Россия invades Україна | UPDATE (20 Apr 2024) - US House passes military aid bill for Ukraine

[CitizenVectron]

Someone figured out how Ukraine is hitting Crimea:

 

 

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 21 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 21 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian forces’ momentum from territorial gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka in late July is likely exhausted, and Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine are likely culminating although very small Russian advances will likely continue. Russian forces seized N

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian forces’ momentum from territorial gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka in late July is likely exhausted, and Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine are likely culminating although very small Russian advances will likely continue. Russian forces seized Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant (TPP) southeast of Bakhmut on July 25 and 26, respectively, consolidating Russian control around difficult water features after many weeks of fighting. Russian sources celebrated these gains as a significant military victory without noting that Ukrainian military Ukrainian forces successfully broke contact and withdrew from the area.[1] Russian forces also celebrated the capture of Ukrainian fortifications around the Butivka Coal Mine ventilation shaft southwest of Avdiivka, after Ukrainian forces withdrew from the area on July 30.[2] Russian forces capitalized on these gains to a limited extent and have been attacking toward Bakhmut from the northeast and southeast, and around Avdiivka, but these attacks are now stalling. Russian forces have not made significant territorial gains around Bakhmut or Avdiivka since their advances through Novoluhanske, the power plant, the Butivka Coal Mine, and a few small settlements near those areas.

 

Russian forces’ failure to capitalize on prior gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka is an example of a more fundamental Russian military problem—the demonstrated inability to translate tactical gains into operational successes. Russian forces have consistently failed to take advantage of tactical breakthroughs to maneuver into Ukrainian rear areas or unhinge significant parts of the Ukrainian defensive lines.  They therefore continually give the Ukrainians time to disengage tactically and re-establish defensible positions against which the Russians must then launch new deliberate attacks.  This phenomenon helps explain the extremely slow rate of Russian advances in the east and strongly suggests that the Russians will be unable to take much more ground in the coming months unless the situation develops in unforeseen ways. Russian forces will likely remain unable to commit enough resources to any one offensive operation to regain the momentum necessary for significant territorial advances that translate to operational successes. Russian forces will also need to generate and commit additional assault groups, equipment, and morale to resume even these limited territorial advances yielding small tactical gains.

 

Russian forces likely face issues repairing combat aircraft due to Western sanctions and may be attempting to bypass these sanctions by leveraging Belarusian connections with less severe sanctions. The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that the Russian and Belarusian Defense Ministries signed “urgent” contracts on August 20 to repair and restore Russian military aviation equipment on Belarusian territory reportedly for further use in Ukraine.[3] Western sanctions against Russia have largely banned the transfer of equipment to the state of Russia as a whole, while sanctions against Belarus largely target individual Belarusian entities.[4] Western countries have previously sanctioned Belarusian industrial-military complex entities producing radar systems, automobiles, and repairing tracked vehicles, but it is unclear to what extent the sanctions impacted Belarusian import of aviation repair parts.[5] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces transferred some unspecified air defense equipment to Belarus from Russia on August 21. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces will close certain sections of Russian airspace in the Lipetsk, Voronezh, and Belgorod Oblasts from August 22-25.[6] The Russian-Belarusian agreement may suggest that Russian officials are attempting to circumvent sanctions on Russia, as it may be easier to import repair parts to Belarus than to Russia.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine have likely exhausted the limited momentum they gained at the end of July and are likely culminating. The Russian military has shown a continual inability to translate small tactical gains into operational successes, a failing that will likely prevent Russia from making significant territorial advances in the coming months barring major changes on the battlefield.
• Ukrainian military intelligence reports that Russia and Belarus have reached an “urgent” agreement for Belarus to repair damaged Russian aviation equipment for re-use in Ukraine. This agreement could be part of a Russian effort to use the looser sanctions regime on Belarus to circumvent sectoral sanctions on Russia.
• Russian forces attempted several unsuccessful ground assaults southwest and southeast of Izyum.
• Russian forces launched a ground attack southeast of Siversk and northeast and south of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces made limited gains west of Donetsk City but did not conduct any ground assaults on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border.
• Russian forces attempted unsuccessful ground assaults southwest of Donetsk City and continued attacking settlements northwest and southwest of Avdiivka.
• Russian forces conducted several assaults on the Kherson-Mykolaiv frontline and made partial advances east of Mykolaiv City.
•  Russian forces are likely not training new recruits in discipline, creating an entitled force engaging in disorderly conduct in Russia and illegal conduct in Ukraine.
• Russian occupation authorities intensified filtration measures and abductions in occupied territories ahead of Ukraine’s Independence Day on August 24.

