Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (16 Apr 2024) - Ukraine "ran out of missiles" around Kyiv, which allowed Russia to destroy major power plant

[CitizenVectron]

1 hour ago, mclumber1 said:

How does that $ compare to what our European allies have sent?  

 

Another way to look at it is:

 

[PaladinSolo]

 

[SuperSpreader]

Germans think far too highly of themselves 

[Link200]

On 8/23/2022 at 11:20 AM, Brian said:

 

This graph needs some modifications IMO. Would be better to show it as a % of the GDP or something similar.

 

Not all countries have the same capacity to give like the US and just showing total cash given wouldn't be accurate.

 

It would be like Bezos donating $1 billion to a charity and then chastising Mark Cuban for giving far less.

[Brian]

3 minutes ago, Link200 said:

This graph needs some modifications IMO. Would be better to show it as a % of the GDP or something similar.

 

Not all countries have the same capacity to give like the US and just showing total cash given wouldn't be accurate.

 

It would be like Bezos donating $1 billion to a charity and then chastising Mark Cuban for giving far less.

For sure but it definitely illustrates how  embarrassing it is that the UK is contributing more than Germany and France combined

[Link200]

17 hours ago, CitizenVectron said:

 

Another way to look at it is:

 

Didn't see this yet. This is definitely the better way to look at this than what I had quoted earlier. It makes it far more sense when making comparisons.

 

 

[Air_Delivery]

17 minutes ago, Link200 said:

This graph needs some modifications IMO. Would be better to show it as a % of the GDP or something similar.

 

Not all countries have the same capacity to give like the US and just showing total cash given wouldn't be accurate.

 

It would be like Bezos donating $1 billion to a charity and then chastising Mark Cuban for giving far less.

The US and the EU GDP are pretty similar 

[Link200]

9 minutes ago, Air_Delivery said:

The EU has a larger GDP than the US..

Not when you randomly pull the biggest economies out of the whole and separate them in the graph.

 

Yes, Europe is still lagging far behind. But not as far as the original graph would make it seem. The GDP graph that was posted flattens the curve considerably and shows a more accurate representation of giving.

 

You can't really combine the EU anyway. Aid packages are up to the individual countries. Judging the EU as a whole just doesn't work. Eastern European countries are contributing far more than the US.

[PaladinSolo]

11 minutes ago, Link200 said:

Not when you randomly pull the biggest economies out of the whole and separate them in the graph.

 

Yes, Europe is still lagging far behind. But not as far as the original graph would make it seem. The GDP graph that was posted flattens the curve considerably and shows a more accurate representation of giving.

 

You can't really combine the EU anyway. Aid packages are up to the individual countries. Judging the EU as a whole just doesn't work. Eastern European countries are contributing far more than the US.

The reason they are is because they are the ones that still have old soviet tanks, fighters, artillery and they're getting reassurances that we'll sell them NATO equipment to replace them.  The UK and the US stand out in that they're giving them more modern NATO equipment, and I imagine if the rest of Europe had a bunch of old T-72s they'd be shoving them at Ukraine as well.

[PaladinSolo]

 

[Link200]

1 hour ago, PaladinSolo said:

The reason they are is because they are the ones that still have old soviet tanks, fighters, artillery and they're getting reassurances that we'll sell them NATO equipment to replace them.  The UK and the US stand out in that they're giving them more modern NATO equipment, and I imagine if the rest of Europe had a bunch of old T-72s they'd be shoving them at Ukraine as well.

True, but also because Russia is literally on their doorstep if Ukraine falls.

[CitizenVectron]

50 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

 

 

Reportedly, power is out in much of the occupied south. No running water in Kherson city. Russia is saying the plant is out as caused by fire, and it will take days to repair. 

[CitizenVectron]

Latvia just demolished a Soviet monument (celebrating victory over the Nazis):

 

 

[Kal-El814]

20 hours ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

Let's call it what it is: the United States is very much in a state of undeclared war with the Russian Federation.

