNR units, which have been operating in the area since 2014, are operating in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area after likely having participated in operations to seize Luhansk Oblast. DNR-based milbloggers and war correspondents have been publishing footage of the DNR 1st Slavic Brigade, 5th Brigade, and the 11th Regiment making limited advances north and northwest of Donetsk City.[15] The DNR also began advertising volunteer recruitment for the DNR 100th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, and Ukrainian officials reported that Russian occupation authorities have begun to mobilize men from Mariupol to join DNR efforts.[16] Readovka also identified that one unspecified Cossack detachment is operating around Mariinka, northwest of Donetsk City.[17] ISW has previously assessed that DNR-based milbloggers have increased their coverage of small-scale progress on the Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis likely in an effort to boost morale among DNR and Russian fighters.[18] It is likely that such coverage is aimed at recruiting more DNR fighters to support the attempted breakthroughs around Donetsk City.

 

Southern Ukraine:

 

Mixed

 

The Russian force composition along the Southern Axis is relatively more diverse than that of other axes. Russian military leadership has likely rushed a mix of forces to this area to defend it against an expected Ukrainian counteroffensive, which likely explains the wide variety of force groupings in this area. ISW has observed elements of the 35th and 36th Combined Arms Armies (CAA) of the Eastern Military District (EMD), the 22nd Army Corps of the Black Sea Fleet, the 49th CAA of the Southern Military District (SMD), 76th Guards Air Assault Division, and Rosgvardia throughout Southern Ukraine.[19]

 

Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted on August 3 that Russian forces were sending elements of the 35th CAA to northern Kherson Oblast.[20] Various Ukrainian officials reported on August 3 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a command post of the 22nd Army Corps in Chornobaivka, on the outskirts of Kherson City.[21] Ukrainian forces additionally targeted control points of the 76th Air Assault Division in Chornobaivka on August 5.[22] Elements of the 49th CAA reportedly have been active on the western bank of the Dnipro River, particularly in the Snihurivka area of Mykolaiv Oblast.[23] Deputy Chief of Ukraine’s Main Operational Department of the General Staff Oleksiy Gromov stated on August 4 that elements of Rosgvardia (Russia’s internal military force) moved to the eastern bank of Dnipro River, suggesting that Russian forces are prioritizing securing the defense of this bank.[24]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian and proxy troops in Ukraine are operating in roughly six force groupings.
• Russian forces conducted ground attacks north of Kharkiv City, northwest of Slovyansk, east of Siversk, and made unspecified gains around Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces reportedly struck a Wagner force concentration in Popasna, Luhansk Oblast, inflicting casualties.
• Forty-two states called on Russian forces to withdraw from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant in Enerhodar, just two to four hours before another strike hit Enerhodar.
• Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivsky road bridge, likely keeping all three road bridges to and on the right bank of the Dnipro inoperable to heavy equipment.
• Russian military recruitment and enlistment centers continue to face challenges in incentivizing Russians to sign military service contracts.
• Russian occupation authorities continued rubleization measures and civilian data collection in occupied territories to set conditions for annexation referenda.

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine must be pretty confident in their aerial superiority, as they are launching daytime bombing runs on Russian positions in the south:

 

🔥✈️ Українські штурмовики... - Міністерство оборони України | Facebook

WWW.FACEBOOK.COM

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🔥✈️ Українські штурмовики Су-25 та бомбардувальники Су-24М знищили близько десятка рашистів та близько 15 їх БМП! ⚔️ Під прикриттям винищувальної авіації, льотчики ЗСУ завдали ударів по взводних та...

 

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Ukrainian Su-25 attack aircraft and Su-24M bombers destroyed about a dozen Rashists and about 15 of their BMPs!

Under the cover of fighter aircraft, the pilots of the ZSU struck platoon and company strongholds, tank columns on the march, positions of rocket systems of salvo fire, crossings and accumulation of manpower and equipment of the Russian occupiers.
 

 

[PaladinSolo]

Well they can't just leave their radars on anymore with AGM88s in play.

[CitizenVectron]

Partly PR, of course, but the different between Ukrainian and Russian soldiers is almost comical. Ukrainian soldiers caring for stray dogs, cats (it's common for groups of soldiers to "adopt" strays), and now even mice...meanwhile Russians just brutalizing anyone they come across.