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Brian]

 

[b_m_b_m_b_m]

Eat shit ur-ope USA #1

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

Sounds like the US may now provide Ukraine with the tank-killer Switchblade 600 drone series.

[CitizenVectron]

Another ammo depot hit inside Russia:

 

 

 

Belgorod administration is claiming it was caused by sun magnification that set off a fire. I guess that excuse is new, and not the 20th time they've claimed someone smoking a cigarette blew up a base.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 22 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 22 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian occupation officials in Zaporizhia Oblast have obliquely declared the region’s independence from Ukraine by falsely identifying Ukrainian citizens entering the occupied region as temporary asylum seekers. Head of the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation a

 

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian occupation officials in Zaporizhia Oblast have obliquely declared the region’s independence from Ukraine by falsely identifying Ukrainian citizens entering the occupied region as temporary asylum seekers. Head of the Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration Yevheny Balitsky signed an order that designates Ukrainian citizens arriving in occupied Zaporizhia Oblast as temporary asylum seekers based on Russian law.[1] The order requires the registration of Ukrainian and Russian citizens based on their place of residence or place of arrival in the Russian-occupied parts of Zaporizhia Oblast and requires the distribution of temporary identification forms for all “stateless persons.” Ukrainians and Russians may register if they present proof of their temporary asylum application. This decree has various implications under both international law and domestic Russian law. International law states that a refugee is an individual from outside the country (or who is stateless) who is seeking “temporary asylum” in another country to escape persecution.[2] Russian law defines a refugee as a person ”who is outside of his/her country of nationality or habitual residence.”[3] Neither of these statuses properly apply to the majority of people crossing from unoccupied Ukraine into occupied Zaporizhia.

 

Russian occupation authorities are thus falsely classifying all Ukrainians entering occupied territories in Zaporizhia Oblast as refugees escaping persecution in Ukraine. The order also de facto identifies Ukraine as a separate country from the Zaporizhia Oblast entity, as defined by the occupation authority. By classifying all Ukrainians as refugees, Russian occupation authorities are establishing a new legal category that might have its own restrictions. Russian occupation authorities may use the refugee status to restrict Ukrainians who temporarily return to occupied territories after evacuating from them. The order will likely affect Ukrainian citizens traveling to occupied Kherson Oblast via the checkpoint in Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, as the order requires the registration of individuals at the point of arrival in the occupied Zaporizhia Oblast, and Vasylivka is the checkpoint serving Kherson as well as Zaporizhia Oblasts.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian-backed occupation authorities in Zaporizhia Oblast have obliquely declared the independence of the occupied areas of the oblast by falsely identifying Ukrainian citizens entering from unoccupied Ukraine as temporary asylum seekers.
• Russian forces conducted localized spoiling attacks southwest and southeast of Izyum.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks southeast of Siversk and northeast and south of Bakhmut.
• Russian forces continued attempts to advance from the northern and western outskirts of Donetsk City and conducted limited ground attacks southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces made marginal gains along the Mykolaiv-Kherson line.
• Ukrainian intelligence stated that the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) will start “general mobilization” processes on September 1.
• Prymorsky Krai announced the formation of a new repair and service volunteer battalion.
• Ukrainian partisans continued to conduct attacks against Russian forces in occupied Melitopol.

 

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Nice. Ukraine's independence day tomorrow (31 years since the fall of the Soviet state), and the US is celebrating with the largest package yet. This one looks to be long-term:

 

 

[Greatoneshere]

Who knew milquetoast actor and comedian Zelensky would actually be as liberal as his old job implies and stronger than ever imagined. The fact Trump tried to beta this guy is hard to believe these days.

[CitizenVectron]

29 minutes ago, Greatoneshere said:

Who knew milquetoast actor and comedian Zelensky would actually be as liberal as his old job implies and stronger than ever imagined. The fact Trump tried to beta this guy is hard to believe these days.

 

Zelenskyy is literally the guy Trump tried to be, and aspired to be. Zelenskyy is more of a "man" than Putin or Trump or any of those types who like to parade about manhood. Can you imagine for a second Trump staying in the Whitehouse while tens of thousands of Russian troops crossed through a nuclear exclusion zone towards him, cruise missiles rained down on the capital, and helicopter-borne troops attempted a landing at the DC airport?

 

Regardless of what the future holds for Zelenskyy (because he could be like a Churchill, and suck at governing post-war), his example of staying in the capital when the entire world though the country only had 48 hours to live will be in the history books.

[CitizenVectron]

 

[CitizenVectron]

The only thing America agrees on?

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Also, Слава Україні on today, Ukraine's independence day.