 

The "proxiness" of this war is largely irrelevant.

 

We haven't declared war since WWII, gotta keep that streak alive.

[PaladinSolo]

Never knew RTS AI was actually based on real life military strategies!

[PaladinSolo]

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 24 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 24 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

---

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated on August 24 that Russian forces are slowing down the overall pace of their offensive operations in Ukraine while reaffirming that Russia’s objectives in the war have not changed. At a meeting with defense m

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated on August 24 that Russian forces are slowing down the overall pace of their offensive operations in Ukraine while reaffirming that Russia’s objectives in the war have not changed. At a meeting with defense ministers from member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Shoigu stated that Russian troops will be slowing down the pace of offensive operations in Ukraine in a conscious effort to minimize civilian casualties.[1] Shoigu also reiterated that operations in Ukraine are going according to plan and that Russian forces will accomplish all their objectives, supporting ISW’s assessment that Russia’s maximalist strategic war aims in Ukraine have not changed.[2] The Russian MoD has previously issued similar statements to account for the pace of operations in Ukraine.[3]

 

Shoigu's statement may also represent an attempt by the Russian MoD to set information conditions to explain and excuse the negligible gains Russian forces have made in Ukraine in the last six weeks. Since Russian forces resumed offensive operations following a pause on July 16 Russian forces have gained about 450.84 km² (roughly 174 square miles) of new territory, an area around the size of Andorra.  Russian forces have lost roughly 45,000 km² of territory since March 21 (the estimated date of Russian forces’ deepest advance into Ukraine), an area larger than Denmark. As ISW has previously assessed, Russian forces are unable to translate limited tactical gains into wider operational successes, and their offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are culminating. Shoigu’s statement is likely an attempt to explain away these failings.[4]

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces have lost an area larger than Denmark since the high-water mark of their invasion of Ukraine in mid-March and gained an area the size of Andorra (one percent of what they have lost) in the last 39 days. 
• Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu reaffirmed that Russia has not changed its maximalist strategic war aims.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest and southeast of Izyum, northeast and south of Bakhmut, and west and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.
• Russian occupation authorities continue to face partisan and internal challenges to the administration of occupation agendas.
• Russian proxy leadership is continuing efforts to oversee the legislative and administrative integration of occupied territories into Russian systems.

 

 

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 25 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

---

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August 25 decree to increase the size of the Russian military starting in January 2023 is unlikely to generate significant combat power in the near future and indicates that Putin is unlikely to order a mass m

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s August 25 decree to increase the size of the Russian military starting in January 2023 is unlikely to generate significant combat power in the near future and indicates that Putin is unlikely to order a mass mobilization soon. The decree increases the nominal end strength of the Russian Armed Forces by 137,000 military personnel, from 1,013,628 to 1,150,628, starting on January 1, 2023.[1] The Russian military likely seeks to recover losses from its invasion of Ukraine and generate forces to sustain its operation in Ukraine. The announcement of a relatively modest (yet likely still unattainable) increased end strength target strongly suggests that Putin remains determined to avoid full mobilization. The Kremlin is unlikely to generate sufficient forces to reach an end strength of over 1,150,000 soldiers as the decree stipulates. The Russian military has not historically met its end-strength targets. It had only about 850,000 active-duty military personnel in 2022 before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for example, well shy of its nominal end strength target of over one million.[2]

 

Russia would likely face serious obstacles to adding large numbers of new soldiers quickly. Apart from the challenges Russian recruiters face, Russia’s net training capacity has likely decreased since February 24, since the Kremlin deployed training elements to participate in combat in Ukraine and these training elements reportedly took causalities.[3] Russia may use the fall conscription cycle in October 2022, which should bring in about 130,000 men, to replenish Russian losses, which reportedly number in the tens of thousands killed and seriously wounded. The Kremlin may alternatively use the additional end strength to formally subsume into the Russian military the forces of the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics and/or the new Russian volunteer units that are not formally part of the Russian military. The net addition to Russia’s combat power in any such case would be very small.