 

 

EDIT - Effectively, it says she eats dried bread or cookies. When she's full, she doesn't scurry at night, and so doesn't disrupt the soldiers trying to get some sleep. Therefore, take care of each other, and live friendly

[CitizenVectron]

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[TUFKAK]

Dead Russian soldiers make me smile.☺️

[PaladinSolo]

 

[CitizenVectron]

And this is a totally new airbase hit in Crimea, 200km from the frontlines.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Wait...another base, this one further south in Crimea. This makes two this morning (plus an electrical station the Russians were using to try to switch the zaporizhzhia nuclear plant to the Russian grid):

 

 

Edit - might only be a small explosion 

[CitizenVectron]

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Wow. Turns out it isn't ATACMS that Ukraine is using to hit Crimean bases...they have special forces operating in the theatre behind Russian lines:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 15 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 15 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militia reportedly refused to continue fighting in Donetsk Oblast and complained about the grueling pace of offensives outside of Luhansk Oblast. The emotional significance of recent Russian targets in D

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Elements of the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) militia reportedly refused to continue fighting in Donetsk Oblast and complained about the grueling pace of offensives outside of Luhansk Oblast. The emotional significance of recent Russian targets in Donetsk Oblast resonates with audiences in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR), but not with LNR audiences tired of grueling offensives beyond their claimed borders. Several Ukrainian channels shared a video on August 15 of soldiers from LNR Battalion 2740 refusing to fight for the DNR.[1] The soldiers claim that they celebrated victory on July 3, when LNR forces reached the borders of Luhansk Oblast, and that their work is done. At least one Russian milblogger has criticized the LNR servicemembers for desiring Russian support for their own ”liberation” and then refusing to fight in Donetsk Oblast.[2] ISW cannot independently verify the origin or authenticity of this particular video. Its message reflects a larger trend of diminished LNR investment in and morale to support the Russian war in Ukraine, however. This trend is particularly dangerous to Russian forces seeking to recruit still more new soldiers from Luhansk Oblast to make up for recent losses. Further division within Russian-led forces also threatens to further impede the efficiency of the Russian war effort.

 

DNR units have previously recorded similar appeals when operating in Luhansk, Kharkiv, and Kherson Oblasts, which may indicate that proxy troops might not fully support the Kremlin’s expansive invasion plans. ISW has previously reported that servicemen of the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the DNR’s 105th Infantry Regiment complained when the unit was redeployed from Mariupol to Luhansk Oblast in late May.[3] The 113th Regiment of the DNR also published a similar appeal from the Kherson Oblast frontlines in early June.[4] Another serviceman of an unspecified DNR battalion complained that Russian border guards held the unit at the Belgorod Oblast border after the unit fought around Kharkiv City in mid-May to allow Russian units to withdraw first.[5] DNR-based war correspondents have been boasting about the DNR progress around Avdiivka, but such attitudes may sour again if the DNR units are recommitted to another axis.

 

Russia’s annual Technical Forum and Army Games which began in Moscow on August 13 do not represent any immediate military threat to Ukraine. The forum and army games are not military exercises. The forum is the Kremlin’s premier annual military-industrial complex exposition and generates reliable arms sale revenue, which the Kremlin uses to supplement income lost due to sanctions.[6] The Army Games are a complementary series of competitive military sporting events that the Kremlin uses to demonstrate Russian weapons systems in the field and develop relationships with foreign militaries. This year’s Army Technical Forum will be held from August 15 to August 21 and the Army Games will run from August 13 to August 27.[7]

 

Key Takeaways

• A reported video of LNR servicemen refusing to fight in Donetsk Oblast suggests further division among Russian-led forces.
• Russian forces attempted several limited ground assaults northwest of Slovyansk.
• Russian forces conducted multiple offensive operations east and southeast of Siversk and northeast and southeast of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued conducting offensive operations northwest, west, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces conducted a limited ground assault north of Kharkiv City.
• Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to trade accusations of shelling the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant.
• St. Petersburg authorities officially denied summoning local men to military recruitment and enlistment centers for discussions of contract service.
• Russian occupation authorities continued preparations for the integration of occupied territories of Ukraine into Russia.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

I saw a convincing argument as to why Ukraine needs to continue striking Crimea:

 

Russia keeps saying that once the south/east holds (sham) referendums and join Russia, then they will defend those regions as Russian territory (meaning nuclear defense doctrine, etc), so the west better step back from helping Ukraine! Ukraine therefore needs to keep hitting "Russian" territory right now (Crimea, Belgorod, etc) to prove that Russia is bluffing.