[CitizenVectron]

It doesn't get the level of coverage of HIMARS strikes, but Ukrainian partisans are keeping up their attacks in occupied territory, especially toward collaborators:

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Happy independence day from Ukraine to Russia:

 

 

More strikes in Nova Kakhovka (where the Russians keep stockpiling stuff each time after Ukraine obliterates the last stockpile).

[CitizenVectron]

A few more details on the new huge, long-term US military aid package being announced today:

 

Biden announces nearly $3B in new military aid for Ukraine | AP News

APNEWS.COM

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WASHINGTON (AP) — Six months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, President Joe Biden announced Wednesday that he is sending $2.98 billion in new military aid to Ukraine that will enable forces there to fight for years to come.

 

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In a statement, Biden said the aid will allow Ukraine to acquire air defense systems, artillery systems and munitions, drones and other equipment “to ensure it can continue to defend itself over the long term.”

 

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“I know this independence day is bittersweet for many Ukrainians as thousands have been killed or wounded, millions have been displaced from their homes, and so many others have fallen victim to Russian atrocities and attacks,” Biden said. “But six months of relentless attacks have only strengthened Ukrainians’ pride in themselves, in their country, and in their thirty-one years of independence.”

 

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Unlike most previous packages, the new funding is largely aimed at helping Ukraine secure its medium- to long-term defense posture, according to officials familiar with the matter. 

 

Also, from Germany:

 

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Other NATO allies are also marking the independence day with new aid announcements.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said his country is providing more than 500 million euros (nearly $500 million) in aid, including powerful anti-aircraft systems. The aid will include rocket launchers, ammunition, anti-drone equipment, a dozen armored recovery vehicles and and three additional IRIS-T long-range air defense systems, the German news agency dpa reported.

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[Greatoneshere]

I keep hearing reports that because Kalinigrad Oblast and breakaway unofficial state Transnistria from Moldova exist in Europe proper among NATO and EU nations (the rest of Russia is essentially one contiguous nation otherwise in Asia) complicates things somewhat in terms of longer term strategy. Moldova can't join NATO or the EU as a result, and that also makes Ukraine ever joining difficult (Ukraine also borders Transnistria). Also, if any moves are made that endanger either of those two places, Russia may get ridiculous about it. Is there truth to any of that? For instance, due to sanctions, Poland and Lithuania imposed sanctions on the rail trade route that connects Russia through Belarus to Kaliningrad Oblast and that caused a lot of potential trouble. Now with Sweden and Finland joining NATO (which is great), the Baltic Sea becomes more complicated as well. 

 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/21/kaliningrad-lithuania-eu-blockade-russia-nato/

[CitizenVectron]

Zelenskyy's message on Ukrainian independence:
 

 

[CitizenVectron]

180 days of war in 30 seconds:
 

 

[CitizenVectron]

Frontline changes since June 25:

 

[TUFKAK]

On 8/23/2022 at 8:22 AM, b_m_b_m_b_m said:

Eat shit ur-ope USA #1

It’s a long history of us defending their damn valleys.

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

ISW analysis for 23 August 2022:

 

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 23 | Institute for the Study of War

WWW.UNDERSTANDINGWAR.ORG

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Russian government sources confirmed that Russia is bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them. Russian federal subject (region) Krasnodar Krai’s Family and Childhood Administration posted about a program under which R

 

 

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Click here to see ISW's interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

 

Russian government sources confirmed that Russia is bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them. Russian federal subject (region) Krasnodar Krai’s Family and Childhood Administration posted about a program under which Russian authorities transferred over 1,000 children from Mariupol to Tyumen, Irkutsk, Kemerov, and Altay Krai where Russian families have adopted them.[1] The Administration stated that over 300 children are still waiting to “meet their new families” and that citizens who decide to adopt these children will be provided with a one-time bonus by the state.[2] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) additionally reported that Russian officials transferred 30 Ukrainian children from Khartsyzk, Ilovaysk, and Zuhres in occupied Donetsk Oblast to Nizhny Novgorod under the guise of having the children participate in youth educational-training programs.[3] The forcible transfer of children of one group to another “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group“ is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[4]

 

Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents. The LNR Internal Ministry reported on August 23 that LNR Internal Ministry personnel conducted joint patrols with consolidated police detachments from the Internal Ministries of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast in Starobilsk, Shchastya, and Stanystia, occupied Luhansk Oblast.[5] The LNR Internal Ministry also reported on August 22 that Rosgvardia (Russian national guard) units conducted security for Russian Flag Day celebrations in Starobilsk.[6] Ukraine‘s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Rosgvardia elements in Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk), Luhansk Oblast are not subordinate to the local LNR forces and that Rosgvardia conducted a search of an LNR official in Dovzhansk.[7] The deployment of Russian security forces to police-occupied areas of Luhansk Oblast supports ISW’s previous assessment that LNR residents and possibly militia forces may be unwilling to continue fighting now that they have reached the Luhansk Oblast borders.[8] Recent intensified Russian efforts to forcibly mobilize residents in Luhansk likely exacerbated this disillusionment, and Russian authorities may be increasing Russian security forces’ presence in Luhansk to suppress any internal instability and/or because they are losing confidence in indigenous Luhansk forces.[9]