 

The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) disconnected from the power grid for the first time in its operational history on August 25. Ukrainian nuclear operating enterprise Energoatom reported that Russian shelling caused the disconnection by starting fires at ash pits near the Zaporizhia Thermal Power Plant (ZTPP), approximately 5km from the ZNPP.[4] Energoatom stated that the ZTPP is currently supplying the ZNPP with power and that work is ongoing to reconnect one of the ZNPP power units back to the Ukrainian power grid.[5]

 

Russian sources accused Ukrainian forces of firing at the ZNPP, but Russia has not provided clear evidence of Ukrainian troops striking the plant.[6] As ISW has previously reported, Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Russian troops deliberately conducted mortar strikes against the ash pits at the ZTPP.[7] The GUR also has not provided clear evidence to support its claims. The Russians’ failure to provide unequivocal evidence of the extensive shelling they accuse Ukraine of conducting is more noteworthy, however, because Russia controls the ground and could provide more conclusive evidence far more easily than Ukraine could. The GUR also reported on August 20 that Russian officials had indefinitely extended the order for Ukrainian employees of the ZNPP to stay home, and there have been no reports of any rescission of that order, which means that a portion of the ZNPP’s workforce is apparently still absent on Russian orders despite the ongoing emergency.[8] Russian forces have also heavily militarized the ZNPP since its capture, despite the fact that the facility is far from the front line and at no risk of imminent Ukrainian ground attack.  This pattern of activity continues to make it far more likely that Russian forces have been responsible for kinetic attacks on and around the ZNPP than that Ukrainian forces have been.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northwest and northeast of Slovyansk, northeast and south of Bakhmut, and northwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in northwestern Kharkiv Oblast.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing recruitment efforts for volunteer battalions, which are continuing to deploy to training grounds in Russia and to Ukraine.
• Russian occupation administrators are continuing to take measures to mitigate challenges to their authority and facilitate the economic and educational integration of occupied territories into the Russian system.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Like...I can't think of a greater failure to change strategy in modern times (I'm sure there are examples). Russia just continues to create massive stockpiles of weapons and equipment (often in the same places as before!) and Ukraine keeps destroying them. Is it really just that Russia's hierarchy is so rigid that nothing is allowed to change, no matter the failure?

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Russian paratrooper group decided to take over an entire hotel in Donbas, so Ukraine blew it up:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Video of the HIMARS strikes on the Antonivka bridge in Kherson:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

And Russia hasn't been able to take out a single MLRS system:

 

 

[PaladinSolo]

I don't even know what their angle here is.

[TUFKAK]

9 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

I don't even know what their angle here is.

Putin had no issue with the useful idiot? I am shocked!

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Different collaborator assassinated:

 

 

Russia doesn't have enough security forces to control the population in the 10% of Ukraine they currently hold. What was their plan for the entire country? 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Presumably this actually means the Russians are shelling the plant (they hold) again:

 

 

[CayceG]

Ukraine is winning the meme wars, at least. 

 

 

[Air_Delivery]

Pretty good breakdown on why Russia can't stop HIMAR rockets

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 26 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 26 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

---

Russian forces did not make any claimed or assessed territorial gains in Ukraine on August 26, 2022, for the first time since August 18, 2022. However, Russian forces still conducted limited and unsuccessful ground attacks on the Eastern Axis on August

 

 

Quote

Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian forces did not make any claimed or assessed territorial gains in Ukraine on August 26, 2022, for the first time since August 18, 2022.[1] However, Russian forces still conducted limited and unsuccessful ground attacks on the Eastern Axis on August 26.

 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that unspecified actors (but almost certainly Russian forces) reconnected part of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to the Ukrainian power grid on August 26.[2] Ukrainian nuclear operating enterprise Energoatom stated that unspecified actors reconnected one of the power units to the ZNPP and are working to add capacity to the ZNPP’s operations.[3] Russian forces remain in full control of the plant, though it is unclear why they would have reconnected the power unit.