[CitizenVectron]

Ukraine hitting more electrical infrastructure that Russia is attempting to use to steal Ukrainian electricity (within Russia!):

 

 

Like...talk about shitting on Russia's face. Who would have guessed that six months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine would be in a position of near-aerial superiority on the frontlines, as well as sending commando teams into Russia on at least three different missions to destroy an airfield, ammo base, and electrical infrastructure.

[PaladinSolo]

 

[PaladinSolo]

Turkey probably feels really stupid buying that first batch of S-400s getting locked out of the F-35, only to see the S-400 fall flat on its face in Ukraine.

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

Russia is demonstrating its superior military tech by launching 2 anti-tank missiles and having a 50% hit rate.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 16 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 16 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian and Ukrainian sources reported explosions at an airfield and a critical Russian supply nexus in Crimea on August 16. Local reports and videos show a series of explosions at a Russian ammunition depot and a transformer substation in Dzhankoiskyi

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported explosions at an airfield and a critical Russian supply nexus in Crimea on August 16. Local reports and videos show a series of explosions at a Russian ammunition depot and a transformer substation in Dzhankoiskyi District and an airfield near Hvardiiske, Crimea.[1] These explosions both caused significant damage to Russian resources and seriously disrupted Russian logistics. Russian forces have used Dzhankoi as a railway hub for transporting troops and equipment to occupied settlements in southern Zaporizhia Oblast, including Melitopol.[2] Russian authorities temporarily suspended passenger rail service from Russia into Crimea following the attack.[3]

 

Ukrainian forces have not officially claimed responsibility for these explosions. The New York Times reported that an anonymous senior Ukrainian official attributed the explosions in Dzhankoiskyi District to “an elite Ukrainian military unit operating behind enemy lines,” but no Ukrainian official has publicly come forward to claim responsibility.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense released a statement calling the explosions “a result of sabotage.”[5]

 

A Ukrainian strike on logistical targets in Crimea, which is the sovereign territory of Ukraine, would not violate Ukrainian commitments to Western partners regarding Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied weapons within Ukrainian territory or stated US policy regarding Ukraine’s right to use force to regain control of all its territory including areas seized by Russia in 2014.[6] There are no indications that Ukrainian forces used US-supplied weapons in recent strikes on Crimea, and it is unlikely that they did since the targets are well beyond the range of the US-provided systems.

 

Attacks on Russian positions in and around Crimea are likely part of a coherent Ukrainian counter-offensive to regain control of the west bank of the Dnipro River. Russian supply lines from Crimea directly support Russian forces in mainland Ukraine including those in western Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s targeting of Russian ground lines of communication and logistic and support assets in Crimea is consistent with the Ukrainian counteroffensive effort that has also targeted bridges over the Dnipro River and Russian logistical support elements in occupied Kherson Oblast.[7] The net effects of this campaign will likely be to disrupt the ability of Russian forces to sustain mechanized forces on the west bank of the Dnipro River and to defend them with air and artillery assets on the east bank from Ukrainian counterattacks.

 

The Kremlin continues efforts to misrepresent its likely maximalist goals in Ukraine. ISW assesses that Russian strategic objectives remain unchanged: changing the regime change in Kyiv and securing territorial control over most of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin omitted mention of territory outside of Donbas while describing the goals of Russia’s war in Ukraine on August 15. Putin closed his preliminary remarks to the Army-2022 forum on August 15 with the claim that Russian and Donbas forces are “doing their duty” to fight for Russia and “liberate” Donbas.[8] Such a limited statement of Russian goals sharply contrasts with previously articulated Russian war goals to “denazify” and “demilitarize” all of Ukraine. Putin‘s relatively limited statement additionally is incompatible with Russian actions to integrate occupied parts of Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts into the Russian Federation.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted ground attacks across the Eastern Axis but failed to advance northwest of Slovyansk and east of Siversk.
• Russian forces are launching offensive operations around Bakhmut, southwest of Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations in northern and northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Ukrainian forces in Nikopol are preparing to conduct provocations at the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant, possibly setting information conditions for further shelling of Nikopol or provocations of its own.
• Chechen units are reportedly relocating to Kherson Oblast to police Russian military deserters.
• Russian forces struggle to recruit soldiers even for safe, prestigious jobs.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Jomini of the West's "intelligence briefing" for Days 159-172: