Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[PaladinSolo]

Its pretty wild Russia really has no response or counterpart to something that seems like what would be a pretty basic weapon for a modern military like guided rockets, lol.

[Air_Delivery]

58 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

Its pretty wild Russia really has no response or counterpart to something that seems like what would be a pretty basic weapon for a modern military like guided rockets, lol.

The answer would be airstrikes normally but we have learned their ability to conduct air operations is laughably bad.

[CitizenVectron]

11 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said:

The answer would be airstrikes normally but we have learned their ability to conduct air operations is laughably bad.

 

Honestly, as manpad systems get better and better, the effectiveness of close aircraft support will probably continue to diminish (just like the effectiveness of main battle tanks has diminished).

[ThreePi]

12 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said:

The answer would be airstrikes normally but we have learned their ability to conduct air operations is laughably bad.

 

I would imagine that's why the US waited so long to send them in the first place.

[Air_Delivery]

8 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Honestly, as manpad systems get better and better, the effectiveness of close aircraft support will probably continue to diminish (just like the effectiveness of main battle tanks has diminished).

Eh manpads will never be effective against high altitude stealth aircraft.

[CitizenVectron]

1 minute ago, Air_Delivery said:

Eh manpads will never be effective against high altitude stealth aircraft.

 

Sorry I should have been more clear; manpads will continue to be more effective against non-NATO aircraft, at least until non-NATO nations improve their stealth capabilities.

[Jason]

Putin faces second war front as Chechens threaten new offensive in Russia

WWW.MSN.COM

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Russian President Vladimir Putin could be facing a second war front as Chechen forces opposed to his war in Ukraine threaten to launch their own offensive.

 

[SuperSpreader]

41 minutes ago, Jason said:

Putin faces second war front as Chechens threaten new offensive in Russia

WWW.MSN.COM

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Russian President Vladimir Putin could be facing a second war front as Chechen forces opposed to his war in Ukraine threaten to launch their own offensive.

 

 

I'm surprised we haven't already armed a bunch of revolutionaries around Russia 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Uaarkson]

29 minutes ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

I think it’s safe to say that Russia bit off way more than it could chew with Ukraine.

[ThreePi]

25 minutes ago, Uaarkson said:

I think it’s safe to say that Russia bit off way more than it could chew with Ukraine.

 

Nope. Special Operation going completely as planned. Everything going according to schedule. Russian soldiers being welcomed as liberators.

[PaladinSolo]

Literally no response.

[PaladinSolo]

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 20 July 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 20 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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The current Russian offensive may secure limited additional territorial gains in Donbas northeast of the E40 highway but will likely culminate before seizing major populated areas such as Slovyansk or Bakhmut. Russian forces have not made significant

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

The current Russian offensive may secure limited additional territorial gains in Donbas northeast of the E40 highway but will likely culminate before seizing major populated areas such as Slovyansk or Bakhmut. Russian forces have not made significant advances towards Slovyansk or along the Siversk-Bakhmut salient in the past few weeks and are continuing to degrade their own offensive combat power in localized fights for small and relatively unimportant settlements throughout Donetsk Oblast. Russian troops have notably been attempting to take Siversk since the capture of Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast border on July 3 and have still not reached the city as of July 20.[1] Similarly, Russian troops have failed to launch direct assaults on Bakhmut and have largely impaled themselves on fights for small settlements to its east and south. Efforts to advance on Slovyansk have mostly ground to a halt and have made no meaningful gains for weeks. The renewal of active ground offensives following the brief operational pause has not yet translated into meaningful Russian forward progress, although it is possible that either steady Russian pressure or the completion of Russian efforts to rebuild combat power could generate limited gains in the coming days or weeks.

 

Russian troops are now struggling to move across relatively sparsely-settled and open terrain.  They will encounter terrain much more conducive to the Ukrainian defenders the closer they get to the E40 around Slovyansk and Bakhmut due to the increasing population density and built-up nature of these areas (see map in-line with text). The current Russian offensive in Donbas is therefore highly likely to culminate somewhere along the E40 in the coming weeks.

 

 

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov articulated expanded geographical aims for Russian operations in Ukraine on July 20, confirming ISW’s long-held assessment that Russia has territorial goals beyond Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Lavrov held an interview with state-owned media outlet RT’s editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan wherein he stated that the geography of the “special operation” has changed since March and now includes not just the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, but also Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts and a number of other unspecified territories.[2] Lavrov also warned that these goals will expand if the West continues to provide Ukraine with long-range weapons. Lavrov’s calls for maximalist territorial objectives are notably divorced from the slow and grinding reality of recent Russian operations in Ukraine as discussed above. Ukrainian counteroffensive pressure is complicating Russian efforts to consolidate military control of occupied Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, and it is unclear how the Kremlin will generate the offensive combat power needed to take significant new amounts of Ukrainian territory.

 

The Russian Defense Ministry publicly identified Lieutenant General Andrey Sychevoy as the commander of the Western force grouping in Ukraine on July 20.[3] The Russian force groupings in Ukraine appear to follow the structure of established Russian military districts. Ukraine’s Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) had previously reported that Sychevoy replaced Commander Alexander Zhuravlev as the Western Military District Commander.[4] Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu instructed Sychevoy to focus on destroying Ukrainian UAVs operating near the Ukraine-Russia border, indicating that the Western force grouping is likely operating on the Kharkiv City Axis.[5] Russian forces have thus apparently split Kharkiv Oblast into two axes: the Western force grouping operating towards Kharkiv City and the Eastern force grouping operating in the Izyum-Slovyansk direction.[6]

 

The Russians have identified commanders of the southern, central, and eastern groups of forces, corresponding to their respective military districts and oriented on Bakhmut, the Izyum area, and Siversk respectively.  They have notably failed to identify any commander of Russian forces operating in occupied southern Ukraine, however. The Russian commander of forces on the Southern Axis could be the commander of the Russian 7th Guards Mountain Airborne (VDV) Division based in Novorossiysk, Krasnodar Krai, or of the Black Sea Fleet’s 22nd Army Corps, based in Simferopol, Crimea, respectively, as there is no other obvious military district from which he might be drawn.[7]

 

Ukrainian troops rescued a cat during clearing operations on Snake Island and evacuated it back to the Ukrainian mainland on July 20.[8] The cat reportedly survived the duration of the Russian occupation of the island.

 

Key Takeaways

• The current Russian offensive will likely make marginal territorial gains northeast of the E40 highway in Donetsk before culminating along the E40.
• Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia is pursuing expanded territorial gains in Ukraine beyond Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast, confirming ISW’s assessment that the Kremlin seeks to capture territory beyond Donbas.
• Russian forces resumed limited ground attacks northwest of Slovyansk and around the Donetsk City-Avdiivka area.
• Russian forces continued localized ground assaults east of Siversk and made marginal gains northeast of Bakhmut.
• Ukrainian forces conducted the second consecutive high-precision strike against the Antonivskyi Bridge-- a major Russian logistics artery east of Kherson City.
• Russian occupation authorities are likely propagandizing recent Ukrainian high-precision strikes and partisan activity to set conditions for mass deportations of Ukrainian citizens to Russian territory.

 

 

 

[Map showing population density in Donbas as of 2020 in comparison with ISW's assessed control of terrain in Donetsk Oblast as of July 20, 2022. Russian forces will likely face challenges taking control of the darker-grey areas, which represent more densely-populated hromadas and are largely concentrated along the E40 highway between Slovyansk and Bakhmut]

 

[PaladinSolo]

Man whats it like to be a Russian and seeing artillery fire with a grouping like that, lol.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 21 July 2022:

 

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, July 21 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces conducted a few limited and highly localized ground attacks on July 21. The current Russian operational tempo is not markedly different from what it was during the officially declared operational pause between July 7 and July 16. Russian

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian forces conducted a few limited and highly localized ground attacks on July 21. The current Russian operational tempo is not markedly different from what it was during the officially declared operational pause between July 7 and July 16. Russian forces continued to conduct minor attacks throughout that period to the northwest of Slovyansk and around the Siversk and Bakhmut areas without capturing any decisive ground.[1] Since July 16, Russian troops have continued local attacks to the east of Siversk as well as east and south of Bakhmut; they have not made any major territorial gains in these areas as of July 21. The Russian grouping northwest of Slovyansk has in fact conducted fewer ground attacks along the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border than it did during the official operational pause. The lack of successful ground attacks beyond the Slovyansk, Siversk, and Bakhmut areas is consistent with ISW’s assessment that the Russian offensive is likely to culminate without capturing Slovyansk or Bakhmut.[2]

 

Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on July 21 that Russian troops have used up to 55-60% of Russia’s pre-war reserve of high-precision missiles.[3] GUR spokesperson Vadym Skibitksy specified that these high-precision missiles include Kh-101, Kh-555, Iskander, and Kalibr systems, which he stated Russian forces have been using less frequently, partially due to the effect of Western sanctions on the availability of needed components for high-precision systems.[4] On the other hand, Ukrainian forces have recently acquired an influx of Western-provided high-precision systems such as high mobility artillery rocket systems (HIMARS), which they are using to a more decisive effect than the Russians have been achieving with their precision systems. Russian forces will likely continue to employ their reserves of lower-precision Soviet weapons systems, but the decisiveness of these strikes, compared to the impact of Ukrainian HIMARS strikes, is likely to remain limited.[5] 

 

Key Takeaways

• The current Russian operational tempo is not markedly different from the pace of Russian offensive operations during the official Russian operational pause, and Russian forces are unlikely to be able to take significant ground in the coming weeks.
• Russia has likely used as much as 55-60% of its high-precision weaponry reserve.
• Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to the east of Siversk and south of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces conducted an unsuccessful ground attack north of Kharkiv City.
• Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian forces may be storing equipment in Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant facilities to protect it against Ukrainian strikes.
• Russia’s Murmansk Oblast is reportedly forming a volunteer battalion.