 

Russian occupation authorities remain unlikely to successfully conduct sham referenda to annex Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation by early September, despite reports of advancing preparations for referenda. Spokesperson for Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) Vadym Skibitsky stated on August 26 that Russian authorities have completed administrative preparations for referenda and created election headquarters, drawn up voter lists, and created election commissions, which Skibitsky stated indicates that the preparatory process for referenda is “almost complete.”[4] Russian-backed occupation authorities in Zaporizhia Oblast announced that they have already audited polling stations, analyzed voter lists, and selected candidates for work in voter precincts and territorial election commissions.[5]

 

However, Russian occupation authorities are unlikely to be able to carry out referenda as they intend (with cooperation from local collaborators) by the purported September 11 deadline due to continued frictions within occupation administrations and ongoing partisan attacks. The Ukrainian advisor to the head of Kherson Oblast, Serhiy Khlan, stated on August 26 that the Kherson occupation administration is struggling to find people to head administrative units in charge of referendum preparations, likely due to a lack of willing locals and low levels of trust in Ukrainian collaborators.[6] Khlan notably stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin may have ordered occupation administrators to avoid importing Russian administrators to fill these roles in order to make the referendum process appear like a grassroots initiative with local support.[7] Ukrainian sources have previously reported that Ukrainian resistance and increasing partisan attacks are inhibiting preparations for the referendum.[8] While Russian authorities could hypothetically forcibly annex Ukrainian territories on an arbitrary date, they are unlikely to do so without holding staged referenda. All observed indicators suggest that Russian authorities seek to create a veneer of local support and participation before conducting the referenda to frame them as widely supported initiatives but face ongoing setbacks that will delay any annexation effort.

 

Key Takeaways

• The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that elements of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) reconnected to the Ukrainian power grid on August 26.
• Russian occupation authorities remain unlikely to successfully conduct sham referenda to annex Ukrainian territory into the Russian Federation by early September, despite reports of advancing preparations for referenda.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southwest of Izyum, northeast and south of Bakhmut, and on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City.
• Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCS) and military infrastructure in Kherson Oblast which support operations on the west bank of the Dnipro River.
• Russian federal subjects (regions) continued additional recruitment drives for volunteer battalions, which continue to deploy to Ukraine.
• Ukrainian partisans and internal division continue to pose threats to Russian control of occupied territories.

 

 

 

[Anathema-]

I gotta imagine Russia conscripting all their potential Ukranian supporters really puts a crimp on their sham election plans. 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Quote

Internal friction between elements of different Russian conventional forces, special forces, private military company (PMC) workers, and national guard elements may be increasing. An unconfirmed Twitter post, which cited sources within the 22nd Spetznaz Brigade, claimed that relations between Russian Spetznaz units are breaking down, as are relationships between Spetznaz units and PMC elements.[36] The post claims that a conflict between groups from two Spetznaz brigades and a PMC unit turned into an armed fight when one Spetznaz unit sided with the PMC unit instead of the other Spetznaz unit.[37] The Russian military leadership is leveraging PMC elements such as the Wagner Group and Spetznaz as key maneuver elements, and internal firefights between these factions could erode the mutual confidence necessary for troops to cooperate effectively in combat.

 

Hehehehehehehehehehehe

[ThreePi]

1 hour ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

 

Hehehehehehehehehehehe

 

While I'm sure there are plenty of reasons why regular Russian armed forces and the PMCs might not particularly like each other or get along, I don't understand how that could ever escalate to actual firefights between the two groups.

[PaladinSolo]

This isn't a military its a bunch of idiots given a gun and dropped off in another country.

[CayceG]

46 minutes ago, PaladinSolo said:

This isn't a military its a bunch of idiots given a gun and dropped off in another country.

 

Honestly, the US knows how that can be.