 

Russian authorities’ deployment of Rosgvardia elements to security duties in occupied Luhansk Oblast diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had likely exhausted their momentum from territorial gains around Avdiivka and Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast – a very small section of the whole Ukrainian theater – partially due to their inability to allocate sufficient resources to offensive operations.[10] LNR forces’ unwillingness to fight in the war, coupled with Rosgvardia forces’ presence in the rear instead of near the front will likely contribute to continued Russian failures to make significant territorial gains.

 

Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City on August 23 to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on August 24, Ukrainian Independence Day. Social media networks in Donetsk City reported that a strike caused damage to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) administrative building, where DNR Head Denis Pushilin works.[11] Pushilin was reportedly absent at the time of the strike. Russian media framed the attack as a direct Ukrainian strike on a DNR government building, potentially to set information conditions for retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian government buildings on Ukrainian Independence Day.[12] Ukrainian government authorities previously warned government workers in Kyiv to work from home the week of August 22 to 26 and cited concerns that Russian forces will target Ukrainian government assets as part of an extended missile and artillery campaign on Independence Day.[13] Russian-backed head of Kherson’s occupation administration Kirill Stremousov also claimed on August 22 that his administration was preparing for Ukrainian provocations on Independence Day, which could have been conditions-setting for a false-flag attack.[14]

 

Unverifiable sources reported that axis commanders in Ukraine are reporting directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin, bypassing both the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov in the chain of command. Independent Russian outlet Vazhnye Istorii or iStories quoted unnamed sources within the Russian General Staff stating that Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu has lost Putin’s trust after the initial phase of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that failed despite Shoigu’s assurances of a swift victory.[15] The sources claimed that Putin now bypasses Shoigu and interacts directly with Commander of Central Military District Alexander Lapin who oversees the “central” group of forces in Ukraine, and the Commander of the Russian Aerospace Forces Sergey Surovikin who commands the “southern” group of forces. ISW cannot independently verify the validity of this report, but if the report is true, it indicates that Putin is also bypassing Gerasimov.

 

Key Takeaways

• Russian government sources confirmed that Russian authorities are bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them. The forcible transfer of children from one group to another “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
• Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents. This deployment diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes.
• Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on Ukrainian Independence Day.
• Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut, on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City, and southwest of Donetsk City.
• Russian forces made limited gains east of Mykolaiv City and in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast.
• Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to increase one-time enlistment bonuses for recruits, and are likely recruiting personnel with no prior military experience for specialist positions.
• Ukrainian partisan activity continues to disrupt Russian occupation activities.

 

 

 

[CitizenVectron]

 

[mclumber1]

How does that $ compare to what our European allies have sent?  

[CitizenVectron]

29 minutes ago, mclumber1 said:

How does that $ compare to what our European allies have sent?  

 

Add another $3 billion onto the US' number:

 

 

[mclumber1]

France is an embarrassment!

[CitizenVectron]

1 minute ago, mclumber1 said:

France is an embarrassment!

 

Also, obviously you have to add up all the European nations, the graph makes it seem worse off than it is...but yes, even combined, Europe is giving only around 1/2 of what the US is.

[Spork3245]

14 minutes ago, mclumber1 said:

France is an embarrassment!

[Commissar SFLUFAN]

Let's call it what it is: the United States is very much in a state of undeclared war with the Russian Federation.

 

The "proxiness" of this war is largely irrelevant.

[Uaarkson]

6 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

Let's call it what it is: the United States is very much in a state of undeclared war with the Russian Federation.

 

The "proxiness" of this war is largely irrelevant.

Putin played his hand and lost. Even his hopes of destabilizing our democracy seem to fade with each passing day 

[Anathema-]

1 hour ago, mclumber1 said:

How does that $ compare to what our European allies have sent?  

 

Who cares? What matters is how much Putin has sent. 

[Anathema-]

26 minutes ago, Commissar SFLUFAN said:

Let's call it what it is: the United States is very much in a state of undeclared war with the Russian Federation.

 

The "proxiness" of this war is largely irrelevant.

 

It's America's most preferred and best role in 2022: Warfighting-as-a-service