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Jomini of the West's "intelligence briefing" for Days 124-148 - he got hit pretty hard by COVID which is the reason for his absence for a few weeks:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

An interesting analysis which ends in an eyebrow-raising, somewhat "overly" optimistic conclusion:

 

 

[Chris-]

5 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

An interesting analysis which ends in an eyebrow-raising, somewhat "overly" optimistic conclusion:

 

 

 

How legit is this guy?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

6 minutes ago, Chris- said:

 

How legit is this guy?

 

He appears to be pretty legit:

 

Dr Mike Martin

WWW.THRESHEDTHOUGHT.COM

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Author & Speaker on conflict, particularly its causes.

 

But the notion that the Russians are going to withdraw from Kherson -- which they specifically occupied to block Ukrainian advances toward Crimea -- as a "goodwill gesture" is just...out there.

[Chris-]

12 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

He appears to be pretty legit:

 

Dr Mike Martin

WWW.THRESHEDTHOUGHT.COM

---

Author & Speaker on conflict, particularly its causes.

 

But the notion that the Russians are going to withdraw from Kherson -- which they specifically occupied to block Ukrainian advances toward Crimea -- as a "goodwill gesture" is just...out there.

 

I read it as they more or less have to withdraw, lest their forces in Kherson get cut off from the backline. It would only be a "goodwill gesture" in the sense that Russia would have to spin it as such.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

1 minute ago, Chris- said:

 

I read it as they more or less have to withdraw, lest their forces in Kherson get cut off from the backline. It would only be a "goodwill gesture" in the sense that Russia would have to spin it as such.

 

If the Russians are forced to withdraw from Kherson, there probably won't be much left of the city for the Ukrainians to liberate.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[marioandsonic]

So, I haven't been following this very well for months now.  Where do things stand right now?

[CitizenVectron]

Sounds like 3 Russian BTGs in Vysokopillia (Kherson Oblast) are almost surrounded and are requesting a retreat corridor from the Ukrainians.

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

5 minutes ago, marioandsonic said:

So, I haven't been following this very well for months now.  Where do things stand right now?

 

Effectively a strategic stalemate.

Russian probably can't capture and control significantly more territory than they currently occupy now and Ukraine probably can't push them out of the territory that is currently under Russian control.

[marioandsonic]

2 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

Effectively a strategic stalemate.

Russian probably can't capture and control significantly more territory than they do now and Ukraine probably can't push them out of the territory that is currently under Russian control.

 

So what's the end result?  The two sides remain in said statement in perpetuity until one side just throws their hands up and capitulates?

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

2 minutes ago, marioandsonic said:

 

So what's the end result?  The two sides remain in said statement in perpetuity until one side just throws their hands up and capitulates?

 

The most likely result is what persisted in eastern Ukraine from 2014 until the present: persistent, low-level conflict.

[CitizenVectron]

1 hour ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

The most likely result is what persisted in eastern Ukraine from 2014 until the present: persistent, low-level conflict.

 

I think that Ukraine realistically has until this Christmas to retake some land. After that, Russia will likely have settled in enough to resist. However, I think this stalemate will be different than 2014 in that now, a majority of the population ruled by Russia in the south and east do not identify as Russia. With Luhansk and Donetsk, they at least had a relatively friendly population (until many realized what life as a Russian vassal is like). But there are millions in the occupied south and east now that did not want to join Russia. Will partisan warfare continue for years?

[Remarkableriots]

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[Signifyin(g)Monkey]

6 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

The most likely result is what persisted in eastern Ukraine from 2014 until the present: persistent, low-level conflict.

Culminating in another escalation that advances Russian retrenchment?

 

The whole ‘Russia helps stoke perpetual civil conflict in a neighboring region->after awhile, Russia escalates to full blown war->Russia gets a little land back’ would seem to be a horribly wasteful strategy for slowly rebuilding the Tsarist empire, but these are the folks who beat Napoleon by setting fire to huge swathes of their own territory. (and it’s worked so far, unfortunately)

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russia promised "green" corridors out of Mariupol for civilians, and then bombed their buses. Ukraine said it wouldn't forget, and it hasn't: no retreat allowed for encircled Russians in Kherson--they surrender, or they die.